Event Notification Report for November 17, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/16/1999 - 11/17/1999
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36453
Rep Org: MALLINCKRODT MEDICAL
Licensee: MALLINCKRODT MEDICAL
Region: 3
City: MARYLAND HEIGHTS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-04206-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES SCHUH
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: MALLINCKRODT MEDICAL
Region: 3
City: MARYLAND HEIGHTS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-04206-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES SCHUH
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 11/19/1999
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/1999
Event Time: 08:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/1999
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/1999
Event Time: 08:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/1999
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(a)(2) - EXCESSIVE RELEASE
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(a)(2) - EXCESSIVE RELEASE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
ACTIVATION OF RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCY PLAN DUE TO Xe-133 RELEASE
On 11/17/1999, the licensee declared an "Alert" and activated their radiological contingency plan after a release of Xe-133 gas (total activity not reported). The facility was evacuated, and the licensee performed onsite and offsite dose assessments. The maximum calculated dose equivalent due to this release was 1.35 mrem. Five employees were contaminated as a result of this event. The licensee has terminated the "Alert" condition.
On 11/17/1999, the licensee declared an "Alert" and activated their radiological contingency plan after a release of Xe-133 gas (total activity not reported). The facility was evacuated, and the licensee performed onsite and offsite dose assessments. The maximum calculated dose equivalent due to this release was 1.35 mrem. Five employees were contaminated as a result of this event. The licensee has terminated the "Alert" condition.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36447
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JEFF CASTLE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JEFF CASTLE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 11/18/1999
Notification Time: 08:55 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/1999
Event Time: 10:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/1999
Notification Time: 08:55 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/1999
Event Time: 10:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT - NCSA VIOLATION BASED ON SPACING
On 11/17/99, at 1010 hours the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not met. A process operator observed a spacing concern while walking down a Fissile Material Operation in the X-333 Low Assay Withdrawal (LAW) Station. A sample manifold that had been removed from the system was staged less than two feet from other uranium bearing material (UF6 process piping). An F-can used for disposal of used Dalton fitting gaskets was also discovered that violated the spacing requirements of NCSA-PLANT025.A05, which constitutes the loss of one control of the double contingency principal.
This violated requirement #3 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which states in part. Both favorable and unfavorable types or uncomplicated handling (UH) equipment shall be spaced a minimum of 2 feet edge-to-edge from other uranium bearing equipment. This constitutes a loss of control such that only one double contingency control remains in place.
The spacing deficiencies were corrected at 1220 hours under Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer approval.
On 11/17/99, at 1010 hours the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not met. A process operator observed a spacing concern while walking down a Fissile Material Operation in the X-333 Low Assay Withdrawal (LAW) Station. A sample manifold that had been removed from the system was staged less than two feet from other uranium bearing material (UF6 process piping). An F-can used for disposal of used Dalton fitting gaskets was also discovered that violated the spacing requirements of NCSA-PLANT025.A05, which constitutes the loss of one control of the double contingency principal.
This violated requirement #3 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which states in part. Both favorable and unfavorable types or uncomplicated handling (UH) equipment shall be spaced a minimum of 2 feet edge-to-edge from other uranium bearing equipment. This constitutes a loss of control such that only one double contingency control remains in place.
The spacing deficiencies were corrected at 1220 hours under Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer approval.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36445
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ELLIS PFEFFER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ELLIS PFEFFER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 11/17/1999
Notification Time: 06:59 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/1999
Event Time: 04:25 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/1999
Notification Time: 06:59 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/1999
Event Time: 04:25 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) FLOW INDICATOR FAILED LOW.
The RCIC system was declared inoperable due to a flow indicator failing downscale (below zero). The indication was noted while the system was in standby. The plant is in a 14-day limiting condition for operation. Troubleshooting efforts are in progress.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
*************** UPDATE AT 1005 EST ON 11/24/99 FROM TIM ROGERS TO LEIGH TROCINE ***************
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This notification retracts a notification made on 11/17/99 due to RCIC flow indicator down scale. Investigation of the RCIC flow indication and control loop showed the loop was operable. RCIC was operable until removed from service for the investigation."
"The apparent down scale condition of the RCIC flow indicator was the result of instrument drift (zero shift) of the flow transmitter, FT-13-58. The zero shift resulted in an apparent downscale condition at no flow, but [it] would not have prevented the system from providing required flow at nominal operating conditions. The flow transmitter would have provided operations with correct readings during RCIC operation. The flow transmitter was calibrated to required tolerances, and the system [was] returned to normal standby conditions."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Gardner).
The RCIC system was declared inoperable due to a flow indicator failing downscale (below zero). The indication was noted while the system was in standby. The plant is in a 14-day limiting condition for operation. Troubleshooting efforts are in progress.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
*************** UPDATE AT 1005 EST ON 11/24/99 FROM TIM ROGERS TO LEIGH TROCINE ***************
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This notification retracts a notification made on 11/17/99 due to RCIC flow indicator down scale. Investigation of the RCIC flow indication and control loop showed the loop was operable. RCIC was operable until removed from service for the investigation."
"The apparent down scale condition of the RCIC flow indicator was the result of instrument drift (zero shift) of the flow transmitter, FT-13-58. The zero shift resulted in an apparent downscale condition at no flow, but [it] would not have prevented the system from providing required flow at nominal operating conditions. The flow transmitter would have provided operations with correct readings during RCIC operation. The flow transmitter was calibrated to required tolerances, and the system [was] returned to normal standby conditions."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Gardner).