Event Notification Report for October 05, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/04/1999 - 10/05/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
3626936291362723626136262
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36269
Rep Org: STATE OF ILLINOIS
Licensee: RUSH-PRES-ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01766-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATRICIA LARKINS (NRC)
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: RUSH-PRES-ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01766-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATRICIA LARKINS (NRC)
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/07/1999
Notification Time: 00:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/1999
Notification Time: 00:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF A NOVOSTE CORPORATION BETA-CATHETER TREATMENT DEVICE DRIVE MECHANISM FAILURE AT ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER (The facility's location was not provided.)
The following text is a portion of an E-mail sent to the NRC operations center from the NRC Office of State Programs (Patricia Larkins) at 1650 on 10/06/99 which enclosed another E-mail from the State of Illinois (Bruce Sanza) to the NRC (Patricia Larkins) at 1409 on 10/05/99:
"FYI. The license number is IL-01766-01"
"-----Original Message----- From: Gulczynski, Andy
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 1999 12:05 PM
To: Sanza, Bruce; Klinger, Joe; Eastvold, Paul
Cc: (ORS, Glen Ellyn DRM Staff)
Subject: Reported Drive Mechanism Failure in Novoste Corporation Beta-Catheter Treatment Device "
"Glenn Sullivan, RSO at Rush-Pres-St. Luke's Medical Center, [ ... ], just called me to report an event which occurred this morning."
"A patient was being treated with a Novoste Corporation Beta-Cath System (Model SRO.S03 using Novoste Source Train 139/99 in transfer device 7Z519). The device is used to treat arterial occlusions. This system contains 56 mCi of Sr-90 as of April 8, 1999, contained in 16 active seeds. The source 'train' contains a total of 18 seeds, two of which are 'dummies', located at the beginning and the end of the source train. The sources are driven in to and out of the catheter using saline solution (water pressure). This system is an 'all or nothing' system, meaning all the seeds are used in each treatment."
"At the conclusion of today's treatment, the staff could not visually verify the presence of all the sources within the machine. They immediately removed the catheter from the patient; surveyed the patient, the catheter,
and the room; and found no sources present. They then connected the catheter to the machine and activated the drive mechanism. Six active sources and one dummy source came out, which they placed into a shielded container. They activated the drive mechanism again and 9 active sources, and one dummy source came out. (This left one source unaccounted for.) They then surveyed the machine and confirmed the presence of the last source within the machine, though they do not know exactly where it is located."
"The patient suffered no adverse effects and received no unplanned exposure as a result of this event."
"Glenn Sullivan is preparing a written report, which will be sent to our Department."
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact name and telephone number.)
******************** UPDATE AT 0044 ON 10/07/99 BY LEIGH TROCINE ********************
The following text is a portion of an E-mail sent to the NRC operations center from the NRC Office of State Programs (Patricia Larkins) at 1651 on 10/06/99 which enclosed another E-mail from the State of Illinois (Bruce Sanza) to the NRC (Patricia Larkins) at 1432 on 10/05/99:
"-----Original Message----- From: Gulczynski, Andy
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 1999 1:31 PM
To: Sanza, Bruce; Klinger, Joe; Eastvold, Paul
Cc: (ORS, Glen Ellyn DRM Staff)
Subject: Update to Novoste Corporation Beta Cath Event"
"Glenn Sullivan called again to inform us that a Novoste Corporation Representative will be at Rush-Pres-St. Luke's Medical Center tomorrow to investigate the cause of this event. Glenn will keep us informed of any new
developments. "
The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jacobson) and NMSS EO (Hickey).
******************** UPDATE AT 0045 ON 10/07/99 BY LEIGH TROCINE ********************
The following text is a portion of an E-mail sent to the NRC operations center from the NRC Office of State Programs (Patricia Larkins) at 1653 on 10/06/99 which enclosed another E-mail from the State of Illinois (Bruce Sanza) to the NRC (Patricia Larkins) at 1436 on 10/06/99:
"-----Original Message----- From: Gulczynski, Andy
Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 1999 1:35 PM
To: Sanza, Bruce; Klinger, Joe; Eastvold, Paul
Cc: (ORS, Glen Ellyn DRM Staff); Merrihew, George
Subject: Update on Novoste Beta-Cath System"
"Glenn Sullivan called me with an update to the Novoste Beta-Cath source drive mechanism failure:"
"Novoste service personnel were there today and dismantled the machine. They found the missing source in the 'belly' of the machine stuck to a magnet. They don't know how or why yet. They left the sources with Glenn and took the machine to their facility to perform tests on it, presumably to figure out the root cause(s) of the failure."
"One of the sources involved in the event appeared to be damaged. All of the sources were leak tested and none, including the damaged one, were leaking. Glenn said that he would package the sources and ship them to the supplier. A written report from Glenn Sullivan will be sent to our Department."
The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jacobson) and NMSS EO (Hickey).
NOTE: The above update dates were changed from 10/07/88 to 10/07/99.
The following text is a portion of an E-mail sent to the NRC operations center from the NRC Office of State Programs (Patricia Larkins) at 1650 on 10/06/99 which enclosed another E-mail from the State of Illinois (Bruce Sanza) to the NRC (Patricia Larkins) at 1409 on 10/05/99:
"FYI. The license number is IL-01766-01"
"-----Original Message----- From: Gulczynski, Andy
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 1999 12:05 PM
To: Sanza, Bruce; Klinger, Joe; Eastvold, Paul
Cc: (ORS, Glen Ellyn DRM Staff)
Subject: Reported Drive Mechanism Failure in Novoste Corporation Beta-Catheter Treatment Device "
"Glenn Sullivan, RSO at Rush-Pres-St. Luke's Medical Center, [ ... ], just called me to report an event which occurred this morning."
"A patient was being treated with a Novoste Corporation Beta-Cath System (Model SRO.S03 using Novoste Source Train 139/99 in transfer device 7Z519). The device is used to treat arterial occlusions. This system contains 56 mCi of Sr-90 as of April 8, 1999, contained in 16 active seeds. The source 'train' contains a total of 18 seeds, two of which are 'dummies', located at the beginning and the end of the source train. The sources are driven in to and out of the catheter using saline solution (water pressure). This system is an 'all or nothing' system, meaning all the seeds are used in each treatment."
"At the conclusion of today's treatment, the staff could not visually verify the presence of all the sources within the machine. They immediately removed the catheter from the patient; surveyed the patient, the catheter,
and the room; and found no sources present. They then connected the catheter to the machine and activated the drive mechanism. Six active sources and one dummy source came out, which they placed into a shielded container. They activated the drive mechanism again and 9 active sources, and one dummy source came out. (This left one source unaccounted for.) They then surveyed the machine and confirmed the presence of the last source within the machine, though they do not know exactly where it is located."
"The patient suffered no adverse effects and received no unplanned exposure as a result of this event."
"Glenn Sullivan is preparing a written report, which will be sent to our Department."
(Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact name and telephone number.)
******************** UPDATE AT 0044 ON 10/07/99 BY LEIGH TROCINE ********************
The following text is a portion of an E-mail sent to the NRC operations center from the NRC Office of State Programs (Patricia Larkins) at 1651 on 10/06/99 which enclosed another E-mail from the State of Illinois (Bruce Sanza) to the NRC (Patricia Larkins) at 1432 on 10/05/99:
"-----Original Message----- From: Gulczynski, Andy
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 1999 1:31 PM
To: Sanza, Bruce; Klinger, Joe; Eastvold, Paul
Cc: (ORS, Glen Ellyn DRM Staff)
Subject: Update to Novoste Corporation Beta Cath Event"
"Glenn Sullivan called again to inform us that a Novoste Corporation Representative will be at Rush-Pres-St. Luke's Medical Center tomorrow to investigate the cause of this event. Glenn will keep us informed of any new
developments. "
The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jacobson) and NMSS EO (Hickey).
******************** UPDATE AT 0045 ON 10/07/99 BY LEIGH TROCINE ********************
The following text is a portion of an E-mail sent to the NRC operations center from the NRC Office of State Programs (Patricia Larkins) at 1653 on 10/06/99 which enclosed another E-mail from the State of Illinois (Bruce Sanza) to the NRC (Patricia Larkins) at 1436 on 10/06/99:
"-----Original Message----- From: Gulczynski, Andy
Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 1999 1:35 PM
To: Sanza, Bruce; Klinger, Joe; Eastvold, Paul
Cc: (ORS, Glen Ellyn DRM Staff); Merrihew, George
Subject: Update on Novoste Beta-Cath System"
"Glenn Sullivan called me with an update to the Novoste Beta-Cath source drive mechanism failure:"
"Novoste service personnel were there today and dismantled the machine. They found the missing source in the 'belly' of the machine stuck to a magnet. They don't know how or why yet. They left the sources with Glenn and took the machine to their facility to perform tests on it, presumably to figure out the root cause(s) of the failure."
"One of the sources involved in the event appeared to be damaged. All of the sources were leak tested and none, including the damaged one, were leaking. Glenn said that he would package the sources and ship them to the supplier. A written report from Glenn Sullivan will be sent to our Department."
The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jacobson) and NMSS EO (Hickey).
NOTE: The above update dates were changed from 10/07/88 to 10/07/99.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36291
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JACK BREEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JACK BREEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/14/1999
Notification Time: 16:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/1999
Notification Time: 16:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Hot Standby |
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS DO NOT MEET CABLE SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS
During a walkdown of redundant cable separation in the St Lucie Unit #1 containment during the on-going 1999 refueling outage, it was determined that essential cables associated with the Pressurizer pressure transmitters do not meet the separation requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R III.G.2 or the separation requirements as stated in St Lucie Unit 1 exemption K1.
In the event of a postulated fire inside containment, circuit failures could cause the pressure transmitters to spuriously provide abnormal signals to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) high pressurizer pressure bistable trip units, the thermal margin/low pressure bistable trip units, the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) cabinet for use in the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and diverse scram system actuation logic, low-low alarm function, and control room indication. If two or more channels failed in the high direction, Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) open signals would be generated. Additional failures for pressure transmitters with similar cable separation could cause spurious operation of the Pressurizer pressure control system (pressurizer spray valves and pressurizer heaters). In addition, control room indication of pressurizer could be compromised.
2. Impact Statement
PT-1102A, PT-1102B, PT-1102C and PT-1102D are safety related narrow range (1500 - 2500 psia) pressurizer transmitters for the Pressurizer Pressure Measurement Loops. The narrow range pressurizer pressure instrument loops provide a signal to the RPS high pressurizer pressure bistable trip units, the thermal margin/low pressure bistable trip units, the ESFAS cabinet for use I the SIAS and diverse scram system actuation logic, low-low alarm function, and control room indication. In addition, cables for the pressurizer transmitters, which are input to the pressurizer pressure control system, are routed in the same manner as the other pressurizer pressure transmitters.
For design basis accident mitigation (UFSAR Chapter 15), the pressurizer pressure transmitters are not impacted and remain operable. Currently, the cable routing for PT-1102A, PT-1102B, PT-1102C and PT-1102D does not meet the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R and therefore is outside the design basis of the plant for Appendix R. This item is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72.
Using the separation criteria per Exemption K1, a fire in the penetration area of containment at elevation 23'-0 would affect pressurizer transmitters PT-1102A (cable 10372A-MA), PT-1102B (cable 10373A-MB), PT-1102C (cable 10374A-MC) and PT-1102D (cable 10374A-MD). The identified cables provide the interface between the protection system pressurizer pressure transmitters and the remaining portions of each instrument loop. Depending on the cable failure mode the pressure signals could fail either high or low.
If two or more channels failed in the high direction, the following would occur:
1. A reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure would occur.
2. PORV open signals would be generated. Spurious operation of PORVs is precluded by placing the PORV control switches in override and by isolation of PORV block valves V1402 and V1404. These actions are currently in the response to fire procedure for containment fire.
If two or more channels failed in the low direction, the following actions would occur:
1. A reactor trip on thermal margin/ low pressure (TM/LP) would occur.
2. Safety Injection (SIAS) and Containment Isolation (CIAS) would actuate. The response to fire procedure currently contains compensatory measure for a spurious SIAS signal.
In addition the same fire could potentially affect the wide range pressure transmitters (PT-1107 and PT-1108) and the transmitters (PT-1100X and PT-1100Y) providing input to the pressurizer pressure control system.
Damage to PT-110X and PT-1100Y could potentially cause spurious operation of the pressurizer spray valves and/or pressurizer heaters. In the event that this control is lost manual control will be used for the pressurizer heaters and the appropriate Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) will be stopped to prevent excessive spray flow. These manual actions are addressed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis and will be addresses in the response to fire procedures.
If all the channels were damaged, then pressurizer pressure indication in the control room could be compromised. In this unlikely event alternate means are available to determine pressurizer pressure. The pressure in the charging header is directly related to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and this pressure indication (PIA-2212) could be used as an indicator for RCS pressure. In addition, pressure indication is available in the sample system (PI-5510) on the sample line from Hot leg loop 1A. This pressure indicator is located in the sample room.
The probability of a fire, and the magnitude of a fire that would cause the above to occur inside the containment is extremely low for the following reasons.
* The main source of combustion inside is the oil in the RCP motor. However, the RCP motors are not in the vicinity of the affected cable trays. The affected cable trays are separated from the RCP motors by the biological shield.
* The combustible loading in this portion of containment is low and in the area where the lack of separation occurs consists of mostly insulation, which has a high ignition temperature.
* There are no fire hazards or ignition sources in the are that the lack of separation occurs.
* All non-IEEE 383 cables are covered with a fire retardant coating.
* This area has fire detectors, which would provide notification of a fire to the control room.
* The containment is inspected prior to operation for items that could impact sump operability; therefore, the potential for transient combustibles is precluded. In addition, the containment is a radiation control area with very limited access during power operation. The possibility of introducing new transient combustibles is very small.
* The containment has a large volume with a high ceiling, which would dissipate the hot gases from a fire to the upper are of containment away from the affected area.
* The cables in the affected cable tray are self-extinguishing which will minimize fire propagation along the cables.
Based upon the above, it is unlikely that a fire would be of the magnitude to affect all four pressure transmitters. In the event, there is a fire of a magnitude to affect all for transmitter cables, the RCS integrity is preserved by isolating the PORVs using the PORV block valves. By procedure, in the event of a fire in containment, the Operators are instructed to position the PORVs to "OVERRIDE" and close the PORV block valves. If pressurizer pressure indication in the control room is lost, alternate means of pressure indication is available.
3. Cause of Occurrence
The above concerns were not properly evaluated during development of the safe shutdown analysis.
4. Immediate Corrective Actions
* A containment loose debris inspection is performed following each containment entry curing Modes 1-4
* If containment entry is being provided for maintenance purposes, an inventory of all material, tools, and other items intended to go into containment is performed.
* All cable trays on the 18 foot and 23 foot elevations will be verified to be free of debris and other fire hazards prior to heatup from the current refueling outage.
* Operations has been informed of the potential that all pressurizer pressure indication may be lost for certain fires inside containment. The "Response to Fire" procedure will be revised to include methods for establishing alternate pressurizer pressure indication.
5. Long Term Corrective Actions
Prior to startup from the next refueling outage, evaluate potential plant modifications and/or licensing/design basis changes. Actions will be implemented as required during the next St. Lucie Unit 1 outage scheduled for April 2001.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event notification by the licensee.
During a walkdown of redundant cable separation in the St Lucie Unit #1 containment during the on-going 1999 refueling outage, it was determined that essential cables associated with the Pressurizer pressure transmitters do not meet the separation requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R III.G.2 or the separation requirements as stated in St Lucie Unit 1 exemption K1.
In the event of a postulated fire inside containment, circuit failures could cause the pressure transmitters to spuriously provide abnormal signals to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) high pressurizer pressure bistable trip units, the thermal margin/low pressure bistable trip units, the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) cabinet for use in the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and diverse scram system actuation logic, low-low alarm function, and control room indication. If two or more channels failed in the high direction, Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) open signals would be generated. Additional failures for pressure transmitters with similar cable separation could cause spurious operation of the Pressurizer pressure control system (pressurizer spray valves and pressurizer heaters). In addition, control room indication of pressurizer could be compromised.
2. Impact Statement
PT-1102A, PT-1102B, PT-1102C and PT-1102D are safety related narrow range (1500 - 2500 psia) pressurizer transmitters for the Pressurizer Pressure Measurement Loops. The narrow range pressurizer pressure instrument loops provide a signal to the RPS high pressurizer pressure bistable trip units, the thermal margin/low pressure bistable trip units, the ESFAS cabinet for use I the SIAS and diverse scram system actuation logic, low-low alarm function, and control room indication. In addition, cables for the pressurizer transmitters, which are input to the pressurizer pressure control system, are routed in the same manner as the other pressurizer pressure transmitters.
For design basis accident mitigation (UFSAR Chapter 15), the pressurizer pressure transmitters are not impacted and remain operable. Currently, the cable routing for PT-1102A, PT-1102B, PT-1102C and PT-1102D does not meet the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R and therefore is outside the design basis of the plant for Appendix R. This item is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72.
Using the separation criteria per Exemption K1, a fire in the penetration area of containment at elevation 23'-0 would affect pressurizer transmitters PT-1102A (cable 10372A-MA), PT-1102B (cable 10373A-MB), PT-1102C (cable 10374A-MC) and PT-1102D (cable 10374A-MD). The identified cables provide the interface between the protection system pressurizer pressure transmitters and the remaining portions of each instrument loop. Depending on the cable failure mode the pressure signals could fail either high or low.
If two or more channels failed in the high direction, the following would occur:
1. A reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure would occur.
2. PORV open signals would be generated. Spurious operation of PORVs is precluded by placing the PORV control switches in override and by isolation of PORV block valves V1402 and V1404. These actions are currently in the response to fire procedure for containment fire.
If two or more channels failed in the low direction, the following actions would occur:
1. A reactor trip on thermal margin/ low pressure (TM/LP) would occur.
2. Safety Injection (SIAS) and Containment Isolation (CIAS) would actuate. The response to fire procedure currently contains compensatory measure for a spurious SIAS signal.
In addition the same fire could potentially affect the wide range pressure transmitters (PT-1107 and PT-1108) and the transmitters (PT-1100X and PT-1100Y) providing input to the pressurizer pressure control system.
Damage to PT-110X and PT-1100Y could potentially cause spurious operation of the pressurizer spray valves and/or pressurizer heaters. In the event that this control is lost manual control will be used for the pressurizer heaters and the appropriate Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) will be stopped to prevent excessive spray flow. These manual actions are addressed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis and will be addresses in the response to fire procedures.
If all the channels were damaged, then pressurizer pressure indication in the control room could be compromised. In this unlikely event alternate means are available to determine pressurizer pressure. The pressure in the charging header is directly related to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and this pressure indication (PIA-2212) could be used as an indicator for RCS pressure. In addition, pressure indication is available in the sample system (PI-5510) on the sample line from Hot leg loop 1A. This pressure indicator is located in the sample room.
The probability of a fire, and the magnitude of a fire that would cause the above to occur inside the containment is extremely low for the following reasons.
* The main source of combustion inside is the oil in the RCP motor. However, the RCP motors are not in the vicinity of the affected cable trays. The affected cable trays are separated from the RCP motors by the biological shield.
* The combustible loading in this portion of containment is low and in the area where the lack of separation occurs consists of mostly insulation, which has a high ignition temperature.
* There are no fire hazards or ignition sources in the are that the lack of separation occurs.
* All non-IEEE 383 cables are covered with a fire retardant coating.
* This area has fire detectors, which would provide notification of a fire to the control room.
* The containment is inspected prior to operation for items that could impact sump operability; therefore, the potential for transient combustibles is precluded. In addition, the containment is a radiation control area with very limited access during power operation. The possibility of introducing new transient combustibles is very small.
* The containment has a large volume with a high ceiling, which would dissipate the hot gases from a fire to the upper are of containment away from the affected area.
* The cables in the affected cable tray are self-extinguishing which will minimize fire propagation along the cables.
Based upon the above, it is unlikely that a fire would be of the magnitude to affect all four pressure transmitters. In the event, there is a fire of a magnitude to affect all for transmitter cables, the RCS integrity is preserved by isolating the PORVs using the PORV block valves. By procedure, in the event of a fire in containment, the Operators are instructed to position the PORVs to "OVERRIDE" and close the PORV block valves. If pressurizer pressure indication in the control room is lost, alternate means of pressure indication is available.
3. Cause of Occurrence
The above concerns were not properly evaluated during development of the safe shutdown analysis.
4. Immediate Corrective Actions
* A containment loose debris inspection is performed following each containment entry curing Modes 1-4
* If containment entry is being provided for maintenance purposes, an inventory of all material, tools, and other items intended to go into containment is performed.
* All cable trays on the 18 foot and 23 foot elevations will be verified to be free of debris and other fire hazards prior to heatup from the current refueling outage.
* Operations has been informed of the potential that all pressurizer pressure indication may be lost for certain fires inside containment. The "Response to Fire" procedure will be revised to include methods for establishing alternate pressurizer pressure indication.
5. Long Term Corrective Actions
Prior to startup from the next refueling outage, evaluate potential plant modifications and/or licensing/design basis changes. Actions will be implemented as required during the next St. Lucie Unit 1 outage scheduled for April 2001.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event notification by the licensee.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36272
Rep Org: COGEMA MINING INC.
Licensee: COGEMA MINING INC.
Region: 4
City: MILLS State: WY
County:
License #: SUA-1341
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN VASELIN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: COGEMA MINING INC.
Region: 4
City: MILLS State: WY
County:
License #: SUA-1341
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN VASELIN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/07/1999
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/1999
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
JOE HOLONICH (NMSS)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
JOE HOLONICH (NMSS)
MONITOR WELL PLACED IN EXCURSION STATUS
"A routine biweekly water sample collected on October 5, 1999 from monitor well MW89, exceeded 2 of its 3 upper control limits (UCLs). A confirmation sample was collected on this date, which also exceeded 2 of its 3 UCLs. Monitor well MW89 has been placed on excursion status as per license Section 11.2 and its sampling frequency is increased to weekly. MW89 is a perimeter ore zone monitor well located approximately 500 feet south of the Mine Unit 2 boundary, at the Christensen Mine, Campbell County Wyoming. The nearest community is Linch, Wyoming, approximately 15 miles to the southeast. Note that mining has been completed in Mine Unit 2 and it is currently on standby status, awaiting for the second phase of groundwater restoration to begin."
Data collected from the well, and the respective upper control limits are listed below:
Chloride Conductivity Alkalinity Uranium
Date mg/l umhos/cm2 mg/l mg/l U3O8
10-5-99 17.5 756 123.6 <0.4
10-7-99 17.1 740 121.9 <0.4
Limits --> 13.6 823 121.3 none
"A routine biweekly water sample collected on October 5, 1999 from monitor well MW89, exceeded 2 of its 3 upper control limits (UCLs). A confirmation sample was collected on this date, which also exceeded 2 of its 3 UCLs. Monitor well MW89 has been placed on excursion status as per license Section 11.2 and its sampling frequency is increased to weekly. MW89 is a perimeter ore zone monitor well located approximately 500 feet south of the Mine Unit 2 boundary, at the Christensen Mine, Campbell County Wyoming. The nearest community is Linch, Wyoming, approximately 15 miles to the southeast. Note that mining has been completed in Mine Unit 2 and it is currently on standby status, awaiting for the second phase of groundwater restoration to begin."
Data collected from the well, and the respective upper control limits are listed below:
Chloride Conductivity Alkalinity Uranium
Date mg/l umhos/cm2 mg/l mg/l U3O8
10-5-99 17.5 756 123.6 <0.4
10-7-99 17.1 740 121.9 <0.4
Limits --> 13.6 823 121.3 none
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36261
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE WIDAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE WIDAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/05/1999
Notification Time: 08:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/1999
Event Time: 08:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/1999
Notification Time: 08:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/1999
Event Time: 08:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
W2 SWITCH SUPPLIED BY WESTINGHOUSE DRAWN FROM STOCK DID NOT OPERATE PROPERLY
AFTER BEING INSTALLED.
W2 SWITCH WAS SUPPLIED TO ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION BY WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION. A SAFETY RELATED W2 SWITCH DRAWN FROM STOCK DID NOT OPERATE SATISFACTORILY AFTER BEING INSTALLED IN THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD FOR USE AS THE CONTROL SWITCH FOR SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1C (1/SIP1 C2). THE SWITCH DID WORK PROPERLY BEFORE INSTALLATION IN THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD POSITION. HOWEVER, SUBSEQUENT TO INSTALLATION THE SWITCH MECHANISM WOULD BIND AND WOULD NOT SPRING RETURN TO THE "AFTER CLOSE" OR "AFTER TRIP" POSITIONS. THE SWITCH IS EXPECTED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY IN BOTH POSITIONS.
THE SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD CREATED BY THE SWITCH POTENTIALLY BEING STUCK IN THE "TRIP" POSITION IS THAT THE ASSOCIATED ECCS PUMP BREAKER WOULD NOT AUTO-CLOSE FOLLOWING A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SYSTEM SIGNAL; THEREFORE, THE ASSOCIATED ECCS PUMP WOULD NOT PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION. THE POSTULATED FAILURE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANOTHER POSTULATED SINGLE FAILURE, COULD CAUSE A LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION FOR THE ECCS SYSTEM.
AFTER BEING INSTALLED.
W2 SWITCH WAS SUPPLIED TO ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION BY WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION. A SAFETY RELATED W2 SWITCH DRAWN FROM STOCK DID NOT OPERATE SATISFACTORILY AFTER BEING INSTALLED IN THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD FOR USE AS THE CONTROL SWITCH FOR SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1C (1/SIP1 C2). THE SWITCH DID WORK PROPERLY BEFORE INSTALLATION IN THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD POSITION. HOWEVER, SUBSEQUENT TO INSTALLATION THE SWITCH MECHANISM WOULD BIND AND WOULD NOT SPRING RETURN TO THE "AFTER CLOSE" OR "AFTER TRIP" POSITIONS. THE SWITCH IS EXPECTED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY IN BOTH POSITIONS.
THE SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD CREATED BY THE SWITCH POTENTIALLY BEING STUCK IN THE "TRIP" POSITION IS THAT THE ASSOCIATED ECCS PUMP BREAKER WOULD NOT AUTO-CLOSE FOLLOWING A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SYSTEM SIGNAL; THEREFORE, THE ASSOCIATED ECCS PUMP WOULD NOT PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION. THE POSTULATED FAILURE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANOTHER POSTULATED SINGLE FAILURE, COULD CAUSE A LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION FOR THE ECCS SYSTEM.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36262
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM BROOK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM BROOK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/05/1999
Notification Time: 09:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/1999
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/1999
Notification Time: 09:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/1999
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE.
DURING DRILLING OPERATIONS TO INSTALL HILTI BOLTS IN THE HPCI ROOM, A WORKER LEANED UP AGAINST AN OIL LINE AND CAUSED AN OIL LEAK. THE LEAK WAS ESTIMATED WITH NO PRESSURE TO BE AT 60 DROPS PER MINUTE. HPCI WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.E.2 (7 DAY LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION) . ALL OTHER EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC), AND THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS ARE FULLY OPERABLE.
THE NRC RESIDENT WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
DURING DRILLING OPERATIONS TO INSTALL HILTI BOLTS IN THE HPCI ROOM, A WORKER LEANED UP AGAINST AN OIL LINE AND CAUSED AN OIL LEAK. THE LEAK WAS ESTIMATED WITH NO PRESSURE TO BE AT 60 DROPS PER MINUTE. HPCI WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.E.2 (7 DAY LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION) . ALL OTHER EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC), AND THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS ARE FULLY OPERABLE.
THE NRC RESIDENT WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.