Event Notification Report for August 13, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/12/1999 - 08/13/1999
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36027
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: CIS-US, INC
Region: 1
City: BEDFORD State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL P. WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: CIS-US, INC
Region: 1
City: BEDFORD State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL P. WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/13/1999
Notification Time: 16:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/1999
Notification Time: 16:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
DALE POWERS (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
DALE POWERS (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
- GammaMed HDR Afterloader Unit Ir-192 sources are incapable of being retracted into their shielded position -
On August 13, 1999, Tony Honnellio of CIS-US, Inc, Bedford, MA, reported to the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program that High Dose Remote (HDR) Afterloader Unit Ir-192 sources they supply for GammaMed devices have been incapable of being retracted into the shielded position. CIS-US believes this problem may be due to the new wire shipment they recently received.
In February, 1998, CIS-US changed their wire order so that they could purchase directly from the supplier, Gemo G. Moritz, instead of through the device manufacturer, Isotopen-Technik Dr. Sauerwein, GmbH; both German companies. Mr Honnellio states that the sealed source and device sheet number NR-555-S-104-S stipulates that the wire for the 724 source assembly may be 1.09 ±0.1 mm in diameter. Recently, CIS-US received wire that was 2-3 one thousandth of an inch (0.0762 mm) smaller than 1.19 mm, but still within specifications. CIS-US believes that this wire diameter may be the culprit, resulting in the wire slipping off the two wheels that protract/retract the source, but they are still investigating.
On August 12, 1999, MDS Nordion, the parent company of Theratronics International Limited, issued GammaMed User Bulletin #GMUB 99-01 (MA Radiation Control Program Docket Number 08-1463) strongly recommending to all 34 of its customers not to use their GammaMed device until the wire/source assembly has been replaced. (Refer to Event #36025). This action was due to four incidents of the source getting stuck in the unshielded position either due to the wire becoming kinked or falling off the two wheels that protract/retract the source. Three of these incidents occurred during a quality control check and one instance involved a hospital patient (there was no medical misadministration). CIS-US estimates it will take one to two weeks to replace all the wire/source assemblies.
On August 13, 1999, Tony Honnellio of CIS-US, Inc, Bedford, MA, reported to the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program that High Dose Remote (HDR) Afterloader Unit Ir-192 sources they supply for GammaMed devices have been incapable of being retracted into the shielded position. CIS-US believes this problem may be due to the new wire shipment they recently received.
In February, 1998, CIS-US changed their wire order so that they could purchase directly from the supplier, Gemo G. Moritz, instead of through the device manufacturer, Isotopen-Technik Dr. Sauerwein, GmbH; both German companies. Mr Honnellio states that the sealed source and device sheet number NR-555-S-104-S stipulates that the wire for the 724 source assembly may be 1.09 ±0.1 mm in diameter. Recently, CIS-US received wire that was 2-3 one thousandth of an inch (0.0762 mm) smaller than 1.19 mm, but still within specifications. CIS-US believes that this wire diameter may be the culprit, resulting in the wire slipping off the two wheels that protract/retract the source, but they are still investigating.
On August 12, 1999, MDS Nordion, the parent company of Theratronics International Limited, issued GammaMed User Bulletin #GMUB 99-01 (MA Radiation Control Program Docket Number 08-1463) strongly recommending to all 34 of its customers not to use their GammaMed device until the wire/source assembly has been replaced. (Refer to Event #36025). This action was due to four incidents of the source getting stuck in the unshielded position either due to the wire becoming kinked or falling off the two wheels that protract/retract the source. Three of these incidents occurred during a quality control check and one instance involved a hospital patient (there was no medical misadministration). CIS-US estimates it will take one to two weeks to replace all the wire/source assemblies.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36028
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: WALKER/WRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: WALKER/WRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/13/1999
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/1999
Event Time: 16:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/1999
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/1999
Event Time: 16:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
- PLANT SECURITY EVENT -
SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO MONITORING FUNCTIONS. COMPENSATORY MEASURES IMMEDIATELY TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.
SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO MONITORING FUNCTIONS. COMPENSATORY MEASURES IMMEDIATELY TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36029
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE HILL
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE HILL
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/13/1999
Notification Time: 18:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/1999
Event Time: 17:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/1999
Notification Time: 18:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/1999
Event Time: 17:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
JOSE CALVO (NRR)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
JOSE CALVO (NRR)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
-TS REQD SHUTDOWN OF ALL 3 UNITS DUE TO BOTH CONTROL ROOM VENT SYSTEM CHILLERS INOP
UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOMS SHARE A COMMON VENTILATION SYSTEM; UNIT 3 CONTROL ROOM HAS ITS OWN VENTILATION SYSTEM. TWO CHILLERS SERVE THE VENTILATION SYSTEMS FOR ALL THREE CONTROL ROOMS.
AT 1659 ON 08/13/99, THE 'B' TRAIN CONTROL ROOM CHILLER TRIPPED DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES. TECH SPEC 3.7.16 REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO RESTORE THE INOPERABLE CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS WITHIN 30 DAYS OR SHUT ALL THREE UNITS DOWN.
AT 1728 ON 08/13/99, THE 'A' TRAIN CONTROL ROOM CHILLER ALSO TRIPPED DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES. TECH SPEC 3.0.3 REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO START SHUTTING ALL THREE UNITS DOWN WITHIN ONE HOUR AND PLACE ALL THREE UNITS IN MODE 3 WITHIN 12 HOURS WITH BOTH CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM CHILLERS INOPERABLE.
THE LICENSEE IS REDUCING THE POWER OF ALL THREE UNITS AT THE RATE OF 1% PER HOUR AND IS ATTEMPTING TO RESTORE AT LEAST ONE CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS.
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
* * * UPDATE AT 2336 ON 08/13/99 FROM SCOTT BATSON TO JOLLIFFE * * *
AT 2240, THE LICENSEE RESTORED THE 'B' CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS USING THE 'A' PUMP AND EXITED TS 3.0.3. TS 3.7.16 REMAINS IN EFFECT FOR THE 'A' CHILLER. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INCREASE POWER FROM A LOW LEVEL OF 87% AND HAS INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R2DO CHUCK OGLE.
*** UPDATE AT 1513 ON 9/9/99 FROM TODD TO POERTNER. ***
The following is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This event was initially reported due to initiation of shutdown of all three Oconee units in accordance with Tech Specs. After all three units reached approximately 85% rated power, the Tech Spec condition was exited. The shutdown was terminated and the units returned to full power. After further review, Duke Energy Company feels that the entry into the Tech Spec condition which required shutdown was INVALID, for reasons explained below. Because the units did actually initiate shutdown under the declared Tech Spec condition, Duke Energy Company does not consider it appropriate to retract the notification but is providing this update to indicate that the conditions did not meet other reportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73."
"This event was reported due to initiation of shutdown of all three Oconee units in accordance with Tech Spec 3.7.16, Condition E, which requires entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3 when two trains of the Chilled Water (WC) system are inoperable. The WC system provides chilled water for the Control Room Ventilation System on all three Oconee Units. Both the 'A' and 'B' chillers had tripped when the initial report was made."
"The 'B' chiller was successfully restarted in combination with the 'A' chilled water pump. Based on this, one train of WC was declared operable. Tech Spec 3.0.3 and 3.7.16, Condition E were exited. Tech Spec 3.7.16 Condition B remained in effect. The shutdown of the Oconee units was terminated. An update notification containing this information was made at 2336 hours on 8-13-99."
"Subsequently, troubleshooting found that the 'B' Chilled Water pump tripped due to a faulty relay, which caused the 'B' Chiller trip. The 'A' Chiller was inoperable due to inadequate refrigerant charge combined with excess oil. Both the 'B' Chilled Water pump and the 'A' Chiller were repaired and returned to service allowing Tech Spec 3.7.16, Condition B to be exited on 8-17-99."
"An Operability Evaluation concluded that the combination of 'A' Chilled Water pump with the 'B' Chiller was Operable throughout the event. This conclusion is based on the following facts:
1) The Oconee Chilled Water system was designed as a non-safety system.
2) Operation following a Design Basis Event requires manual alignment and restart.
3) Restart is not required for an extended period (greater than 18 hours).
4) Operation in this alignment is included in the applicable procedure.
5) No maintenance was required on either the 'A' WC pump or the 'B' Chiller.
Therefore, the entry into Tech Spec 3.7.16, Condition E, and 3.0.3 was invalid."
"Also, the Operability Evaluation found that the 'A' chiller had been confirmed to be operable on 7-27-99 when it was run as part of a post maintenance test following PM of the 'A' Chilled Water Pump. The Operability Evaluation concluded that the 'A' Chiller became inoperable after that date. Therefore, the 30 day action statement of Tech Spec 3.7.16, Condition B for one WC train out of service was not exceeded."
"As a result of this Operability Evaluation, Duke Energy has concluded that there are no conditions reportable under 50.73 associated with this event."
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOMS SHARE A COMMON VENTILATION SYSTEM; UNIT 3 CONTROL ROOM HAS ITS OWN VENTILATION SYSTEM. TWO CHILLERS SERVE THE VENTILATION SYSTEMS FOR ALL THREE CONTROL ROOMS.
AT 1659 ON 08/13/99, THE 'B' TRAIN CONTROL ROOM CHILLER TRIPPED DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES. TECH SPEC 3.7.16 REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO RESTORE THE INOPERABLE CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS WITHIN 30 DAYS OR SHUT ALL THREE UNITS DOWN.
AT 1728 ON 08/13/99, THE 'A' TRAIN CONTROL ROOM CHILLER ALSO TRIPPED DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES. TECH SPEC 3.0.3 REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO START SHUTTING ALL THREE UNITS DOWN WITHIN ONE HOUR AND PLACE ALL THREE UNITS IN MODE 3 WITHIN 12 HOURS WITH BOTH CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM CHILLERS INOPERABLE.
THE LICENSEE IS REDUCING THE POWER OF ALL THREE UNITS AT THE RATE OF 1% PER HOUR AND IS ATTEMPTING TO RESTORE AT LEAST ONE CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS.
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
* * * UPDATE AT 2336 ON 08/13/99 FROM SCOTT BATSON TO JOLLIFFE * * *
AT 2240, THE LICENSEE RESTORED THE 'B' CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS USING THE 'A' PUMP AND EXITED TS 3.0.3. TS 3.7.16 REMAINS IN EFFECT FOR THE 'A' CHILLER. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INCREASE POWER FROM A LOW LEVEL OF 87% AND HAS INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R2DO CHUCK OGLE.
*** UPDATE AT 1513 ON 9/9/99 FROM TODD TO POERTNER. ***
The following is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"This event was initially reported due to initiation of shutdown of all three Oconee units in accordance with Tech Specs. After all three units reached approximately 85% rated power, the Tech Spec condition was exited. The shutdown was terminated and the units returned to full power. After further review, Duke Energy Company feels that the entry into the Tech Spec condition which required shutdown was INVALID, for reasons explained below. Because the units did actually initiate shutdown under the declared Tech Spec condition, Duke Energy Company does not consider it appropriate to retract the notification but is providing this update to indicate that the conditions did not meet other reportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73."
"This event was reported due to initiation of shutdown of all three Oconee units in accordance with Tech Spec 3.7.16, Condition E, which requires entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3 when two trains of the Chilled Water (WC) system are inoperable. The WC system provides chilled water for the Control Room Ventilation System on all three Oconee Units. Both the 'A' and 'B' chillers had tripped when the initial report was made."
"The 'B' chiller was successfully restarted in combination with the 'A' chilled water pump. Based on this, one train of WC was declared operable. Tech Spec 3.0.3 and 3.7.16, Condition E were exited. Tech Spec 3.7.16 Condition B remained in effect. The shutdown of the Oconee units was terminated. An update notification containing this information was made at 2336 hours on 8-13-99."
"Subsequently, troubleshooting found that the 'B' Chilled Water pump tripped due to a faulty relay, which caused the 'B' Chiller trip. The 'A' Chiller was inoperable due to inadequate refrigerant charge combined with excess oil. Both the 'B' Chilled Water pump and the 'A' Chiller were repaired and returned to service allowing Tech Spec 3.7.16, Condition B to be exited on 8-17-99."
"An Operability Evaluation concluded that the combination of 'A' Chilled Water pump with the 'B' Chiller was Operable throughout the event. This conclusion is based on the following facts:
1) The Oconee Chilled Water system was designed as a non-safety system.
2) Operation following a Design Basis Event requires manual alignment and restart.
3) Restart is not required for an extended period (greater than 18 hours).
4) Operation in this alignment is included in the applicable procedure.
5) No maintenance was required on either the 'A' WC pump or the 'B' Chiller.
Therefore, the entry into Tech Spec 3.7.16, Condition E, and 3.0.3 was invalid."
"Also, the Operability Evaluation found that the 'A' chiller had been confirmed to be operable on 7-27-99 when it was run as part of a post maintenance test following PM of the 'A' Chilled Water Pump. The Operability Evaluation concluded that the 'A' Chiller became inoperable after that date. Therefore, the 30 day action statement of Tech Spec 3.7.16, Condition B for one WC train out of service was not exceeded."
"As a result of this Operability Evaluation, Duke Energy has concluded that there are no conditions reportable under 50.73 associated with this event."
The NRC resident inspector has been notified.