Event Notification Report for October 22, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/21/1999 - 10/22/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
363463632936331363323633436335363363633736374
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36346
Rep Org: RAC SERVICES, INC.
Licensee: RAC SERVICES, INC.
Region: 4
City: WASHINGTON State: OK
County:
License #: UNK
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JUDY GAYANICH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: RAC SERVICES, INC.
Region: 4
City: WASHINGTON State: OK
County:
License #: UNK
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JUDY GAYANICH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/25/1999
Notification Time: 18:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/1999
Notification Time: 18:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
DAVID LOVELESS (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
DAVID LOVELESS (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
IN-LINE DENSIOMETER CONTAINING 200mCi of CESIUM-137 STOLEN THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 22, 1999. POLICE AND SHERIFFS DEPARTMENTS NOTIFIED, REWARD POSTED BY LICENSEE.
The following event was reported by RAC Services, Inc., located in Washington, OK. NRC Region 4 Linda Howell had the licensee call the event into the Operations Center and she remained on line during the event notification.
The In-Line Densiometer was last serviced by Texas Nuclear (TN) Technologies on October 14, 1999 at its office located in Round Rock, Tx (10-15 miles north of Austin). The In-Line Densiometer is 3' in length, 2' wide and weighs about 80 pounds. The In-Line Densiometer is gray in color and its model number is 5192 and its serial number is B6670, contains 200mCi of Cs-137. It is licensed under a general license number (owners did not know/have the license number for the In-Line Densiometer). Rex, one of the callers, said that this In-Line Densiometer did not have any radioactive placards or labels on it (may have been rubbed off). Rex said that he did not have to wear a Film Badge or TLD when carrying the In-Line Densiometer.
In the early morning hours (0300 AM) of 10/21/99 the licensee was heading back on a county road (road runs between 2 county lines) about 8 miles North of Calumet, OK when the trailer blew a tire. The trailer was full of scrap iron painted red and the In-Line Densiometer was chained to the trailer. The In-Line Densiometer was not in its case at this time. The licensee checked on the trailer twice during October 21, 1999 (Thursday) and the last time they saw the trailer was around 2030 hours on 10/21/99. When the licensee arrived around 1230 hours on 10/22/99 (Friday) to replace the flat tire they discovered that the trailer was missing and presumed stolen.
The licensee notified police and one of the county Sheriffs Department that the trailer and In-Line Densiometer had been stolen Friday afternoon (10/22/99). On Monday, October 25, 1999, the licensee notified the other county Sheriffs Department that their In-Line Densiometer had been stolen along with the trailer. The licensee has offered a $5,000 reward for the In-Line Densiometer. The In-Line Densiometer is shipped in a Type "A "package.
A telephone call was placed to Texas Nuclear Technologies and a message was left on their answering machine to either call the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer or call NRC Region 4 Office.
Ask HOO for telephone numbers and address..
The following event was reported by RAC Services, Inc., located in Washington, OK. NRC Region 4 Linda Howell had the licensee call the event into the Operations Center and she remained on line during the event notification.
The In-Line Densiometer was last serviced by Texas Nuclear (TN) Technologies on October 14, 1999 at its office located in Round Rock, Tx (10-15 miles north of Austin). The In-Line Densiometer is 3' in length, 2' wide and weighs about 80 pounds. The In-Line Densiometer is gray in color and its model number is 5192 and its serial number is B6670, contains 200mCi of Cs-137. It is licensed under a general license number (owners did not know/have the license number for the In-Line Densiometer). Rex, one of the callers, said that this In-Line Densiometer did not have any radioactive placards or labels on it (may have been rubbed off). Rex said that he did not have to wear a Film Badge or TLD when carrying the In-Line Densiometer.
In the early morning hours (0300 AM) of 10/21/99 the licensee was heading back on a county road (road runs between 2 county lines) about 8 miles North of Calumet, OK when the trailer blew a tire. The trailer was full of scrap iron painted red and the In-Line Densiometer was chained to the trailer. The In-Line Densiometer was not in its case at this time. The licensee checked on the trailer twice during October 21, 1999 (Thursday) and the last time they saw the trailer was around 2030 hours on 10/21/99. When the licensee arrived around 1230 hours on 10/22/99 (Friday) to replace the flat tire they discovered that the trailer was missing and presumed stolen.
The licensee notified police and one of the county Sheriffs Department that the trailer and In-Line Densiometer had been stolen Friday afternoon (10/22/99). On Monday, October 25, 1999, the licensee notified the other county Sheriffs Department that their In-Line Densiometer had been stolen along with the trailer. The licensee has offered a $5,000 reward for the In-Line Densiometer. The In-Line Densiometer is shipped in a Type "A "package.
A telephone call was placed to Texas Nuclear Technologies and a message was left on their answering machine to either call the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer or call NRC Region 4 Office.
Ask HOO for telephone numbers and address..
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36329
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 06:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 03:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/1999
Notification Time: 06:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 03:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI IS INOPERABLE
WHILE PERFORMING HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM OPERABILITY TEST (OPT-09-2) FOR POST MAINTENANCE TESTING, THE TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE #1-E41-F001 FAILED IN MID-POSITION. THIS OCCURRED WHEN THE VALVE WAS BEING CLOSED TO PLACE THE SYSTEM IN ITS STANDBY LINEUP FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE OPERABILITY TEST. IN ADDITION, THE STEAM SUPPLY DRAIN POT INBOARD AND OUTBOARD DRAIN VALVES #1-E41-F028 AND #1-E41-F029 DID NOT OPERATE AS EXPECTED. THESE VALVES OPEN AND CLOSE IN UNISON AUTOMATICALLY AS DETERMINED BY THE POSITION OF THE TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE #1-E41-F001. CURRENTLY, THE INBOARD DRAIN VALVE #1-E41-F028 IS CLOSED AND THE OUTBOARD DRAIN VALVE #1-E41-F029 IS OPEN.
THE AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM, LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM, CORE SPRAY SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLANT SYSTEM ARE OPERABLE. THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM AND SUSPECTS IT MIGHT BE DUE TO A LOGIC/LIMIT SWITCH CIRCUITRY PROBLEM.
THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IS MINIMAL.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1614ET ON 10/25/99 BY STEVE TABOR TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
BASED ON FURTHER EVALUATION, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE HPCI MALFUNCTION WAS CAUSED BY THE PLANNED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES AND WAS NOT A PRE-EXISTING CONDITION. SPECIFICALLY, THE MALFUNCTION WAS DUE TO A CONDITION WHICH WAS INTRODUCED BY THE REPLACEMENT OF THE HPCI TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID VALVE, E41-C002-SV1 (ie, DELAYED OPERATION OF THE E41-C003-SV1). THIS CONDITION WAS CORRECTED AND POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING COMPLETED SATISFACTORILY. SINCE THIS CONDITION WAS INTRODUCED DURING THE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES WITH THE HPCI SYSTEM PROPERLY REMOVED FROM SERVICE AND IDENTIFIED AS PART OF POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING ACTIVITIES, IT DOES NOT REPRESENT AN EVENT OR CONDITION THAT ALONE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF HPCI. AS SUCH, THIS EVENT IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D). R2DO (K. LANDIS) NOTIFIED.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
WHILE PERFORMING HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM OPERABILITY TEST (OPT-09-2) FOR POST MAINTENANCE TESTING, THE TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE #1-E41-F001 FAILED IN MID-POSITION. THIS OCCURRED WHEN THE VALVE WAS BEING CLOSED TO PLACE THE SYSTEM IN ITS STANDBY LINEUP FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE OPERABILITY TEST. IN ADDITION, THE STEAM SUPPLY DRAIN POT INBOARD AND OUTBOARD DRAIN VALVES #1-E41-F028 AND #1-E41-F029 DID NOT OPERATE AS EXPECTED. THESE VALVES OPEN AND CLOSE IN UNISON AUTOMATICALLY AS DETERMINED BY THE POSITION OF THE TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE #1-E41-F001. CURRENTLY, THE INBOARD DRAIN VALVE #1-E41-F028 IS CLOSED AND THE OUTBOARD DRAIN VALVE #1-E41-F029 IS OPEN.
THE AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM, LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM, CORE SPRAY SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLANT SYSTEM ARE OPERABLE. THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM AND SUSPECTS IT MIGHT BE DUE TO A LOGIC/LIMIT SWITCH CIRCUITRY PROBLEM.
THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IS MINIMAL.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1614ET ON 10/25/99 BY STEVE TABOR TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *
BASED ON FURTHER EVALUATION, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE HPCI MALFUNCTION WAS CAUSED BY THE PLANNED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES AND WAS NOT A PRE-EXISTING CONDITION. SPECIFICALLY, THE MALFUNCTION WAS DUE TO A CONDITION WHICH WAS INTRODUCED BY THE REPLACEMENT OF THE HPCI TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID VALVE, E41-C002-SV1 (ie, DELAYED OPERATION OF THE E41-C003-SV1). THIS CONDITION WAS CORRECTED AND POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING COMPLETED SATISFACTORILY. SINCE THIS CONDITION WAS INTRODUCED DURING THE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES WITH THE HPCI SYSTEM PROPERLY REMOVED FROM SERVICE AND IDENTIFIED AS PART OF POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING ACTIVITIES, IT DOES NOT REPRESENT AN EVENT OR CONDITION THAT ALONE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF THE SAFETY FUNCTION OF HPCI. AS SUCH, THIS EVENT IS REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D). R2DO (K. LANDIS) NOTIFIED.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36331
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 09:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/11/1999
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 09:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/11/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
- Steam Generator #RC-2A in Tech Spec Category C-3; Steam Generator inspections continuing -
At 0922 CDT on 10/22/99, during eddy current testing of the steam generators (SG), it has been determined that 50 tubes in SG #RC-2A require plugging. This places SG #RC-2A in Technical Specification category C-3 per 3.17(2). Forty-four tubes have been determined to require plugging in SG #RC-2B at this time. Eddy current testing is continuing on the SGs. A 100% full length bobbin coil inspection program has been completed in both SGs. A rotating pancake coil probe (Plus Point) is being used to inspect 100% of the top of the hot leg tube sheets for both SGs. One hundred percent of these inspections for the 'A' SG are complete with about 99% evaluated. About 85% are complete on the 'B' SG with the rest expected to be completed on 10/22/99. In addition, a large number of rotating pancake coil probe inspections are being conducted at other locations in the SGs. In-situ pressure testing is being completed where needed. To date, 4 tubes in the 'A' SG and 2 tubes in the 'B' SG have been pressure tested. All 6 of these tubes have passed at 3 times normal operating differential pressure with zero leakage.
This report is conservatively being made prior to completing the SG testing and before completely evaluating the effect on the plant. Further evaluation of reportability will be completed following the completion of the eddy current and in-situ pressure testing of the SGs.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
NOTE: Refer to related Event #36338.
* * * RETRACTION 0923 EST 11/9/1999 FROM MATZKE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"Both steam generators were declared in category C-3 per Technical Specification 3.17 due to having greater than 1% of the inspected tubes being found defective. In steam generator RC-2A, 63 tubes were found defective out of 4901 inspected tubes. In steam generator RC-2B, 57 tubes were found defective out of 4905 inspected tubes.
"The technical specifications contain provisions for plugging tubes when they are found to contain defects that penetrate greater than 40% through-wall. Under this technical specification, it is expected that the plant may operate for a period of time with defects greater than 40% through-wall prior to being found and plugged. The tubes that were found to contain defects were plugged in accordance with technical specifications. The plugging criteria currently in use at Fort Calhoun Station requires that all indications of corrosion detected by eddy current are plugged on detection due to the absence of a qualified technique for sizing indications.
"Following eddy current testing of the steam generator tubes, in-situ pressure testing was performed on certain defects which exceeded the screening criteria. The criteria is based on the potential to exceed the performance criteria for leakage or structural integrity. The leakage performance criterion requires that leakage from all defects within a steam generator shall not exceed 1 gallon per minute under worst case accident differential pressure and the structural integrity performance criterion states that the tubes shall withstand pressure of up to three times normal operating differential pressure without burst. Selected indications which are representative of the worst of the population of indications found in the steam generators successfully passed in-situ pressure tests with no leakage at worst case accident differential pressure and no leakage at three times normal operating differential pressure. There was no detectable primary-to-secondary leakage during operation prior to shutdown for the current refueling outage. Therefore, the steam generators were both available to perform their required safety functions as verified through in-situ pressure testing. Based on the testing performed, the tubes are not considered to have been seriously degraded, the plant was not in an unanalyzed condition, the steam generators would have performed their design basis functions during accident conditions, and this did not constitute a condition outside the plant's operating and emergency procedures.
"The original reports were made conservatively awaiting the completion of the inspection and testing program. The reports are now being retracted based on the complete testing results. The Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specification 30-day plugging report and 6-month inspection report will be submitted as required."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R4DO (Smith).
* * * UPDATE AT 1605 ON 11/11/99 MATZKE TO GOULD * * * UNRETRACT A RETRACTION
As a result of discussions with NRC personnel on 11/10/99, regarding reporting requirements, OPPD is withdrawing the retraction notification of 11/09/99, and changing the basis of the original notification to "voluntary". This is because the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72 were determined to be not applicable, and thus it is not clear that reporting pursuant to the technical specifications is required. However, due to NRC desire for formal, prompt notification of this type of event and the absence of explicit regulatory guidance, reporting on a voluntary basis appears appropriate.
The 30 day steam generator tube plugging report to the NRC pursuant to Technical Specification 3.17(5)(i) has been sent. The six month steam generator inspection report pursuant to Technical Specification 3.17(5)(ii) will be sent as required and will include the information requested in the second sentence of Technical Specification 3.17(5)(iii).
The licensess notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified R4DO (Linda Smith).
At 0922 CDT on 10/22/99, during eddy current testing of the steam generators (SG), it has been determined that 50 tubes in SG #RC-2A require plugging. This places SG #RC-2A in Technical Specification category C-3 per 3.17(2). Forty-four tubes have been determined to require plugging in SG #RC-2B at this time. Eddy current testing is continuing on the SGs. A 100% full length bobbin coil inspection program has been completed in both SGs. A rotating pancake coil probe (Plus Point) is being used to inspect 100% of the top of the hot leg tube sheets for both SGs. One hundred percent of these inspections for the 'A' SG are complete with about 99% evaluated. About 85% are complete on the 'B' SG with the rest expected to be completed on 10/22/99. In addition, a large number of rotating pancake coil probe inspections are being conducted at other locations in the SGs. In-situ pressure testing is being completed where needed. To date, 4 tubes in the 'A' SG and 2 tubes in the 'B' SG have been pressure tested. All 6 of these tubes have passed at 3 times normal operating differential pressure with zero leakage.
This report is conservatively being made prior to completing the SG testing and before completely evaluating the effect on the plant. Further evaluation of reportability will be completed following the completion of the eddy current and in-situ pressure testing of the SGs.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
NOTE: Refer to related Event #36338.
* * * RETRACTION 0923 EST 11/9/1999 FROM MATZKE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"Both steam generators were declared in category C-3 per Technical Specification 3.17 due to having greater than 1% of the inspected tubes being found defective. In steam generator RC-2A, 63 tubes were found defective out of 4901 inspected tubes. In steam generator RC-2B, 57 tubes were found defective out of 4905 inspected tubes.
"The technical specifications contain provisions for plugging tubes when they are found to contain defects that penetrate greater than 40% through-wall. Under this technical specification, it is expected that the plant may operate for a period of time with defects greater than 40% through-wall prior to being found and plugged. The tubes that were found to contain defects were plugged in accordance with technical specifications. The plugging criteria currently in use at Fort Calhoun Station requires that all indications of corrosion detected by eddy current are plugged on detection due to the absence of a qualified technique for sizing indications.
"Following eddy current testing of the steam generator tubes, in-situ pressure testing was performed on certain defects which exceeded the screening criteria. The criteria is based on the potential to exceed the performance criteria for leakage or structural integrity. The leakage performance criterion requires that leakage from all defects within a steam generator shall not exceed 1 gallon per minute under worst case accident differential pressure and the structural integrity performance criterion states that the tubes shall withstand pressure of up to three times normal operating differential pressure without burst. Selected indications which are representative of the worst of the population of indications found in the steam generators successfully passed in-situ pressure tests with no leakage at worst case accident differential pressure and no leakage at three times normal operating differential pressure. There was no detectable primary-to-secondary leakage during operation prior to shutdown for the current refueling outage. Therefore, the steam generators were both available to perform their required safety functions as verified through in-situ pressure testing. Based on the testing performed, the tubes are not considered to have been seriously degraded, the plant was not in an unanalyzed condition, the steam generators would have performed their design basis functions during accident conditions, and this did not constitute a condition outside the plant's operating and emergency procedures.
"The original reports were made conservatively awaiting the completion of the inspection and testing program. The reports are now being retracted based on the complete testing results. The Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specification 30-day plugging report and 6-month inspection report will be submitted as required."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R4DO (Smith).
* * * UPDATE AT 1605 ON 11/11/99 MATZKE TO GOULD * * * UNRETRACT A RETRACTION
As a result of discussions with NRC personnel on 11/10/99, regarding reporting requirements, OPPD is withdrawing the retraction notification of 11/09/99, and changing the basis of the original notification to "voluntary". This is because the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72 were determined to be not applicable, and thus it is not clear that reporting pursuant to the technical specifications is required. However, due to NRC desire for formal, prompt notification of this type of event and the absence of explicit regulatory guidance, reporting on a voluntary basis appears appropriate.
The 30 day steam generator tube plugging report to the NRC pursuant to Technical Specification 3.17(5)(i) has been sent. The six month steam generator inspection report pursuant to Technical Specification 3.17(5)(ii) will be sent as required and will include the information requested in the second sentence of Technical Specification 3.17(5)(iii).
The licensess notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified R4DO (Linda Smith).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36332
Rep Org: ENERTECH
Licensee: ENERTECH
Region: 4
City: BREA State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN DeKLEINE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: ENERTECH
Region: 4
City: BREA State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN DeKLEINE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 15:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 10:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 12/01/1999
Notification Time: 15:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 10:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 12/01/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
VERN HODGE (by fax) (NRR)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
VERN HODGE (by fax) (NRR)
- Potential 10CFR Part 21 Report -
In late 1998 Enertech manufactured and shipped electro-hydraulic actuators for installation on valves to be installed in an overseas plant. Prior to shipment, the valve manufacturer observed pressure switch indication problems during final testing of the valves on which the actuators were installed.
Collective investigation by Burns and Roe, Enertech, including its switch supplier and the valve manufacturer determined the problem resulted from changes in manufacturing methods implemented by the switch supplier. The immediate problem was addressed, the pressure switches were modified using the supplier's previous manufacturing methods, installed on the valves and subsequently passed all final test requirements.
* * * RETRACTION 1715 12/01/1999 FROM LEACHMAN (BY FAX) INPUT BY STRANSKY * * *
"On October 22, 1999 Enertech preliminarily notified the NRC of a potential deficiency in our Commercial Dedication Program. In that correspondence we stated that we had initiated an investigation to determine if previously shipped items which were dedicated by Enertech comply with EPRI and regulatory requirements. We further stated a final report would be issued the end of November 1999. We have performed a programmatic review in an effort to assure dedication activities performed by Enertech are in accordance with known accepted Industry guidelines and requirements. We have evaluated our processes for maintenance of equipment qualification in accordance with established Industry guidelines and found our system is fully compliant. Enertech has concluded a reportable condition does not exist."
Notified NRR (Hodges) via fax.
In late 1998 Enertech manufactured and shipped electro-hydraulic actuators for installation on valves to be installed in an overseas plant. Prior to shipment, the valve manufacturer observed pressure switch indication problems during final testing of the valves on which the actuators were installed.
Collective investigation by Burns and Roe, Enertech, including its switch supplier and the valve manufacturer determined the problem resulted from changes in manufacturing methods implemented by the switch supplier. The immediate problem was addressed, the pressure switches were modified using the supplier's previous manufacturing methods, installed on the valves and subsequently passed all final test requirements.
* * * RETRACTION 1715 12/01/1999 FROM LEACHMAN (BY FAX) INPUT BY STRANSKY * * *
"On October 22, 1999 Enertech preliminarily notified the NRC of a potential deficiency in our Commercial Dedication Program. In that correspondence we stated that we had initiated an investigation to determine if previously shipped items which were dedicated by Enertech comply with EPRI and regulatory requirements. We further stated a final report would be issued the end of November 1999. We have performed a programmatic review in an effort to assure dedication activities performed by Enertech are in accordance with known accepted Industry guidelines and requirements. We have evaluated our processes for maintenance of equipment qualification in accordance with established Industry guidelines and found our system is fully compliant. Enertech has concluded a reportable condition does not exist."
Notified NRR (Hodges) via fax.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36334
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 16:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 16:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
- WATER TIGHT DOOR BETWEEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOMS FOUND IMPROPERLY SHUT -
AT 1615 ON 10/22/99, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT THE WATER TIGHT PERSONNEL ACCESS DOOR BETWEEN THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMP ROOM AND THE MOTOR DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM IN THE TURBINE BUILDING WAS NOT PROPERLY "DOGGED" SHUT. WITH THIS DOOR NOT PROPERLY SEALED SHUT, A STEAM LEAK IN THE TURBINE DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM COULD HAVE DISABLED ALL THREE AFW PUMPS. THE LICENSEE IMMEDIATELY SHUT THE DOOR AND SECURED ALL THE DOOR "DOGS". THE LICENSEE IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION AND HAS DETERMINED THAT THE DOOR HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY SHUT FOR 10 TO 60 MINUTES.
THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
AT 1615 ON 10/22/99, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT THE WATER TIGHT PERSONNEL ACCESS DOOR BETWEEN THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMP ROOM AND THE MOTOR DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM IN THE TURBINE BUILDING WAS NOT PROPERLY "DOGGED" SHUT. WITH THIS DOOR NOT PROPERLY SEALED SHUT, A STEAM LEAK IN THE TURBINE DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM COULD HAVE DISABLED ALL THREE AFW PUMPS. THE LICENSEE IMMEDIATELY SHUT THE DOOR AND SECURED ALL THE DOOR "DOGS". THE LICENSEE IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION AND HAS DETERMINED THAT THE DOOR HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY SHUT FOR 10 TO 60 MINUTES.
THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36335
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARY BETH DePUYDT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARY BETH DePUYDT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 17:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 17:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
- SEVERAL PLANT LOCATIONS DISCOVERED TO BE UNPROTECTED HELB AREAS -
This is a four hour non-emergency notification in accordance 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(1), of a condition which was found while both reactors were shutdown, which, had it been found while the reactors were in operation, could have resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety.
A review of the High Energy Line Break (HELB) Program has identified a number of locations in the plant that had previously been analyzed to be protected from a HELB event, but are now considered to be unprotected HELB areas. These areas contain equipment that is not qualified for the harsh environment resulting from a HELB event in or near these locations, or the jet impingement from a crack in high energy piping near the equipment may damage the components and/or electrical cabling. The equipment potentially affected Includes:
- Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, previously reported in LER 315/99-058-00
- Safety and non-safety related switchgear supplying power to safety-related and safe shutdown components and vital instruments
- Emergency Diesel Generators and associated Ventilation Systems
- Component Cooling Water Pumps, previously reported in LER 316/98-005-00
- Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Batteries
- Cabling and Conduit inside Containment due to jet impingement.
Evaluations of these potential design deficiencies are ongoing.
Both units are currently in no Technical Specifications Operating Mode with both cores offloaded.
See also the following Event Notifications made on HELB issues:
Event #35008 and associated LER 316/98-007-00
Event #35428 and associated LER 315/99-007-00
Event #34515 and associated LER 316/98-005-00.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
This is a four hour non-emergency notification in accordance 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(1), of a condition which was found while both reactors were shutdown, which, had it been found while the reactors were in operation, could have resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety.
A review of the High Energy Line Break (HELB) Program has identified a number of locations in the plant that had previously been analyzed to be protected from a HELB event, but are now considered to be unprotected HELB areas. These areas contain equipment that is not qualified for the harsh environment resulting from a HELB event in or near these locations, or the jet impingement from a crack in high energy piping near the equipment may damage the components and/or electrical cabling. The equipment potentially affected Includes:
- Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, previously reported in LER 315/99-058-00
- Safety and non-safety related switchgear supplying power to safety-related and safe shutdown components and vital instruments
- Emergency Diesel Generators and associated Ventilation Systems
- Component Cooling Water Pumps, previously reported in LER 316/98-005-00
- Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Batteries
- Cabling and Conduit inside Containment due to jet impingement.
Evaluations of these potential design deficiencies are ongoing.
Both units are currently in no Technical Specifications Operating Mode with both cores offloaded.
See also the following Event Notifications made on HELB issues:
Event #35008 and associated LER 316/98-007-00
Event #35428 and associated LER 315/99-007-00
Event #34515 and associated LER 316/98-005-00.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36336
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DON SHEEHAN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DON SHEEHAN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 19:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/10/1999
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 19:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/10/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
- UNIT 1 IS OPERATING OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS IN ITS CURRENT OPERATING CONDITION -
Unit 1 received information from its Engineering Department that Unit 1 is operating outside of design basis in its current operating condition. Specifically, with #11 Reactor Recirc Pump fully isolated, an analysis for thermal shock caused by initiation of #12 Emergency Cooling Loop injecting through #11 Reactor Recirc Loop suction nozzle has not been performed. Mitigating actions include isolating #12 Emergency Cooling Loop, in order to return the plant to an analyzed condition, which requires that the plant enter a 7-Day Technical Specification Shutdown LCO until such time that an analysis for thermal shock has been performed. Engineering Department has reasonable assurance that this analysis will be completed within the 7 days required by Unit 1 Tech Specs.
All other Emergency Core Cooling System equipment is operable.
This event has no effect on Unit 2.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1349 ON 11/10/99 BY KIRCHNER TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
A licensee engineering supporting analysis has been performed which demonstrated that the plant has been operating within the design basis. Therefore, this event has been retracted. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified R1DO (Dan Holody).
Unit 1 received information from its Engineering Department that Unit 1 is operating outside of design basis in its current operating condition. Specifically, with #11 Reactor Recirc Pump fully isolated, an analysis for thermal shock caused by initiation of #12 Emergency Cooling Loop injecting through #11 Reactor Recirc Loop suction nozzle has not been performed. Mitigating actions include isolating #12 Emergency Cooling Loop, in order to return the plant to an analyzed condition, which requires that the plant enter a 7-Day Technical Specification Shutdown LCO until such time that an analysis for thermal shock has been performed. Engineering Department has reasonable assurance that this analysis will be completed within the 7 days required by Unit 1 Tech Specs.
All other Emergency Core Cooling System equipment is operable.
This event has no effect on Unit 2.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1349 ON 11/10/99 BY KIRCHNER TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
A licensee engineering supporting analysis has been performed which demonstrated that the plant has been operating within the design basis. Therefore, this event has been retracted. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified R1DO (Dan Holody).
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36337
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 21:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/1999
Notification Time: 21:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
- NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT -
ERROR MESSAGE ON THE X-705 DECONTAMINATION FACILITY URANIUM RECOVERY EVAPORATOR FLOW DIVERSION SYSTEM CONDUCTIVITY PROBE
At 1750 on 10/22/99, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Approval requirement had not been maintained in the X-705 Decontamination Facility. Upon discovery of an error message on one of three conductivity probes on the Uranium Recovery Evaporator Flow Diversion (UREFD) System, an investigation was initiated to determine cause and impact.
Evidence shows that on 09/28/99, two of three conductivity cells credited as Active Engineered Features of the applicable NCS Approvals were displaying error codes while the evaporator system was in operation. Engineering began an evaluation, but at that time, was not able to provide Reasonable Assurance of Operability for the system. The PSS declared the UREFD System inoperable at that time.
The NCS Evaluation credits the UREFD System as a secondary NCS Control with the physical Integrity of the evaporator tubes as the primary NCS Control. There is no indication that the physical integrity of the evaporator tube was ever compromised.
The conductivity cells and associated flow diversion valves, while not specifically listed in NCS Approval Part 'B' requirements, are still considered "NCS Controls" for the purpose of satisfying the double contingency principle. The loss of the UREFD System is considered a loss of control such that only one double contingency control remained in place.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The safety significance of this event is very low. The inoperability of the UREFD System was a transient event. Available data immediately before and after the suspect time shows the system operating within normal parameters.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
During the brief time the UREFD System was inoperable, an evaporator tube could have ruptured and allowed uranium bearing solution to enter the unfavorable geometry storm drain system. If the concentration of U-235 was high enough and the geometry large enough, the system could have reached a critical configuration.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
Geometry and concentration were controlled. Geometry was controlled within the evaporator tube and the favorable geometry storage tanks. Concentration was controlled in the condensate being discharged into the storm sewer system.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDES PROCESS LIMIT AND PER CENT WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
The UREFD System normally contains uranyl nitrate or nitrate based solutions. The system is analyzed to 100% enriched U-235 solutions, but not more the 10% is expected due to plant certificate limitations. The UREFD System actuates automatically at 1000 mhos which corresponds to 15 ppm uranium. No uranium bearing solution was involved in this event, so no data is available on estimated amount or per cent worst case of critical mass.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The UREFD System monitors the condensate entering the storm sewers to automatically divert the flow to favorable geometry storage tanks in the event the concentration of uranium exceeds 15 ppm. The system is actuated when two of three conductivity probes detect more than 1000 mhos. The system was inoperable for a brief period when two of the three conductivity probes were displaying an error message instead of providing a conductivity reading.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
At the direction of the PSS, the requirements for an NCS Anomalous Condition were initiated and the UREFD System was shut down and placed in safe configuration.
There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
The Certificate Holder notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event.
ERROR MESSAGE ON THE X-705 DECONTAMINATION FACILITY URANIUM RECOVERY EVAPORATOR FLOW DIVERSION SYSTEM CONDUCTIVITY PROBE
At 1750 on 10/22/99, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Approval requirement had not been maintained in the X-705 Decontamination Facility. Upon discovery of an error message on one of three conductivity probes on the Uranium Recovery Evaporator Flow Diversion (UREFD) System, an investigation was initiated to determine cause and impact.
Evidence shows that on 09/28/99, two of three conductivity cells credited as Active Engineered Features of the applicable NCS Approvals were displaying error codes while the evaporator system was in operation. Engineering began an evaluation, but at that time, was not able to provide Reasonable Assurance of Operability for the system. The PSS declared the UREFD System inoperable at that time.
The NCS Evaluation credits the UREFD System as a secondary NCS Control with the physical Integrity of the evaporator tubes as the primary NCS Control. There is no indication that the physical integrity of the evaporator tube was ever compromised.
The conductivity cells and associated flow diversion valves, while not specifically listed in NCS Approval Part 'B' requirements, are still considered "NCS Controls" for the purpose of satisfying the double contingency principle. The loss of the UREFD System is considered a loss of control such that only one double contingency control remained in place.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The safety significance of this event is very low. The inoperability of the UREFD System was a transient event. Available data immediately before and after the suspect time shows the system operating within normal parameters.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
During the brief time the UREFD System was inoperable, an evaporator tube could have ruptured and allowed uranium bearing solution to enter the unfavorable geometry storm drain system. If the concentration of U-235 was high enough and the geometry large enough, the system could have reached a critical configuration.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
Geometry and concentration were controlled. Geometry was controlled within the evaporator tube and the favorable geometry storage tanks. Concentration was controlled in the condensate being discharged into the storm sewer system.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDES PROCESS LIMIT AND PER CENT WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
The UREFD System normally contains uranyl nitrate or nitrate based solutions. The system is analyzed to 100% enriched U-235 solutions, but not more the 10% is expected due to plant certificate limitations. The UREFD System actuates automatically at 1000 mhos which corresponds to 15 ppm uranium. No uranium bearing solution was involved in this event, so no data is available on estimated amount or per cent worst case of critical mass.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The UREFD System monitors the condensate entering the storm sewers to automatically divert the flow to favorable geometry storage tanks in the event the concentration of uranium exceeds 15 ppm. The system is actuated when two of three conductivity probes detect more than 1000 mhos. The system was inoperable for a brief period when two of the three conductivity probes were displaying an error message instead of providing a conductivity reading.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
At the direction of the PSS, the requirements for an NCS Anomalous Condition were initiated and the UREFD System was shut down and placed in safe configuration.
There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
The Certificate Holder notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36374
Rep Org: SCIENTECH, INC.
Licensee: NUSI
Region: 1
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL LOCH
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Licensee: NUSI
Region: 1
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County: MONTGOMERY
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL LOCH
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 10/29/1999
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/23/1999
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
MARK LESSER (R2)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
PART 21 REPORT
SCIENTECH, Inc.'s subsidiary NUS Instruments, Inc. (NUSI) has determined that a Basic Component, supplied to Carolina Power & Light Robinson Nuclear Plant under CP&L purchase orders 8Q3800CM and 9D3530CJ, contains a deviation that is reportable under 10 CFR Part 21. NUSI became aware of this potential deviation on October 22, 1999. SCIENTECH, Inc's. President was informed October 28, 1999. CP&L is aware of this problem and the components have been removed from service. A formal written report will be provided within 30 days of this notification. The components, Low Level Amplifier M/N:RTL850, P/N:NUS-A002PA-1/3, Rev. 1 (1 ea.) and P/N:NUS-A002PA-1, Rev. 0 (12 ea.), were manufactured by NUSI. These components have been supplied to no other utility for use in Safety Related Systems. NUSI has opened a 10 CFR Part 21 file concerning this component and has numbered it as 21-99-01.
***UPDATE ON 11/23/99 AT 1431 ET FROM PAUL LOCH TAKEN BY MACKINNON***
SCIENTECH, Inc.'s subsidiary NUS Instruments, Inc. (NUSI) formal report as a follow up to the above preliminary notice which was reported to the NRC on October 29, 1999.
AFFECTED FACILITY AND PRODUCT WHICH IS NON-COMPLIANT
The facility is Carolina Power & Light, Robinson Plant. The Basic Component is Low Level Amplifier used to process signals from resistance temperature detectors (RTD). Then module is NUS Instruments Model No. RTL850.
SUPPLYING FIRM IDENTIFICATION
NUS Instruments, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of SCIENTECH, Inc.
440 W. Broadway
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECT AND ASSOCIATED SAFETY HAZARD (INCLUDES THE DATE THAT INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED)
NUS Instruments Model RTL850 Low Level Amplifiers were installed in the Robinson Plant at Carolina Power & Light as replacement modules for Hagan Model 118 modules and NUS Instruments Model RTD850 modules due to the RTL's better temperature coefficients. The modules were being used to monitor primary plant temperatures of the cold and hot logs to provide Tave and DeltaT indications for operators. The lead length compensation circuitry on the RTL converter PC board has its polarity inverted. This results in the output of the RTL, when configured in three wire mode, to read higher than it actually should. The magnitude is dependent upon the range configured, the RTD type, the lead resistance and other factors. This error can result in actions being taken to control the reactor based upon incorrect information. NUS Instruments became aware of this problem on October 2, 1999 and a 10 CFR PART 21 log entry was made with the number 21-99-01 assigned to it.
CORRECTIVE ACTION THAT HAS BEEN OR IS BEING TAKEN
Corrective action for the basic component is to replace the internal RTL, Personality Module (RPM, P/N: NUS-B003PA-3) in all RTL modules with a new RPM built to a revised schematic to correct for the inverted polarity in the PC board.
NUS Instruments has verified through testing that the units equipped with revision 3 RPMs properly compensated for lead length resistance and is confident no recurrence of this problem will occur. All affected utilities have been notified of this problem and all affected components have been recalled (including modules in Non-Safety Related applications)
ESTIMATE OF WHEN CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE COMPLETE:
14 January 2000
The R2DO (Len Wert) and NRR (Vern Hodge) were notified by the NRC operations officer.
SCIENTECH, Inc.'s subsidiary NUS Instruments, Inc. (NUSI) has determined that a Basic Component, supplied to Carolina Power & Light Robinson Nuclear Plant under CP&L purchase orders 8Q3800CM and 9D3530CJ, contains a deviation that is reportable under 10 CFR Part 21. NUSI became aware of this potential deviation on October 22, 1999. SCIENTECH, Inc's. President was informed October 28, 1999. CP&L is aware of this problem and the components have been removed from service. A formal written report will be provided within 30 days of this notification. The components, Low Level Amplifier M/N:RTL850, P/N:NUS-A002PA-1/3, Rev. 1 (1 ea.) and P/N:NUS-A002PA-1, Rev. 0 (12 ea.), were manufactured by NUSI. These components have been supplied to no other utility for use in Safety Related Systems. NUSI has opened a 10 CFR Part 21 file concerning this component and has numbered it as 21-99-01.
***UPDATE ON 11/23/99 AT 1431 ET FROM PAUL LOCH TAKEN BY MACKINNON***
SCIENTECH, Inc.'s subsidiary NUS Instruments, Inc. (NUSI) formal report as a follow up to the above preliminary notice which was reported to the NRC on October 29, 1999.
AFFECTED FACILITY AND PRODUCT WHICH IS NON-COMPLIANT
The facility is Carolina Power & Light, Robinson Plant. The Basic Component is Low Level Amplifier used to process signals from resistance temperature detectors (RTD). Then module is NUS Instruments Model No. RTL850.
SUPPLYING FIRM IDENTIFICATION
NUS Instruments, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of SCIENTECH, Inc.
440 W. Broadway
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
DESCRIPTION OF DEFECT AND ASSOCIATED SAFETY HAZARD (INCLUDES THE DATE THAT INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED)
NUS Instruments Model RTL850 Low Level Amplifiers were installed in the Robinson Plant at Carolina Power & Light as replacement modules for Hagan Model 118 modules and NUS Instruments Model RTD850 modules due to the RTL's better temperature coefficients. The modules were being used to monitor primary plant temperatures of the cold and hot logs to provide Tave and DeltaT indications for operators. The lead length compensation circuitry on the RTL converter PC board has its polarity inverted. This results in the output of the RTL, when configured in three wire mode, to read higher than it actually should. The magnitude is dependent upon the range configured, the RTD type, the lead resistance and other factors. This error can result in actions being taken to control the reactor based upon incorrect information. NUS Instruments became aware of this problem on October 2, 1999 and a 10 CFR PART 21 log entry was made with the number 21-99-01 assigned to it.
CORRECTIVE ACTION THAT HAS BEEN OR IS BEING TAKEN
Corrective action for the basic component is to replace the internal RTL, Personality Module (RPM, P/N: NUS-B003PA-3) in all RTL modules with a new RPM built to a revised schematic to correct for the inverted polarity in the PC board.
NUS Instruments has verified through testing that the units equipped with revision 3 RPMs properly compensated for lead length resistance and is confident no recurrence of this problem will occur. All affected utilities have been notified of this problem and all affected components have been recalled (including modules in Non-Safety Related applications)
ESTIMATE OF WHEN CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE COMPLETE:
14 January 2000
The R2DO (Len Wert) and NRR (Vern Hodge) were notified by the NRC operations officer.