Skip to main content

Event Notification Report for October 08, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/07/1999 - 10/08/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
362743627536276

Power Reactor
Event Number: 36274
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: THOMAS HOWARD
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/08/1999
Notification Time: 09:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/1999
Event Time: 09:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/1999
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
MIKE TSCHILTZ (EDO)
BURNICE CARR (FEMA)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 24 Power Operation 24 Power Operation
Event Text
DECLARATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT VARIOUS AREAS OF THE PLANT ARE INACCESSIBLE DUE TO A HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"[At 0905 on 10/08/99, an] Unusual Event [was] declared due to Cardox fire system discharge ([carbon dioxide]) in [the Administration Building at 0815]. Various levels of the plant are being considered inaccessible until [oxygen] levels are verified [to be] satisfactory. [Carbon dioxide] venting is in progress. [There is no] effect on plant operation at [the] present time[, and no effect is currently] anticipated."

"[The] preliminary cause of discharge of [carbon dioxide] appears to be a switch malfunction. No fire was detected."

The licensee stated that the Cardox fire system has both a 30-second siren and flashing red lights prior to the discharge of carbon dioxide in order to allow personnel to evacuate the affected areas. There were no injuries reported, and carbon dioxide venting is currently in progress. The Administration Building and some adjacent areas of the turbine building were affected.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector as well as state and local agencies. The licensee also plans to issue a media/press release.

* * * UPDATE 1219 10/8/1999 FROM MATTESON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

The Unusual Event was terminated at 1210 EDT. The NRC resident inspector has been informed. Notified R1DO (Kinneman), NRR (Marsh), IRO (Miller), FEMA (Carr).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36275
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CALVIN WARD
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/08/1999
Notification Time: 13:17 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/1999
Event Time: 11:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REQUIRED BY NPDES PERMIT

The licensee contacted the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding the discharge of effluent to the Atlantic Ocean. The site settling ponds were pumped down due to high water levels caused by recent rain. The site National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit requires that the licensee contact the state DEP regarding this discharge. No release limits were exceeded. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36276
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1     State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS GUMBERT
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/08/1999
Notification Time: 16:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/1999
Event Time: 15:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii) - DEGRAD COND DURING OP
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R ISSUE REGARDING CABLE SEPARATION

The following is text of a (rather lengthy) facsimile submitted by the licensee:

"1. Description of Condition

"During a review of the Salem Post-fire Safe Shutdown Analysis a concern was identified with the cable routing of the pressurizer PORV and block valves. The cable for each PORV and its associated block valve is routed in the same cable tray inside the containment. The pressurizer PORVs and block valves are considered a high/low pressure interface point for 10CFR50 Appendix R analysis. Therefore each PORV block valve combination is considered as redundant components that require proper separation in accordance with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to prevent hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground from causing spurious operation of these valves.

"In the event of a postulated fire inside containment a block valve could lose power; since this valve is in the open position it would not be able to be closed. A hot short could also cause the PORV to spuriously open. These two occurrences together would result in the loss of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory control. This condition does not satisfy the 10CFR50 Appendix R performance goal of inventory control for post-fire Safe Shutdown (SSD).

"A second similar concern exists with the PORVs and block valves for Alternate Shutdown (ASD) capability. ASD is implemented in the event of a fire in the Control Room, Relay Room or the ceiling of the 460V Switchgear room. A fire in the above areas could lead to the spurious operation of the PORVs. Operators implement the ASD methodology in accordance with procedures S1(2).OP-AB.CR-0002. Spurious operation of the PORV could occur prior to the operators reaching the step in the ASD to operate the local switch for the block valve and close the block valve. In the current procedure, it takes approximately 20 minutes to reach the step to operate the transfer switch for the block valve. Prior to closing the block valve, there would be a loss of RCS inventory control due to the spurious operation of the PORV.

"2. Impact Statement

"For design basis accident mitigation (UFSAR Chapter 15), the PORV and block valves are not impacted and remain operable. Currently, the PORV and block valve configuration does not meet the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R and therefore is outside the design basis of the plant for Appendix R. This item is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72.

"The inadvertent opening of the PORV and block valve would result in RCS depressurization. For the block valve and PORV to open the following needs to occur:

"* an external or internal "hot short" of the PORV solenoid DC control circuitry which causes the energization of the solenoid, coincident with the complete loss of the power supply cable to the PORV block valve, which prevents remote operation (closure) of the block valve, is a very low probability event.

"* The control cables have external insulation, with an armored shield, with multiple individual insulated conductors within the shield. In order for the internal hot short to occur, the external fire would have to burn through the cable external jacket, and shielding, and then selectively affect specific DC conductors within the cable to enable conductors of the correct polarity to come in contact in such a manner to energize the solenoid valve and open the PORV. The same external fire would also have to damage the power supply to the block valve to preclude operation, as stated above.

"* In order for the external hot short to occur, another cable in the same raceway system, which is also of a shielded construction, would have to have one of its internal conductors affected by the external fire affect the conductors of the PORV control circuit, which is contained in its own shielded cable. This is an even more unlikely scenario.

"The probability of a fire, of a magnitude that would cause the above to occur inside containment is extremely low for the following reasons.

"* The main source of combustion inside containment is the oil in the RCP motor. However, the RCP motor is not in the vicinity of the affected cable trays. The RCP motor is equipped with detection and suppression system. An oil collection system is provided in the event of the leakage.

"* The introduction of transient combustible materials into the containment is extremely remote due to limited containment access during operation.

"* The RCP motor oil level has a low-level alarm in the control room. Any inadvertent oil loss would be detected and corrected early. This reduces the probability of lire due to the oil leakage.

"* The cables in the affected cable tray are made up of self-extinguishing cable material. This will minimize fire propagation along the cables.

"* Containment volume is large. The probability of a plume to occur to affect the cable trays is extremely low.

"* A qualitative risk assessment shows that the probability of fire inside containment, in the area of concern, is extremely low.

"3. Cause of Occurrence

"The above concerns were not properly evaluated during development of the safe shutdown analysis.

"4. Immediate Corrective Actions

"* Establish appropriate compensatory measures for the Alternate Shutdown Area in accordance with the fire protection program.

"* A containment loose debris inspection is performed following each containment entry during Modes 1-4.

"* Following any containment entry, a walkdown will be performed to ensure that there are no combustible loads in the vicinity of the affected cable trays.

"* Ensure operating shifts are alerted that spurious operation of the PORVs may be caused by a fire inside containment.

"* Additional corrective actions are being evaluated and will be implemented as necessary.

"5. Long Term Corrective Actions

"* Prior to startup from the next refueling outage, evaluate potential plant modifications and/or licensing/design basis changes. Actions will be implemented as required to address the PORV and block valve spurious operation concern."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.