Event Notification Report for December 06, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/05/1999 - 12/06/1999
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36491
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM MORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM MORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/06/1999
Notification Time: 17:48 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/1999
Event Time: 12:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/1999
Notification Time: 17:48 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/1999
Event Time: 12:33 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS ANDREWS (R4)
THOMAS ANDREWS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24-HOUR REPORT REGARDING A VIOLATION OF A LICENSE CONDITION - UNIT 1, TRAIN 'B,' FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR GREATER THAN 7 DAYS
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Carbon samples obtained from the fuel handling building exhaust air system train 'B' failed laboratory tests. The Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8.b.2 and 4.9.12.b.2 limit of 1% for methyl iodide penetration was exceeded. The as-found methyl iodide penetration results were 2.91%. This results in the train 'B' fuel handling building exhaust air system being inoperable since the time that the carbon samples were obtained on November 22, 1999, at 0930 hours [CST]. Thus, the train was inoperable for greater than 7 days, which is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.8. The sample results were received on December 6, 1999."
"This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76, Condition 2.G, for operation or condition prohibited by technical specifications."
The licensee stated that there was nothing unusual or not understood and that all systems functioned as required. The licensee also stated that a 7-day technical specification limiting condition for operation was entered at 1233 CST today as a result of this issue. The licensee plans to replace the charcoal.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Carbon samples obtained from the fuel handling building exhaust air system train 'B' failed laboratory tests. The Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8.b.2 and 4.9.12.b.2 limit of 1% for methyl iodide penetration was exceeded. The as-found methyl iodide penetration results were 2.91%. This results in the train 'B' fuel handling building exhaust air system being inoperable since the time that the carbon samples were obtained on November 22, 1999, at 0930 hours [CST]. Thus, the train was inoperable for greater than 7 days, which is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.8. The sample results were received on December 6, 1999."
"This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76, Condition 2.G, for operation or condition prohibited by technical specifications."
The licensee stated that there was nothing unusual or not understood and that all systems functioned as required. The licensee also stated that a 7-day technical specification limiting condition for operation was entered at 1233 CST today as a result of this issue. The licensee plans to replace the charcoal.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36492
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: REINSBURROW
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: REINSBURROW
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/07/1999
Notification Time: 11:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/1999
Event Time: 15:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/1999
Notification Time: 11:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/1999
Event Time: 15:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
AL BELISLE (R2)
AL BELISLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT
A contract supervisor has tested positive for illegal drug use during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access into the plant protected area has been suspended. Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A contract supervisor has tested positive for illegal drug use during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access into the plant protected area has been suspended. Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36489
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK ABRAMSKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK ABRAMSKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/06/1999
Notification Time: 10:07 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/1999
Event Time: 09:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/1999
Notification Time: 10:07 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/1999
Event Time: 09:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
STEAM LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM DOES NOT MEET LICENSING BASIS.
"The JAF [James A. Fitzpatrick] Licensing Basis states the steam leak detection system will be able to detect a 7-gpm steam leak for areas outside containment. The basis for the 7-gpm criteria is to detect and isolate a leak before the [pipe] crack propagates to a critical point beyond which the pipe is assumed to fail. These values are established for a (representative) 3-inch diameter pipe.
"Preliminary engineering analysis has concluded the JAF steam leak detection system cannot meet this 7-gpm criterion. Preliminary engineering analysis was also performed using 25 gpm as a criterion. 25 gpm is a criterion established by the NSSS vendor for detecting and isolating a leak before the [pipe] crack propagates to a critical point on other BWR designs and which, it is believed, can be technically applied to JAF. The 25-gpm value is also established for a (representative) 3-inch diameter pipe.
"The JAF steam leak detection system is capable of detecting the 25-gpm leak in most areas. For those areas which the system cannot detect a 25-gpm leak, the system is considered operable because in some cases, the actual pipe diameter is greater than 3 inches. It is believed that leakage rate, crack size, and critical crack size are directly proportional. In other cases, the combination of conservative assumptions (initial temperature condition and margin beyond instrument uncertainty) provides a basis for operability."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The JAF [James A. Fitzpatrick] Licensing Basis states the steam leak detection system will be able to detect a 7-gpm steam leak for areas outside containment. The basis for the 7-gpm criteria is to detect and isolate a leak before the [pipe] crack propagates to a critical point beyond which the pipe is assumed to fail. These values are established for a (representative) 3-inch diameter pipe.
"Preliminary engineering analysis has concluded the JAF steam leak detection system cannot meet this 7-gpm criterion. Preliminary engineering analysis was also performed using 25 gpm as a criterion. 25 gpm is a criterion established by the NSSS vendor for detecting and isolating a leak before the [pipe] crack propagates to a critical point on other BWR designs and which, it is believed, can be technically applied to JAF. The 25-gpm value is also established for a (representative) 3-inch diameter pipe.
"The JAF steam leak detection system is capable of detecting the 25-gpm leak in most areas. For those areas which the system cannot detect a 25-gpm leak, the system is considered operable because in some cases, the actual pipe diameter is greater than 3 inches. It is believed that leakage rate, crack size, and critical crack size are directly proportional. In other cases, the combination of conservative assumptions (initial temperature condition and margin beyond instrument uncertainty) provides a basis for operability."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.