Event Notification Report for October 06, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/05/1999 - 10/06/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
362703652436264362663626736268
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36270
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/07/1999
Notification Time: 01:03 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 21:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/1999
Notification Time: 01:03 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 21:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (4-HOUR REPORT)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"On 10/06/99 at 2110 hrs, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified by NCS Engineering, that an Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being maintained in the X-333 process building during a maintenance evolution. Maintenance personnel, while working on seal exhaust pumps, removed the filter from the demister without prior non-destructive analysis (NDA) being completed."
"Requirement #12 of NCSA-033_016.AO1 states in part [that] seal exhaust pumps/demisters shall be drained of oil then NDA measured for U-235 content prior to removal."
"At the direction of the [PSS,] the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were initiated, and the area was boundaried off."
"There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: An NDA measurement was not obtained; however, the demister was drained of oil. Therefore, an unsafe mass is not anticipated. The maximum enrichment for the seal exhaust is 3% U-235. Spacing was maintained; therefore, the overall safety [significance] is low. (At the enrichment involved, the component is a favorable geometry)."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): In order for criticality to occur, a spacing violation would have to occur as well as a failure to NDA the equipment prior to removal."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Spacing [was] maintained. Mass [was] assumed [to be] lost."
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): The equipment removed was only a part [of] the seal exhaust pump demister; therefore, a large mass is not anticipated. The enrichment was at 3% in the form of UF4 with oil."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: NDA was not performed on seal demisters prior to removal. The NDA is required to demonstrate that the component is less than a safe mass. Spacing between components was maintained."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: At the direction of the [PSS,] the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were initiated, and the [area was] boundaried off. The filters removed will be scheduled to have NDA measurements performed."
Portsmouth personnel stated that this event was a 4-hour notification because it involved a loss of one of two criticality controls without re-establishment within 4 hours.
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and the Department of Energy site representative.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"On 10/06/99 at 2110 hrs, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified by NCS Engineering, that an Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being maintained in the X-333 process building during a maintenance evolution. Maintenance personnel, while working on seal exhaust pumps, removed the filter from the demister without prior non-destructive analysis (NDA) being completed."
"Requirement #12 of NCSA-033_016.AO1 states in part [that] seal exhaust pumps/demisters shall be drained of oil then NDA measured for U-235 content prior to removal."
"At the direction of the [PSS,] the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were initiated, and the area was boundaried off."
"There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: An NDA measurement was not obtained; however, the demister was drained of oil. Therefore, an unsafe mass is not anticipated. The maximum enrichment for the seal exhaust is 3% U-235. Spacing was maintained; therefore, the overall safety [significance] is low. (At the enrichment involved, the component is a favorable geometry)."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): In order for criticality to occur, a spacing violation would have to occur as well as a failure to NDA the equipment prior to removal."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Spacing [was] maintained. Mass [was] assumed [to be] lost."
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): The equipment removed was only a part [of] the seal exhaust pump demister; therefore, a large mass is not anticipated. The enrichment was at 3% in the form of UF4 with oil."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: NDA was not performed on seal demisters prior to removal. The NDA is required to demonstrate that the component is less than a safe mass. Spacing between components was maintained."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: At the direction of the [PSS,] the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were initiated, and the [area was] boundaried off. The filters removed will be scheduled to have NDA measurements performed."
Portsmouth personnel stated that this event was a 4-hour notification because it involved a loss of one of two criticality controls without re-establishment within 4 hours.
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and the Department of Energy site representative.
Hospital
Event Number: 36524
Rep Org: WATERBURY HOSPITAL
Licensee: WATERBURY HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: WATERBURY State: CT
County:
License #: 06-02406-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARIANNE POLIZZANO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: WATERBURY HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: WATERBURY State: CT
County:
License #: 06-02406-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARIANNE POLIZZANO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/17/1999
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 09:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/1999
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 09:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
10 CFR Section:
35.33 - MED MISADMINISTRATION
Person (Organization):
BILL RULAND (R1)
JOHN SURMEIER (NMSS)
BILL RULAND (R1)
JOHN SURMEIER (NMSS)
MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION INVOLVING DIAGNOSTIC I-131 USED FOR A TOTAL BODY SCAN
DURING A QUARTERLY AUDIT, THE HOSPITAL HEALTH PHYSICIST DISCOVERED THAT A PATIENT WHO HAD BEEN PRESCRIBED A DOSE OF 3.0 mCi I-131 FOR A TOTAL BODY SCAN RECEIVED 3.65 mCi. THE PRESCRIBING PHYSICIAN WAS INFORMED; HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO PLANS TO NOTIFY THE PATIENT. THERE WERE NO ADVERSE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES SINCE THE DOSE ADMINISTERED WAS WITHIN THE NORMAL RANGE OF 1-4 mCi. THE LICENSEE ATTRIBUTES THE CAUSE TO PERSONNEL ERROR AND IS REVIEWING WORK PRACTICES TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
(CALL THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR LICENSEE CONTACT INFORMATION.)
DURING A QUARTERLY AUDIT, THE HOSPITAL HEALTH PHYSICIST DISCOVERED THAT A PATIENT WHO HAD BEEN PRESCRIBED A DOSE OF 3.0 mCi I-131 FOR A TOTAL BODY SCAN RECEIVED 3.65 mCi. THE PRESCRIBING PHYSICIAN WAS INFORMED; HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO PLANS TO NOTIFY THE PATIENT. THERE WERE NO ADVERSE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES SINCE THE DOSE ADMINISTERED WAS WITHIN THE NORMAL RANGE OF 1-4 mCi. THE LICENSEE ATTRIBUTES THE CAUSE TO PERSONNEL ERROR AND IS REVIEWING WORK PRACTICES TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
(CALL THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR LICENSEE CONTACT INFORMATION.)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36264
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: OSCAR PIPKINS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: OSCAR PIPKINS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/06/1999
Notification Time: 12:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 10:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/1999
Notification Time: 12:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 10:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM SPRINKLER FOR 'B' EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE
The licensee determined that the fire protection sprinkler system FPM-4B could not meet the pressure requirements for the Fire Protection Code NFA-13. The system was declared inoperable, but in service and a continuous fire watch was posted as an immediate compensatory measure. The system is for fire protection in the 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) room, the EDG remains operable due to the fire watch. The condition was discovered during a review of sprinkler system hydraulic calculations in response to an earlier condition report.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee determined that the fire protection sprinkler system FPM-4B could not meet the pressure requirements for the Fire Protection Code NFA-13. The system was declared inoperable, but in service and a continuous fire watch was posted as an immediate compensatory measure. The system is for fire protection in the 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) room, the EDG remains operable due to the fire watch. The condition was discovered during a review of sprinkler system hydraulic calculations in response to an earlier condition report.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36266
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAUGHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAUGHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/06/1999
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 17:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 17:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation |
ERROR FOUND IN LARGE BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS
"Westinghouse Letter DLC-99-768 reported errors found in the Large Break LOCA analysis for both Beaver Valley units. These errors resulted in calculated maximum Peak Clad Temperatures >2200°F with out taking credit for any other available margins. Per 10CFR50.46.a.3.(ii), any change or error correction that results in a calculated ECCS performance (where Peak Clad Temperature is not maintained <2200°F) Is reportable per 10CFR50.72
"It should be noted that Westinghouse Letter DLC-99-768 proposed a more conservative restriction on FQ limits for both units, and a more conservative limit on Steam Generator tube plugging at unit 2 that would overcome the effects of the reported errors. These limits are presently being met and have been met for the time periods of the present cycles at both units, so that the proposed analysis appears to be valid. Engineering evaluation is pending for final approval of these proposals."
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * Retraction on 10/26/99 at 1430 ET by C. Hynes taken by MacKinnon at 1458 ET * * *
Available design margins in FQ and steam generator tube plugging at Unit 2 were sufficient to offset the increase in PCT due to the identified errors and maintain compliance with the ECCS Performance Criteria of 10 CFR 50.46. Utilizing these design margins has necessitated reduction of the FQ surveillance limits in the Core Operating Limits Report. Administrative controls were implemented on 10/08/99 to achieve this reduction in the FQ surveillance limits. A review of completed flux maps has shown that the reduced FQ limit has been met for the present operating cycle. Current steam generator tube plugging levels were also confirmed to be less than the reduced limit. Subsequent engineering review has confirmed that the evaluations performed by Westinghouse show that all applicable safety analysis acceptance criteria continue to be met. Recovery of available margin results in a PCT that has in the past and presently remains < 2000 F. As such, the basis for retraction of the 10CFR50.72 notification on 10/06/99 is that this condition does not place either Unit outside its design basis. However, this condition is applicable to the 30 day reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii). R1DO (David Lew) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee..
"Westinghouse Letter DLC-99-768 reported errors found in the Large Break LOCA analysis for both Beaver Valley units. These errors resulted in calculated maximum Peak Clad Temperatures >2200°F with out taking credit for any other available margins. Per 10CFR50.46.a.3.(ii), any change or error correction that results in a calculated ECCS performance (where Peak Clad Temperature is not maintained <2200°F) Is reportable per 10CFR50.72
"It should be noted that Westinghouse Letter DLC-99-768 proposed a more conservative restriction on FQ limits for both units, and a more conservative limit on Steam Generator tube plugging at unit 2 that would overcome the effects of the reported errors. These limits are presently being met and have been met for the time periods of the present cycles at both units, so that the proposed analysis appears to be valid. Engineering evaluation is pending for final approval of these proposals."
The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * Retraction on 10/26/99 at 1430 ET by C. Hynes taken by MacKinnon at 1458 ET * * *
Available design margins in FQ and steam generator tube plugging at Unit 2 were sufficient to offset the increase in PCT due to the identified errors and maintain compliance with the ECCS Performance Criteria of 10 CFR 50.46. Utilizing these design margins has necessitated reduction of the FQ surveillance limits in the Core Operating Limits Report. Administrative controls were implemented on 10/08/99 to achieve this reduction in the FQ surveillance limits. A review of completed flux maps has shown that the reduced FQ limit has been met for the present operating cycle. Current steam generator tube plugging levels were also confirmed to be less than the reduced limit. Subsequent engineering review has confirmed that the evaluations performed by Westinghouse show that all applicable safety analysis acceptance criteria continue to be met. Recovery of available margin results in a PCT that has in the past and presently remains < 2000 F. As such, the basis for retraction of the 10CFR50.72 notification on 10/06/99 is that this condition does not place either Unit outside its design basis. However, this condition is applicable to the 30 day reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii). R1DO (David Lew) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee..
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36267
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/06/1999
Notification Time: 18:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 16:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 18:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 16:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE
During periodic inspections, technicians discovered multiple loose battery terminal connections on both UPS-1A and UPS-1B batteries. The licensee was uncertain of the operability of the batteries and conservatively declared both trains of low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) inoperable. This put them in a 24-hour Technical Specification action statement (3.5.A.6) to bring the plant to hot shutdown. Electrical maintenance is on site tightening connections and inspecting all battery connections. The licensee does not anticipate having to shutdown as electrical maintenance is working now. An investigation into the event will follow up the event.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Vermont Nuclear Engineer.
* * * Retraction on 10/26/99 at 1639 ET by Mark Magnuson taken by MacKinnon * * *
Vermont Yankee Design Electrical Engineering (EE) has since evaluated the as-found condition of the battery terminals (interconnection plate fasteners at less than the required torque). EE reviewed the as-found interconnection resistance values. Those resistance values showed that the total resistance created by the battery connections in the as-found configuration was elevated by only 0.57%. The as-found resistance's also showed that the highest resistance interconnection would, with running load placed upon the battery, have induced a voltage drop of less than 0.002% of rated battery voltage. Additionally, the potential heating of the highest resistance interconnection plate assembly (under running load) was determined to be 0.6 watt-hours. This is not sufficient energy to cause overheating of the connection.
EE's conclusion after a detailed assessment of the condition of the 2 UPS batteries, is that they were operational at all times they were considered operable. Therefore, they were fully capable of supporting operation of the LPCI system. Therefore, this event is being retracted by the licensee.
R1DO (David Lew) notified. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee of the retraction of the event.
During periodic inspections, technicians discovered multiple loose battery terminal connections on both UPS-1A and UPS-1B batteries. The licensee was uncertain of the operability of the batteries and conservatively declared both trains of low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) inoperable. This put them in a 24-hour Technical Specification action statement (3.5.A.6) to bring the plant to hot shutdown. Electrical maintenance is on site tightening connections and inspecting all battery connections. The licensee does not anticipate having to shutdown as electrical maintenance is working now. An investigation into the event will follow up the event.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Vermont Nuclear Engineer.
* * * Retraction on 10/26/99 at 1639 ET by Mark Magnuson taken by MacKinnon * * *
Vermont Yankee Design Electrical Engineering (EE) has since evaluated the as-found condition of the battery terminals (interconnection plate fasteners at less than the required torque). EE reviewed the as-found interconnection resistance values. Those resistance values showed that the total resistance created by the battery connections in the as-found configuration was elevated by only 0.57%. The as-found resistance's also showed that the highest resistance interconnection would, with running load placed upon the battery, have induced a voltage drop of less than 0.002% of rated battery voltage. Additionally, the potential heating of the highest resistance interconnection plate assembly (under running load) was determined to be 0.6 watt-hours. This is not sufficient energy to cause overheating of the connection.
EE's conclusion after a detailed assessment of the condition of the 2 UPS batteries, is that they were operational at all times they were considered operable. Therefore, they were fully capable of supporting operation of the LPCI system. Therefore, this event is being retracted by the licensee.
R1DO (David Lew) notified. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee of the retraction of the event.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36268
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEITH WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEITH WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/06/1999
Notification Time: 18:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 17:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/1999
Notification Time: 18:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/1999
Event Time: 17:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
INFORMATION REPORT ON RUPTURE OF CIRCULATING WATER HEADER FOLLOWED BY AN OFFSITE NOTIFICATION (4-HOUR NOTIFICATION)
The plant suffered a rupture in a 6-inch header on the plant circulating water header that does not affect present plant operation. Work is in progress to isolate the leak. Several thousand gallons of water have been released on site, and environmental sampling of the site outfalls is underway to determine if any release offsite of chlorine (water additive) has taken place.
Portsmouth personnel have notified the NRC resident inspector.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a contact telephone number.)
******************** UPDATE AT 0103 ON 10/07/99 FROM ERIC SPAETH TO LEIGH TROCINE ********************
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"At approximately 1703 hrs on 10/06/99, a recirculating cooling water line rupture occurred on the plant. A 6-inch line rupture caused a significant increase in flow through an NPDES outfall. Monitoring has not determined a permitted limit exceedance or impact to local water tributaries. However, [at 0008 hrs on 10/07/99,] a courtesy notification to [the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA)] was made to advise of this upset condition."
"[This is a 4-hour] notification to the NRC due to [the] plant notifying [another] government agency [ ... ]."
"There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."
Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector and the Department of Energy site representative. The NRC operations center notified the R3DO (Jacobson), NMSS EO (Hickey), and IRO (Miller).
* * * UPDATE 1601 10/7/1999 FROM LARSON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"At 1205 hours on 10/7/99 Environmental Management personnel notified the Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources of an observed fish kill in a local tributary (Little Beaver Creek) that was attributed to the recirculating cooling water line rupture that occurred on 10/6/99. Additionally, the Ohio EPA was notified at 1240 hours on 10/7/99. A press release was also issued at 1600 hours on 10/7/99."
Notified R3DO (Shear).
The plant suffered a rupture in a 6-inch header on the plant circulating water header that does not affect present plant operation. Work is in progress to isolate the leak. Several thousand gallons of water have been released on site, and environmental sampling of the site outfalls is underway to determine if any release offsite of chlorine (water additive) has taken place.
Portsmouth personnel have notified the NRC resident inspector.
(Call the NRC operations officer for a contact telephone number.)
******************** UPDATE AT 0103 ON 10/07/99 FROM ERIC SPAETH TO LEIGH TROCINE ********************
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"At approximately 1703 hrs on 10/06/99, a recirculating cooling water line rupture occurred on the plant. A 6-inch line rupture caused a significant increase in flow through an NPDES outfall. Monitoring has not determined a permitted limit exceedance or impact to local water tributaries. However, [at 0008 hrs on 10/07/99,] a courtesy notification to [the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA)] was made to advise of this upset condition."
"[This is a 4-hour] notification to the NRC due to [the] plant notifying [another] government agency [ ... ]."
"There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."
Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector and the Department of Energy site representative. The NRC operations center notified the R3DO (Jacobson), NMSS EO (Hickey), and IRO (Miller).
* * * UPDATE 1601 10/7/1999 FROM LARSON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"At 1205 hours on 10/7/99 Environmental Management personnel notified the Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources of an observed fish kill in a local tributary (Little Beaver Creek) that was attributed to the recirculating cooling water line rupture that occurred on 10/6/99. Additionally, the Ohio EPA was notified at 1240 hours on 10/7/99. A press release was also issued at 1600 hours on 10/7/99."
Notified R3DO (Shear).