Event Notification Report for August 12, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/11/1999 - 08/12/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
360303602336024360263653836160
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36030
Facility: SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY
COMMERICAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: LOREN MAAS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY
COMMERICAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: LOREN MAAS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/13/1999
Notification Time: 18:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 14:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/1999
Notification Time: 18:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 14:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT -
The Mop Powder Dissolver Facility dissolves dirty Urania powder and uses a vacuum drum filter to separate the dissolved uranium from the dirt. Shavings from the vacuum drum filter (filter media, dirt, and a presumably small quantity of uranium) are collected in a 4-gallon container, sampled, and queued one foot apart. When sample results are received, the contents of the 4-gallon containers are placed into a 55-gallon drum. The drum is then reverified to contain less than 100 grams U-235 by non-destructive assay (NDA). After the second verification, the drum is then moved to the waste storage pad.
At approximately 1730 PDT on Tuesday, August 10, 1999, the Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) Laboratory Supervisor contacted an SPC Criticality Safety Specialist with evidence that the laboratory method normally used to analyze the uranium content of these shavings may have been 30% low. This information was based on the fact that a microwave dissolution process put all of the shavings into solution. Subsequent analysis of the liquid yielded higher results. The SPC Criticality Safety Specialist determined that this relatively small error did not have immediate criticality safety concerns but requested SPC laboratory personnel to continue further investigation.
At approximately 1430 PDT on Thursday, August 12, 1999, the SPC Laboratory Supervisor reported to the Criticality Safety Specialist that microwave dissolution of sample material from a 4-gallon container had yielded uranium results that exceeded those found using the normal dissolution method by a larger margin than previously reported. Further evaluation of additional samples demonstrated that the microwave dissolution method provides uranium results that are three times higher than those indicated by NDA of the shavings.
Safety Significance of Event:
Assuming the uranium content determined by NDA is low by a factor of three, the three drums with the highest uranium content, if stored in three-tier array, would exceed the allowed surface density by 23%. (Hypothetical worst case conditions are 49.4% of the minimum critical surface density.) Additionally, no drum contains greater than 60 grams U per liter. The minimum critical concentration is greater than 280 grams U per liter at 5.0 wt.% U-235. Therefore, criticality was not possible with this material.
Potential Criticality Pathways Involved:
A criticality accident is only possible if the concentration of uranium exceeds the minimum critical concentration, i.e., approximately 280 grams U per liter at 5.0 wt.% U-235.
Controlled Parameters:
Surface density (mass per unit area, i.e., kgs U per square foot), and concentration control.
Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material:
A total of 32 drums were stored in a three-tier array. Assuming the NDA is off by a factor of three, the highest amount of uranium in any drum is less than 10 kgs and the total amount of uranium in the array is less than 209 kgs. The enrichment is less than 5.0 wt.% U-235. The average enrichment is expected to be 3.6 wt.% U-235. The analytical data currently available shows enrichment between 2.98 and 3.75 wt.% U-235.
Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or Control System(s) and Description of the Failures or Deficiencies:
- Preprocessing of laboratory samples did not put all of the uranium solids into solution.
- The standard used to calibrate the NDA equipment did not adequately reflect the material and geometry of the shavings when they are counted.
Corrective Actions to restore safety systems and when each was implemented:
- The Mop Powder Dissolver has been shut down and tagged out and production of shavings has therefore been stopped, as has the processing of shavings now in 4-gallon containers.
- Drums of shavings currently on the storage pad were moved into a single-tier arrangement.
- Additional multi-drum samplings were initiated to verify the actual uranium content.
- Production and processing of shavings will remain shut down pending further investigation and completion of corrective actions.
The Mop Powder Dissolver Facility dissolves dirty Urania powder and uses a vacuum drum filter to separate the dissolved uranium from the dirt. Shavings from the vacuum drum filter (filter media, dirt, and a presumably small quantity of uranium) are collected in a 4-gallon container, sampled, and queued one foot apart. When sample results are received, the contents of the 4-gallon containers are placed into a 55-gallon drum. The drum is then reverified to contain less than 100 grams U-235 by non-destructive assay (NDA). After the second verification, the drum is then moved to the waste storage pad.
At approximately 1730 PDT on Tuesday, August 10, 1999, the Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) Laboratory Supervisor contacted an SPC Criticality Safety Specialist with evidence that the laboratory method normally used to analyze the uranium content of these shavings may have been 30% low. This information was based on the fact that a microwave dissolution process put all of the shavings into solution. Subsequent analysis of the liquid yielded higher results. The SPC Criticality Safety Specialist determined that this relatively small error did not have immediate criticality safety concerns but requested SPC laboratory personnel to continue further investigation.
At approximately 1430 PDT on Thursday, August 12, 1999, the SPC Laboratory Supervisor reported to the Criticality Safety Specialist that microwave dissolution of sample material from a 4-gallon container had yielded uranium results that exceeded those found using the normal dissolution method by a larger margin than previously reported. Further evaluation of additional samples demonstrated that the microwave dissolution method provides uranium results that are three times higher than those indicated by NDA of the shavings.
Safety Significance of Event:
Assuming the uranium content determined by NDA is low by a factor of three, the three drums with the highest uranium content, if stored in three-tier array, would exceed the allowed surface density by 23%. (Hypothetical worst case conditions are 49.4% of the minimum critical surface density.) Additionally, no drum contains greater than 60 grams U per liter. The minimum critical concentration is greater than 280 grams U per liter at 5.0 wt.% U-235. Therefore, criticality was not possible with this material.
Potential Criticality Pathways Involved:
A criticality accident is only possible if the concentration of uranium exceeds the minimum critical concentration, i.e., approximately 280 grams U per liter at 5.0 wt.% U-235.
Controlled Parameters:
Surface density (mass per unit area, i.e., kgs U per square foot), and concentration control.
Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material:
A total of 32 drums were stored in a three-tier array. Assuming the NDA is off by a factor of three, the highest amount of uranium in any drum is less than 10 kgs and the total amount of uranium in the array is less than 209 kgs. The enrichment is less than 5.0 wt.% U-235. The average enrichment is expected to be 3.6 wt.% U-235. The analytical data currently available shows enrichment between 2.98 and 3.75 wt.% U-235.
Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or Control System(s) and Description of the Failures or Deficiencies:
- Preprocessing of laboratory samples did not put all of the uranium solids into solution.
- The standard used to calibrate the NDA equipment did not adequately reflect the material and geometry of the shavings when they are counted.
Corrective Actions to restore safety systems and when each was implemented:
- The Mop Powder Dissolver has been shut down and tagged out and production of shavings has therefore been stopped, as has the processing of shavings now in 4-gallon containers.
- Drums of shavings currently on the storage pad were moved into a single-tier arrangement.
- Additional multi-drum samplings were initiated to verify the actual uranium content.
- Production and processing of shavings will remain shut down pending further investigation and completion of corrective actions.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36023
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROKES
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROKES
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/12/1999
Notification Time: 07:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 04:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/1999
Notification Time: 07:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 04:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
PLANT HAD A REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO A LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL.
An automatic reactor trip occurred during a transient on the 34 instrument bus, which de-energized for unknown reasons. This resulted in a turbine runback and loss of automatic control of steam generator level. The reactor trip was generated as a result of a low level on the 33 steam generator. Auxiliary feedwater automatically started as a result of the trip. All rods fully inserted, and no ECCS injection occurred. No primary relief valves lifted, but one steam generator relief valve lifted. (They have no steam generator tube leaks.)
The plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with the heat sink being the condenser. The cause of the instrument bus transient is under investigation.
The NRC resident inspector was notified by the licensee.
******************* UPDATE AT 1306 ON 08/13/99 FROM NICK LIZZO RECEIVED BY TROCINE *******************
"An [emergency notification system (ENS)] notification was made at 0750 on August 12, 1999, which identified [that] an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a transient on the 34 instrument bus. In response to a question by the NRC contact in regard to whether any primary relief valves had lifted, we responded that no primary side relief valves had lifted but that one steam generator relief valve had lifted. In fact, one pressurizer pilot-operated relief valve (PORV), PORV-PCV-455C, did lift and quickly [reseated] when the automatic reactor trip occurred. This question was originally answered in the 0750 ENS notification in the context that it was known that a steam generator safety/relief valve had lifted and reseated but that no primary safety valve had lifted. The answer to the question was not clarified as to the lifting of the pressurizer PORVs themselves as opposed to the primary or secondary side safety valves."
"The 0750 ENS notification is also updated to indicate that a media/press release was subsequently made concerning the automatic reactor trip on August 12, 1999, at approximately 1100 that same day."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Gray).
An automatic reactor trip occurred during a transient on the 34 instrument bus, which de-energized for unknown reasons. This resulted in a turbine runback and loss of automatic control of steam generator level. The reactor trip was generated as a result of a low level on the 33 steam generator. Auxiliary feedwater automatically started as a result of the trip. All rods fully inserted, and no ECCS injection occurred. No primary relief valves lifted, but one steam generator relief valve lifted. (They have no steam generator tube leaks.)
The plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with the heat sink being the condenser. The cause of the instrument bus transient is under investigation.
The NRC resident inspector was notified by the licensee.
******************* UPDATE AT 1306 ON 08/13/99 FROM NICK LIZZO RECEIVED BY TROCINE *******************
"An [emergency notification system (ENS)] notification was made at 0750 on August 12, 1999, which identified [that] an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a transient on the 34 instrument bus. In response to a question by the NRC contact in regard to whether any primary relief valves had lifted, we responded that no primary side relief valves had lifted but that one steam generator relief valve had lifted. In fact, one pressurizer pilot-operated relief valve (PORV), PORV-PCV-455C, did lift and quickly [reseated] when the automatic reactor trip occurred. This question was originally answered in the 0750 ENS notification in the context that it was known that a steam generator safety/relief valve had lifted and reseated but that no primary safety valve had lifted. The answer to the question was not clarified as to the lifting of the pressurizer PORVs themselves as opposed to the primary or secondary side safety valves."
"The 0750 ENS notification is also updated to indicate that a media/press release was subsequently made concerning the automatic reactor trip on August 12, 1999, at approximately 1100 that same day."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Gray).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36024
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK NANCE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK NANCE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/12/1999
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/1999
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
Licensee 24-hour Report of violation of Operating License NPF-76 based on inoperable control room makeup and cleanup filtration train (control room ventilation system).
In accordance with technical specification surveillance requirement 4.7.7.c.2, carbon samples were removed from the Unit 1 train 'B' control room makeup and cleanup filtration system on 07/19/99 and sent offsite for laboratory analysis. On 08/02/99, the licensee was notified that the as-found methyl iodide penetration for the makeup and cleanup filter unit samples were 1.62% and 1.13%, respectively, which exceeded the required 1.0% technical specification acceptance criteria. Although surveillance requirement 4.7.7.c.2 allows up to 31 days to obtain charcoal sample analysis results, the allowed outage time for the respective train per Technical Specification 3.7.7 is 7 days. The charcoal samples were removed on 07/19/99, and results were received on 08/02/99 (14 days later). Upon receipt of the unsatisfactory laboratory analysis results, maintenance was initiated to replace the charcoal and was completed on 08/05/99. Therefore, the Unit 1 train 'B' control room makeup and cleanup filtration system was in a condition prohibited by technical specifications for approximately 10 days longer than the allowed outage time.
Additionally, the Unit 1 train 'C' control room makeup and cleanup filtration system was inoperable as part of a train 'C' extended allowed outage time (EAOT) from 0300 CDT on 07/26/99 to 2227 CDT on 07/29/99 (based on train 'C' essential chiller out-of service and return to operable status times), and thus, both train 'B' and train 'C' control room makeup and cleanup filtration systems were inoperable concurrently for a period of 91 hours and 27 minutes. Therefore, Unit 1 had also unknowingly exceeded Technical Specification 3.7.7 shutdown LCO requirements for two trains in an inoperable condition by 13 hours and 27 minutes (based on a 72-hour LCO time plus 6 hours to enter Mode 3).
Furthermore, Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.d requires that with an emergency diesel generator (EDG) inoperable, all required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining two operable EDGs are verified to be operable within 24 hours, or be in at least Hot Standby Mode within the next 6 hours, and in Cold Shutdown Mode within the following 30 hours. Since the train 'C' EDG was inoperable from 0300 CDT on 07/26/99 until 0330 CDT on 07/29/99 (72.5 hours) as part of the train 'C' EAOT, Unit 1 had unknowingly exceeded Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.d shutdown LCO requirements beginning at 0900 CDT on 07/27/99 (based on a 24-hour LCO time plus 6 hours to enter Mode 3) for a total of 42.5 hours.
Although the technical specification limit of 1.0% methyl iodide penetration (or 99.0% filter efficiency) was exceeded, design basis accident analyses assume a filter efficiency of 95%. Since the as-found efficiencies for both the makeup and cleanup filter units were above 98%, the train 'B' control room makeup and cleanup filtration system was at all times capable of performing its required design function, and therefore, the overall safety impact as a result of this event is believed to be minimal.
This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76, Section 2.G, for an operation or condition prohibited by technical specifications.
This event had no impact on Unit 2.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
In accordance with technical specification surveillance requirement 4.7.7.c.2, carbon samples were removed from the Unit 1 train 'B' control room makeup and cleanup filtration system on 07/19/99 and sent offsite for laboratory analysis. On 08/02/99, the licensee was notified that the as-found methyl iodide penetration for the makeup and cleanup filter unit samples were 1.62% and 1.13%, respectively, which exceeded the required 1.0% technical specification acceptance criteria. Although surveillance requirement 4.7.7.c.2 allows up to 31 days to obtain charcoal sample analysis results, the allowed outage time for the respective train per Technical Specification 3.7.7 is 7 days. The charcoal samples were removed on 07/19/99, and results were received on 08/02/99 (14 days later). Upon receipt of the unsatisfactory laboratory analysis results, maintenance was initiated to replace the charcoal and was completed on 08/05/99. Therefore, the Unit 1 train 'B' control room makeup and cleanup filtration system was in a condition prohibited by technical specifications for approximately 10 days longer than the allowed outage time.
Additionally, the Unit 1 train 'C' control room makeup and cleanup filtration system was inoperable as part of a train 'C' extended allowed outage time (EAOT) from 0300 CDT on 07/26/99 to 2227 CDT on 07/29/99 (based on train 'C' essential chiller out-of service and return to operable status times), and thus, both train 'B' and train 'C' control room makeup and cleanup filtration systems were inoperable concurrently for a period of 91 hours and 27 minutes. Therefore, Unit 1 had also unknowingly exceeded Technical Specification 3.7.7 shutdown LCO requirements for two trains in an inoperable condition by 13 hours and 27 minutes (based on a 72-hour LCO time plus 6 hours to enter Mode 3).
Furthermore, Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.d requires that with an emergency diesel generator (EDG) inoperable, all required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining two operable EDGs are verified to be operable within 24 hours, or be in at least Hot Standby Mode within the next 6 hours, and in Cold Shutdown Mode within the following 30 hours. Since the train 'C' EDG was inoperable from 0300 CDT on 07/26/99 until 0330 CDT on 07/29/99 (72.5 hours) as part of the train 'C' EAOT, Unit 1 had unknowingly exceeded Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.d shutdown LCO requirements beginning at 0900 CDT on 07/27/99 (based on a 24-hour LCO time plus 6 hours to enter Mode 3) for a total of 42.5 hours.
Although the technical specification limit of 1.0% methyl iodide penetration (or 99.0% filter efficiency) was exceeded, design basis accident analyses assume a filter efficiency of 95%. Since the as-found efficiencies for both the makeup and cleanup filter units were above 98%, the train 'B' control room makeup and cleanup filtration system was at all times capable of performing its required design function, and therefore, the overall safety impact as a result of this event is believed to be minimal.
This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76, Section 2.G, for an operation or condition prohibited by technical specifications.
This event had no impact on Unit 2.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36026
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: WARNER ANDREWS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: WARNER ANDREWS
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/12/1999
Notification Time: 20:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 18:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/1999
Notification Time: 20:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 18:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
- CONTROL ROOM CHILLER ROOM DOORS INOPERABLE DUE TO INCORRECT DOOR LATCH PINS -
AT 1846 CDT ON 08/12/99, THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED PERSONNEL ENTRY DOORS #158 AND #159 TO THE CONTROL ROOM CHILLER ROOMS #121 AND #123, RESPECTIVELY, AS BEING INOPERABLE DUE TO MATERIAL PROPERTY CONCERNS OF THE LATCH PINS. AN ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT THE EXISTING PINS WERE OF INADEQUATE STRENGTH TO WITHSTAND HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK FORCES. THE INOPERABILITY OF THE DOOR PINS RESULTED IN THE INOPERABILITY OF BOTH TRAINS OF THE CONTROL ROOM SPECIAL VENTILATION SYSTEM (TECH SPEC 3.13.A.1).
AT 1938 CDT ON 08/12/99, THE PINS WERE REPLACED, AND THE DOORS AND CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM WERE BOTH RETURNED TO OPERABLE STATUS.
THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
AT 1846 CDT ON 08/12/99, THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED PERSONNEL ENTRY DOORS #158 AND #159 TO THE CONTROL ROOM CHILLER ROOMS #121 AND #123, RESPECTIVELY, AS BEING INOPERABLE DUE TO MATERIAL PROPERTY CONCERNS OF THE LATCH PINS. AN ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT THE EXISTING PINS WERE OF INADEQUATE STRENGTH TO WITHSTAND HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK FORCES. THE INOPERABILITY OF THE DOOR PINS RESULTED IN THE INOPERABILITY OF BOTH TRAINS OF THE CONTROL ROOM SPECIAL VENTILATION SYSTEM (TECH SPEC 3.13.A.1).
AT 1938 CDT ON 08/12/99, THE PINS WERE REPLACED, AND THE DOORS AND CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM WERE BOTH RETURNED TO OPERABLE STATUS.
THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36538
Rep Org: STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Licensee: UC SAN DIEGO
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #: 1339-37
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K . HANNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: UC SAN DIEGO
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #: 1339-37
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K . HANNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/24/1999
Notification Time: 14:59 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/24/1999
Notification Time: 14:59 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
WILLIAM JOHNSON (R4)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
RESEARCH STUDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RECEIVED AND EXTREMITY DOSE OF 61.65 REM TO HER LEFT INDEX FINGER.
The event occurred between April of 1999 and June 1999 at the University of California in San Diego. The individual was observed holding a petri dish with her left index finger over the unshielded portion of the dish. The radioactive element in the petri dish was P-32. Her film badge was processes on August 12, 1999, and it was discovered that her left index finger had received a dose of 61.65 Rem. The State of California Department of Health Services Radiological Health Branch was notified of this event on 10/14/99. There were no adverse health affects to the individual. The State of California Department of Health Services Radiological Health Branch event number assigned to this incident is 10-14-99.
(Call the NRC operations officer for additional information.)
The event occurred between April of 1999 and June 1999 at the University of California in San Diego. The individual was observed holding a petri dish with her left index finger over the unshielded portion of the dish. The radioactive element in the petri dish was P-32. Her film badge was processes on August 12, 1999, and it was discovered that her left index finger had received a dose of 61.65 Rem. The State of California Department of Health Services Radiological Health Branch was notified of this event on 10/14/99. There were no adverse health affects to the individual. The State of California Department of Health Services Radiological Health Branch event number assigned to this incident is 10-14-99.
(Call the NRC operations officer for additional information.)
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36160
Rep Org: BNFL FUEL
Licensee: BNFL FUEL
Region: 0
City: SPRINGFIELDS State:
County: ENGLAND
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HOWARD WHITTAKER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: BNFL FUEL
Region: 0
City: SPRINGFIELDS State:
County: ENGLAND
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HOWARD WHITTAKER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/14/1999
Notification Time: 05:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 09/14/1999
Notification Time: 05:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 09/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(c)(3)(i) - DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(c)(3)(i) - DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) (NMSS)
GARY SHEAR (R3)
KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) (NMSS)
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT - CYLINDER NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH ANSI 14.1 SENT TO PADUCAH (Refer to event #36273 for additional information.)
"A full 48Y cylinder containing natural UF6 was sent to USEC at Paducah from BNFL Springfields in May 1997. On August 12, 1999, whilst preparing the cylinder for feeding, USEC personnel discovered that the cylinder was not in compliance with ANSI 14.1. The cylinder nameplate was stamped with a water capacity of 4019 Kgs equivalent to 142.1 cubic feet. The current standard of ANSI 14.1 requires a minimum volume of a 48Y cylinder to be 4037 Kgs water equivalent to 142.7 cubic feet. Since this cylinder does not comply with the ANSI standard it cannot be fed to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
"It is our understanding that the USA Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR Part 21 requires the receiver of a basic component that has a defect or deviates from a specification, to notify the supplier of the component of the defect or deviation. We have received a formal notification from the Paducah Plant of a deviation from the technical specification for UF6 cylinders.
"10 CFR Part 21 requires the supplier of the basic component to complete an evaluation / failure to comply associated with safety hazards as soon as practical, and in all cases within 60 days of discovery to identify any defect etc that could create a substantial safety hazard if it remained uncorrected.
"We therefore have accepted our responsibility for reporting the deviation to the NRC and to conduct the evaluation as per the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21."
"A full 48Y cylinder containing natural UF6 was sent to USEC at Paducah from BNFL Springfields in May 1997. On August 12, 1999, whilst preparing the cylinder for feeding, USEC personnel discovered that the cylinder was not in compliance with ANSI 14.1. The cylinder nameplate was stamped with a water capacity of 4019 Kgs equivalent to 142.1 cubic feet. The current standard of ANSI 14.1 requires a minimum volume of a 48Y cylinder to be 4037 Kgs water equivalent to 142.7 cubic feet. Since this cylinder does not comply with the ANSI standard it cannot be fed to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
"It is our understanding that the USA Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR Part 21 requires the receiver of a basic component that has a defect or deviates from a specification, to notify the supplier of the component of the defect or deviation. We have received a formal notification from the Paducah Plant of a deviation from the technical specification for UF6 cylinders.
"10 CFR Part 21 requires the supplier of the basic component to complete an evaluation / failure to comply associated with safety hazards as soon as practical, and in all cases within 60 days of discovery to identify any defect etc that could create a substantial safety hazard if it remained uncorrected.
"We therefore have accepted our responsibility for reporting the deviation to the NRC and to conduct the evaluation as per the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21."