Event Notification Report for September 10, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/09/1999 - 09/10/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
3614436145361463636836209
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36144
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETER ABBOTT
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETER ABBOTT
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/10/1999
Notification Time: 12:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/1999
Event Time: 08:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/1999
Notification Time: 12:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/1999
Event Time: 08:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO INOPERABLE TRIP MODULE.
During routine High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system temperature isolation logic testing, an isolation trip module was found to be inoperable. Per Technical Specification requirements, the HPCI system steam supply primary containment isolation outboard valves must be closed within four hours. This renders the HPCI system inoperable. The isolation valves were closed and deactivated at 1153 EDT.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
During routine High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system temperature isolation logic testing, an isolation trip module was found to be inoperable. Per Technical Specification requirements, the HPCI system steam supply primary containment isolation outboard valves must be closed within four hours. This renders the HPCI system inoperable. The isolation valves were closed and deactivated at 1153 EDT.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36145
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL TESORIERO
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL TESORIERO
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/10/1999
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/1999
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
TOM MOSLAK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 87 | Power Operation | 86 | Power Operation |
PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO PINHOLE LEAK IN THE ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM.
At approximately 1400 hours on September 10, 1999, a plant shutdown was commenced as scheduled to enter a refueling outage. The ENS notification is being made because a portion of the Essential Service Water (SW) header was declared inoperable at approximately 1215 hours. A pinhole leak on 18 inch SW pipe number 408 was evaluated using the guidance of Generic Letter 90-05 and it was determined that the SW pipe could not be declared operable using the criteria provided in the Generic Letter. Concurrent with the planned shutdown, Technical Specification 3.3.F.2 requires the reactor be brought to the cold shutdown condition starting no later than 12 hours after the SW pipe was declared inoperable. The SW pipe will be repaired prior to plant startup.
The SW pipe leak is located outside containment and can not be isolated for repairs until the plant is in cold shutdown. The SW pipe supplies the containment Fan Cooler units which are required by Technical Specifications. The leak rate is I to 2 drops per minute.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1354 EDT ON 10/1/99 BY BRIAN ROKES TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"The New York Power Authority (NYPA) is withdrawing the 1 hour non-emergency report made at 1453 hours,
on September 10, 1999 (ENS Log No. 36145). The report identified that a 18 inch Service Water (SW) pipe,
comprising a portion of the essential header outside containment, contained a pin hole leak that could not meet
the operability criteria of Generic Letter 90-05. The SW pipe supplies the containment Fan Cooler Units. The
inoperable SW pipe could not be isolated for repairs until the plant was in cold shutdown.
"Upon further assessment NYPA determined that this event is not reportable. A revised calculation of the
structural integrity of the pipe using the pipe stresses at the exact location of the weld with a through-wall flaw
(pin hole) determined the piping was operable using the guidelines of NRC GL 90-05. The new calculation
supersedes the original calculation which was performed conservatively by using a stress value enveloping two
stress points on the pipe that resulted in the use of a higher stress value. The through-wall flaw occurred when
the pipe weld was ground down for a Ultrasonic Testing. The UT was planned based on an Radiographic Test previously performed in RO 9. It was required and is standard industry practice to grind the weld flat for a proper straight beam UT. As part of NYPA's corrective action program, the cause and extent of condition of the through-wall flaw in a weld of SW piping is being evaluated and any repairs required will be performed before start-up from the current outage
(RO 10)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (David Silk) has been notified.
At approximately 1400 hours on September 10, 1999, a plant shutdown was commenced as scheduled to enter a refueling outage. The ENS notification is being made because a portion of the Essential Service Water (SW) header was declared inoperable at approximately 1215 hours. A pinhole leak on 18 inch SW pipe number 408 was evaluated using the guidance of Generic Letter 90-05 and it was determined that the SW pipe could not be declared operable using the criteria provided in the Generic Letter. Concurrent with the planned shutdown, Technical Specification 3.3.F.2 requires the reactor be brought to the cold shutdown condition starting no later than 12 hours after the SW pipe was declared inoperable. The SW pipe will be repaired prior to plant startup.
The SW pipe leak is located outside containment and can not be isolated for repairs until the plant is in cold shutdown. The SW pipe supplies the containment Fan Cooler units which are required by Technical Specifications. The leak rate is I to 2 drops per minute.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1354 EDT ON 10/1/99 BY BRIAN ROKES TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"The New York Power Authority (NYPA) is withdrawing the 1 hour non-emergency report made at 1453 hours,
on September 10, 1999 (ENS Log No. 36145). The report identified that a 18 inch Service Water (SW) pipe,
comprising a portion of the essential header outside containment, contained a pin hole leak that could not meet
the operability criteria of Generic Letter 90-05. The SW pipe supplies the containment Fan Cooler Units. The
inoperable SW pipe could not be isolated for repairs until the plant was in cold shutdown.
"Upon further assessment NYPA determined that this event is not reportable. A revised calculation of the
structural integrity of the pipe using the pipe stresses at the exact location of the weld with a through-wall flaw
(pin hole) determined the piping was operable using the guidelines of NRC GL 90-05. The new calculation
supersedes the original calculation which was performed conservatively by using a stress value enveloping two
stress points on the pipe that resulted in the use of a higher stress value. The through-wall flaw occurred when
the pipe weld was ground down for a Ultrasonic Testing. The UT was planned based on an Radiographic Test previously performed in RO 9. It was required and is standard industry practice to grind the weld flat for a proper straight beam UT. As part of NYPA's corrective action program, the cause and extent of condition of the through-wall flaw in a weld of SW piping is being evaluated and any repairs required will be performed before start-up from the current outage
(RO 10)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (David Silk) has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36146
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: NEAL BERNARD
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: NEAL BERNARD
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/10/1999
Notification Time: 21:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/1999
Event Time: 19:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/1999
Notification Time: 21:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/1999
Event Time: 19:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND FEEDWATER ACTUATION DUE TO RCP 2B SEAL FAILURE.
The licensee performed a manual reactor trip due to failure of the Reactor Coolant Pump 2B seals. Emergency feedwater actuated following the trip. All control rods fully inserted. No relief valves or safety valves opened and excess energy is being released via steam to the main condenser. RCP 2B was secured following the trip. RCP 2B seal pressures are significantly lower than normal and seal leakoff flow is also low. The plant is in hot standby and stable. The licensee plans to go to cold shutdown to repair the RCP.
The NRC resident was notified.
The licensee performed a manual reactor trip due to failure of the Reactor Coolant Pump 2B seals. Emergency feedwater actuated following the trip. All control rods fully inserted. No relief valves or safety valves opened and excess energy is being released via steam to the main condenser. RCP 2B was secured following the trip. RCP 2B seal pressures are significantly lower than normal and seal leakoff flow is also low. The plant is in hot standby and stable. The licensee plans to go to cold shutdown to repair the RCP.
The NRC resident was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36368
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DARYL CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DARYL CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 10/28/1999
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/1999
Event Time: 14:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/1999
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/1999
Event Time: 14:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - HIGH CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM FLOW
On September 10, 1999, while performing the Control Room Emergency Filtration System monthly surveillance, the system flow rate was found to be 2317 scfm. The required Tech Spec flow rate is 2000 scfm +/-10%. The condition was immediately corrected at the time of discovery by repositioning the ventilation damper. This event is still being evaluated by the licensee.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
On September 10, 1999, while performing the Control Room Emergency Filtration System monthly surveillance, the system flow rate was found to be 2317 scfm. The required Tech Spec flow rate is 2000 scfm +/-10%. The condition was immediately corrected at the time of discovery by repositioning the ventilation damper. This event is still being evaluated by the licensee.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36209
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DARYL CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DARYL CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 09/21/1999
Notification Time: 20:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/1999
Event Time: 14:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/1999
Notification Time: 20:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/1999
Event Time: 14:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
-CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM INOP DUE TO FAILING ITS SURVEILLANCE TEST-
At 1440 CDT on 09/10/99, while performing the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System monthly surveillance test, the system flow rate was found to be 2317 scfm. The required tech spec flow rate is 2000 scfm +/- 10%. The licensee declared the CREF System inoperable per Tech Spec 3.8.D and entered a 7 day LCO. This event is being reported to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D), a condition that prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
The licensee declared the CREF System operable 40 minutes later after adjusting the air flow.
The licensee is continuing to evaluate the reportability of this issue.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION 2158 10/8/1999 FROM LECHMAIER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"This report is a retraction of the ENS call made on 9/21/99 concerning the Control Room Emergency Filtration System. We have completed our evaluation and have determined that the high flow rate condition found would not have prevented the system from performing its intended function. Therefore, this event is not reportable with respect to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii).
"The system damper that was previously repositioned on 9/1/99 was the cause of this high flow. This condition is prohibited by Technical Specifications (LCO exceeded) and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(I)(B)."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R3DO (Jacobson).
At 1440 CDT on 09/10/99, while performing the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System monthly surveillance test, the system flow rate was found to be 2317 scfm. The required tech spec flow rate is 2000 scfm +/- 10%. The licensee declared the CREF System inoperable per Tech Spec 3.8.D and entered a 7 day LCO. This event is being reported to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D), a condition that prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
The licensee declared the CREF System operable 40 minutes later after adjusting the air flow.
The licensee is continuing to evaluate the reportability of this issue.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION 2158 10/8/1999 FROM LECHMAIER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"This report is a retraction of the ENS call made on 9/21/99 concerning the Control Room Emergency Filtration System. We have completed our evaluation and have determined that the high flow rate condition found would not have prevented the system from performing its intended function. Therefore, this event is not reportable with respect to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii).
"The system damper that was previously repositioned on 9/1/99 was the cause of this high flow. This condition is prohibited by Technical Specifications (LCO exceeded) and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(I)(B)."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R3DO (Jacobson).