Event Notification Report for November 12, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/11/1999 - 11/12/1999
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36432
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 11/12/1999
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/1999
Event Time: 10:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/1999
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/1999
Event Time: 10:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
BOTH SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEMS/EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS (SPDS/ERIS) WERE OUT OF SERVICE FOR LONGER THAN 8 HOURS.
At 1008 on 11/12/99, both SPDS/ERIS systems failed. Maintenance activities were ongoing at the time of failure. In accordance with site procedures, SPDS/ERIS out of service for longer than 8 hours constitutes a loss of emergency response capability. Efforts to restore both SPDS/ERIS systems to service are in progress.
This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(I)(v), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
At 1823, one of the SPDS/ERIS systems was returned to service. The plant did not enter any LCO action statement.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1008 on 11/12/99, both SPDS/ERIS systems failed. Maintenance activities were ongoing at the time of failure. In accordance with site procedures, SPDS/ERIS out of service for longer than 8 hours constitutes a loss of emergency response capability. Efforts to restore both SPDS/ERIS systems to service are in progress.
This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(I)(v), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
At 1823, one of the SPDS/ERIS systems was returned to service. The plant did not enter any LCO action statement.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36428
Rep Org: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER
Licensee: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER
Region: 0
City: State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAT PATTERSON
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER
Region: 0
City: State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAT PATTERSON
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 11/12/1999
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/1999
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(c)(3)(i) - DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(c)(3)(i) - DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DAN HOLODY (R1)
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
VERN HODGE (by fax) (NRR)
DAN HOLODY (R1)
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
VERN HODGE (by fax) (NRR)
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT -
Eaton Cutler-Hammer personnel identified a potential safety concern involving the potential for the malfunction of the Eaton Cutler-Hammer DS and DSL Class 1E circuit breakers due to the improper application of zinc chromate plating to hardened parts during breaker reconditioning.
The failure of hardened parts to maintain their design integrity due to cracking and the potential for the total separation of pieces during a seismic event or normal operation and their subsequent infiltration of the breaker operating assembly could cause the failure of the breaker to perform its design function. In addition, mechanical interlocks may not perform as expected or the breaker may not be able to be charged depending on the actual failure which could occur.
The installed base of the DS style circuit breakers is spread throughout the nuclear industry. However, it is unknown to Eaton Cutler-Hammer specifically which utilities may have had reconditioning performed on their breakers that included plating of parts.
Eaton Cutler-Hammer recommends that a thorough inspection be conducted on all breakers which may have undergone previous reconditioning activities which included plating or replating of component parts. Specific attention should be directed toward spiral pins, which are constructed of hardened spring steel.
See the Eaton Cutler-Hammer Part 21 report for additional details.
Eaton Cutler-Hammer personnel identified a potential safety concern involving the potential for the malfunction of the Eaton Cutler-Hammer DS and DSL Class 1E circuit breakers due to the improper application of zinc chromate plating to hardened parts during breaker reconditioning.
The failure of hardened parts to maintain their design integrity due to cracking and the potential for the total separation of pieces during a seismic event or normal operation and their subsequent infiltration of the breaker operating assembly could cause the failure of the breaker to perform its design function. In addition, mechanical interlocks may not perform as expected or the breaker may not be able to be charged depending on the actual failure which could occur.
The installed base of the DS style circuit breakers is spread throughout the nuclear industry. However, it is unknown to Eaton Cutler-Hammer specifically which utilities may have had reconditioning performed on their breakers that included plating of parts.
Eaton Cutler-Hammer recommends that a thorough inspection be conducted on all breakers which may have undergone previous reconditioning activities which included plating or replating of component parts. Specific attention should be directed toward spiral pins, which are constructed of hardened spring steel.
See the Eaton Cutler-Hammer Part 21 report for additional details.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36429
Rep Org: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER
Licensee: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER
Region: 0
City: State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAT PATTERSON
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER
Region: 0
City: State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAT PATTERSON
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 11/12/1999
Notification Time: 10:09 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/1999
Notification Time: 10:09 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(c)(3)(i) - DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(c)(3)(i) - DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DAN HOLODY (R1)
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
VERN HODGE (by fax) (NRR)
DAN HOLODY (R1)
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
VERN HODGE (by fax) (NRR)
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT -
Eaton Cutler-Hammer personnel identified a potential safety concern involving the potential for the malfunction of the Eaton Cutler-Hammer DS and DSL Class 1E circuit breakers due to the application of incorrect torque values during breaker reconditioning.
Previous industry DS Circuit Breaker Maintenance Guidance originally published by Westinghouse Nuclear Services Division in June 1993 and subsequently revised in March 1999 contained incorrect torque specifications for DS circuit breaker arc chute mounting bolts. Specifically, this guidance as originally published, was in error by a factor of at least 2 (two) regarding the DS 206 and by a factor of at least 3 (three) for the DS 416 when compared to the torque values identified in the Manufacturing Instructions utilized by the OEM (Cutler-Hammer) factory during the manufacturing process. The current revision information while being closer to the proper values is still incorrect. Multiple instances of longitudinal cracks have been observed in the mounting bolt block portion of the arc chute case. In addition, the "O" rings used as a retaining or capture device for the arc chute mounting bolts have been damaged. Pieces of the "O" rings have been found laying around the inside of circuit breakers. The failure of the arc chute case to maintain its design integrity due to cracking and the potential for the total separation of pieces during a seismic event or normal operation and their subsequent infiltration of the breaker operating assembly could cause the failure of the breaker to perform its design function. Likewise, "O" ring failure could result in the same final effect.
The installed base of the DS style circuit breakers is spread throughout the nuclear industry. However, it is unknown to Eaton Cutler-Hammer specifically which utilities may have incorporated this erroneous information into their maintenance programs.
Eaton Cutler-Hammer recommends that a thorough inspection be conducted with the arc chutes properly torqued into place on the circuit breaker. Please note that the cracks may not be visible once the arc chutes have been removed from the breaker. A second inspection should be conducted of the "O" rings following removal of the arc chute from the breaker.
See the Eaton Cutler-Hammer Part 21 report for additional details.
Eaton Cutler-Hammer personnel identified a potential safety concern involving the potential for the malfunction of the Eaton Cutler-Hammer DS and DSL Class 1E circuit breakers due to the application of incorrect torque values during breaker reconditioning.
Previous industry DS Circuit Breaker Maintenance Guidance originally published by Westinghouse Nuclear Services Division in June 1993 and subsequently revised in March 1999 contained incorrect torque specifications for DS circuit breaker arc chute mounting bolts. Specifically, this guidance as originally published, was in error by a factor of at least 2 (two) regarding the DS 206 and by a factor of at least 3 (three) for the DS 416 when compared to the torque values identified in the Manufacturing Instructions utilized by the OEM (Cutler-Hammer) factory during the manufacturing process. The current revision information while being closer to the proper values is still incorrect. Multiple instances of longitudinal cracks have been observed in the mounting bolt block portion of the arc chute case. In addition, the "O" rings used as a retaining or capture device for the arc chute mounting bolts have been damaged. Pieces of the "O" rings have been found laying around the inside of circuit breakers. The failure of the arc chute case to maintain its design integrity due to cracking and the potential for the total separation of pieces during a seismic event or normal operation and their subsequent infiltration of the breaker operating assembly could cause the failure of the breaker to perform its design function. Likewise, "O" ring failure could result in the same final effect.
The installed base of the DS style circuit breakers is spread throughout the nuclear industry. However, it is unknown to Eaton Cutler-Hammer specifically which utilities may have incorporated this erroneous information into their maintenance programs.
Eaton Cutler-Hammer recommends that a thorough inspection be conducted with the arc chutes properly torqued into place on the circuit breaker. Please note that the cracks may not be visible once the arc chutes have been removed from the breaker. A second inspection should be conducted of the "O" rings following removal of the arc chute from the breaker.
See the Eaton Cutler-Hammer Part 21 report for additional details.