Event Notification Report for September 02, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/01/1999 - 09/02/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
36113361143611536116361173611836120
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36113
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KURT SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KURT SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/02/1999
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/1999
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
MICROFILTRATION SYSTEM pH PROBES OUT OF TOLERANCE
On 9/1/99 at 1300 hours, the plant shift superintendent was notified that a previously discovered X-705 Microfiltration System (MFS) pH probe out of tolerance condition likely existed during a time period when the MFS was in operation. The out of tolerance condition was in a non-conservative direction and previously documented during a routine weekly surveillance on 6/4/99. During the engineering evaluation, it was concluded at 1000 hours on 9/2/99, that the out of tolerance condition likely existed from approximately 5/28/99 to 6/4/99.
The out of tolerance condition affected 2 of the 3 probes (2 out of 3 logic required to activate the safety system). The as found data for the 2 probes indicated they would actuate at 6.70 pH and 6.63 pH, which is below the 7 pH required setpoint. A review of MFS operational history indicated that the MFS pH was maintained above a 7 pH during the time the probes are suspected to have been out of tolerance.
There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE 1452EDT ON 9/2/99 FROM KURT SISLER TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following is a portion of information provided as an update to include classification of the event as a 24-hour 91-01 Bulletin report:
"Upon further review of [the] X-705 Microfiltration System pH probe failure, it was determined to be reportable per NRC Bulletin 91-01 criteria.
"Safety Significance:
"Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three logic for system actuation. The probes read 7.30 and 7.37 for a buffer solution which had a pH of approximately 7.0 (depending on the temperature). NCSA-0705_015.A10 takes credit for these pH probes in satisfying the double contingency principle. Active engineered feature #5 states 'Microfiltration effluent pH shutdown system will automatically stop the flow of microfilter permeate to the T-105 tank if pH<7.0 (with an allowable test tolerance of -0.2), by closing both isolation valves automatically.' Since the probes were overestimating the pH, a pH of as low as approximately 6.70 could be present without an actuation of the system.
"Contingency event B.4.2 credits the effluent pH shutdown system in preventing dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry tank downstream). Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a low pH making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of the pH adjustment system. Therefore, the out of tolerance condition in a non-conservative direction constitutes a loss of one criticality control in a double contingency system.
"The discussion for B.4.2 includes the following, 'Based on chemical reactions and calculations in POEF-340-98-113, it would require an extremely low pH (in the range of approximately 4 to 5) before the resulting solution would pick up any appreciable amounts (i.e., milligrams per liter) of uranium. However, this level of uranium is well below the individually always safe concentration limit reported in GAT-225, Rev. 4, of 5000 ppm U-235 for 100% enriched solution.' Based on the as-found tolerances, a pH of 6.70 would have caused the system to actuate. Therefore, this event has a low safety significance.
"Potential Criticality Pathways involved (Brief scenario(s) of how criticality could occur):
"Event B.4.2.a credits the effluent pH shutdown system in preventing dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry tank downstream). Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a low pH making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of the pH adjustment system. Both a failure in the pH shutdown system and the unlikely event of a low pH following pH adjustment would have to occur for this scenario to take place.
"Controlled parameters:
"The prevention of acidic solutions from entering the microfiltration modules maintains the uranium in the filters in a favorable geometry, rather than picking up uranium in addition to the safe batch being processed. Therefore, geometry is controlled.
"Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material (include process limit and % worst case of critical mass):
"The operation is approved for 100% U-235; however, only USEC material (maximum 10% U-235 has been processed recently. The microfiltration process is controlled such that only a safe mass of U-235 is present in any unfavorable geometry. Operational information indicates that the pH was never less than 7.0 during the time the system was potentially out of calibration
"Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls(s) or control system(s) and description of failures or deficiencies:
"Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three logic for system actuation. The system is relied on to keep unmeasured quantities of uranium (from the microfilter modules) from entering an unfavorable geometry tank.
"Therefore, the failure of the pH shutdown system (due to out of calibration probes or any reason) is an analyzed condition."
The HOO notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS (Piccone).
* * * UPDATE AT 2257 ON 09//22/99 BY JOE HALCOMB TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * *
A MORE DETAILED REVIEW OF THE pH PROBE OPERATING HISTORY AND AS-FOUND CALIBRATIONS WAS CONDUCTED TO FURTHER ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A HIGH DELTA pH CONDITION. THIS REVIEW REVEALED THAT THE DELTA pH BETWEEN THE THREE pH PROBES IS NOT AN INDICATOR THAT THE PROBES ARE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE REVIEW NOTED THAT THERE IS NO CORRELATION BETWEEN THE DELTA pH AND AS-FOUND CALIBRATION RESULTS. BASED ON THIS FINDING, THE ORIGINAL BASIS FOR DETERMINING THAT THE JUNE 4 OUT-OF-TOLERANCE CONDITION WAS A REPORTABLE EVENT IS NO LONGER VALID. THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW
ARE DOCUMENTED IN EVAL-PS-1999-0567, REV 0.
BASED ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION, THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION, (PTS-1999-074), SHOULD BE RETRACTED.
PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO ROGER LANKSBURY AND NMSS EO JOHN SURMEIER.
On 9/1/99 at 1300 hours, the plant shift superintendent was notified that a previously discovered X-705 Microfiltration System (MFS) pH probe out of tolerance condition likely existed during a time period when the MFS was in operation. The out of tolerance condition was in a non-conservative direction and previously documented during a routine weekly surveillance on 6/4/99. During the engineering evaluation, it was concluded at 1000 hours on 9/2/99, that the out of tolerance condition likely existed from approximately 5/28/99 to 6/4/99.
The out of tolerance condition affected 2 of the 3 probes (2 out of 3 logic required to activate the safety system). The as found data for the 2 probes indicated they would actuate at 6.70 pH and 6.63 pH, which is below the 7 pH required setpoint. A review of MFS operational history indicated that the MFS pH was maintained above a 7 pH during the time the probes are suspected to have been out of tolerance.
There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE 1452EDT ON 9/2/99 FROM KURT SISLER TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following is a portion of information provided as an update to include classification of the event as a 24-hour 91-01 Bulletin report:
"Upon further review of [the] X-705 Microfiltration System pH probe failure, it was determined to be reportable per NRC Bulletin 91-01 criteria.
"Safety Significance:
"Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three logic for system actuation. The probes read 7.30 and 7.37 for a buffer solution which had a pH of approximately 7.0 (depending on the temperature). NCSA-0705_015.A10 takes credit for these pH probes in satisfying the double contingency principle. Active engineered feature #5 states 'Microfiltration effluent pH shutdown system will automatically stop the flow of microfilter permeate to the T-105 tank if pH<7.0 (with an allowable test tolerance of -0.2), by closing both isolation valves automatically.' Since the probes were overestimating the pH, a pH of as low as approximately 6.70 could be present without an actuation of the system.
"Contingency event B.4.2 credits the effluent pH shutdown system in preventing dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry tank downstream). Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a low pH making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of the pH adjustment system. Therefore, the out of tolerance condition in a non-conservative direction constitutes a loss of one criticality control in a double contingency system.
"The discussion for B.4.2 includes the following, 'Based on chemical reactions and calculations in POEF-340-98-113, it would require an extremely low pH (in the range of approximately 4 to 5) before the resulting solution would pick up any appreciable amounts (i.e., milligrams per liter) of uranium. However, this level of uranium is well below the individually always safe concentration limit reported in GAT-225, Rev. 4, of 5000 ppm U-235 for 100% enriched solution.' Based on the as-found tolerances, a pH of 6.70 would have caused the system to actuate. Therefore, this event has a low safety significance.
"Potential Criticality Pathways involved (Brief scenario(s) of how criticality could occur):
"Event B.4.2.a credits the effluent pH shutdown system in preventing dissolved uranium past the microfilters (to an unsafe geometry tank downstream). Also credited is the unlikely event of solution with a low pH making it to the microfiltration modules due to the functioning of the pH adjustment system. Both a failure in the pH shutdown system and the unlikely event of a low pH following pH adjustment would have to occur for this scenario to take place.
"Controlled parameters:
"The prevention of acidic solutions from entering the microfiltration modules maintains the uranium in the filters in a favorable geometry, rather than picking up uranium in addition to the safe batch being processed. Therefore, geometry is controlled.
"Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material (include process limit and % worst case of critical mass):
"The operation is approved for 100% U-235; however, only USEC material (maximum 10% U-235 has been processed recently. The microfiltration process is controlled such that only a safe mass of U-235 is present in any unfavorable geometry. Operational information indicates that the pH was never less than 7.0 during the time the system was potentially out of calibration
"Nuclear Criticality Safety Controls(s) or control system(s) and description of failures or deficiencies:
"Two out of three safety system pH probes used in the microfiltration system were found to be out of tolerance. The system relies on a two-out-of-three logic for system actuation. The system is relied on to keep unmeasured quantities of uranium (from the microfilter modules) from entering an unfavorable geometry tank.
"Therefore, the failure of the pH shutdown system (due to out of calibration probes or any reason) is an analyzed condition."
The HOO notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS (Piccone).
* * * UPDATE AT 2257 ON 09//22/99 BY JOE HALCOMB TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * *
A MORE DETAILED REVIEW OF THE pH PROBE OPERATING HISTORY AND AS-FOUND CALIBRATIONS WAS CONDUCTED TO FURTHER ASSESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A HIGH DELTA pH CONDITION. THIS REVIEW REVEALED THAT THE DELTA pH BETWEEN THE THREE pH PROBES IS NOT AN INDICATOR THAT THE PROBES ARE OUT OF TOLERANCE. THE REVIEW NOTED THAT THERE IS NO CORRELATION BETWEEN THE DELTA pH AND AS-FOUND CALIBRATION RESULTS. BASED ON THIS FINDING, THE ORIGINAL BASIS FOR DETERMINING THAT THE JUNE 4 OUT-OF-TOLERANCE CONDITION WAS A REPORTABLE EVENT IS NO LONGER VALID. THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW
ARE DOCUMENTED IN EVAL-PS-1999-0567, REV 0.
BASED ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION, THIS EVENT NOTIFICATION, (PTS-1999-074), SHOULD BE RETRACTED.
PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO ROGER LANKSBURY AND NMSS EO JOHN SURMEIER.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36114
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: D. COVEYOU
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: D. COVEYOU
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/02/1999
Notification Time: 13:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 10:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/1999
Notification Time: 13:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 10:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
RPS ACTUATION - REACTOR SCRAM
At 1036 CDT on 9/2/99, Unit 1 received an RPS Automatic Actuation. The actuation occurred due to low water level (12.5 inches, Level 3) resulting from a feedwater transient. The lowest level noted was -10 inches on the wide range recorders. No ECCS actuations occurred or were required during the transient. All systems operated as designed except as described below: During the auxiliary power fast bus transfer the Unit 1 station air compressor surged and was subsequently restored, the 0C clean condensate pump tripped and the 0A clean condensate pump was started, the 1A and 1C circulating water pumps tripped, the 1B circulating water pump remained running, actions are being taken to restart the 1A circulating water pump and a delay is being encountered restoring the 345 kV ring bus due to difficulties in opening the main power transformer disconnects.
All rods inserted and no safety relief valves lifted.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
*** UPDATE 1610 EDT on 9/3/99 FROM COVEYOU TO POERTNER ***
The 1A and 1C circulation water pump trips are understood and restoration is in progress. The Main Power Transformer disconnects have been adjusted/repaired and the 345 kV ring bus was restored at 1005 CDT September 3, 1999. The root cause for the event was a personnel error. A non-licensed operator inappropriately restored the feedwater hydraulic control oil switch alignment to normal for the inservice loop, resulting in the feedwater transient that caused the low-level scram. Corrective actions are in progress and will be included in the 30 day written License Event Report per 10CFR50.73. Preparations are being made for Unit 1 start up late today, September 3, 1999.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
Notified R3DO (HILLS).
At 1036 CDT on 9/2/99, Unit 1 received an RPS Automatic Actuation. The actuation occurred due to low water level (12.5 inches, Level 3) resulting from a feedwater transient. The lowest level noted was -10 inches on the wide range recorders. No ECCS actuations occurred or were required during the transient. All systems operated as designed except as described below: During the auxiliary power fast bus transfer the Unit 1 station air compressor surged and was subsequently restored, the 0C clean condensate pump tripped and the 0A clean condensate pump was started, the 1A and 1C circulating water pumps tripped, the 1B circulating water pump remained running, actions are being taken to restart the 1A circulating water pump and a delay is being encountered restoring the 345 kV ring bus due to difficulties in opening the main power transformer disconnects.
All rods inserted and no safety relief valves lifted.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
*** UPDATE 1610 EDT on 9/3/99 FROM COVEYOU TO POERTNER ***
The 1A and 1C circulation water pump trips are understood and restoration is in progress. The Main Power Transformer disconnects have been adjusted/repaired and the 345 kV ring bus was restored at 1005 CDT September 3, 1999. The root cause for the event was a personnel error. A non-licensed operator inappropriately restored the feedwater hydraulic control oil switch alignment to normal for the inservice loop, resulting in the feedwater transient that caused the low-level scram. Corrective actions are in progress and will be included in the 30 day written License Event Report per 10CFR50.73. Preparations are being made for Unit 1 start up late today, September 3, 1999.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
Notified R3DO (HILLS).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36115
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/02/1999
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 11:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/1999
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 11:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ESF ACTUATION - PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) GROUP III ISOLATION
At 1143, on 9/2/99, the control room received a PCIS Group III isolation. A Group III isolation isolates all drywell atmospheric valves and reactor building ventilation. Standby gas treatment started. The cause of the isolation was the west refuel floor radiation monitor failing upscale. The actuation is considered invalid.
Local radiation readings were verified less than 1 mR/hr. New fuel inspections will be secured prior to resetting the Group III isolation to allow reestablishing drywell to torus differential pressure which had been broken for vacuum breaker testing prior to the isolation.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
At 1143, on 9/2/99, the control room received a PCIS Group III isolation. A Group III isolation isolates all drywell atmospheric valves and reactor building ventilation. Standby gas treatment started. The cause of the isolation was the west refuel floor radiation monitor failing upscale. The actuation is considered invalid.
Local radiation readings were verified less than 1 mR/hr. New fuel inspections will be secured prior to resetting the Group III isolation to allow reestablishing drywell to torus differential pressure which had been broken for vacuum breaker testing prior to the isolation.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36116
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN RAMSEY
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN RAMSEY
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/02/1999
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 11:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/1999
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 11:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
TAD MARSH (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
At 1158 CDT, 9/2/99, the National Earthquake Information Center, Golden Colorado, reported that an earthquake occurred at 1117 CDT with an epicenter approximately 30 miles from the site. It was reported the earthquake occurred approximately 10 miles SSE of Dixon, Illinois at a magnitude of 3.5 on the Richter scale. Some minor tremors were felt by site personnel. There was no impact on plant operations. Plant seismic instrumentation did not detect this event. The instrumentation was tested and verified operable. At approximately 1400 CDT a presentation was made to the local media to address questions they had.
The NRC resident has been notified.
At 1158 CDT, 9/2/99, the National Earthquake Information Center, Golden Colorado, reported that an earthquake occurred at 1117 CDT with an epicenter approximately 30 miles from the site. It was reported the earthquake occurred approximately 10 miles SSE of Dixon, Illinois at a magnitude of 3.5 on the Richter scale. Some minor tremors were felt by site personnel. There was no impact on plant operations. Plant seismic instrumentation did not detect this event. The instrumentation was tested and verified operable. At approximately 1400 CDT a presentation was made to the local media to address questions they had.
The NRC resident has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36117
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GREG JANAK
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GREG JANAK
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/02/1999
Notification Time: 17:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/1999
Notification Time: 17:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24 HOUR REPORT - CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE VENTILATION SYSTEM MAKEUP UNIT TRAIN 'C' INOPERABLE
South Texas Project made the following notification per NPF-076, Section 2G:
Carbon samples obtained from control room envelope ventilation system makeup unit train 'C' failed laboratory tests. The Technical Specification 4.7.7.c.2 limit of 1% for methyl iodine penetration was exceeded. The as found methyl iodine penetration results were 2.87%. This results in the train 'C' control room envelope system being inoperable since the time that the carbon samples were obtained on August 23, 1999 at 0940 CDT. This results in the system being inoperable for greater than 7 days which is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.7 action a. The sample results were obtained on September 1, 1999 at 0935 CDT.
The charcoal adsorber banks for train 'C' control room envelope system have been replaced and testing is in progress to verify system operability.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
South Texas Project made the following notification per NPF-076, Section 2G:
Carbon samples obtained from control room envelope ventilation system makeup unit train 'C' failed laboratory tests. The Technical Specification 4.7.7.c.2 limit of 1% for methyl iodine penetration was exceeded. The as found methyl iodine penetration results were 2.87%. This results in the train 'C' control room envelope system being inoperable since the time that the carbon samples were obtained on August 23, 1999 at 0940 CDT. This results in the system being inoperable for greater than 7 days which is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.7 action a. The sample results were obtained on September 1, 1999 at 0935 CDT.
The charcoal adsorber banks for train 'C' control room envelope system have been replaced and testing is in progress to verify system operability.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36118
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL BOWERS
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL BOWERS
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/02/1999
Notification Time: 19:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/1999
Notification Time: 19:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ACCIDENT MITIGATION
On 03/15/99 and 04/29/99, surveillance test STS AE-001, Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Accumulator Discharge Test, was performed using a digital temperature indicator that was subsequently found to be out of calibration. The surveillance test ensures the nitrogen pre-charge is sufficient to close the main feedwater isolation valves. With the out-of-calibration temperature indication, the nitrogen pre-charge may not have been adequate to close the valves. The surveillance test is performed monthly and has subsequently been performed using calibrated instruments. The feedwater isolation valves are currently operable.
The NRC resident inspector will be notified by the licensee.
******** UPDATE AT 1337 EDT ON 09/16/99 FROM ROBERT SHANE FERGUSON TO LEIGH TROCINE *******
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Further investigation showed that the temperature instrument used was broken not out of calibration and was functioning properly when the initial test was completed for the red train. A new pyrometer was used on the second train test. The results of the test were reviewed and were not out of range. Therefore, there were no operability concerns, and the testing was satisfactory."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Andrews).
On 03/15/99 and 04/29/99, surveillance test STS AE-001, Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Accumulator Discharge Test, was performed using a digital temperature indicator that was subsequently found to be out of calibration. The surveillance test ensures the nitrogen pre-charge is sufficient to close the main feedwater isolation valves. With the out-of-calibration temperature indication, the nitrogen pre-charge may not have been adequate to close the valves. The surveillance test is performed monthly and has subsequently been performed using calibrated instruments. The feedwater isolation valves are currently operable.
The NRC resident inspector will be notified by the licensee.
******** UPDATE AT 1337 EDT ON 09/16/99 FROM ROBERT SHANE FERGUSON TO LEIGH TROCINE *******
The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Further investigation showed that the temperature instrument used was broken not out of calibration and was functioning properly when the initial test was completed for the red train. A new pyrometer was used on the second train test. The results of the test were reviewed and were not out of range. Therefore, there were no operability concerns, and the testing was satisfactory."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Andrews).
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36120
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MIKE UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MIKE UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 09/02/1999
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 12:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/1999
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/1999
Event Time: 12:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE 76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS 76.120(c)(2)(iii) - REDUNDANT EQUIP INOP
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE 76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS 76.120(c)(2)(iii) - REDUNDANT EQUIP INOP
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
24 HOUR REPORT - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
At 1257 CDT on 9/2/99, during performance of a proceduralized simulated power failure test, the main breaker to the Unit 2 battery room tripped. In addition, the transformer secondary breakers on all four auxiliary substations tripped due to undervoltage relay action. As a result of the loss of power to the four auxiliary substations, three plant air compressors on-line in the C-335 air plant were deenergized. The unplanned loss of the C-335 air compressors caused the on-line plant air compressor capacity to drop to 6500 SCFM which is below the 10,250 SCFM required to ensure plant Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) audibility. CAAS detectability was not affected. CAAS TSR LCO actions for inaudibility were initiated for affected facilities C-310, C-331, C-333, C-333A, C-335, C-337, C-337A, C-360, C-400, and C-409. The plant air capacity was restored to above 10,250 SCFM at 1300 hours by placing standby air compressors in service. The CAAS was declared operable at 1312 hours and the LCOs were exited.
The licensee is still investigating the cause of the event.
This event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as a event in which equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
At 1257 CDT on 9/2/99, during performance of a proceduralized simulated power failure test, the main breaker to the Unit 2 battery room tripped. In addition, the transformer secondary breakers on all four auxiliary substations tripped due to undervoltage relay action. As a result of the loss of power to the four auxiliary substations, three plant air compressors on-line in the C-335 air plant were deenergized. The unplanned loss of the C-335 air compressors caused the on-line plant air compressor capacity to drop to 6500 SCFM which is below the 10,250 SCFM required to ensure plant Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) audibility. CAAS detectability was not affected. CAAS TSR LCO actions for inaudibility were initiated for affected facilities C-310, C-331, C-333, C-333A, C-335, C-337, C-337A, C-360, C-400, and C-409. The plant air capacity was restored to above 10,250 SCFM at 1300 hours by placing standby air compressors in service. The CAAS was declared operable at 1312 hours and the LCOs were exited.
The licensee is still investigating the cause of the event.
This event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as a event in which equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.