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Event Notification Report for August 11, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/10/1999 - 08/11/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
3601436015360163601736019360203602136022

Power Reactor
Event Number: 36014
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2     State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PALMER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/11/1999
Notification Time: 10:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/1999
Event Time: 06:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
THE LICENSEE ENTERED AN LCO ACTION STATEMENT DUE TO INCORRECT RADIATION MONITOR SETPOINTS.

FOUR CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION RADIATION AREA MONITORS WERE DETERMINED TO HAVE A NON-CONSERVATIVE HIGH VALUE FOR BACKGROUND RADIATION LEVEL. THIS RESULTS IN A NON-CONSERVATIVE SETPOINT FOR THE CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION FUNCTION. THIS CONDITION ALSO PLACED THE PLANT IN AN LCO ACTION STATEMENT REQUIRING THEM TO ISOLATE NORMAL CONTAINMENT PURGE, WHICH THEY HAVE ALREADY DONE. CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE TO RECALIBRATE THE SETPOINTS.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.

* * * UPDATE 1653 8/11/1999 FROM PALMER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

"This is a followup notification to our report made at 1040 this morning. The nonconservative setpoints for the containment ventilation isolation function from the four containment area radiation monitors has been corrected. The setpoints were corrected and the area radiation monitors declared operable at 1225 today. We are still investigating if this was an actual 'loss of a safety function'. Followup notification will be provided in the applicable 10 CFR 50.73 notification."

The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this update by the licensee. Notified R2DO (Ogle).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36015
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4     State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE NETERER
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 08/11/1999
Notification Time: 12:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/1999
Event Time: 09:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
ROBERT BENNEDICT (NRR)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HEATER DRAIN LINE BREAK

Operators manually tripped the reactor after receiving indication of a steam leak in the turbine building. An 8" diameter line from the 'D' 1st stage reheater drain tank to the '6B' high pressure heater experienced a double ended guillotine break. All control rods inserted into the core following the trip, and all systems functioned as designed. The licensee reported that the unit is currently stable in Hot Standby, and the steam leak has been isolated. No personnel injuries resulted from this event.

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36016
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRIAN WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/11/1999
Notification Time: 13:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/1999
Event Time: 10:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
INADVERTENT DIESEL GENERATOR START DURING TROUBLESHOOTING OF A SPEED CONTROL PROBLEM

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On 08/11/99 at 1006, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an inadvertent start of the Division I Diesel Generator during troubleshooting of a speed control problem. This speed control problem had been experienced earlier when the Diesel no-load frequency could not be controlled from the control room when the Diesel was started for the monthly surveillance/PMT run. The Division I Diesel has been inoperable since 0710 on 08/10/99 for preplanned maintenance."

"The primary starting circuit relay 4X1 had already been diagnosed with high resistance readings across shut contacts indicating that it needed replacement. Further troubleshooting was desired to ensure the remainder of the primary starting circuit was operating correctly prior to restarting the Diesel. The primary starting circuit relay 4X1 was removed from the circuit and a test meter was placed on the coil inputs for the 4X1 relay to monitor coil voltage when the DS9 optical isolator receiver was actuated by a flashlight. This action allowed testing of the optical isolator receiver board 'E' without inducing an engine start. The fact that board 'A' DS11 optical isolator receiver would also turn on was missed during the planning of the emergent work order. The DS11 optical isolator activation caused a secondary start signal to be generated which initiated the inadvertent Diesel start."

"This notification is being made per 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(ii) for 'any event or condition that results in a manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature.' Although the actuation was invalid, the actuation was not pre-planned, and the Diesel was not removed from service."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36017
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1     State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN TRUESDALE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/11/1999
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/1999
Event Time: 13:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii) - DEGRAD COND DURING OP
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
DISCOVERY OF A HISTORICAL CONDITION INVOLVING LOW DIESEL GENERATOR VOLTAGE

The licensee determined that voltage for the 'B' emergency diesel generator would not have met the technical specification criteria, and this rendered the 'B' emergency diesel generator inoperable approximately 32 days prior to 08/05/99. Although the voltage was discovered to be low during a test run of the 'B' emergency diesel generator on 08/05/99, it was thought to be acceptable (satisfactory) at the time of the test run. However, subsequent engineering review determined that the voltage was in fact below the technical specification (TS) acceptance criteria.

The licensee determined this event to be reportable at 1353 on 08/11/99.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

******************** UPDATE AT 1435 ON 08/17/99 FROM STEPHEN BAKER TO TROCINE ********************

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"Condition Report M2-99-2179[, 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator Slow Start Did Not Meet TS Acceptance Criteria,'] was written when it was identified that the output voltage for the "B" emergency diesel generator (EDG) did not meet the TS acceptance criteria, potentially rendering the diesel inoperable."

"The original reportability determination for this condition concluded that this condition was reportable under 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), Technical Specifications, and 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii), Outside Design Basis, based upon initial investigation of the deficiency. Accordingly, a prompt report was issued on 08/11/99 per
10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)."

"Upon further investigation of this condition it was determined that while the voltage requirements of the applicable surveillance procedure were not met, the requirements of [TS] Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 were met. Additionally, it was discovered that the output voltage was set sufficiently high during the previous month's surveillance such that the EDG would have loaded properly and performed its required safety function(s) during the period in question."

"Therefore, this condition is NOT reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.73(5)(2)(i), Technical Specifications, or 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii), Outside Design Basis, and it is recommended that the associated prompt report be retracted."

"Based on the above discussion, this is not a condition which is adverse to safety. This deficiency was reviewed against the requirements of 10CFR50.72, 10CFR50.73, [and] 10CFR50.9(b), and [it was] determined to be not reportable."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Eselgroth).


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36019
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MICKLOW
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/11/1999
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
DISCOVERY THAT ONE OF SIX RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) PUMP ANCHOR BOLTS WAS MISSING

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"During [an] engineering walkdown of [the] 'B' RHR pump, it was determined that (1) corner anchor bolt was missing out of a total of (6) anchor bolts. Preliminary analysis indicates that [the] existing anchorage configuration cannot be seismically qualified."

The unit is in a 72-hour limiting condition for operation as a result of this issue.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1411 ON 08/31/99 BY KEVIN McLAUGHLIN TO JOLLIFFE * * *

A licensee preliminary analysis concluded that one RHR train had been incapable of performing its design function for an extended period of time, since concrete loads exceeded design values. The preliminary analysis did not account for reinforcing bar (rebar) present in the pump concrete pad.

A reanalysis has been performed, using more accurate assumptions. This reanalysis has shown that the pump is operable, under seismic loads, with one corner anchor bolt missing, and the RHR train was, in fact, capable of performing its design function. In addition, the nonconforming bolt configuration has been restored to a correct configuration as part of the licensee's corrective action program.

Therefore, the licensee has concluded that this event is not reportable to the NRC and retracts this event notification.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO John Rogge.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36020
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4     State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID CLARIDGE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 08/11/1999
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/1999
Event Time: 15:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
VCT OUTLET VALVES DO NOT MEET 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX R SEPARATION REQUIREMENT

The volume control tank (VCT) outlet valves (BG-LCV-1112B and C) are located approximately 42" apart, and are not separated by a three hour rated fire barrier. A postulated fire in this area could prevent these valves from being closed. The valves are normally open to provide a suction source for the centrifugal charging pumps. The postulated fire could prevent the VCT from being isolated from the CCP suction, permitting the hydrogen cover gas in the VCT to enter the suction of the CCPs, damaging the pumps and causing the loss of high head safety injection. In addition, the VCT level transmitters associated with the above mentioned valves are not separated by a fire barrier, and are less than 20 feet apart. A postulated fire could damage both level transmitters, preventing the VCT from isolating upon low level.

The licensee considers this condition to be outside the design basis of the plant for fire protection of safe shutdown components. A continuous fire watch has been posted, and, in the event of a fire, actions will be taken to isolate the VCT. If these actions are not successful, the boric acid transfer pump will be started to provide a water source to the CCPs to prevent hydrogen intrusion into the CCP suction. The licensee is currently working to find a permanent solution to this condition.

The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36021
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 08/11/1999
Notification Time: 21:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/1999
Event Time: 13:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
Event Text
GASEOUS DIFFUSION REPORT - UF6 DETECTION SYSTEM RENDERED INOPERABLE

"At 1350, on 8/11/99. maintenance personnel were in the process of completing repairs to valves in the C-333-A feed facility. During this work, a pressure indicator was bumped by the maintenance personnel causing a spark, which shorted out the fuse to the #1 North and South autoclaves power supply. The power supply, for the local autoclave area audible and visual alarms for the UF6 Release Detection System are fed from the #1 autoclaves control power. Due to the loss of control power to the #1 autoclaves, the UF6 Release Detection System was rendered inoperable. At the time of this incident, the C-333-A facility was in an operational mode in which the UF6 Release Detection System was required to be operable. Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) required actions were put in place until power could be restored. Power was restored, and the UF6 Release Detection was operable at 1715 on 8/11/98.

"It has been determined that this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36022
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/12/1999
Notification Time: 01:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/1999
Event Time: 12:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
Event Text
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT)

At 1235 on 08/11/99. the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being maintained in the X-333 process building. NCS Engineering, while performing a pre-implementation walkdown of an NCSA, noticed a depression in the floor around a building column (X-333 operating floor) that is greater than 1.5 inches deep (~1.75 to 2 inches). A 12-position rack for storing small diameter uranium bearing containers is located directly above the depression (NCSA-PLANT025).

Requirement #10 of NCSA-PLANT025.A01 states in part, "Storage areas shall not be located over equipment or spaces that could confine a spill to a depth of greater than 1.5 inches. In the event of a spill or a loss of container integrity, the depression in the floor (a violation of requirement #10) could result in an unfavorable geometry."

At the direction of the PSS, the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were initiated, and the area was bounded off.

Safety significance of the event is low, and the diked area would have to be full of uranium at optimum moderated conditions for criticality to be possible. Geometry was the controlled parameter that was lost. The mass of material (uranium solution with a max allowed enrichment of 10%) is not controlled; therefore, more than a safe mass could be in the containers.

Corrective action was to remove all small containers from the storage area and reestablish NCS compliance.

There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified, and the DOE Site Representative will be notified.