Event Notification Report for October 26, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/25/1999 - 10/26/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
36356363473634836349363503635236353
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36356
Rep Org: OREGON DEPT. RAD. CONTROL
Licensee: GN NORTHERN
Region: 4
City: GRESHAM State: OR
County:
License #: ORE-90711
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED WRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: GN NORTHERN
Region: 4
City: GRESHAM State: OR
County:
License #: ORE-90711
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED WRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/27/1999
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 20:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/1999
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 20:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY STOLEN FROM THE BACK OF A TRUCK
A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE CONTAINING 9 mCi OF CESIUM-137 AND 44 mCi OF AMERICIUM-241/BERYLLUM WAS CHAINED AND LOCKED IN THE BACK OF A PICKUP TRUCK PARKED AT THE DRIVER'S APARTMENT. WHEN HE CAME OUT OF THE APARTMENT AT 2000, HE FOUND THAT THE GAUGE WAS MISSING. THE GRESHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT. THE GAUGE MODEL NUMBER IS #3430 AND SERIAL NUMBER IS #23852.
GN NORTHERN, LOCATED IN YAKIMA , OR, REPORTED THIS INCIDENT TO THE STATE OF OREGON DEPARTMENT OF RADIATION CONTROL.
A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE CONTAINING 9 mCi OF CESIUM-137 AND 44 mCi OF AMERICIUM-241/BERYLLUM WAS CHAINED AND LOCKED IN THE BACK OF A PICKUP TRUCK PARKED AT THE DRIVER'S APARTMENT. WHEN HE CAME OUT OF THE APARTMENT AT 2000, HE FOUND THAT THE GAUGE WAS MISSING. THE GRESHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT. THE GAUGE MODEL NUMBER IS #3430 AND SERIAL NUMBER IS #23852.
GN NORTHERN, LOCATED IN YAKIMA , OR, REPORTED THIS INCIDENT TO THE STATE OF OREGON DEPARTMENT OF RADIATION CONTROL.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36347
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: LARRY LEES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: LARRY LEES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 03:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 01:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 03:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 01:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
DAVID LOVELESS (R4)
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
CANUPP (FEMA)
PERKINS (DOE)
DAVID LOVELESS (R4)
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
CANUPP (FEMA)
PERKINS (DOE)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNIT 1 REPORTED ENTERING AND EXITING CONDITIONS REQUIRING AN ALERT DECLARATION
"AT 0132CDT, WHEN ATTEMPTING TO TRANSFER STATION LIGHTING, VITAL BUSES 1A3 AND 1A4 WERE DEENERGIZED. [BOTH] DIESEL GENERATORS [DG-1 AND DG-2] WERE IN 'OFF-AUTO' FOR MODE 5 CONDITIONS. WHEN THE DIESEL GENERATORS WERE TAKEN TO 'AUTO,' THE DIESEL GENERATORS AUTOSTARTED AND ENERGIZED VITAL BUSES 1A3 AND 1A4, AT 0134CDT. SHUTDOWN COOLING WAS LOST FOR APPROXIMATELY [TWO] 2 MINUTES AND RESTORED WHEN THE DIESEL GENERATORS WERE PLACED ON THE BUS. SHUTDOWN COOLING TEMPERATURE INDICATED [ZERO] 0 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT TEMPERATURE RISE IN THE [TWO] 2 MINUTES THAT SHUTDOWN COOLING WAS LOST. WHEN THE EMERGENCY PLAN WAS ENTERED, VITAL BUSES WERE ALREADY RE-ENERGIZED. AN ALERT WAS REPORTED UNDER EAL 4.3 BUT NOT DECLARED. OFFSITE POWER WAS ALWAYS AVAILABLE, AND AS OF THIS TIME IS ON VITAL BUS 1A3."
OFFSITE POWER WAS RESTORED TO BUSES 1A3 AND 1A4 AT 0159CDT AND 0209CDT, RESPECTIVELY. INITIAL RCS TEMPERATURE WAS 103 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT. SHUTDOWN COOLING TRAIN "A" WAS PLACED IN-SERVICE TO REPLACE THE OPERATING TRAIN "B" WHICH WAS DEENERGIZED. THE ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE HAS LOOKED AT TRANSFORMERS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE PLANT AND FOUND NO APPARENT FAILURE.
THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED BOTH STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES AND WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
"AT 0132CDT, WHEN ATTEMPTING TO TRANSFER STATION LIGHTING, VITAL BUSES 1A3 AND 1A4 WERE DEENERGIZED. [BOTH] DIESEL GENERATORS [DG-1 AND DG-2] WERE IN 'OFF-AUTO' FOR MODE 5 CONDITIONS. WHEN THE DIESEL GENERATORS WERE TAKEN TO 'AUTO,' THE DIESEL GENERATORS AUTOSTARTED AND ENERGIZED VITAL BUSES 1A3 AND 1A4, AT 0134CDT. SHUTDOWN COOLING WAS LOST FOR APPROXIMATELY [TWO] 2 MINUTES AND RESTORED WHEN THE DIESEL GENERATORS WERE PLACED ON THE BUS. SHUTDOWN COOLING TEMPERATURE INDICATED [ZERO] 0 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT TEMPERATURE RISE IN THE [TWO] 2 MINUTES THAT SHUTDOWN COOLING WAS LOST. WHEN THE EMERGENCY PLAN WAS ENTERED, VITAL BUSES WERE ALREADY RE-ENERGIZED. AN ALERT WAS REPORTED UNDER EAL 4.3 BUT NOT DECLARED. OFFSITE POWER WAS ALWAYS AVAILABLE, AND AS OF THIS TIME IS ON VITAL BUS 1A3."
OFFSITE POWER WAS RESTORED TO BUSES 1A3 AND 1A4 AT 0159CDT AND 0209CDT, RESPECTIVELY. INITIAL RCS TEMPERATURE WAS 103 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT. SHUTDOWN COOLING TRAIN "A" WAS PLACED IN-SERVICE TO REPLACE THE OPERATING TRAIN "B" WHICH WAS DEENERGIZED. THE ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE HAS LOOKED AT TRANSFORMERS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE PLANT AND FOUND NO APPARENT FAILURE.
THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED BOTH STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES AND WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36348
Rep Org: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARTEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARTEN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 10:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 10:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID LEW (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
DAVID LEW (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
THE FBI REPORTED A STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE WAS RECOVERED.
THE FBI RECOVERED A STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE MODEL 3411-B SERIAL # 4311 ON SOUTH CAPITAL ST IN WASHINGTON D.C. IT WAS RECOVERED FROM AN INDIVIDUAL THAT WAS TRYING TO SELL IT.
THE DEVICE APPEARED TO BE INTACT, BUT THE PLASTIC CASE WAS OPEN. THE READINGS MEASURED WAS 1.18 MILLIREM AND THE PAGER-S READ 8. THE FBI HAS THE DEVICE IN ITS POSSESSION.
*** UPDATE ON 10/26/99 @ 1104 BY NELSON TO GOULD ***
THE FBI HAVE LOCATED THE OWNER OF THE STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE. EBA ENGINEERING OF BALTIMORE, MD. IS THE OWNER OF THE DEVICE AND THEY BELIEVE IT WAS STOLEN LAST NIGHT.
THE FBI HAS NOT YET RETURNED THE DEVICE TO THE OWNER.
NOTIFIED REG 1 RDO(LEW) AND NMSS EO(HICKEY)
THE FBI RECOVERED A STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE MODEL 3411-B SERIAL # 4311 ON SOUTH CAPITAL ST IN WASHINGTON D.C. IT WAS RECOVERED FROM AN INDIVIDUAL THAT WAS TRYING TO SELL IT.
THE DEVICE APPEARED TO BE INTACT, BUT THE PLASTIC CASE WAS OPEN. THE READINGS MEASURED WAS 1.18 MILLIREM AND THE PAGER-S READ 8. THE FBI HAS THE DEVICE IN ITS POSSESSION.
*** UPDATE ON 10/26/99 @ 1104 BY NELSON TO GOULD ***
THE FBI HAVE LOCATED THE OWNER OF THE STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE. EBA ENGINEERING OF BALTIMORE, MD. IS THE OWNER OF THE DEVICE AND THEY BELIEVE IT WAS STOLEN LAST NIGHT.
THE FBI HAS NOT YET RETURNED THE DEVICE TO THE OWNER.
NOTIFIED REG 1 RDO(LEW) AND NMSS EO(HICKEY)
Hospital
Event Number: 36349
Rep Org: MERCY HOSPITAL
Licensee: MERCY HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: PORT HURON State: MI
County:
License #: 211563801
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: MERCY HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: PORT HURON State: MI
County:
License #: 211563801
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 03:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 03:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION AT THE MERCY HOSPITAL IN PORT HURON, MI
A PATIENT AT THE HOSPITAL WAS UNDERGOING TREATMENT WITH A WIRE OF IRIDIUM SEEDS(33 @ .923 MILLICURIES/SEED) INSERTED INTO A CATHETER, HOWEVER, THE WIRE CAME OUT PRIOR TO THE TIME IT WAS SCHEDULED TO BE REMOVED. TREATMENT TIME WAS TO BE 48 HOURS BEGINNING @ 1015 ON 10/25/99, HOWEVER THE WIRE CAME OUT @ 0330 ON 10/26/99 RESULTING IN THE PATIENT ONLY RECEIVING 36% TO 38% OF HIS PRESCRIBED TREATMENT. THE NURSE RESPONDED TO THE PATIENT'S CALL WITHIN A MINUTE AND REMOVED THE SOURCES FROM THE PROXIMITY OF THE PATIENT AND CALLED THE AUTHORIZED USER AND THE RSO. HOWEVER ,WHEN THE NURSE ENTERED THE PATIENT'S ROOM, SHE FOUND THE PATIENT HOLDING THE WIRE IN HIS HANDS. THEY CALCULATED THE DOSE TO THE PATIENT'S FINGERS TO BE 5 RADS. THE PATIENT'S PHYSICIAN HAS NOT YET BEEN NOTIFIED.
A PATIENT AT THE HOSPITAL WAS UNDERGOING TREATMENT WITH A WIRE OF IRIDIUM SEEDS(33 @ .923 MILLICURIES/SEED) INSERTED INTO A CATHETER, HOWEVER, THE WIRE CAME OUT PRIOR TO THE TIME IT WAS SCHEDULED TO BE REMOVED. TREATMENT TIME WAS TO BE 48 HOURS BEGINNING @ 1015 ON 10/25/99, HOWEVER THE WIRE CAME OUT @ 0330 ON 10/26/99 RESULTING IN THE PATIENT ONLY RECEIVING 36% TO 38% OF HIS PRESCRIBED TREATMENT. THE NURSE RESPONDED TO THE PATIENT'S CALL WITHIN A MINUTE AND REMOVED THE SOURCES FROM THE PROXIMITY OF THE PATIENT AND CALLED THE AUTHORIZED USER AND THE RSO. HOWEVER ,WHEN THE NURSE ENTERED THE PATIENT'S ROOM, SHE FOUND THE PATIENT HOLDING THE WIRE IN HIS HANDS. THEY CALCULATED THE DOSE TO THE PATIENT'S FINGERS TO BE 5 RADS. THE PATIENT'S PHYSICIAN HAS NOT YET BEEN NOTIFIED.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36350
Rep Org: TECHNOLOGY for ENERGY CORP.
Licensee: TECHNOLOGY for ENREGY CORP.
Region: 2
City: KNOXVILLE State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF LOLLAR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: TECHNOLOGY for ENREGY CORP.
Region: 2
City: KNOXVILLE State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF LOLLAR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 13:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2000
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 13:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
DAVID LEW (R1)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
DAVID LOVELESS (R4)
MARK LESSER (R2)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
DAVID LEW (R1)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
DAVID LOVELESS (R4)
RTV SEALANT USED IN THE TEC VALVE FLOW MONITORING SYSTEM CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED TO MEET THE CONTAINMENT QUALIFICATION CONDITIONS.
10 CFR Part 21 Interim Report submitted by Technology for Energy Corporation (TEC), located in Knoxville, TN.
TEC is reporting a potential defect in Valve Flow Monitoring Systems provided by TEC to the nuclear power industry. Further evaluation is required to determine if the subject condition constitutes a defect as defined in 10CFR21.3.
The RTV-738 sealant used in the TEC Valve Flow Monitoring System cannot be demonstrated to meet the containment qualification conditions.
During discussions with customers concerning the application of RTV-738 sealant at the accelerometer connection to hardline cable, it was discovered that the recommended installation procedure was not specified during the qualification test (1980). One witness to the qualification test confirm that the RTV-738 was present but further stated it had been removed and replaced between qualification stages (aging, irradiation, seismic, and LOCA). Records cannot confirm if this was the test condition, but a set of cable resistance measurements suggest the RTV-738 was removed in order to perform the resistance testing. This uncertainty impacts the qualified life of the Valve Flow Monitoring System since the accelerometer to hardline cable could be exposed to LOCA conditions and the RTV-738 is applied to seal the junction between these components. Internal Corrective Action Report # 0026 has been initiated to track this condition.
After confirming that documentation was not available to conclusively demonstrate the qualified test conditions, a new qualification test plan was generated and has started. This testing is designed to demonstrate if the accelerometer to hardline cable junction can be qualified not only using RTV-738 , but also without RTV-738 and with Raychem heat shrink. Thermal aging is complete without failure and irradiation is now underway. The full test is expected to be completed by December 10, 1999 with the final LOCA testing phase scheduled to start on November 8, 1999.
There have been no reported failures of the accelerometer to hardline cable junction except due to physical damage during outages. Therefore, no action is recommended at this time pending verification of the qualified assembly both with and without the RTV-738 sealant.
* * * UPDATE AT 1508 EST ON 12/13/99 BY RONALD BRENNER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"Technology for Energy Corporation has been advised that accident simulation testing of accelerometer/hardline cable junctions by Wyle Laboratories will not be completed until December 23, 1999. The NRC will be notified of any further change in the status of this testing.
The R1DO (Clifford Anderson), R2DO (Al Belisle), R3DO (Gary Shear), R4DO (Phil Harrell) and NRR Part 21 (Vern Hodge) have been notified.
******* UPDATE AT 1017 ON 03/06/00 VIA FACSIMILE FROM RONALD BRENNER TO LEIGH TROCINE *******
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Technology for Energy Corporation:
"Subject: NRC Event Report Number 36350"
"In an October 26, 1999, Interim Report, Technology for Energy Corporation (TEC) notified the NRC that TEC was evaluating a potential defect involving a hardline cable/accelerometer junction (the Junction) in the TEC Model 1414 Valve Flow Monitoring (VFM) System. The purpose of TEC's evaluation was to determine if the use of Dow Coming RTV738 Sealant (RTV738) at the Junction constituted a defect as defined in 10CFR21.3."
"TEC has completed its final determination of reportability. A full range of thermal aging, radiation aging, seismic testing, and LOCA testing demonstrated that the RTV738 protected the Junction in a harsh environment. Therefore, TEC concludes that the use of the RTV738 in its Model 1414 VFM System has been demonstrated to meet the qualification conditions as delineated in TEC Report Number 517-TR-03, Revision 2, dated December 1, 1981."
"Based on this evaluation, TEC concludes the following:
1. The Junction configuration does not create a substantial safety hazard, and no industry corrective action
is required.
2. There is no evidence of a defect as defined in 10CFR21.3.
3. TEC's evaluation pertaining to subject event is hereby closed."
The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Cranston), R2DO (Wert), R3DO (Lanksbury), R4DO (Loveless), and NRR (Hodge).
(Contact the NRC operations officer for a contact address and telephone number.)
10 CFR Part 21 Interim Report submitted by Technology for Energy Corporation (TEC), located in Knoxville, TN.
TEC is reporting a potential defect in Valve Flow Monitoring Systems provided by TEC to the nuclear power industry. Further evaluation is required to determine if the subject condition constitutes a defect as defined in 10CFR21.3.
The RTV-738 sealant used in the TEC Valve Flow Monitoring System cannot be demonstrated to meet the containment qualification conditions.
During discussions with customers concerning the application of RTV-738 sealant at the accelerometer connection to hardline cable, it was discovered that the recommended installation procedure was not specified during the qualification test (1980). One witness to the qualification test confirm that the RTV-738 was present but further stated it had been removed and replaced between qualification stages (aging, irradiation, seismic, and LOCA). Records cannot confirm if this was the test condition, but a set of cable resistance measurements suggest the RTV-738 was removed in order to perform the resistance testing. This uncertainty impacts the qualified life of the Valve Flow Monitoring System since the accelerometer to hardline cable could be exposed to LOCA conditions and the RTV-738 is applied to seal the junction between these components. Internal Corrective Action Report # 0026 has been initiated to track this condition.
After confirming that documentation was not available to conclusively demonstrate the qualified test conditions, a new qualification test plan was generated and has started. This testing is designed to demonstrate if the accelerometer to hardline cable junction can be qualified not only using RTV-738 , but also without RTV-738 and with Raychem heat shrink. Thermal aging is complete without failure and irradiation is now underway. The full test is expected to be completed by December 10, 1999 with the final LOCA testing phase scheduled to start on November 8, 1999.
There have been no reported failures of the accelerometer to hardline cable junction except due to physical damage during outages. Therefore, no action is recommended at this time pending verification of the qualified assembly both with and without the RTV-738 sealant.
* * * UPDATE AT 1508 EST ON 12/13/99 BY RONALD BRENNER TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"Technology for Energy Corporation has been advised that accident simulation testing of accelerometer/hardline cable junctions by Wyle Laboratories will not be completed until December 23, 1999. The NRC will be notified of any further change in the status of this testing.
The R1DO (Clifford Anderson), R2DO (Al Belisle), R3DO (Gary Shear), R4DO (Phil Harrell) and NRR Part 21 (Vern Hodge) have been notified.
******* UPDATE AT 1017 ON 03/06/00 VIA FACSIMILE FROM RONALD BRENNER TO LEIGH TROCINE *******
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Technology for Energy Corporation:
"Subject: NRC Event Report Number 36350"
"In an October 26, 1999, Interim Report, Technology for Energy Corporation (TEC) notified the NRC that TEC was evaluating a potential defect involving a hardline cable/accelerometer junction (the Junction) in the TEC Model 1414 Valve Flow Monitoring (VFM) System. The purpose of TEC's evaluation was to determine if the use of Dow Coming RTV738 Sealant (RTV738) at the Junction constituted a defect as defined in 10CFR21.3."
"TEC has completed its final determination of reportability. A full range of thermal aging, radiation aging, seismic testing, and LOCA testing demonstrated that the RTV738 protected the Junction in a harsh environment. Therefore, TEC concludes that the use of the RTV738 in its Model 1414 VFM System has been demonstrated to meet the qualification conditions as delineated in TEC Report Number 517-TR-03, Revision 2, dated December 1, 1981."
"Based on this evaluation, TEC concludes the following:
1. The Junction configuration does not create a substantial safety hazard, and no industry corrective action
is required.
2. There is no evidence of a defect as defined in 10CFR21.3.
3. TEC's evaluation pertaining to subject event is hereby closed."
The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Cranston), R2DO (Wert), R3DO (Lanksbury), R4DO (Loveless), and NRR (Hodge).
(Contact the NRC operations officer for a contact address and telephone number.)
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36352
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM MCCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM MCCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 20:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 03:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 20:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 03:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
RECEIVED A CASCADE AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING (CADP) SMOKEHEAD ALARM.
On 10/26/99 at 0359 hours, operations personnel received a CADP smokehead alarm for system 31-3 smoke head S-16 located in Cascade Facility X-330. A valving operation was in progress when the alarm was received. Operations immediately stopped the operation and isolated the piping. Radiological air samples and visual observations did not indicate a release of Uranium Hexafluoride. Smokehead detector can be activated by dust, smoke , Uranium Hexafluoride, etc.
A graphic plot of the firing voltage (voltage drop) from the CADP system of the alarming smokehead gave indication that the CADP system received a valid signal. The certificate holder does not know what activated the smokehead.
This is reportable as an activation of a Q safety system per Safety Analysis Report (SAR) section 6.9 table 6.9-1.
There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
On 10/26/99 at 0359 hours, operations personnel received a CADP smokehead alarm for system 31-3 smoke head S-16 located in Cascade Facility X-330. A valving operation was in progress when the alarm was received. Operations immediately stopped the operation and isolated the piping. Radiological air samples and visual observations did not indicate a release of Uranium Hexafluoride. Smokehead detector can be activated by dust, smoke , Uranium Hexafluoride, etc.
A graphic plot of the firing voltage (voltage drop) from the CADP system of the alarming smokehead gave indication that the CADP system received a valid signal. The certificate holder does not know what activated the smokehead.
This is reportable as an activation of a Q safety system per Safety Analysis Report (SAR) section 6.9 table 6.9-1.
There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate holder.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36353
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MARSHALL FUNKHOUSER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MARSHALL FUNKHOUSER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 22:51 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 19:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/01/1999
Notification Time: 22:51 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/1999
Event Time: 19:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/01/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO ITS MINIMUM FLOW VALVE FAILING TO FULLY OPEN.
Clinton Power Station is presently performing a planned Division-3 (HPCS diesel) outage. The plant has been in a limited condition for operation allowed by technical specifications for this outage since 0230 CDT on 10/26/99. At 1920 CDT on 10/26/99 during performance of a high pressure spray system surveillance the HPCS minimum flow valve (1E22-F012) failed to operate properly. During an open stroke of the minimum flow valve, power was lost due to a breaker trip, and the valve failed to fully open. This valve provides a minimum amount of flow through the system to ensure that the pump does not overheat. The plant's technical specification provides allowances for this condition, but 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) requires that a component failure that could have prevented an independent safety system from performing its function be reported. This system may have failed to perform its safety function due to the failure of this valve; thus, this report is being made. The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.5.1 (14-day limiting condition of operation). The reactor core isolation cooling system and all emergency core cooling systems are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable, and the Division 1 and 2 emergency diesel generators are fully operable.
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/24/99 AT 1907 EST FROM THOMAS J. LANDIN TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
Further evaluation of this condition by engineering has determined that this condition is not reportable. If HPCS was called to function in accordance with its design safety function while the 1E22-F012 minimum flow valve was left open, HPCS injection flow would have been reduced. The engineering evaluation shows that the reduction of HPCS system flow caused by the minimum flow valve open would not compromise the safety function of HPCS system. That is, even with the minimum flow valve wide open, HPCS could still perform its safety function and designed RCIC backup function. Therefore, there is no reportability under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D), and this report is being retracted.
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event retraction by the licensee. The R3DO (Gardner) was notified by the NRC operations officer.
* * * UPDATE ON 12/01/99 AT 1016ET FROM GREG HALVERSON TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
On November 30, 1999, Clinton Power Station (CPS) recognized that the General Electric CPS- specific SAFER/GESTR Sensitivity Study utilized a methodology that is not currently established or approved in the CPS Licensing Basis for evaluating ECCS cooling performance. Upon recognizing that the method was not consistent with the current licensing basis, CPS reassessed the event and determined that the notification should not have been retracted but instead revised to report the outside design basis condition described above. The decision to make the unretraction of this event was made today at 0835CT.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee. NRC Region 3 Duty Officer (Jeff Wright) was notified of this update by the NRC Operation Officer.
Clinton Power Station is presently performing a planned Division-3 (HPCS diesel) outage. The plant has been in a limited condition for operation allowed by technical specifications for this outage since 0230 CDT on 10/26/99. At 1920 CDT on 10/26/99 during performance of a high pressure spray system surveillance the HPCS minimum flow valve (1E22-F012) failed to operate properly. During an open stroke of the minimum flow valve, power was lost due to a breaker trip, and the valve failed to fully open. This valve provides a minimum amount of flow through the system to ensure that the pump does not overheat. The plant's technical specification provides allowances for this condition, but 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) requires that a component failure that could have prevented an independent safety system from performing its function be reported. This system may have failed to perform its safety function due to the failure of this valve; thus, this report is being made. The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.5.1 (14-day limiting condition of operation). The reactor core isolation cooling system and all emergency core cooling systems are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable, and the Division 1 and 2 emergency diesel generators are fully operable.
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/24/99 AT 1907 EST FROM THOMAS J. LANDIN TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
Further evaluation of this condition by engineering has determined that this condition is not reportable. If HPCS was called to function in accordance with its design safety function while the 1E22-F012 minimum flow valve was left open, HPCS injection flow would have been reduced. The engineering evaluation shows that the reduction of HPCS system flow caused by the minimum flow valve open would not compromise the safety function of HPCS system. That is, even with the minimum flow valve wide open, HPCS could still perform its safety function and designed RCIC backup function. Therefore, there is no reportability under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D), and this report is being retracted.
The NRC resident inspector was notified of this event retraction by the licensee. The R3DO (Gardner) was notified by the NRC operations officer.
* * * UPDATE ON 12/01/99 AT 1016ET FROM GREG HALVERSON TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
On November 30, 1999, Clinton Power Station (CPS) recognized that the General Electric CPS- specific SAFER/GESTR Sensitivity Study utilized a methodology that is not currently established or approved in the CPS Licensing Basis for evaluating ECCS cooling performance. Upon recognizing that the method was not consistent with the current licensing basis, CPS reassessed the event and determined that the notification should not have been retracted but instead revised to report the outside design basis condition described above. The decision to make the unretraction of this event was made today at 0835CT.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee. NRC Region 3 Duty Officer (Jeff Wright) was notified of this update by the NRC Operation Officer.