Event Notification Report for November 07, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/06/1999 - 11/07/1999
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36410
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JIM McKAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JIM McKAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/07/1999
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/1999
Event Time: 13:48 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/1999
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/1999
Event Time: 13:48 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
JAMES CREED (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILURE OF THE ASSOCIATED ROOM COOLER
"DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS, HPCI HAS BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC SECTION 3.5.A.3.g. HPCI IS INOPERABLE DUE TO THE FAILURE OF SUPPORT AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT, i.e., THE VENTILATION COOLING COIL HAS A MAJOR LEAK REQUIRING ISOLATION OF THE VENTILATION UNIT. HPCI IS IN A 14-DAY LCO."
THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES AS A COURTESY AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1050 EST ON 12/7/99 FROM McKAY TO STEVE SANDIN * * *
"This notification retracts a notification made 11/7/99 due to HPCI being declared inoperable for failure of required auxiliary support equipment. V-AC-8B is one of two room coolers in the HPCI room. V-AC-8B, considered required auxiliary support equipment, was isolated due to a coil leak.
"Further analysis shows that [the] HPCI building room would remain under it's design temperature and operable with no room coolers operable. Investigation following the event determined that the leaking water did not have any effect on HPCI instruments or operability. The leak was repaired, and the system [was] returned to normal standby condition."
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Patrick Hiland).
"DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS, HPCI HAS BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC SECTION 3.5.A.3.g. HPCI IS INOPERABLE DUE TO THE FAILURE OF SUPPORT AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT, i.e., THE VENTILATION COOLING COIL HAS A MAJOR LEAK REQUIRING ISOLATION OF THE VENTILATION UNIT. HPCI IS IN A 14-DAY LCO."
THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES AS A COURTESY AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1050 EST ON 12/7/99 FROM McKAY TO STEVE SANDIN * * *
"This notification retracts a notification made 11/7/99 due to HPCI being declared inoperable for failure of required auxiliary support equipment. V-AC-8B is one of two room coolers in the HPCI room. V-AC-8B, considered required auxiliary support equipment, was isolated due to a coil leak.
"Further analysis shows that [the] HPCI building room would remain under it's design temperature and operable with no room coolers operable. Investigation following the event determined that the leaking water did not have any effect on HPCI instruments or operability. The leak was repaired, and the system [was] returned to normal standby condition."
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Patrick Hiland).
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36411
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KURT SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KURT SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/07/1999
Notification Time: 22:36 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/1999
Event Time: 04:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/1999
Notification Time: 22:36 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/1999
Event Time: 04:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
JAMES CREED (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 NOTIFICATION INVOLVING LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROL (MODERATION)
"On 11/7/99 at 0400 hours, it was discovered that the standard solution used to calibrate X-344, Autoclave #2 conductivity system probes on 11/1/99 was past its shelf life expiration date as stated on the certificate of NIST traceability. This brings into question the operability (AQ-NCS boundary item) of the conductivity system. Autoclave #2 was operated in Mode II (Cylinder Heating) for approximately 30 minutes on 11/2/99. Conductivity system as-found readings were performed on 11/2/99 with a standard solution in date according to NIST requirements, The as-found results were within tolerance indicating that the system would have performed its intended safety function.
"Nuclear Criticality Engineering has determined that the operation of the autoclave, after calibration of the conductivity system with out-dated conductivity standard solution, constitutes the loss of one (1) NCS control (moderation). The other control (Mass) was maintained throughout the duration of this event. The loss of one NCS control is reportable to the NRC as a 24-hour event.
"THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"The safety significance of this event is low. The conductivity probes are required to be operable and are tested semi-annually to verify this. The probes were tested on 11/1/99 however, the solution used to calibrate the probes was out of date. If the probes completely failed a UF6 release in quantities greater than the minimum critical mass would have to occur or a slow release could allow a dilute UO(2)F(2) solution to reach unfavorable geometry storm drains. There was no UF6 release during this event and the autoclave was only operated for 30 minutes in this condition (As-found testing with in-date standard on 11/2/99 revealed that the conductivity system was within allowable tolerance).
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"The potential pathway to criticality is that a slow UF6 release occurs (less than 2 pounds per minute) and the conductivity probes fail to detect it. A release with greater than 2 pounds per minute would isolate the autoclave due to high pressure. This slow release could allow a dilute solution to reach unfavorable geometry storm drains.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"The controlled parameters are mass and moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"The estimated amount of material is zero because there was no release, the maximum enrichment is 5% U235 and the form of material is UF6.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
"The control that was lost was moderation. The conductivity probes were calibrated with a solution that was out of date and therefore the probes were inoperable. The autoclave was operated for 30 minutes in this condition.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"As found readings were completed with an in-date batch of conductivity standard solution. All as-found readings were in acceptable limits. Autoclave #2 is inoperable (since 11/4/99) for reasons other than this event."
The standard solution used to calibrate the conductivity system expired on 10/12/99. Operations has the cause for this incident report under review; however, the preliminary investigation attributes the failure to personnel error.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1434 ON 11/9/99 BY SPAETH TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
Further evaluation has determined that although the autoclave was operated with a conductivity system that was calibrated with an out-of-date buffer solution, as-found data show that the system was operable and capable of performing its safety function as required by the NCSA. Therefore, double contingency controls remained in place throughout this incident.
It should also be noted that the original event description incorrectly stated that moderation and mass were the controlled parameters. The controlled parameters in this case should have been reported as moderation and geometry. Moderation control is based on the integrity of the UF6 cylinder, and geometry control is based on the conductivity system preventing UF6 from entering the unfavorable geometry floor drains.
HOO notified R3DO (Parker) and NMSS (Piccone).
"On 11/7/99 at 0400 hours, it was discovered that the standard solution used to calibrate X-344, Autoclave #2 conductivity system probes on 11/1/99 was past its shelf life expiration date as stated on the certificate of NIST traceability. This brings into question the operability (AQ-NCS boundary item) of the conductivity system. Autoclave #2 was operated in Mode II (Cylinder Heating) for approximately 30 minutes on 11/2/99. Conductivity system as-found readings were performed on 11/2/99 with a standard solution in date according to NIST requirements, The as-found results were within tolerance indicating that the system would have performed its intended safety function.
"Nuclear Criticality Engineering has determined that the operation of the autoclave, after calibration of the conductivity system with out-dated conductivity standard solution, constitutes the loss of one (1) NCS control (moderation). The other control (Mass) was maintained throughout the duration of this event. The loss of one NCS control is reportable to the NRC as a 24-hour event.
"THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"The safety significance of this event is low. The conductivity probes are required to be operable and are tested semi-annually to verify this. The probes were tested on 11/1/99 however, the solution used to calibrate the probes was out of date. If the probes completely failed a UF6 release in quantities greater than the minimum critical mass would have to occur or a slow release could allow a dilute UO(2)F(2) solution to reach unfavorable geometry storm drains. There was no UF6 release during this event and the autoclave was only operated for 30 minutes in this condition (As-found testing with in-date standard on 11/2/99 revealed that the conductivity system was within allowable tolerance).
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"The potential pathway to criticality is that a slow UF6 release occurs (less than 2 pounds per minute) and the conductivity probes fail to detect it. A release with greater than 2 pounds per minute would isolate the autoclave due to high pressure. This slow release could allow a dilute solution to reach unfavorable geometry storm drains.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"The controlled parameters are mass and moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"The estimated amount of material is zero because there was no release, the maximum enrichment is 5% U235 and the form of material is UF6.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
"The control that was lost was moderation. The conductivity probes were calibrated with a solution that was out of date and therefore the probes were inoperable. The autoclave was operated for 30 minutes in this condition.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"As found readings were completed with an in-date batch of conductivity standard solution. All as-found readings were in acceptable limits. Autoclave #2 is inoperable (since 11/4/99) for reasons other than this event."
The standard solution used to calibrate the conductivity system expired on 10/12/99. Operations has the cause for this incident report under review; however, the preliminary investigation attributes the failure to personnel error.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1434 ON 11/9/99 BY SPAETH TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
Further evaluation has determined that although the autoclave was operated with a conductivity system that was calibrated with an out-of-date buffer solution, as-found data show that the system was operable and capable of performing its safety function as required by the NCSA. Therefore, double contingency controls remained in place throughout this incident.
It should also be noted that the original event description incorrectly stated that moderation and mass were the controlled parameters. The controlled parameters in this case should have been reported as moderation and geometry. Moderation control is based on the integrity of the UF6 cylinder, and geometry control is based on the conductivity system preventing UF6 from entering the unfavorable geometry floor drains.
HOO notified R3DO (Parker) and NMSS (Piccone).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36409
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: HUGH NIXON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: HUGH NIXON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/07/1999
Notification Time: 11:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/1999
Event Time: 09:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/1999
Notification Time: 11:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/1999
Event Time: 09:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
JAMES CREED (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN INTEGRITY QUESTIONABLE DURING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT
"CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREENS (ESS RECIRC) ARE IN A DIFFERENT CONFIGURATION THAN PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT. THE SCREEN MATERIAL IS NOT WELDED TO THE SCREEN FRAME FOR AT LEAST ONE THIRD OF IT'S LENGTH. INSTEAD, THE PERIPHERY OF THE SCREEN IS CLAMPED AT NUMEROUS PLACES MAKING THE SCREEN INTEGRITY QUESTIONABLE IN THE EVENT OF A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT FLOW RATES."
THIS CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED DURING THE REFUELING INSPECTION OF THE CONTAINMENT SUMP, AND IT MAY HAVE EXISTED SINCE INITIAL CONSTRUCTION. THE LICENSEE IS PERFORMING FURTHER ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION PRIOR TO RESTART.
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/24/99 AT 1723 EST FROM DAN MALONE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
ALTHOUGH THE CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN ATTACHMENTS ARE NOT CONFIGURED AS WAS EXPECTED, SUBSEQUENT ENGINEERING EVALUATION HAS DETERMINED CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN INTEGRITY IS NOT IMPACTED BY THE AS-FOUND ATTACHING METHOD. THEREFORE, THE CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREENS HAVE BEEN, AND CONTINUE TO BE, OPERABLE WITH RESPECT TO THIS ISSUE.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. THE R3DO (RON GARDNER) WAS NOTIFIED BY THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER.
"CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREENS (ESS RECIRC) ARE IN A DIFFERENT CONFIGURATION THAN PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT. THE SCREEN MATERIAL IS NOT WELDED TO THE SCREEN FRAME FOR AT LEAST ONE THIRD OF IT'S LENGTH. INSTEAD, THE PERIPHERY OF THE SCREEN IS CLAMPED AT NUMEROUS PLACES MAKING THE SCREEN INTEGRITY QUESTIONABLE IN THE EVENT OF A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT FLOW RATES."
THIS CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED DURING THE REFUELING INSPECTION OF THE CONTAINMENT SUMP, AND IT MAY HAVE EXISTED SINCE INITIAL CONSTRUCTION. THE LICENSEE IS PERFORMING FURTHER ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION PRIOR TO RESTART.
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/24/99 AT 1723 EST FROM DAN MALONE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
ALTHOUGH THE CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN ATTACHMENTS ARE NOT CONFIGURED AS WAS EXPECTED, SUBSEQUENT ENGINEERING EVALUATION HAS DETERMINED CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN INTEGRITY IS NOT IMPACTED BY THE AS-FOUND ATTACHING METHOD. THEREFORE, THE CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREENS HAVE BEEN, AND CONTINUE TO BE, OPERABLE WITH RESPECT TO THIS ISSUE.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. THE R3DO (RON GARDNER) WAS NOTIFIED BY THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER.