Event Notification Report for November 18, 1999

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) OIL SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY BREACHED

At approximately 1636 CST on 11/18/99, during replacement of the Unit 2 HPCI Oil Cooler Discharge Temperature Switch by Instrument Maintenance, the pressure boundary of the HPCI oil system was inadvertently breached for a total of approximately five minutes (the work package assumed that the Temperature Switch had a well, but it when the Temperature Switch was removed it was discovered that Switch did not have a well). The breach occurred because adequate documentation was not included in the work package. The switch was successfully replaced and the work document subsequently completed and closed out at 2005 CST on 11/18/99. Upon further evaluation of this work activity by Site Engineering and Operations personnel, it has been determined that the HPCI system would not have been capable of performing its intended design function during the time frame the oil system was breached.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

ESF ACTUATION - INADVERTENT LEVEL ONE ACTUATION WHILE SHUTDOWN

While venting and filling the control rod drive system, an invalid level 1 signal was generated due to an isolation valve leaking past its seat and spiking the transmitters. Because the plant is in a refueling outage, the majority of Division 1 equipment was removed from service, the Division 1 drywell purge compressor did actuate from the invalid signal. Additionally the load shedding and sequencing for Division 1 actuated. The RHR 'A' shutdown cooling pump and service water pump were shed and reloaded. The signal also caused the opening of the RHR 'A' injection valve and started the Division 1 diesel generator. Shutdown cooling flow was never entirely lost as the RHR pump re-started after 5 seconds.

All components and actuations have been reset to their pre-existing configurations.

The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.

UNEXPECTED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE

"After restoration from planned maintenance, the 'A' Diesel Generator was transferred for the 'E' Diesel Generator. When the 'A' diesel Generator control was taken from local to remote, the Operator at the diesel Generator heard air porting from the diesel and it began to start. This was not an expected response. Subsequently, several alarms were received in the Control Room and locally and the diesel appeared to be slowing down. Seconds later it appeared the diesel began to crank up again. At this point, the Operator at the diesel initiated an emergency stop. Investigation into the cause of the auto initiation is ongoing.

"This event is an Unplanned Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature and therefore requires a four hour ENS Notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii)."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.

* * * RETRACTED AT 1008 EST ON 12/10/99 BY DAVID WALSH TO FANGIE JONES * * *

"Following extensive investigation and testing, PP&L has concluded that the unplanned roll of the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) on November 18, 1999 did not constitute an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation. No EDG start signal (automatic or manual) occurred. An individual, internally mis-wired relay resulted in the energizing of a single solenoid valve, allowing cranking air to roll the engine. No other components in the complex EDG starting and control logic system circuitry were actuated. Thus, energization of the minimum actuation logic needed to fulfill the ESF function (i.e., EDG start) did not occur and the EDG ESF function was not unnecessarily challenged. The EDG would have responded properly to a start signal, had one been introduced. As such, the event reported as an unplanned ESF actuation on November 18, 1999 (NRC Event 36452) is hereby retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R1DO (Clifford Anderson).

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - ILL GREEN SEA TURTLE

A GREEN SEA TURTLE WAS TRANSPORTED TO THE SITE MARICULTURE CENTER FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATION. THE TURTLE WAS DETERMINED TO BE IN POOR HEALTH WITH AN ILLNESS NOT ATTRIBUTED TO PLANT OPERATION. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE STATE OF FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY.

THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

UNESCORTED ACCESS GRANTED INAPPROPRIATELY. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. CONTACT THE OPERATIONS CENTER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

MANUAL CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION ISOLATION DUE TO SMOKE

At 1220, operators detected smoke in the main control room, but could not readily locate the source. Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) N-01 was entered, and operators manually initiated a control room isolation. At 1235, a burnt filter capacitor was located in the annunciator channel 'A' inverter. The inverter was deenergized and annunciator power was transferred to the maintenance source. The annunicators remained operable at all times. At 1338, operators exited AOP N-01 after the smoke cleared and recovery operations were completed.

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.