Event Notification Report for August 25, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/24/1999 - 08/25/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
3606836070360733607436351
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36068
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/25/1999
Notification Time: 04:29 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/1999
Event Time: 01:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/1999
Notification Time: 04:29 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/1999
Event Time: 01:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNEXPECTED HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM SUCTION SWAPOVER DURING ROUTINE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR TESTING
While using the "Diesel Generator Undervoltage Test Auto Start Switch" to start the 'B' emergency diesel generator as part of a routine surveillance test, an unexpected high pressure coolant injection system suction swapover occurred, and three valves actuated to swap the suction from the condensate storage tank (normal) to the torus. Apparently, a low spike was received on both the DC1 system and condensate storage tank level when the "Diesel Generator Undervoltage Test Auto Start Switch" was operated. After the condensate storage tank and torus levels were verified to be normal, the licensee swapped the high pressure coolant injection suction back to its normal lineup. The licensee is currently investigating the cause of this transient.
The 'B' emergency diesel generator started as expected.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and the State of Vermont.
* * * RETRACTION 1205 9/13/1999 FROM DENNIS MAY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"Section 3.3.2 of NUREG 1022, rev. 1, states, 'Usually, the staff would not consider this [reporting criterion] to include single component actuations because single components of complex systems, by themselves, usually do not mitigate thc consequences of significant events.'
"VY evaluated the conditions that were present at the time of the automatic transfer. VY concluded that the automatic transfer occurred independent of the EDG start. The transfer occurred due to a spurious low condensate storage tank level indication spike, not an ESF initiating signal. A single component, the HPCI CST Suction Isolation Valve responded to that spurious signal. The two Torus (Suppression Pool) suction isolation valves then responded as designed to the CST Suction isolation valve 'not full open' indication. The CST suction was immediately capable of being reopened, were it to have been needed.
"The 'not reportable' conclusion is based upon thc fact that the cited action, the automatic closure of the HPCI CST Suction Isolation Valve, and the appropriate opening of the Torus Suction isolation valves, would not mitigate the consequences of an event. Therefore, this is not a condition requiring an ENS notification or an LER relative to ESF actuations."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Della Greca).
While using the "Diesel Generator Undervoltage Test Auto Start Switch" to start the 'B' emergency diesel generator as part of a routine surveillance test, an unexpected high pressure coolant injection system suction swapover occurred, and three valves actuated to swap the suction from the condensate storage tank (normal) to the torus. Apparently, a low spike was received on both the DC1 system and condensate storage tank level when the "Diesel Generator Undervoltage Test Auto Start Switch" was operated. After the condensate storage tank and torus levels were verified to be normal, the licensee swapped the high pressure coolant injection suction back to its normal lineup. The licensee is currently investigating the cause of this transient.
The 'B' emergency diesel generator started as expected.
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and the State of Vermont.
* * * RETRACTION 1205 9/13/1999 FROM DENNIS MAY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"Section 3.3.2 of NUREG 1022, rev. 1, states, 'Usually, the staff would not consider this [reporting criterion] to include single component actuations because single components of complex systems, by themselves, usually do not mitigate thc consequences of significant events.'
"VY evaluated the conditions that were present at the time of the automatic transfer. VY concluded that the automatic transfer occurred independent of the EDG start. The transfer occurred due to a spurious low condensate storage tank level indication spike, not an ESF initiating signal. A single component, the HPCI CST Suction Isolation Valve responded to that spurious signal. The two Torus (Suppression Pool) suction isolation valves then responded as designed to the CST Suction isolation valve 'not full open' indication. The CST suction was immediately capable of being reopened, were it to have been needed.
"The 'not reportable' conclusion is based upon thc fact that the cited action, the automatic closure of the HPCI CST Suction Isolation Valve, and the appropriate opening of the Torus Suction isolation valves, would not mitigate the consequences of an event. Therefore, this is not a condition requiring an ENS notification or an LER relative to ESF actuations."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Della Greca).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36070
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK SCHAFFER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK SCHAFFER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 08/25/1999
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/1999
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/1999
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/1999
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT
A LICENSEE SUPERVISOR WAS DETERMINED TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE DURING A FOR-CAUSE FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST. THE INDIVIDUAL'S PLANT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION WAS TERMINATED. THE INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN REFERRED TO THE LICENSEE FITNESS-FOR-DUTY PROGRAM. CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.
THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
A LICENSEE SUPERVISOR WAS DETERMINED TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE DURING A FOR-CAUSE FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST. THE INDIVIDUAL'S PLANT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION WAS TERMINATED. THE INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN REFERRED TO THE LICENSEE FITNESS-FOR-DUTY PROGRAM. CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.
THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36073
Rep Org: CD TECHNOLOGIES
Licensee: CD TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 1
City: CONSHOHOCKEN State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY KINDEN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: CD TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 1
City: CONSHOHOCKEN State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY KINDEN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 08/25/1999
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/1999
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
RICHARD WESSMAN (NRR)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
PHIL HARRELL (R4)
RICHARD WESSMAN (NRR)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
10CFR PART 21 REPORT DUE TO SAFETY RELATED LEAD ACID BATTERY CELL NONCONFORMANCE
A nonconformance within LCR-25 safety related lead acid battery cells manufactured by C&D for Nebraska Public Power District's (NPPD's) Cooper Nuclear facility has been discovered. The cells were purchased by NPPD and they reported to C&D that they have seen growth in the positive plates within some cells and at least one cell was removed when a short developed. Analysis of the cells has been completed by C&D, in conjunction with NPPD personnel, showing nonconforming levels of calcium within the positive grid alloy.
To the best of C&D's knowledge, no other utility has been effected by this nonconformance besides NPPD.
A final evaluation will be delivered to the NRC and to effected utilities within 30 days.
A nonconformance within LCR-25 safety related lead acid battery cells manufactured by C&D for Nebraska Public Power District's (NPPD's) Cooper Nuclear facility has been discovered. The cells were purchased by NPPD and they reported to C&D that they have seen growth in the positive plates within some cells and at least one cell was removed when a short developed. Analysis of the cells has been completed by C&D, in conjunction with NPPD personnel, showing nonconforming levels of calcium within the positive grid alloy.
To the best of C&D's knowledge, no other utility has been effected by this nonconformance besides NPPD.
A final evaluation will be delivered to the NRC and to effected utilities within 30 days.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36074
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RON CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RON CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 08/26/1999
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/1999
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/1999
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/1999
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
BULLETIN 91-01 24-HOUR REPORT
On 8/25/99 at 1030 hours, X-705 Operations personnel discovered that a leaching screen basket for the small parts handtables did not meet the dimensional requirements of NCSA-0705-012. The NCSA requires dimensions of 3.75 inches wide by 24 inches long by 6 inches deep. Additionally, an overflow container for the Group 2 handtable was 18.5 inches tall, while the NCSA requires a maximum height of 17 inches. The Group 2 handtable is presently out of service. This resulted in the loss of one control (geometry) of the double contingency principle. The second (interaction) was maintained. An NCS anomalous condition was entered, and the affected equipment was tagged out of service by 1045 hours; at which time, the controls of NCSA-0705-012 were restored, and the anomalous condition was exited.
The loss of the NCS double contingency principle constitutes a 24-hour reportable event in accordance with NRC Bulletin 91-01.
There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
On 8/25/99 at 1030 hours, X-705 Operations personnel discovered that a leaching screen basket for the small parts handtables did not meet the dimensional requirements of NCSA-0705-012. The NCSA requires dimensions of 3.75 inches wide by 24 inches long by 6 inches deep. Additionally, an overflow container for the Group 2 handtable was 18.5 inches tall, while the NCSA requires a maximum height of 17 inches. The Group 2 handtable is presently out of service. This resulted in the loss of one control (geometry) of the double contingency principle. The second (interaction) was maintained. An NCS anomalous condition was entered, and the affected equipment was tagged out of service by 1045 hours; at which time, the controls of NCSA-0705-012 were restored, and the anomalous condition was exited.
The loss of the NCS double contingency principle constitutes a 24-hour reportable event in accordance with NRC Bulletin 91-01.
There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36351
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: K HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: K HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/1999
Event Time: 10:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/1999
Event Time: 10:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
MIKE JORDAN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) DECLARED INOPERABLE ON 08/26/99
The licensee is reviewing events from the past couple of years in which RCIC was declared inoperable. Control Room personnel were notified they should have reported events to the NRC over the last couple of years(per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D)) when RCIC was declared inoperable.
On 08/25/99 at 1020CT, while conducting post maintenance testing to return Unit 2 RCIC to operable status, the RCIC system turbine tripped on overspeed. RCIC was subsequently repaired and made operable on 08/26/99 at approximately 1500 hours. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems were fully operable during the time period RCIC was inoperable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
The licensee is reviewing events from the past couple of years in which RCIC was declared inoperable. Control Room personnel were notified they should have reported events to the NRC over the last couple of years(per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D)) when RCIC was declared inoperable.
On 08/25/99 at 1020CT, while conducting post maintenance testing to return Unit 2 RCIC to operable status, the RCIC system turbine tripped on overspeed. RCIC was subsequently repaired and made operable on 08/26/99 at approximately 1500 hours. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems were fully operable during the time period RCIC was inoperable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.