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Event Notification Report for November 24, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/23/1999 - 11/24/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
3646036461

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36460
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2     State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID JENKINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/24/1999
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 11/24/1999
Event Time: 12:32 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/15/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LEN WERT (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) TURBINE TRIPPED ON HIGH EXHAUST PRESSURE DURING POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING.

While rolling the turbine during post-maintenance testing of RCIC system for Unit 2, the turbine tripped on high exhaust pressure. The turbine trip is caused by either one of two instruments sensing a high turbine exhaust pressure (nominally 45 psi). Turbine exhaust pressure was not noted to be abnormally high on the control room instrumentation during this evolution. The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.7, which requires that the licensee return the RCIC system to service within 14 days or to shut down the unit. All emergency core cooling systems are fully operable. Maintenance and engineering personnel are investigating this problem with initial focus on the pressure sensing instrumentation.

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

*************** UPDATE AT 0918 ON 12/15/99 FROM CHARLES ELBERFELD TO LEIGH TROCINE ***************

The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On November 24, 1999, at 0918 hours, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was declared inoperable for scheduled maintenance/testing, which was to include static and dynamic testing of two RCIC system motor-operated valves as well as quarterly system operability surveillance testing required by the plant's technical specifications. The RCIC turbine was started and subsequently secured three times during the maintenance/testing evolution."

"At approximately 1232 hours, the RCIC turbine was started again, and this time the RCIC turbine high exhaust pressure annunciator came in accompanied by a RCIC turbine trip. The RCIC system was considered to be inoperable for reasons that originated from other than maintenance or testing. Based on the information available at the time, the condition was assessed as reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii), and on November 24, 1999, at 1359 hours, notification was made to the NRC (Event No. 36460)."

"This notification was made because RCIC, being a single train system, did not operate properly during maintenance testing of the system. At the time the notification was made, the cause of the malfunction had not been determined. To meet the 4-hour report time limit, the conservative decision was made to report the event."

"Subsequently, it has been determined that the malfunction of the RCIC system was due to a condition which was introduced by the maintenance/testing activities. After the RCIC system had been started and operated in a test mode numerous times, a RCIC turbine exhaust line check valve began to bind to the point that, during the turbine start, the valve binding resulted in a pressure spike in the exhaust line of sufficient magnitude to cause a RCIC turbine trip. This condition was corrected and post-maintenance testing completed satisfactorily. The RCIC system was declared operable, and LCO A2-99-2468 was cancelled at 1639 on November 29, 1999."

"Based on the sequence, this event is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73. NUREG-1022, Revision 1, provides clarification of the reporting requirements contained within 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. Specifically, in discussions associated with events that alone could prevent fulfillment of a safety function, NUREG-1022, Revision 1, Section 3.3.3, provides the following example of a condition that is not reportable under these criteria:

removal of a system or part of a system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or
surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's [technical
specifications] (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its
function)"

"In this case, RCIC was properly removed from service for planned maintenance/testing under LCO A2-99-2468 and was not returned to service until operability was restored. The intent of the qualifying statement in NUREG- 1022 (i.e., unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function) is to ensure that pre-existing operability concerns that are discovered during maintenance activities are reported. It is not intended to require reporting of conditions, introduced by the maintenance/testing activity, that are identified and corrected prior to returning the system to service. This is supported by Example 14 for this section of NUREG-1022. Example 14 deals with a two-train system in which the wrong lubricant is placed in [one] pump during maintenance activities. NUREG-1022 states that this condition would not be reportable if testing would clearly identify the error. This example is similar to the RCIC inoperability in that testing identified the problem prior to returning the system to service."

"Carolina Power & Light Company has determined that this event does not meet the 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73 reporting criteria, and the notification for Event Number 36460 is retracted."

"Supporting information:"

"10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) Four-hour reports. If not reported under paragraphs (a) or (b)(1) of this section, the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases, within four hours of the occurrence of any of the following: (iii) any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) remove residual heat, (C) control the release of radioactive material, or (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident."

"10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) The licensee shall report: (v) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) remove residual heat, (C) control the release of radioactive material, or (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R2DO (Boland).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36461
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RUSS KEARNEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/24/1999
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 11/24/1999
Event Time: 10:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
TRAIN 'A' STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM AGASTAT RELAY SEISMIC RESTRAINT FOUND UNCLIPPED.

During a walkdown of the control room, the licensee discovered that an Agastat relay for the Train 'A' standby liquid control system was not seismically restrained. The seismic restraint for the relay (C41-K002A) was unclipped. Train 'A' of the standby liquid control system was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification 3.1.7 (one train of the standby liquid control system inoperable for more than 7 days or shut down) was entered. The seismic restraint was reclipped, and Train 'A' of the standby liquid control system was declared operable at 1223 EST.

A search of the licensee's records revealed that no work activity had been performed on the relay since initial startup. The licensee has assumed that the Agastat relay has been non-seismically qualified since initial startup which requires a 24-hour notification to the NRC per Operating License 2.C.2, item b (24-hour call to the NRC when the technical specification time limit is exceeded).

The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.