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Event Notification Report for October 19, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/18/1999 - 10/19/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
36317363143632036309363113631236393

Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36317
Rep Org: SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP
Licensee: SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP
Region: 1
City: NEWBURGH   State: NY
County:
License #: 04-26507-01MD
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KORY KODIMER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
Event Text
LOSS OF CONTROL OF MATERIAL FOR APPROXIMATELY 15 MINUTES

The licensee reported that, sometime in mid-July, a package containing a Tc-99m generator fell out of a delivery truck and was not controlled for approximately 15 minutes. The package was being shipped from Stamford, CT to the Syncor facility in Newburgh, NY. The package was intact when found. The corporate RSO stated that he had been notified of the event on 10/19/1999. The licensee has discussed this event with NRC Region IV (Cruz).


General Information or Other
Event Number: 36314
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: PRITCHARD ENGINEERING INC
Region: 2
City: STARKVILLE   State: MS
County:
License #: MS-865-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: NELSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 09:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/1999
Event Time: 17:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
SCOTT MOORE EO (NMSS)
Event Text
THE MISSISSIPPI DIVISION OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH REPORTED A LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE.

PRITCHARD ENGINEERING INC. LOST A MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE WHEN IT FELL OUT OF THE BACK OF A TRUCK IN STARKVILLE, MS. THE GAUGE IS A CAMPBELL-PACIFIC MODEL 131 SERIAL # MD80804480 CONTAINING 10 MILLICURIES OF CESIUM-137 AND 50 MILLICURIES OF AMERICIUM-241/BERYLLIUM. THE DEVICE SHOULD BE LOCKED IN AN ORANGE CONTAINER AND ALSO LOCKED AT THE GAUGE HANDLE. THE LOCAL SHERIFF AND MISSISSIPPI HEALTH DEPARTMENT HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. THEY ARE CURRENTLY LOOKING FOR THE DEVICE.


*** UPDATE ON 10/26/99 @ 0945 BY NELSON TO GOULD ***

THE GAUGE WAS FOUND ON 10/25/99 BY A SEARS SERVICEMAN ON A ROAD IN MASHULAVILLE, MS. THE DEVICE WAS INTACT WITH ONLY MINOR DAMAGE TO THE CASE. THE SEARS SERVICEMAN NOTIFIED THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TO LOCATE AND RETURN THE DEVICE TO THE OWNER. THE OWNER TOOK POSSESSION OF THE DEVICE LAST NIGHT.

THE REG 2 RDO(LANDIS) AND NMSS EO(PICCONE) WERE NOTIFIED.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 36320
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: GEOENGINEERS, INC.
Region: 4
City: OLYMPIA   State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0204-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE (via email)
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 15:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/1999
Event Time: 10:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED AT CONSTRUCTION SITE

The following report was submitted by the State of Washington via email:

Licensee: GeoEngineers, Inc.
City and state: Redmond, WA
License number: WN-I0204-1
Type of license: Portable Gauge

Date of Event: October 19, 1999
Location of Event: Olympia, WA

ABSTRACT (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, DOH on-site investigation; media attention): At approximately 10 AM a Troxler model 3430 portable gauge containing 8 millicuries of Cs-137 and 44 millicuries of Am-241 was hit and damaged by a forklift at a construction site in Olympia. The incident occurred while the gauge operator was performing soil tests in the area. After completing one test, the gauge operator moved the gauge over to the side of the road (the source was in the shielded position) and walked about 20 feet away with his back to the gauge. He noticed the forklift entering the area but assumed the driver was going to continue down the road past the gauge. Instead the driver turned around. The operator saw the forklift backing up toward the gauge and shouted but the driver didn't hear him. Immediately after the accident, the gauge operator checked that the probe was in the shielded position, cordoned off the area, and called the licensee's RSO.

The state radiation control program was notified by the RSO and the state responded to the scene. The state verified that both sources were intact inside the undamaged end of the broken gauge housing. Radiation
measurements were made and the gauge was secured in its transport box. The gauge operator did not have the lock for the handle. The survey reading on the outside of the box was normal. The gauge in its transport
box was secured in the back of a pickup truck with chains, cables and padlocks. It was returned immediately to the Redmond office where the RSO will arrange to send it to Troxler.

What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? (WAC? Abnormal Occurrence?)
per NRC handbook SA-300

Activity and Isotope(s) involved: 8 millicuries Cs-137 and 44 millicuries Am-241.

Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (Mfg., Model, serial number):
Damage to Troxler model 3430, serial number 19884, with Cs-137 source sn 75-1078 and Am-241
source sn 47-15372.

Disposition/recovery: Return to manufacturer

Release of activity? NO


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36309
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4     State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/19/1999
Notification Time: 07:36 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/1999
Event Time: 00:49 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
UNEXPECTED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73."

"On October 19, 1999, at approximately 0049 MST, Palo Verde Unit 1 experienced an unexpected start of the Train A Emergency Diesel Generator. In addition, many Train-A components actuated to the post Safety Injection Actuation (SIAS) condition. No safety injection pumps or valves actuated, and no injection into the reactor coolant system occurred. Train A Leg 2-4 (half leg) annunciation alarms were received and immediately cleared for SIAS, Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS), Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS), Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS), Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS-1 and AFAS-2), and Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS). The Train A Emergency Diesel Generator received a start signal, started from a standby condition, and ran unloaded until it was shut down. Based on initial investigation, a Plant Protection System (PPS) power supply anomaly is suspected to be the cause of this condition. The unit is stable with all fuel removed from the reactor vessel to the spent fuel pool during a scheduled refueling outage (U1R8)."

"Palo Verde personnel are investigating the PPS power supplies and power sources to the power supplies. There was no valid actuation signal. The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."

The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required in response to this event; however, the root cause of the event is under investigation. There were no maintenance activities involving the power supplies ongoing at the time of the event. Spent fuel pool cooling was not affected by this transient.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36311
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARCUS ABERNATHY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/19/1999
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
DESIGN ISSUE REGARDING BULK HYDROGEN SUPPLY PIPING IN VICINITY OF RWST

"A licensee audit of the design, operation, and maintenance of the site bulk hydrogen systems identified an apparent deviation from the approved Fire Protection Program. It was observed that a section of hydrogen supply piping located in a safety-related area appeared not to meet the requirements in section C.5.d.5 of Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 (SRP). BTP CMEB 9.5-1, section C.5.d.5 requires that 'hydrogen lines in safety related areas should be either designed to seismic Class I requirements, or sleeved such that the water (i.e. guard) pipe is directly vented to the outside, or equipped with an excess flow valve so that in case of a line break, the hydrogen concentration in the affected areas will not exceed 2%.' An immediate evaluation determined that this is an old design issue and it does not present a current operability issue. In the Catawba SSER No. 2, the staff indicated that the bulk hydrogen system at Catawba was designed in accordance with the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. Other hydrogen lines that are located in safety related areas are either seismically designed or supplied with an excess flow check valve. The piping in question travels from the hydrogen bulk storage house, is buried in the yard, enters the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) trench, and proceeds into the auxiliary building. It appears that the failure to seismically design the hydrogen piping located in the RWST trench was an oversight. Engineering is evaluating appropriate long-term corrective actions.

"The licensee's staff has completed an evaluation and determined that this situation constitutes a deviation from the approved Fire Protection Program as described in the Facility Operating License (FOL) condition 2.C.(8)

"Catawba FOL NPF-35 (Unit 1) and NPP-52 (Unit 2) require a 24-hour notification to the NRC for deviations from the approved Fire Protection Program. The above deviation is being reported under that license condition criterion. A follow-up report describing the cause of the deviation and corrective actions will be submitted to the NRC within 30 days."

The licensee has notified the resident NRC inspector of this issue.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36312
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GLEN MORROW
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/19/1999
Notification Time: 19:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/1999
Event Time: 17:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(iv) - ECCS INJECTION 50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
MANUAL ECCS INJECTION INTO REACTOR VESSEL

The licensee manually initiated the "2B" core spray subsystem to restore reactor vessel water level after observing a decrease in reactor vessel water level. At the time of the event, the reactor vessel was flooded up above the main steam lines. The licensee had removed the "B" main steam line plug in order to perform some refueling outage activities when the level decrease was observed. Level decreased approximately six inches before recovering.

Reactor vessel water level was restored to normal and the "B" main steam line plug was reinstalled. Upon investigation, the licensee discovered that the "2E" electromatic relief valve (ERV) was open, creating a flow path from the main steam line to the suppression pool. The ERV was closed by the licensee. The licensee is currently investigating the cause of the ERV opening.

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36393
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3     State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DUANE BISTODEAU
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 11/03/1999
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/1999
Event Time: 17:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
- REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR EIGHT DAYS -

At 1720 CDT on 10/19/99, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System was removed from service for a surveillance test and corrective maintenance. During post maintenance testing following corrective maintenance, a problem was identified that may have made the RCIC System inoperable. Subsequently, the RCIC System was repaired, tested, returned to service and operable status at 0135 CDT on 10/27/99. This event was originally determined to be not reportable to the NRC. However, at 1500 CST on 11/03/99, plant management decided to report this event to the NRC.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.