Event Notification Report for November 23, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/22/1999 - 11/23/1999
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36462
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV. OF RADIATION
Licensee: GTS DURATEK WEST
Region: 2
City: MEMPHIS State: TN
County:
License #: R-79171
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA SHULTS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: GTS DURATEK WEST
Region: 2
City: MEMPHIS State: TN
County:
License #: R-79171
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA SHULTS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/24/1999
Notification Time: 14:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/23/1999
Event Time: 16:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/1999
Notification Time: 14:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/23/1999
Event Time: 16:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LEN WERT (R2)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
LEN WERT (R2)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
GTS CONFISCATED TWO FIREFIGHTER'S COATS, PANTS, AND GLOVES AS A PRECAUTION AFTER THEIR CLOTHING TRIGGERED THE PCMs.
The following Agreement State report was faxed to the NRC Operation Center:
"[The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation - Division of Radiological Health] was notified by the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) of a fire at GTS Duratek, a waste facility. Two employees were using a proflame torch to cut a contaminated moisture separator in Building E, Safeshop B. The employees noticed smoke coming out of the dust collection system. This system has three sets of filters: prefilters, canisters, and HEPA. The fire alarm was activated, and the employees were evacuated from the plant. Firefighters responded within 15 minutes. Two firefighters and two GTS employees went into the area. Dry chemicals were used to try to extinguish the fire but were unsuccessful. Water was used to extinguish the fire. A garden hose was used instead of the standard fire hose to minimize the amount of water that could be possibly become contaminated. All monitors functioned properly, and negative pressure was maintained. There were no releases to the environment."
"GTS confiscated the two firefighters' coats, pants, and gloves as a precaution after their clothing triggered the PCMs. A survey of the clothing indicated minimal contamination, and it will be resurveyed after it dries. GTS personnel were not injured nor contaminated. The damage was limited to replacement of filter cartridges. The Radiation Safety Officer issued a stop work order until an investigation is completed."
"These events do not pose a threat to public health and safety but are reportable under 1200-2-5-141(2)(c)4.(ii) of State Regulations for Protection Against Radiation."
"Three local television stations reported the fire. [There was no coverage by] print media."
The Tennessee event report number assigned to this event is TN-99-164.
Call the NRC operations officer for a contact name and telephone number.
The following Agreement State report was faxed to the NRC Operation Center:
"[The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation - Division of Radiological Health] was notified by the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) of a fire at GTS Duratek, a waste facility. Two employees were using a proflame torch to cut a contaminated moisture separator in Building E, Safeshop B. The employees noticed smoke coming out of the dust collection system. This system has three sets of filters: prefilters, canisters, and HEPA. The fire alarm was activated, and the employees were evacuated from the plant. Firefighters responded within 15 minutes. Two firefighters and two GTS employees went into the area. Dry chemicals were used to try to extinguish the fire but were unsuccessful. Water was used to extinguish the fire. A garden hose was used instead of the standard fire hose to minimize the amount of water that could be possibly become contaminated. All monitors functioned properly, and negative pressure was maintained. There were no releases to the environment."
"GTS confiscated the two firefighters' coats, pants, and gloves as a precaution after their clothing triggered the PCMs. A survey of the clothing indicated minimal contamination, and it will be resurveyed after it dries. GTS personnel were not injured nor contaminated. The damage was limited to replacement of filter cartridges. The Radiation Safety Officer issued a stop work order until an investigation is completed."
"These events do not pose a threat to public health and safety but are reportable under 1200-2-5-141(2)(c)4.(ii) of State Regulations for Protection Against Radiation."
"Three local television stations reported the fire. [There was no coverage by] print media."
The Tennessee event report number assigned to this event is TN-99-164.
Call the NRC operations officer for a contact name and telephone number.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36459
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ARDIE KISINGER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ARDIE KISINGER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 11/23/1999
Notification Time: 11:07 [ET]
Event Date: 11/23/1999
Event Time: 10:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/23/1999
Notification Time: 11:07 [ET]
Event Date: 11/23/1999
Event Time: 10:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
CURTIS COWGILL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TRAVERSING INCORE PROBE GUIDE TUBE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CONTROLS DO NOT MEET GENERAL DESIGN CRITERION 56.
The design of the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) guide tube primary containment isolation controls does not meet General Design Criterion 56 for lines penetrating primary containment that communicate directly with the drywell atmosphere. A failure at the TIP Guide Tube Isolation Ball Valve could result in a direct pathway from the Drywell atmosphere to the Reactor Building secondary containment. This constitutes a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant.
The TIP Ball Valve controls are not designed or qualified for nuclear safety-related service and do not meet the requirements of IEEE 279-1971 Criteria for Protection Systems. As a result, there can be no assurance that multiple failures, resulting in undesired opening of any or all of the five guide tube penetrations, would not occur under design basis accident conditions. However, the TIP Ball Valve and TIP Shear Valve actuation circuits remain operable and continue to be capable of operating as containment boundary devices. There remains a high degree of confidence that the TIP Ball Valves will remain isolated, when required, and that the Shear Valves will be capable of isolating when necessary.
The TIP Ball Valve control is powered through the TIP Drive Mechanism. The TIP Drive Mechanism is in the de-energized state (i.e., OFF) during normal operating conditions. The TIP Ball Valve will be further disabled by removing the power source from the Drive Mechanism when the TIP system is not actively in use per Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.1.1.8. The Drive Mechanism power will be restored, under administrative control, when the TIP system is required for use per SR 3.3.1.1.8, and as system maintenance and testing dictate.
This report is applicable to Susquehanna Units 1 and 2.
The design of the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) guide tube primary containment isolation controls does not meet General Design Criterion 56 for lines penetrating primary containment that communicate directly with the drywell atmosphere. A failure at the TIP Guide Tube Isolation Ball Valve could result in a direct pathway from the Drywell atmosphere to the Reactor Building secondary containment. This constitutes a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant.
The TIP Ball Valve controls are not designed or qualified for nuclear safety-related service and do not meet the requirements of IEEE 279-1971 Criteria for Protection Systems. As a result, there can be no assurance that multiple failures, resulting in undesired opening of any or all of the five guide tube penetrations, would not occur under design basis accident conditions. However, the TIP Ball Valve and TIP Shear Valve actuation circuits remain operable and continue to be capable of operating as containment boundary devices. There remains a high degree of confidence that the TIP Ball Valves will remain isolated, when required, and that the Shear Valves will be capable of isolating when necessary.
The TIP Ball Valve control is powered through the TIP Drive Mechanism. The TIP Drive Mechanism is in the de-energized state (i.e., OFF) during normal operating conditions. The TIP Ball Valve will be further disabled by removing the power source from the Drive Mechanism when the TIP system is not actively in use per Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.1.1.8. The Drive Mechanism power will be restored, under administrative control, when the TIP system is required for use per SR 3.3.1.1.8, and as system maintenance and testing dictate.
This report is applicable to Susquehanna Units 1 and 2.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36600
Rep Org: UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
Region: 3
City: MINNEAPOLIS State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERRY STEIGER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
Region: 3
City: MINNEAPOLIS State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERRY STEIGER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 01/18/2000
Notification Time: 11:24 [ET]
Event Date: 11/23/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2000
Notification Time: 11:24 [ET]
Event Date: 11/23/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
MISSING TRITIUM FILLED EXIT SIGNS
The licensee contacted the NRC Operations Center to report the loss of three tritium-filled exit signs, each containing 11.5 Ci, from a dormitory. The signs had initially been found to have been removed late in 1999, and the licensee had contacted the Region III office (G. Wright) at that time. During the semester break, housing personnel searched all student rooms but were unable to locate the signs. All other tritium filled signs have been removed from the dormitory and returned to the vendor.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)
The licensee contacted the NRC Operations Center to report the loss of three tritium-filled exit signs, each containing 11.5 Ci, from a dormitory. The signs had initially been found to have been removed late in 1999, and the licensee had contacted the Region III office (G. Wright) at that time. During the semester break, housing personnel searched all student rooms but were unable to locate the signs. All other tritium filled signs have been removed from the dormitory and returned to the vendor.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)