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Event Notification Report for August 18, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/17/1999 - 08/18/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
3604236040

Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36042
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEITH WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 08/19/1999
Notification Time: 08:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/1999
Event Time: 09:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRENT CLAYTON (R3)
JOSIE PICCONE (NMSS)
Event Text
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT

"On 8/18/99 at approximately 0980 hours, Operations personnel repackaging Dry Active Waste (DAW) in the X-326 Process Building discovered a plastic bag which contained between one (1) and two (2) quarts of water in the DAW drum. During handling, the plastic bag broke spilling its contents into the DAW drum. The amount of water present in the DAW drum exceeded the one quart of liquid allowed by Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval #NCSA-PLANT018.A02, which constitutes a violation of the double contingency principle (loss of one control). The second control (mass) was maintained throughout this event. The loss of one NCSA control is reportable to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Notification Report.

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The water when initially found was in a plastic bag. There was no visible uranium in the drum, thus there was no method for the water to dissolve fissile material. After the bag containing the water broke, it ran through the material in the drum and collected on the bottom of the drum. Since there was no visible uranium In the drum, the liquid could not adsorb sufficient tissue material to cause a noticeably nor could it form a shape favorable for criticality. Thus this event has a low safety significance.

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): items containing visible uranium could be placed into a DAW drum in violation of a NCSA control. Then free liquid could be placed into a DAW drum in violation of another NCSA control. The free liquid could dissolve the uranium. If the shape of the resulting solution is favorable there Is the possibility that a criticality could occur.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): This NCSA controls the mass of uranium (no visible) and the amount of moderation present In a DAW drum.

"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): Estimated Amount: No visible uranium in the DAW drum. Estimated Enrichment: Unknown, but probably less then 10% based on current plant operations. The NCSA assumed 100% enrichment for the analysis. Form: U02 F2, process limit is no visible.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Free liquid was placed in a DAW drum exceeding the amount allowed by NCSA-PLANT018.A02. The mass control (no visible uranium) from NCSA-PLANT018.A02 was maintained.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer responded to the X326 Facility to assist in the assessment and safe resolution or the event. Compliance with NCSA-PLANT0I8.A02 was re-established at 1215 hours, 8/18/99".

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36040
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL NORTH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/18/1999
Notification Time: 21:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/1999
Event Time: 19:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH BARR (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A GENERATOR LOCKOUT FOR UNKNOWN REASONS

At 1956 on 08/18/99, Oconee Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100% power, and the cause of the trip is currently under investigation. At this time, the licensee believes that an electrical generator lockout (for unknown reasons) cause a turbine trip and subsequent reactor trip. Post-trip response was normal. All control rods fully inserted. There were no emergency core cooling system or engineered safety feature actuations, and none were required. The main steam safety valves lifted and reseated as expected. There were no maintenance or surveillance activities occurring at the time of the generator lockout. There were no storms in the area, and the weather was stable and hot. All systems functioned as required, and the cause of the generator lockout is the only thing that is not understood at this time.

The reactor is currently subcritical, and shutdown margin is within technical specification limits. Reactor coolant system inventory control is being provided via normal makeup. The power-operated relief valves and pressurizer code safety valves are closed. Primary system transport is being controlled by forced circulation via all four reactor coolant pumps. Secondary steam is being dumped to the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves, and main feedwater is supplying water to the steam generators.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

*** UPDATE AT 1242 EDT ON 8/20/99 FROM NICHOLSON TO POERTNER ***

The original cause of the Oconee Unit 1 trip on 8/18/99 was believed to have been an electrical generator lockout based on annunciation available at the time. Subsequent evaluation has concluded that the trip was caused by an internal voltage problem within the solid state programmer for the group 5 control rods. This voltage anomaly caused the Group 5 rods to drop into the core. The entire programmer has been replaced, with the defective equipment being returned to the manufacturer for additional evaluation.

The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
The HOO notified the R2DO (BARR)