Event Notification Report for December 03, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/02/1999 - 12/03/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
3648436485364863648736488
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36484
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SCHOENBACH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SCHOENBACH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/03/1999
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/1999
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PART OF THE RCS LEAK RATE DETECTION SYSTEM MAY BE OUTSIDE DESIGN BASES.
"Callaway was contacted by Wolf Creek [see Event #36481] with a concern regarding the Containment Normal Sump Level Measurement System and Containment Air Cooler Condensate Flow Rate System not [being] capable of performing their design function in all cases. Further review by Callaway determined this concern was also applicable to Callaway Plant. These systems are required per Tech Spec 3.4.6.1b&c for the RCS Leakage Detection Systems. The FSAR states [that] this system meets the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.45, which requires the leakage detection system to be able to detect a 1 gpm leak within 1 hour. The methodology used will not always provide adequate leak detection to ensure a 1 gpm RCS leak will be detected in 1 hour.
"Therefore, Callaway may be operating outside its design bases since the Containment Normal Sump Level Measurement System and Containment Air Cooler Condensate Flow Rate System do not meet this design bases at this time. The licensee is pursuing a software change to bring the systems into compliance with the design bases well within the 30-day action statement requirement of Tech Spec 3.4.6.1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"Callaway was contacted by Wolf Creek [see Event #36481] with a concern regarding the Containment Normal Sump Level Measurement System and Containment Air Cooler Condensate Flow Rate System not [being] capable of performing their design function in all cases. Further review by Callaway determined this concern was also applicable to Callaway Plant. These systems are required per Tech Spec 3.4.6.1b&c for the RCS Leakage Detection Systems. The FSAR states [that] this system meets the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.45, which requires the leakage detection system to be able to detect a 1 gpm leak within 1 hour. The methodology used will not always provide adequate leak detection to ensure a 1 gpm RCS leak will be detected in 1 hour.
"Therefore, Callaway may be operating outside its design bases since the Containment Normal Sump Level Measurement System and Containment Air Cooler Condensate Flow Rate System do not meet this design bases at this time. The licensee is pursuing a software change to bring the systems into compliance with the design bases well within the 30-day action statement requirement of Tech Spec 3.4.6.1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36485
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV. OF RAD. HEALTH
Licensee: JOHNSON CITY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 2
City: JOHNSON CITY State: TN
County:
License #: R-90005-L97
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ARNOTT
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: JOHNSON CITY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 2
City: JOHNSON CITY State: TN
County:
License #: R-90005-L97
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ARNOTT
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/03/1999
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/1999
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KENNETH BARR (R2)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
KENNETH BARR (R2)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
NEW SOURCES FOR BRACHYTHERAPY DEVICE TOO LONG
The State of Tennessee, Division of Radiological Health, received a call from Mountain States Alliance DBA Johnson City Medical Center concerning receipt of three new sources for brachytherapy treatment that did not fit. The three sources, model number CDC.T1 Product Code CDCS.J4, which contain cesium-137, were the same model number, but were 1 millimeter longer than the original sources. The extra length would not allow the shielded storage drawer to close. The medical center called Tennessee to inform them of the problem and called the manufacturer, Amersham, in Illinois. The Division of Radiological Health called the State of Illinois for their information.
The State of Tennessee, Division of Radiological Health, received a call from Mountain States Alliance DBA Johnson City Medical Center concerning receipt of three new sources for brachytherapy treatment that did not fit. The three sources, model number CDC.T1 Product Code CDCS.J4, which contain cesium-137, were the same model number, but were 1 millimeter longer than the original sources. The extra length would not allow the shielded storage drawer to close. The medical center called Tennessee to inform them of the problem and called the manufacturer, Amersham, in Illinois. The Division of Radiological Health called the State of Illinois for their information.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36486
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: E. G. WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: E. G. WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 12/03/1999
Notification Time: 22:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/1999
Event Time: 13:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/1999
Notification Time: 22:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/1999
Event Time: 13:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) - LOSS OF A DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CONTROL
"On 12-3-99, at 1300 CST, the C-333 Seal Exhaust and Wet Air Station pumps were discovered to be hard-piped to the building lube oil supply in violation of NCSE.014. The NCSE (Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation) credits an air gap as a design feature of the lube oil piping to prevent the potential for backflow of uranium contaminated oil into the unit lube oil system.
"In order for a criticality to be possible, significant quantities of oil contaminated with uranium enriched to greater than 1.0 wt. % 235U assay would have to backflow into the unit lube oil system and collect in the Seal Exhaust and Wet Air pumps with the oil reservoir filled above 4.75 inches. In order for oil to backflow, the pump reservoir would need to be filled to absolute capacity, operator level checks would need to fail to detect and correct the overfilled condition, and the oil would need to backflow through multiple closed valves and overcome the elevation head of the oil lines. Therefore, it is not considered credible that contaminated oil intrusion into the unit lube oil system has ever occurred.
"The Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) relies upon an air gap being installed in the oil fill line to the Seal Exhaust and Wet Air pumps to prevent backflow of uranium contaminated oil into the unit lube oil supply system. There are no double contingency arguments for this scenario because the scenario is considered incredible with the installed air gap.
"NCSA (Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval) GEN-01 was immediately initiated on discovery of the problem to ensure nuclear criticality safety implementation. Initiation of a modification package to correct the deficiency was implemented in accordance with NCS engineering approval."
Paducah personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 12-3-99, at 1300 CST, the C-333 Seal Exhaust and Wet Air Station pumps were discovered to be hard-piped to the building lube oil supply in violation of NCSE.014. The NCSE (Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation) credits an air gap as a design feature of the lube oil piping to prevent the potential for backflow of uranium contaminated oil into the unit lube oil system.
"In order for a criticality to be possible, significant quantities of oil contaminated with uranium enriched to greater than 1.0 wt. % 235U assay would have to backflow into the unit lube oil system and collect in the Seal Exhaust and Wet Air pumps with the oil reservoir filled above 4.75 inches. In order for oil to backflow, the pump reservoir would need to be filled to absolute capacity, operator level checks would need to fail to detect and correct the overfilled condition, and the oil would need to backflow through multiple closed valves and overcome the elevation head of the oil lines. Therefore, it is not considered credible that contaminated oil intrusion into the unit lube oil system has ever occurred.
"The Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) relies upon an air gap being installed in the oil fill line to the Seal Exhaust and Wet Air pumps to prevent backflow of uranium contaminated oil into the unit lube oil supply system. There are no double contingency arguments for this scenario because the scenario is considered incredible with the installed air gap.
"NCSA (Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval) GEN-01 was immediately initiated on discovery of the problem to ensure nuclear criticality safety implementation. Initiation of a modification package to correct the deficiency was implemented in accordance with NCS engineering approval."
Paducah personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36487
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL T. MURPHY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL T. MURPHY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/04/1999
Notification Time: 01:17 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/1999
Event Time: 22:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/1999
Notification Time: 01:17 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/1999
Event Time: 22:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ACTUATION OF TWO UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL RADIATION MONITORS DURING PERFORMANCE OF VENTILATION SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE TESTING
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 2230 [CST] during normal Unit 1 [and] 2 [reactor coolant system] sampling, a [high] radiation and [emergency safety feature (ESF)] actuation signal was received on [radiation monitors] 2R-30 and 2R-37 ([auxiliary building] normal exhaust monitors). Normal exhaust was off, and [the auxiliary] building special ventilation system was in operation while performing [surveillance procedure] SP-1172, Monthly Ventilation System Operation. Alarm response procedures were completed for high radiation on 2R-30 [and 2R-]37. [The] duty chemist was informed, the sample was secured, and 2R-30 [and 2R-]37 levels [then] returned normal. At 2255 [CST,] the actuating signals were reset, and all equipment returned to normal."
The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required in response to the high radiation and ESF actuation signal. The cause of the ESF signal is under investigation. At the time of this event notification, both units were operating at 100% power.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1251 ON 12/30/99 BY DALE JOHNSON TO JOLLIFFE * * *
The licensee desires to retract this event because the regulation does not require reporting of an actuation of the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System if it was started by an invalid start signal. The licensee determined that the actuation in this instance was initiated by an invalid start signal.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Burgess.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 2230 [CST] during normal Unit 1 [and] 2 [reactor coolant system] sampling, a [high] radiation and [emergency safety feature (ESF)] actuation signal was received on [radiation monitors] 2R-30 and 2R-37 ([auxiliary building] normal exhaust monitors). Normal exhaust was off, and [the auxiliary] building special ventilation system was in operation while performing [surveillance procedure] SP-1172, Monthly Ventilation System Operation. Alarm response procedures were completed for high radiation on 2R-30 [and 2R-]37. [The] duty chemist was informed, the sample was secured, and 2R-30 [and 2R-]37 levels [then] returned normal. At 2255 [CST,] the actuating signals were reset, and all equipment returned to normal."
The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required in response to the high radiation and ESF actuation signal. The cause of the ESF signal is under investigation. At the time of this event notification, both units were operating at 100% power.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1251 ON 12/30/99 BY DALE JOHNSON TO JOLLIFFE * * *
The licensee desires to retract this event because the regulation does not require reporting of an actuation of the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System if it was started by an invalid start signal. The licensee determined that the actuation in this instance was initiated by an invalid start signal.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Burgess.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36488
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JEFF CASTLE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JEFF CASTLE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 12/04/1999
Notification Time: 11:04 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/1999
Event Time: 16:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/1999
Notification Time: 11:04 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/1999
Event Time: 16:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) - LOSS OF MODERATION CONTROL
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"At 1610 hours on 12/03/99, operations personnel in the X-333 Process Building identified a piece of unattended cascade equipment (33-8-6 stage-1 converter) which had an uncovered 'A'-line flange. This violated requirement #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which states; 'Openings/penetrations made during maintenance activities shall be covered to minimize the potential for moderator collection and moist air exposure when unattended.' This constitutes the loss of one NCS control (moderation) with mass and interaction controls maintained throughout this event. Moderation control was reestablished at 1800 hours under the direction of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) personnel by covering the opening."
"This is reportable under NRC Bulletin 91-01: 24-hour criticality control."
"There was no lose of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological exposure as a result of this event."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: This event has a low safety significance. Although the control credited toward making moderation intrusion unlikely was lost, no actual intrusion of liquid moderation occurred. Interaction and mass controls remained in place."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): For a criticality to occur, additional U-235 would have to be added to the system."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Mass, moderation, and interaction are controlled. The mass and interaction controls were maintained, but moderation control was lost."
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): UO2F2 [was] equal to or less than 3% enriched U-235."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Mass, moderation, and interaction are controlled. The mass and interaction controls ware maintained, but moderation control was lost."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Moderation control was reestablished at 1800 hours [on] 12/03/99 under the direction of NCS personnel by covering the opening."
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and the Department of Energy site representative.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"At 1610 hours on 12/03/99, operations personnel in the X-333 Process Building identified a piece of unattended cascade equipment (33-8-6 stage-1 converter) which had an uncovered 'A'-line flange. This violated requirement #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which states; 'Openings/penetrations made during maintenance activities shall be covered to minimize the potential for moderator collection and moist air exposure when unattended.' This constitutes the loss of one NCS control (moderation) with mass and interaction controls maintained throughout this event. Moderation control was reestablished at 1800 hours under the direction of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) personnel by covering the opening."
"This is reportable under NRC Bulletin 91-01: 24-hour criticality control."
"There was no lose of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological exposure as a result of this event."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: This event has a low safety significance. Although the control credited toward making moderation intrusion unlikely was lost, no actual intrusion of liquid moderation occurred. Interaction and mass controls remained in place."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): For a criticality to occur, additional U-235 would have to be added to the system."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Mass, moderation, and interaction are controlled. The mass and interaction controls were maintained, but moderation control was lost."
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): UO2F2 [was] equal to or less than 3% enriched U-235."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Mass, moderation, and interaction are controlled. The mass and interaction controls ware maintained, but moderation control was lost."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Moderation control was reestablished at 1800 hours [on] 12/03/99 under the direction of NCS personnel by covering the opening."
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and the Department of Energy site representative.