Event Notification Report for November 16, 1999

UNIT 2 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE FOR APPROXIMATELY 1 HOUR DUE TO THE LOSS OF THE PROCESS COMPUTER

"AT 1700 CST ON 11/16/99, OPERATORS IDENTIFIED THAT THE SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) WAS LOST ON THE CONTROL ROOM CRT DISPLAYS. COMPUTER SUPPORT PERSONNEL RESPONDED AND IDENTIFIED THAT THE PROCESS COMPUTER HAD BEEN LOST. STATION PROCEDURE 'REPORTABILITY MANUAL' STATES THAT 'LOSS OF DISPLAY OR PROCESS COMPUTER' REQUIRES [A] 1 HOUR ENS NOTIFICATION.

"AT 1801 CST ON 11/16/99 THE PROCESS COMPUTER SPDS WERE RESTORED."

THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC CONTROL SYSTEM (EHC) MALFUNCTION

"At 1830 CST a Turbine Intercept Valve Fast Closure alarm and an EHC Malfunction Alarm occurred. Intercept Valves 4, 5, and 6 were observed to be closed. Intercept valves 1, 2, and 3 were 50% open. #1 main turbine control valve was oscillating as was 'A' Low Pressure Turbine inlet pressure. Multiple feedwater heaters were lost during the transient. A manual reactor scram was inserted at 1834 CST. All rods fully inserted on the scram. Reactor water level reached -13" following the scram. There were no PCIS, ECCS, or ESF actuations other than the inserted manual scram. The cause of the EHC alarms and valve response is unknown at this time. The forced outage plan will be implemented."

During the transient a high pressure spike was observed, however, no safety relief valves lifted. Decay heat is being removed via the bypass valves to the main condenser. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.

Four-hour Non-Emergency Notification on ECCS Voiding

"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii), PG&E is making a 4-hour non-emergency notification report of a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. On October 26, 1999, at 0015 PDT, PG&E discovered a void in the common suction line for the emergency core cooling (ECCS) pumps. PG&E immediately entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, vented the void, and exited TS 3.0.3. on October 26, 1999, at 0040 PDT. PG&E was in the process of writing a 30 day report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

"On November 16, 1999, at 1045 PST, during a telecommunication between PG&E and the NRC, the NRC stated that the condition should have been reported as a four-hour non-emergency report. PG&E has previously demonstrated that the void condition would not have prevented the safety function of ECCS to recirculate reactor coolant after a loss of coolant accident. However, PG&E also identified that either both centrifugal charging pumps (CCP) or both safety injection pumps (SIP) could have become inoperable due to air binding. The NRC stated that if either SI or the charging system were inoperable, then the safety function of a safety system was not met and the event would be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72. PG&E concluded that even though the overall safety function of post LOCA recirculation was maintained, the analysis showed that either the CCPs or SIPs (both are subsystems) were inoperable and therefore reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii)."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

Hoo Note: Unit 2 was in mode 3 (Hot Standby) on October 26, 1999 when the ECCS voiding was discovered. The Event Date/Time referenced in the header is when the event was determined reportable.

STATE OF NEW YORK NOTIFIED OF MINOR OIL SPILL ONSITE

A NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION (SPILL REPORT 99-09952) DUE TO A 15 GALLON TRANSMISSION FLUID SPILL INTO THE MOAT SURROUNDING THE BACKUP DIESEL AIR COMPRESSOR DURING A RUN OF THE AIR COMPRESSOR FOR TEST. ALL OIL WAS CONTAINED AND CLEANED UP. THE LICENSEE BELIEVES A GASKET FAILED DURING THE TEST RUN.

THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.