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Event Notification Report for August 19, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/18/1999 - 08/19/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
3604436045360463604736048360433604136273

Power Reactor
Event Number: 36044
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GOETCHIUS
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 08/19/1999
Notification Time: 16:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/1999
Event Time: 15:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
PETER ESELGROTH (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS

During the course of design documentation review, a potential condition was identified where in the event of a loss of offsite power and a unit trip with a single failure of one DC supply train, the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) load sequence would begin early. This could result in some equipment starting and loading earlier than the design specifies.

Due to the probability of the failure, the existing operator procedurally driven responses, and initial review of the impact of potential loads on the EDG's, it is believed the EDG's are operable.

This condition would have no impact on plant response to any safety injection signal/sequencing.

A formal operability determination is underway and the plant plans to remain at full power.

The NRC resident inspector has been notified.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 36045
Rep Org: IDAHO NAT ENGR & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB
Licensee: IDAHO NAT ENGR & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS   State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SCHUM
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 08/19/1999
Notification Time: 16:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/1999
Event Time: 13:34 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
WILLIAM BEECHER (PAO)
YATES (DOE)
Event Text
DOE ALERT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE IN THE DESERT ON DOE CONTROLLED PROPERTY.

This event was classified as an alert at 1334 MDT in accordance with Department of Energy (DOE) procedures. This is not a classification driven by the Three Mile Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSI) emergency plan.

A range fire occurred on DOE controlled property. The Idaho Nuclear Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) fire department and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) are fighting the fire. The fire is not threatening any site area. The fire is presently located 12 miles east of the ISFSI facility and is traveling north, away from the facility. Eight BLM rigs are in route to the fire.

DOE made notifications per procedures to activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Emergency Control Center (ECC). DOE notified State and Local Authorities.

NRC assistance was not requested.

*** UPDATE AT 2039 EDT ON 8/20/99 FROM SCHUM TO POERTNER ***

The DOE Alert was terminated at 1833 MDT when the range fire was extinguished.

HOO notified R4DO (Howell), NMSS EO (Holonich), IRO (Giitter), PAO (Beecher), FEMA (Bagwell), HHS-CDC (Davis), EPA-NRC (Gauter), DOE (Young), and USDA (Conley)


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36046
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLIE KOCSIS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/19/1999
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/1999
Event Time: 12:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
PETER ESELGROTH (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT

AT 1215 ON 08/19/99, THE LICENSEE WAS NOTIFIED OF A CONFIRMED POSITIVE DRUG TEST RESULT FROM A RANDOM FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST ON A NON-LICENSED PLANT EMPLOYEE. THE LICENSEE WITHDREW THE EMPLOYEE'S PLANT UNESCORTED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION AND REFERRED THE EMPLOYEE TO THE LICENSEE FITNESS-FOR-DUTY PROGRAM. THE LICENSEE IS REVIEWING THE EMPLOYEE'S WORK HISTORY BACK TO APRIL 1999, THE LAST TIME THE EMPLOYEE HAD SATISFACTORILY PASSED A RANDOM FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36047
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2     State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: LISA HILBERT-SEMMES
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 08/19/1999
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/1999
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
Person (Organization):
KENNETH BARR (R2)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
SPENT FUEL STORAGE CASK SECONDARY SEAL LEAK AT THE SURRY INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION

At 1315 on 8/19/99, as a result of troubleshooting due to an intermittent low pressure alarm at the Surry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Facility, it was determined that a leak existed at the
secondary seal on Cask #I-24. The leak rate was measured at 5.8E-2 mbar-liter/sec which exceeds the ISFSI Tech Spec limit of 1E-6 mbar-liter/sec. This is a GNSI Castor X/33 cask that was placed at the Surry ISFSI Facility, Pad #1 in 1994. It has been verified that there is still pressure between the primary and secondary lids and there is no evidence of a leak from the cask fuel cavity. Radiation levels at the cask are normal. Investigation is ongoing to determine the cause and required corrective actions for this issue. Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are currently at 100% power. Pursuant to 10CFR72.75(b)(2) and (3), this event is being reported as a significant reduction in the effectiveness of a spent fuel storage confinement system during use.

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 36048
Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: HUNT REFINING COMPANY
Region: 2
City: TUSCALOOSA   State: AL
County:
License #: AL-683
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. McNESS
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 08/19/1999
Notification Time: 15:52 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/1999
Event Time: 13:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KENNETH BARR (R2)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF A FIRE AT HUNT REFINING COMPANY, TUSCALOOSA, ALABAMA, (AL Incident #99-11)

At 1335 on 08/18/99, Bobby Freeman, RSO at Hunt Refining Company, Alabama License No. 683, called the Alabama Radiation Control (ARC) and reported that there had been a fire at their plant around 1040 on 08/18/99 which lasted for about two hours. The fire had been in the vicinity of several Ohmart devices which contain Cs-137 radioactive sources. Mr. Freeman stated that none of the devices appeared to be melted or damaged when viewed from a few yards away. Mr. Freeman further informed ARC that a service technician from Ohmart was to arrive at approximately 1800 that evening to check out the gauges and that until that time the area within 12 to 15 feet of each device would be cordoned off.

Hunt Refining Company does not possess radiation detection meters nor are they licensed to repair, relocate or service the radioactive devices.

At approximately the same time as the notification from the licensee, ARC received a reciprocity notification from Ohmart, informing ARC that Ohmart was sending an employee to Hunt Refining Company to inspect and possibly repair or recover any damaged source holder(s) resulting from the fire.

The State of Alabama decided it was not necessary to send a representative to the site.

At the start of business on 08/19/99, ARC received reports from both the licensee and Ohmart, that on the evening of 08/18/99, the Ohmart representative inspected all radioactive devices in the area of the fire and found no structural damage or unusual radiation levels. One radiation detector located opposite the vessel from a radioactive source holder did sustain electrical wiring damage because of the fire and will be replaced.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36043
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLIE KOCIS
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 08/19/1999
Notification Time: 14:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/1999
Event Time: 11:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PETER ESELGROTH (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
BOTH MOTOR-DRIVEN AUXILIARY BOILER FEEDWATER PUMPS AUTO STARTED DURING SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES.

On August 19, 1999, at approximately 1158 EDT, both motor-driven auxiliary boiler feedwater pumps automatically started after exceeding their 28-second time delay during performance of the low-low steam generator water level section of procedure 3PT-M13B, "Reactor Protection Logic Channel Functional Test." The operators secured the pumps before discharge pressure exceeded steam generator pressure preventing them from feeding the steam generators. As a result, there was no positive reactivity addition. The operators anticipated these results because the test states in its precaution and limitations section that the pumps would start if the action required by the test is not completed within the 28-second time delay.

The NRC resident inspector has been notified by the licensee.

*************** UPDATE AT 1520 EDT ON 09/17/99 FROM BRIAN ROKES TO LEIGH TROCINE ***************

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"The [licensee] is withdrawing the 4-hour non-emergency notification made on August 19, 1999, at 1456 hours (ENS Log No. 36043). The notification reported the automatic starting of both motor-driven auxiliary boiler feedwater (AFW) Pumps after exceeding their start logic 28-second time delay during performance of the Low-Low Steam Generator Water Level section of procedure 3PT-M13B, 'Reactor Protection Logic Channel Functional Test,' as an engineered safety feature actuation."

"Upon further assessment, [the licensee] determined that this event is not reportable because the event meets the intent of the exception criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii)(A), which states, 'The actuation results from and is part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' Test 3PT-M13B intended to initiate the AFW pump start logic for both motor-driven AFW pumps and the steam-driven AFW pump for reasons other than to mitigate the consequences of an event. The intended result is to start the steam-driven AFW pump but to take action during the 28-second time delay to prevent the motor-driven AFW pumps from actually operating. Action is also taken to prevent the steam-driven AFW pump from delivering flow. Test 3PT-M13B expects the motor-driven pumps to operate if action is not taken within the 28-second delay time delay. The test requires coordination with an operator before proceeding with the test step that initiates the timer for auto start of the motor-driven AFW pumps. The test states that each of the test logic sequence actions must be completed within 28 seconds to prevent auto start of the motor-driven AFW pumps."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Della Greca).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36041
Facility: HADDAM NECK
Region: 1     State: CT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB MORGAN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 08/19/1999
Notification Time: 02:48 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/1999
Event Time: 01:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
PETER ESELGROTH (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF ONSITE CHEMICAL SPILL

The licensee notified the Connecticut state Environmental Protection Agency regarding an onsite spill of sodium hypochlorite. Approximately 50 gallons of 50% sodium hypochlorite solution leaked from a barrel in the turbine building. The licensee reported that the leakage has stopped, and that the solution is flowing into floor drains which connect to an isolated sump (the licensee has disabled pumpout capability). A hazardous materials contractor has been retained to clean up the spill. The licensee plans to contact the National Response Center regarding this event.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 36273
Rep Org: BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS, PLC
Licensee: BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS, PLC
Region: 0
City:   State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EUR ING MIKE R A SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/08/1999
Notification Time: 08:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/13/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
JOHN JACOBSON (R3)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
KEVIN RAMSEY (NMSS)
Event Text
10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE POTENTIAL FOR A CYLINDER (MANUFACTURED BY STARVELEY'S LIMITED AND SUPPLIED BY BNFL TO USEC FOR ENRICHMENT) TO BE OVERFILLED BECAUSE THE CERTIFIED WATER CAPACITY STAMPED ON THE CYLINDER IS LESS THAN THE SPECIFIED MINIMUM CAPACITY

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Eur Ing Mike R. A. Smith, MRA Smith BSc CEng MIES, Head of Magnox and Hex Business, British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL), Fuel Business Group:

"[10 CFR 21.21(4)(ii) - Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the U.S. which fails to comply or contains a defect:] 48Y Cylinder no. 1122/0690 containing 12,155.5 kg of UF6 supplied to [United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)] by BNFL Fuel for enrichment."

"[10 CFR 21.21(4)(iii) - Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:] Cylinder manufactured by Staveley's Limited, Manchester, England in 1978.

"[10 CFR 21.21(4)(iv) - Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:] The certified water capacity stamped on the cylinder as part of the name plate data is less than the minimum capacity specified in ANSI N14.1, Table 1, standard cylinder data for a 48Y cylinder. [The] required minimum capacity [is] 142.7 ft³[, and the] actual certified water capacity [is] 4,019 kg; equivalent to 142.1 ft³. The cylinder, in its current condition, represents no safety hazard since the actual contents of 2,155.5 kg of UF6 still allows a cylinder ullage of 7.2%. The cylinder has the potential to be overfilled if the normal maximum fill limit for a 48Y was reached (12,501 kg of UF6 as specified in ANSI N14.1)."

"[10 CFR 21.21(4)(v) - The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:] A memo was sent from USEC on 19 August 1999, informing BNFL Fuel that they had noted the certified water capacity was less than the ANSI-N14.1 minimum."

"[10 CFR 21.21(4)(vi) - In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part:] Cylinder 1122/0690 is one of a batch of 108 cylinders purchased from Staveleys in 1978. All other 48Y Type Cylinders 1122/0600 to 1122/0707 inclusive, numbering 107, are located on licensed sites in the UK."

"[10 CFR 21.21(4)(vii) - The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:] Having established that cylinder 1122/0690 is safe to feed; it is proposed to discuss with USEC the possibility of proceeding with the feed to their diffusion plant, as planned. Alternatively, should USEC be unwilling to proceed then concession will be sought to transfer the cylinder back to BNFL in the UK."

"Once emptied, the cylinder will be removed from service to prevent any possibility of a re-occurrence."

"The Head of Site at BNFL Springfields has commissioned a Working Party, which includes an independent senior engineer, independent senior operations manager, and standards/surveillance engineers."

"The Working Party:
a) Has already independently verified that there are no other under capacity cylinders located in the U.S.;
b) Will independently verify whether or not any other BNFL cylinders are under capacity;
c) In the event that the independent verification does reveal any further such defective cylinders, will initiate appropriate action to remove such cylinders from service;
d) Will monitor the implementation of any such actions through to completion;
e) [Has] already examined and modified BNFL's cylinder filling procedures to prevent an under capacity cylinder from being filled in the future; [and]
f) [Is] in the process of reviewing our cylinder purchase specification to prevent any further under capacity cylinders from being supplied."

"[10 CFR 21.21(4)(viii) - Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:] The UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) and Department of the Environment, Transport, and Regions (DETR) have been advised of this notification."

(Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.)

* * * UPDATE 10/13/1999 - This event notification is a followup to EN 36160, initially reported on 9/14/1999. * * *