Event Notification Report for August 21, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/20/1999 - 08/21/1999
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36054
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE KOSHAR
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE KOSHAR
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/21/1999
Notification Time: 16:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/1999
Event Time: 15:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/1999
Notification Time: 16:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/1999
Event Time: 15:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
DISCOVERY THAT THE TECH SPEC ALLOWABLE LIMIT FOR DEGRADED BUS VOLTAGE SETTINGS MAY NOT PROTECT ALL SAFEGUARDS LOADS FROM THE EFFECTS OF AN UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION UNDER ALL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1305 [hours EDT on] 08/21/99, [the licensee] determined that the technical specification allowable limit for degraded bus voltage settings may not protect all safeguards loads from the effects of an undervoltage condition under all accident conditions. A recent calculation has verified that under certain plant conditions, the current degraded bus undervoltage settings are below that required to insure proper operation of equipment powered by our 600-volt safeguards buses. Safeguards loads on our 600-volt buses consists primarily of valves and ventilation equipment."
"Currently, both units are in a defueled condition. In the current mode, the degraded bus voltage function is not required. Also, since the safeguards buses are lightly loaded during shutdown conditions, the impact due to low grid voltage is low. An operability determination has been performed to demonstrate that the condition does not affect the operability of the safeguards buses while the plant is in a shutdown condition."
"Actions are in progress to correct the low degraded bus voltage settings as well as the limit specified in technical specifications."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1305 [hours EDT on] 08/21/99, [the licensee] determined that the technical specification allowable limit for degraded bus voltage settings may not protect all safeguards loads from the effects of an undervoltage condition under all accident conditions. A recent calculation has verified that under certain plant conditions, the current degraded bus undervoltage settings are below that required to insure proper operation of equipment powered by our 600-volt safeguards buses. Safeguards loads on our 600-volt buses consists primarily of valves and ventilation equipment."
"Currently, both units are in a defueled condition. In the current mode, the degraded bus voltage function is not required. Also, since the safeguards buses are lightly loaded during shutdown conditions, the impact due to low grid voltage is low. An operability determination has been performed to demonstrate that the condition does not affect the operability of the safeguards buses while the plant is in a shutdown condition."
"Actions are in progress to correct the low degraded bus voltage settings as well as the limit specified in technical specifications."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36056
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/22/1999
Notification Time: 02:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/1999
Event Time: 22:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/1999
Notification Time: 02:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/1999
Event Time: 22:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 78 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
THE PLANT HAD A REACTOR SCRAM AT 78% POWER ON A LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL SIGNAL.
AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM OCCURRED ON A LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL(LEVEL 3, 12.5") AND WAS THE RESULT OF A FEEDWATER TRANSIENT WHICH OCCURRED DURING A PLANNED LOAD REDUCTION(REDUCTION IN REACTOR POWER). DURING THE PLANNED POWER REDUCTION, OSCILLATIONS WERE NOTED ON THE REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMPS, SO THE REACTOR OPERATOR TOOK MANUAL CONTROL OF REACTOR WATER LEVEL IN AN ATTEMPT TO STABILIZE THE VESSEL LEVEL. MANUAL CONTROL OF THE REACTOR LEVEL FAILED TO CONTROL LEVEL AND THE LEVEL REACHED THE AUTOMATIC SCRAM SETPOINT OF LEVEL 3 AND THE AUTOMATIC SCRAM OCCURRED. THE REMAINDER OF THE PLANT RESPONDED AS EXPECTED AND LEVEL WAS RESTORED TO NORMAL BAND. ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED AND NO ECCS INJECTION OCCURRED OR SAFETY RELIEF VALVES LIFTED. THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT IS BEING INVESTIGATED.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.
AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM OCCURRED ON A LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL(LEVEL 3, 12.5") AND WAS THE RESULT OF A FEEDWATER TRANSIENT WHICH OCCURRED DURING A PLANNED LOAD REDUCTION(REDUCTION IN REACTOR POWER). DURING THE PLANNED POWER REDUCTION, OSCILLATIONS WERE NOTED ON THE REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMPS, SO THE REACTOR OPERATOR TOOK MANUAL CONTROL OF REACTOR WATER LEVEL IN AN ATTEMPT TO STABILIZE THE VESSEL LEVEL. MANUAL CONTROL OF THE REACTOR LEVEL FAILED TO CONTROL LEVEL AND THE LEVEL REACHED THE AUTOMATIC SCRAM SETPOINT OF LEVEL 3 AND THE AUTOMATIC SCRAM OCCURRED. THE REMAINDER OF THE PLANT RESPONDED AS EXPECTED AND LEVEL WAS RESTORED TO NORMAL BAND. ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED AND NO ECCS INJECTION OCCURRED OR SAFETY RELIEF VALVES LIFTED. THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT IS BEING INVESTIGATED.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36057
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/22/1999
Notification Time: 09:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/1999
Event Time: 19:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/1999
Notification Time: 09:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/1999
Event Time: 19:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
JOE HOLONICH (NMSS)
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
JOE HOLONICH (NMSS)
THE CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (CAAS) HORN DID NOT PASS TESTING CRITERIA.
At 1824 on 8/21/99, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that there may be a problem with a specific model of CAAS horn. During testing of the new CAAS system in C-746-Q. the 30 watt AC/DC CAAS horn did not pass the testing criteria for horn actuation time. (Currently the new CAAS horns in C-748-Q building are not inservice and the building is serviced by the old System which does lot use these 30 watt AC/DC horns and remains operable) ANSI/ANS 8.3 identities that the CAAS System shall automatically initiate an evacuation alarm signal within one half second of the alarm setpoint being exceeded. Preliminary testing Indicated that the 30 watt AC/DC CAAS horn will not actuate in the required time frame (it takes 0.6 - 0.9 seconds). The C-710 facility uses the 30 watt AC/DC CAAS horn in its current inservice configuration. During the initial investigation of this event, it was identified that when this type CAAS horn was installed in C-710, it was not tested for response time, however the 15 watt AC horns which are also installed in C-710 were tested within an acceptable time frame. At that time, engineering did not suspect a deviation in horn activation response time between the two different horn types. Since reasonable assurance of operability is not maintained for the 30 watt AC/DC CAAS horn, the C-710 building was declared inoperable at 1955 on 8/21/99.
This event is reportable as "equipment is disabled and equipment Is required by a TSR to be available and operable and no redundant equipment is available and operable".
Corrective actions have not yet been determined.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.
At 1824 on 8/21/99, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that there may be a problem with a specific model of CAAS horn. During testing of the new CAAS system in C-746-Q. the 30 watt AC/DC CAAS horn did not pass the testing criteria for horn actuation time. (Currently the new CAAS horns in C-748-Q building are not inservice and the building is serviced by the old System which does lot use these 30 watt AC/DC horns and remains operable) ANSI/ANS 8.3 identities that the CAAS System shall automatically initiate an evacuation alarm signal within one half second of the alarm setpoint being exceeded. Preliminary testing Indicated that the 30 watt AC/DC CAAS horn will not actuate in the required time frame (it takes 0.6 - 0.9 seconds). The C-710 facility uses the 30 watt AC/DC CAAS horn in its current inservice configuration. During the initial investigation of this event, it was identified that when this type CAAS horn was installed in C-710, it was not tested for response time, however the 15 watt AC horns which are also installed in C-710 were tested within an acceptable time frame. At that time, engineering did not suspect a deviation in horn activation response time between the two different horn types. Since reasonable assurance of operability is not maintained for the 30 watt AC/DC CAAS horn, the C-710 building was declared inoperable at 1955 on 8/21/99.
This event is reportable as "equipment is disabled and equipment Is required by a TSR to be available and operable and no redundant equipment is available and operable".
Corrective actions have not yet been determined.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.