Event Notification Report for September 24, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/23/1999 - 09/24/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
36230362233622636227
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36230
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/25/1999
Notification Time: 12:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/1999
Event Time: 20:10 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/1999
Notification Time: 12:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/1999
Event Time: 20:10 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE YANDELL (R4)
LAWRENCE YANDELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24 HOUR REPORT UNDER CONDITION OF LICENSE REGARDING FOR UNUSUAL FISH KILL
A periodic heat treatment, the temperature of the intake structure is raised in order to limit biological fouling. After the heat treatment a fish kill was discovered. The total weight, 4800 pounds, is greater than the reporting limit of 4500 pounds.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspection.
A periodic heat treatment, the temperature of the intake structure is raised in order to limit biological fouling. After the heat treatment a fish kill was discovered. The total weight, 4800 pounds, is greater than the reporting limit of 4500 pounds.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspection.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36223
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE GWIRTZ
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE GWIRTZ
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 11:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/1999
Event Time: 07:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 11:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/1999
Event Time: 07:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
CONTAINMENT GASEOUS ACTIVITY MONITOR ALARM DURING DETENSIONING OF THE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD IN PREPARATION FOR A HEAD LIFT
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 0754, with normal maintenance activities in progress, the 1R12A, [which is] the containment gaseous activity monitor, went into alarm. The alarm setpoint is two times background per technical specifications, and [it] is set at 135 counts per minute. The containment purge and pressure relief valves were already closed, so no actuations occurred, although this was a valid signal. Other containment area monitors showed no rise in activity levels other than one [local] area monitor on [the] 78 elevation which showed a slight increase. No release [is in] progress. We will continue to monitor levels and investigate the source of the increase."
The licensee stated that the normal maintenance activities in progress at the time of the alarm involved detensioning of the reactor vessel head in preparation for a head lift. The unit is not currently in a technical specification limiting condition for operation as a result of this event due to the current mode of operation (Refueling).
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 0754, with normal maintenance activities in progress, the 1R12A, [which is] the containment gaseous activity monitor, went into alarm. The alarm setpoint is two times background per technical specifications, and [it] is set at 135 counts per minute. The containment purge and pressure relief valves were already closed, so no actuations occurred, although this was a valid signal. Other containment area monitors showed no rise in activity levels other than one [local] area monitor on [the] 78 elevation which showed a slight increase. No release [is in] progress. We will continue to monitor levels and investigate the source of the increase."
The licensee stated that the normal maintenance activities in progress at the time of the alarm involved detensioning of the reactor vessel head in preparation for a head lift. The unit is not currently in a technical specification limiting condition for operation as a result of this event due to the current mode of operation (Refueling).
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36226
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/1999
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
VENTILATION DAMPER FOUND TO FAIL OPEN INSTEAD OF CLOSED
"During an engineering review of an industry event it was determined that a design flaw of a ventilation damper that feeds the Aux electric equipment room fails open instead of failing closed. With this valve failing open it introduces 15000 CFM of air to the AEER and causes it to become positive in pressure with respect to the control room emergency zone. This allows a leak path into the control room and can affect the dose to the control room operators. Compensatory measures are being planned that will gag closed this damper to rectify the problem."
The gagging of the damper is the temporary fix, a long term fix is being investigated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1927 EDT ON 9/25/99 BY BRIAN SAMPSON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
Upon further review of the damper operation by Dresden Operations and Engineering personnel, it was determined that the damper in question will fail closed, which is the desired position for post-accident conditions. Therefore the condition is not outside design basis, and is not reportable. This event report is retracted.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Roger Lanksbury) has been notified.
"During an engineering review of an industry event it was determined that a design flaw of a ventilation damper that feeds the Aux electric equipment room fails open instead of failing closed. With this valve failing open it introduces 15000 CFM of air to the AEER and causes it to become positive in pressure with respect to the control room emergency zone. This allows a leak path into the control room and can affect the dose to the control room operators. Compensatory measures are being planned that will gag closed this damper to rectify the problem."
The gagging of the damper is the temporary fix, a long term fix is being investigated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1927 EDT ON 9/25/99 BY BRIAN SAMPSON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
Upon further review of the damper operation by Dresden Operations and Engineering personnel, it was determined that the damper in question will fail closed, which is the desired position for post-accident conditions. Therefore the condition is not outside design basis, and is not reportable. This event report is retracted.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Roger Lanksbury) has been notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36227
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RICK LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RICK LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 17:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/1999
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Notification Time: 17:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/1999
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
JOHN SURMEIER (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
JOHN SURMEIER (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
4 HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT
"ON 9/24/99 AT 1330 AN ANALYSIS OF A TACKY TEXTURED SUBSTANCE FOUND IN THE SIDE PURGE PIPING DURING REPAIRS TO THIS SYSTEM REVEALS A URANIUM COMPOUND THAT IS UNPRECEDENTED IN CASCADE OPERATIONS. THE COMPOUND UO2CL(OH).2H2O HAS A H/U RATIO OF 5. THE ASSUMED PROCESS MODERATION CONDITION FOR NCSA-PLANT 062.AO2 HAS BEEN EXCEEDED, RESULTING IN A LOSS OF ONE LEG OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY. THE OTHER LEG OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY (MASS CONTROL) HAS BEEN MAINTAINED.
"THIS IS REPORTABLE PER NRC BL 91-01 FOR 'OCCURRENCE OF ANY UNANTICIPATED OR UNANALYZED EVENT FOR WHICH THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RE-ESTABLISH DOUBLE CONTINGENCY ARE NOT READILY IDENTIFIABLE..
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"THE PRESENCE OF UO2CL(0H).2H2O (H/U = 5) RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF MODERATION CONTROL IN THE SECTION OF THE SIDE PURGE PIPING WHERE THE COMPOUND IS PRESENT (i.e., THE ASSUMED NORMAL MODERATION PROCESS CONDITION WAS EXCEEDED.) THE PREDOMINANT ENRICHMENT OF URANIUM-BEARING MATERIAL INSIDE THE PIPE IS APPROXIMATELY 6%. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO GREATER THAN SAFE MASS DEPOSITS IN THE AREA NEAR THIS MATERIAL, NOR IS THERE A POTENTIAL FOR DEPOSIT MOVEMENT (e.g., VIA FLAKING) WHICH COULD CREATE A GREATER THAN SAFE MASS DEPOSIT. THEREFORE, MASS CONTROL IS STILL MAINTAINED, AND A CRITICALITY CANNOT OCCUR WITHOUT THE ADDITION OF MORE URANIUM MASS. THIS IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IF NOT INCREDIBLE BECAUSE THE SIDE PURGE CASCADE PIPING IS CURRENTLY ISOLATED FROM THE OPERATING CASCADE, AND IS AT A HIGHER PRESSURE THAN THE SURROUNDING OPERATING EQUIPMENT. THE FORMATION OF THIS COMPOUND WAS ONLY POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE CONDITIONS PRESENT DURING THE X-326 FIRE; THEREFORE, OTHER CASCADE EQUIPMENT IS NOT IMPACTED BY THE PRESENCE OF THIS COMPOUND. BASED ON THIS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IS LOW.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR);
"THE ONLY WAY THAT A CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR IS IF ADDITIONAL URANIUM MASS IS ADDED TO THE SIDE PURGE PIPE, CREATING A GREATER THAN SAFE MASS DEPOSIT. AS DISCUSSED ABOVE, THIS IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IF NOT INCREDIBLE BECAUSE THE SIDE PURGE. CASCADE PIPING IS CURRENTLY ISOLATED FROM THE OPERATING CASCADE, AND IS AT A HIGHER PRESSURE THAN THE SURROUNDING OPERATING EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, A VALVING ERROR WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR AT THE SAME TIME AS A MAJOR CASCADE UPSET CAUSING INCREASED PRESSURES IN THE SURROUNDING OPERATING CASCADE EQUIPMENT. IN ORDER FOR THE MORE MASS TO ENTER THIS
PIPE.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"MASS MAINTAINED, MODERATION-LOST
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"THE PREDOMINANT ENRICHMENT OF THE MATERIAL IN THE PIPE IS APPROXIMATELY 6%. THE COMPOUND OF CONCERN IS IN THE FORM OF UO2CL(OH).2H2O (H/U=5). THE MASS OF THE LARGEST DEPOSIT IN THE AREA IS APPROXIMATELY 159 GRAMS 235U, WHICH IS WELL BELOW A SAFE MASS OF 740 GRAMS 235U. THE SAFE MASS ASSUMES 6% ENRICHMENT OPTIMUM SPHERICAL GEOMETRY OPTIMUM MODERATION, AND FULL REFLECTION, AND INCLUDES A SAFETY MARGIN OF APPROXIMATELY A FACTOR OF 2 FROM THE ACTUAL CRITICAL MASS.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"THE NCSA PROVIDES CONTROLS ON MASS AND MODERATION. THE PRESENCE OF UO2CL(OH).2H2O (H/U=5) RESULTS TS IN A LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE PROCESS CONDITION. MASS CONTROLS WERE MAINTAINED.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"THE FOLLOWING CORRECTIONS ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN: AREA WILL REMAIN BOUNDARIED, NCSA-PLANT 062 MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES WILL REMAIN SUSPENDED, AND NCS WILL DEVELOP AN NCSA TO COVER THIS OPERATION."
"ON 9/24/99 AT 1330 AN ANALYSIS OF A TACKY TEXTURED SUBSTANCE FOUND IN THE SIDE PURGE PIPING DURING REPAIRS TO THIS SYSTEM REVEALS A URANIUM COMPOUND THAT IS UNPRECEDENTED IN CASCADE OPERATIONS. THE COMPOUND UO2CL(OH).2H2O HAS A H/U RATIO OF 5. THE ASSUMED PROCESS MODERATION CONDITION FOR NCSA-PLANT 062.AO2 HAS BEEN EXCEEDED, RESULTING IN A LOSS OF ONE LEG OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY. THE OTHER LEG OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY (MASS CONTROL) HAS BEEN MAINTAINED.
"THIS IS REPORTABLE PER NRC BL 91-01 FOR 'OCCURRENCE OF ANY UNANTICIPATED OR UNANALYZED EVENT FOR WHICH THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RE-ESTABLISH DOUBLE CONTINGENCY ARE NOT READILY IDENTIFIABLE..
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"THE PRESENCE OF UO2CL(0H).2H2O (H/U = 5) RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF MODERATION CONTROL IN THE SECTION OF THE SIDE PURGE PIPING WHERE THE COMPOUND IS PRESENT (i.e., THE ASSUMED NORMAL MODERATION PROCESS CONDITION WAS EXCEEDED.) THE PREDOMINANT ENRICHMENT OF URANIUM-BEARING MATERIAL INSIDE THE PIPE IS APPROXIMATELY 6%. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO GREATER THAN SAFE MASS DEPOSITS IN THE AREA NEAR THIS MATERIAL, NOR IS THERE A POTENTIAL FOR DEPOSIT MOVEMENT (e.g., VIA FLAKING) WHICH COULD CREATE A GREATER THAN SAFE MASS DEPOSIT. THEREFORE, MASS CONTROL IS STILL MAINTAINED, AND A CRITICALITY CANNOT OCCUR WITHOUT THE ADDITION OF MORE URANIUM MASS. THIS IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IF NOT INCREDIBLE BECAUSE THE SIDE PURGE CASCADE PIPING IS CURRENTLY ISOLATED FROM THE OPERATING CASCADE, AND IS AT A HIGHER PRESSURE THAN THE SURROUNDING OPERATING EQUIPMENT. THE FORMATION OF THIS COMPOUND WAS ONLY POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE CONDITIONS PRESENT DURING THE X-326 FIRE; THEREFORE, OTHER CASCADE EQUIPMENT IS NOT IMPACTED BY THE PRESENCE OF THIS COMPOUND. BASED ON THIS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IS LOW.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR);
"THE ONLY WAY THAT A CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR IS IF ADDITIONAL URANIUM MASS IS ADDED TO THE SIDE PURGE PIPE, CREATING A GREATER THAN SAFE MASS DEPOSIT. AS DISCUSSED ABOVE, THIS IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IF NOT INCREDIBLE BECAUSE THE SIDE PURGE. CASCADE PIPING IS CURRENTLY ISOLATED FROM THE OPERATING CASCADE, AND IS AT A HIGHER PRESSURE THAN THE SURROUNDING OPERATING EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, A VALVING ERROR WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR AT THE SAME TIME AS A MAJOR CASCADE UPSET CAUSING INCREASED PRESSURES IN THE SURROUNDING OPERATING CASCADE EQUIPMENT. IN ORDER FOR THE MORE MASS TO ENTER THIS
PIPE.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"MASS MAINTAINED, MODERATION-LOST
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
"THE PREDOMINANT ENRICHMENT OF THE MATERIAL IN THE PIPE IS APPROXIMATELY 6%. THE COMPOUND OF CONCERN IS IN THE FORM OF UO2CL(OH).2H2O (H/U=5). THE MASS OF THE LARGEST DEPOSIT IN THE AREA IS APPROXIMATELY 159 GRAMS 235U, WHICH IS WELL BELOW A SAFE MASS OF 740 GRAMS 235U. THE SAFE MASS ASSUMES 6% ENRICHMENT OPTIMUM SPHERICAL GEOMETRY OPTIMUM MODERATION, AND FULL REFLECTION, AND INCLUDES A SAFETY MARGIN OF APPROXIMATELY A FACTOR OF 2 FROM THE ACTUAL CRITICAL MASS.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"THE NCSA PROVIDES CONTROLS ON MASS AND MODERATION. THE PRESENCE OF UO2CL(OH).2H2O (H/U=5) RESULTS TS IN A LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE PROCESS CONDITION. MASS CONTROLS WERE MAINTAINED.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"THE FOLLOWING CORRECTIONS ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN: AREA WILL REMAIN BOUNDARIED, NCSA-PLANT 062 MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES WILL REMAIN SUSPENDED, AND NCS WILL DEVELOP AN NCSA TO COVER THIS OPERATION."