Event Notification Report for September 22, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/21/1999 - 09/22/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
362103621136212362133621536318
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36210
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: SANJEEV ARAB
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: SANJEEV ARAB
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/22/1999
Notification Time: 09:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 08:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/1999
Notification Time: 09:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 08:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
JOHN DAVIDSON, IAT (NMSS)
JOE GIITTER (IRO)
JIM LYONS, EO (NRR)
R. ROSANO, IAT (NRR)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
JOHN DAVIDSON, IAT (NMSS)
JOE GIITTER (IRO)
JIM LYONS, EO (NRR)
R. ROSANO, IAT (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
ACTUAL INTRODUCTION OF CONTRABAND INTO A PROTECTED AREA. CONTRABAND DISCOVERED BY VISITING WORKERS. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF NOTIFIED.
NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT.
SEE HOO LOG BOOK FOR FURTHER DETAILS.
NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT.
SEE HOO LOG BOOK FOR FURTHER DETAILS.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36211
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: THOMAS O'MEARA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: THOMAS O'MEARA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/22/1999
Notification Time: 10:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 09:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/1999
Notification Time: 10:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 09:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
JIM LYONS (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
JIM LYONS (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNIT 1 WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER
Planned maintenance was being performed on the feeder breaker to non-vital Motor Control Center # 116. While the feeder breaker was being worked on, Motor Control Centers # 116 and # 106 were tied together through one tie breaker. The amps limits for the tie breaker were misinterpreted in the procedure and the feeder breaker that was supplying Motor Control Centers # 116 and # 106 tripped on overcurrent (The operators that performed the evolution verified that each Motor Control Center was less than 500 amps but the total for both Motor Control Centers was greater than 500 amps). The normal feeder tripped open on the feed that was supplying both Motor Control Centers. The loss of power to the Motor Control Centers caused a loss of control oil to both Main Feedwater Pumps and a loss of oil to the Main Condenser air removal pumps. The loss of both Main Feedwater pumps caused a loss of feedwater to the both Steam Generators. Both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started. The licensee manually tripped the reactor before the reactor would have automatically tripped on low Steam Generator Water Level. All rods fully inserted into the core. The loss of the oil pumps to the Main Condenser air removal pumps caused a loss of condenser vacuum. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed due to the loss of condenser vacuum. At the present time, the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and the Steam Generator Atmospheric valves are maintaining the plant in Hot Standby. The licensee said that they have a very small Steam Generator tube leak on Unit 1, but there is no detectable release.
All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Calvert County of the reactor trip.
* * * UPDATE AT 2026 EDT 0N 9/23/99 BY MONTY SECKENS TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"Unit 1 is at normal operating temperature and pressure and being maintained in hot stand-by. Preliminary results are that the normal feeder breaker to non-vital Motor Control Center (MCC) 106 tripped. MCC 116 was tied to MCC 106 for maintenance on MCC 116's feeder breaker. The direct cause of the feeder breaker tripping was the actual current through the breaker was approximately 690 amps. This value is sufficient to cause the amp detector long-time delay to start timing the circuit breaker function as designed. The reason the actual current was above the procedure limit of 500 amps was that the readings were taken incorrectly and only half the current was measured. There are two conductors per phase feeding MCC's 116 and 106. A technician used a clamp-on amp meter for the procedure but only measured one of the two conductors. The design curve specifies that the breaker should trip at 18 minutes at 690 amps and this is precisely what occurred.
"Vacuum has been reestablished and the plant is back on main feedwater, therefore, aux feedwater is now in stand-by. At the present main feedwater and turbine by-pass valves steaming to the condenser are maintaining the plant in hot stand-by. Preparations for reactor start-up are in progress."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Robert Summers) has been informed.
Planned maintenance was being performed on the feeder breaker to non-vital Motor Control Center # 116. While the feeder breaker was being worked on, Motor Control Centers # 116 and # 106 were tied together through one tie breaker. The amps limits for the tie breaker were misinterpreted in the procedure and the feeder breaker that was supplying Motor Control Centers # 116 and # 106 tripped on overcurrent (The operators that performed the evolution verified that each Motor Control Center was less than 500 amps but the total for both Motor Control Centers was greater than 500 amps). The normal feeder tripped open on the feed that was supplying both Motor Control Centers. The loss of power to the Motor Control Centers caused a loss of control oil to both Main Feedwater Pumps and a loss of oil to the Main Condenser air removal pumps. The loss of both Main Feedwater pumps caused a loss of feedwater to the both Steam Generators. Both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started. The licensee manually tripped the reactor before the reactor would have automatically tripped on low Steam Generator Water Level. All rods fully inserted into the core. The loss of the oil pumps to the Main Condenser air removal pumps caused a loss of condenser vacuum. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed due to the loss of condenser vacuum. At the present time, the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and the Steam Generator Atmospheric valves are maintaining the plant in Hot Standby. The licensee said that they have a very small Steam Generator tube leak on Unit 1, but there is no detectable release.
All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Calvert County of the reactor trip.
* * * UPDATE AT 2026 EDT 0N 9/23/99 BY MONTY SECKENS TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"Unit 1 is at normal operating temperature and pressure and being maintained in hot stand-by. Preliminary results are that the normal feeder breaker to non-vital Motor Control Center (MCC) 106 tripped. MCC 116 was tied to MCC 106 for maintenance on MCC 116's feeder breaker. The direct cause of the feeder breaker tripping was the actual current through the breaker was approximately 690 amps. This value is sufficient to cause the amp detector long-time delay to start timing the circuit breaker function as designed. The reason the actual current was above the procedure limit of 500 amps was that the readings were taken incorrectly and only half the current was measured. There are two conductors per phase feeding MCC's 116 and 106. A technician used a clamp-on amp meter for the procedure but only measured one of the two conductors. The design curve specifies that the breaker should trip at 18 minutes at 690 amps and this is precisely what occurred.
"Vacuum has been reestablished and the plant is back on main feedwater, therefore, aux feedwater is now in stand-by. At the present main feedwater and turbine by-pass valves steaming to the condenser are maintaining the plant in hot stand-by. Preparations for reactor start-up are in progress."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Robert Summers) has been informed.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36212
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DICK LUCKETT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DICK LUCKETT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 09/22/1999
Notification Time: 14:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 09:32 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/1999
Notification Time: 14:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 09:32 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOSEPH TAPIA (R4)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
JOSEPH TAPIA (R4)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
- AUTO REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKING THE UNIT 1 500 KV LINE -
At 0932 PDT on 09/22/99, lightning struck the Unit 1 500 kV line in the plant switchyard causing the unit output breakers to trip open and caused a full load rejection. The Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped from 100% power due to an overtemperature differential temperature (OTdT) trip signal. All control rods inserted completely. A pressurizer power operated relief valve lifted, as expected, and immediately reseated. Steam is being dumped to the main condenser. The auxiliary feedwater system auto started, as expected. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Offsite power remained available throughout this event. There were no personnel injuries. Plant personnel are walking the plant down for any damage. The lighting strike had minimal impact on Unit 2 which remained at 100% power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 0932 PDT on 09/22/99, lightning struck the Unit 1 500 kV line in the plant switchyard causing the unit output breakers to trip open and caused a full load rejection. The Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped from 100% power due to an overtemperature differential temperature (OTdT) trip signal. All control rods inserted completely. A pressurizer power operated relief valve lifted, as expected, and immediately reseated. Steam is being dumped to the main condenser. The auxiliary feedwater system auto started, as expected. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Offsite power remained available throughout this event. There were no personnel injuries. Plant personnel are walking the plant down for any damage. The lighting strike had minimal impact on Unit 2 which remained at 100% power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36213
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KEN GRACIA
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KEN GRACIA
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 09/22/1999
Notification Time: 17:56 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/1999
Notification Time: 17:56 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
- EDG ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANELS INOPERABLE DUE TO UNISOLATED CIRCUIT -
At 1730 on 09/22/99, the emergency diesel generator (EDG) alternate shutdown (ASD) panels were declared inoperable based upon engineering evaluation. A circuit for wattmeter indication from the EDGs in the main control room is not isolated by the ASD panels. This places the ASD panels for the EDGs outside the plant design basis. In case of a fire in the cable spreading room, this circuit being energized could affect EDG operation during performance of ASD from outside the main control room.
Short term corrective action is to revise procedure(s) to have operators isolate the affected relays when needed. Long term corrective action is being evaluated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to notify state officials.
At 1730 on 09/22/99, the emergency diesel generator (EDG) alternate shutdown (ASD) panels were declared inoperable based upon engineering evaluation. A circuit for wattmeter indication from the EDGs in the main control room is not isolated by the ASD panels. This places the ASD panels for the EDGs outside the plant design basis. In case of a fire in the cable spreading room, this circuit being energized could affect EDG operation during performance of ASD from outside the main control room.
Short term corrective action is to revise procedure(s) to have operators isolate the affected relays when needed. Long term corrective action is being evaluated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to notify state officials.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36215
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: McLAUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: McLAUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/23/1999
Notification Time: 03:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 23:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/1999
Notification Time: 03:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 23:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation |
DIVISION 3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR TRIPPED ON OVER SPEED DURING MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE TESTING.
While performing monthly surveillance start of the High Pressure Core Spray system Emergency Diesel Generator, the Diesel automatically tripped off on an overspeed signal. The diesel does not appear to have been damaged but remains shutdown and unavailable for on-going investigation of the failure. The High Pressure Core Spray system is inoperable but available from normal power source only. The failure mechanism is being investigated and corrective actions will be performed. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling pump and all other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are also fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1756ET ON 10/25/99 BY R HASTY TAKEN BY MACKINNON* * *
Preliminary troubleshooting on the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator determined that the cause of the overspeed trip was that the governor synchronizer speed setting was at its mechanical high-speed stop. It was not known when the governor synchronizer speed setting had reached that position, so an ENS call was made per 10 CFR 50.72.
A thorough investigation has been performed. The investigation has determined that the most probable cause of the event was a mechanical failure of the local governor control switch. This switch is only in the governor control circuit when the governor control is in local manual, which indicates that the failure occurred during the initial start sequence, after the diesel generator was out of service for the surveillance test. In addition, the local governor control switch is bypassed when in remote manual, switch is required for standby conditions and operability of the diesel generator.
Since the failure occurred after the diesel generator was out of service, and was identified and repaired in 31 hours, well within the 14 day Technical Specification allowed outage time, it has been determined that this event is not reportable to the NRC, and this event notification is being retracted. R3DO (Mike Jordan) notified.
The NRC Resident was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
While performing monthly surveillance start of the High Pressure Core Spray system Emergency Diesel Generator, the Diesel automatically tripped off on an overspeed signal. The diesel does not appear to have been damaged but remains shutdown and unavailable for on-going investigation of the failure. The High Pressure Core Spray system is inoperable but available from normal power source only. The failure mechanism is being investigated and corrective actions will be performed. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling pump and all other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are also fully operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1756ET ON 10/25/99 BY R HASTY TAKEN BY MACKINNON* * *
Preliminary troubleshooting on the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator determined that the cause of the overspeed trip was that the governor synchronizer speed setting was at its mechanical high-speed stop. It was not known when the governor synchronizer speed setting had reached that position, so an ENS call was made per 10 CFR 50.72.
A thorough investigation has been performed. The investigation has determined that the most probable cause of the event was a mechanical failure of the local governor control switch. This switch is only in the governor control circuit when the governor control is in local manual, which indicates that the failure occurred during the initial start sequence, after the diesel generator was out of service for the surveillance test. In addition, the local governor control switch is bypassed when in remote manual, switch is required for standby conditions and operability of the diesel generator.
Since the failure occurred after the diesel generator was out of service, and was identified and repaired in 31 hours, well within the 14 day Technical Specification allowed outage time, it has been determined that this event is not reportable to the NRC, and this event notification is being retracted. R3DO (Mike Jordan) notified.
The NRC Resident was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36318
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: C. F. MEYER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: C. F. MEYER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 10:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/1999
Event Time: 10:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO OPEN DOORS
"On September 22, 1999 at about 1050, personnel were painting the double doors that adjoins the east side of the control room. Both the inner and outer doors were opened to facilitate the painting of the edges of the doors. The Shift Superintendent noticed that both doors were open and confirmed that only one door should be opened at a time. The doors were attended by personnel who had been directed to open only one door at a time and to close the doors when directed. Control room operators were aware of the need to notify the door attendants to close the doors in the event of a Control Room Isolation. Shortly thereafter the doors were closed.
"Both Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREFS) trains for both units were affected by the open doors for a period of approximately 9 minutes.
"On October 20, 1999 at 1025 EDT, after further review of the event, it was determined that this represents a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident since opening the doors affects the ability of the CREFS units to create a positive pressure.
"Additional review of this event is continuing."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
"On September 22, 1999 at about 1050, personnel were painting the double doors that adjoins the east side of the control room. Both the inner and outer doors were opened to facilitate the painting of the edges of the doors. The Shift Superintendent noticed that both doors were open and confirmed that only one door should be opened at a time. The doors were attended by personnel who had been directed to open only one door at a time and to close the doors when directed. Control room operators were aware of the need to notify the door attendants to close the doors in the event of a Control Room Isolation. Shortly thereafter the doors were closed.
"Both Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREFS) trains for both units were affected by the open doors for a period of approximately 9 minutes.
"On October 20, 1999 at 1025 EDT, after further review of the event, it was determined that this represents a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident since opening the doors affects the ability of the CREFS units to create a positive pressure.
"Additional review of this event is continuing."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.