Event Notification Report for August 10, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/09/1999 - 08/10/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
36018360113601236013
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36018
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM McCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JIM McCLEERY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/11/1999
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/1999
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/04/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
FAILURE OF 13 HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SPRINKLER SYSTEMS TO MEET SYSTEM OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS (24-Hour Report) - (Refer the event #36605 for a similar event at Portsmouth and refer to event #35790 and event #36552 for related events at Paducah.)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"On 08/10/99 at approximately 1600 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that 13 sprinkler systems associated with the High Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) system were not capable of meeting system operability requirements. This condition was discovered as a result of an engineering review of individual sprinkler heads that had previously been identified as exhibiting corrosion around the valve seat. The engineering review was conducted following the discovery that similar corrosion problems experienced at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant resulted in sprinkler heads being unable to actuate at normal pressure. An initial screening of PORTS sprinkler heads known to exhibit corrosion was conducted, and systems where the potential for two or more adjacent heads to be corroded were inspected. This identified 11 systems in the X-333 and 2 systems in the X-326 that did not meet the sprinkler system operability requirement that no two adjacent sprinkler heads be inoperable."
"The PSS declared the affected sprinkler systems inoperable, and TSR required actions were completed. Further inspections of sprinkler systems are planned. This report will be updated if additional sprinkler systems are determined to be inoperable."
"There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the onsite Department of Energy representative.
*** UPDATE ON 08/19/99 AT 2327 FROM HALCOMB TO POERTNER ***
During continuing walkdowns, HPFW system #398 was discovered with two or more (3) adjacent sprinkler heads with mineral deposits. This HPFW sprinkler was declared inoperable at 1038 hours and was repaired at 1407 hours.
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1415 EDT ON 08/28/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information was provided as an update to this report:
"During continuing walk downs of the HPFW system, systems 194, 196, 197, 211, [and] 212 were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable to meet system operability. Systems were made inoperable at 1452 on 08/27/99. All sprinklers were repaired and system operability made at 0550 [on] 08/26/99."
Portsmouth personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone).
* * * UPDATE AT 2337 ON 08/30/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"During continuing walkdowns of the HPFW system, seven additional systems were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable to meet system operability. Six systems were in the X-333 and one in the X-330. These systems were made inoperable starting at 1100 [on] 08/30/99 and repairs are being performed at this time."
The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Piccone).
* * * UPDATE AT 2305 ON 08/31/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"Add seven HPFW systems from X-333 building."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Pierson).
* * * UPDATE 0047 ON 09/02/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"Add fourteen HPFW systems from X-333 building."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Pierson).
*** UPDATE 1438 EDT ON 09/03/99 FROM WILLIAMSON TO POERTNER ***
"Add 5 HPFW systems from the X-333 and X-330 building."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Hickey).
******************** UPDATE AT 0439 ON 09/03/99 FROM JEFF CASTLE TO TROCINE ********************
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"[The] X-326, X-330, [and] X-333 HPFW sprinkler systems [were] all declared inoperable based on [the] number of corroded sprinkler heads being identified during ongoing building walkdowns."
It was stated that the actions of the Technical Safety Requirement are being met. These actions include smoke watch tours every 4 hours and controls on hot work in the area.
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and Department of Energy site representative. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills and Madera) and NMSS EO (Pierson).
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"On 08/10/99 at approximately 1600 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that 13 sprinkler systems associated with the High Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) system were not capable of meeting system operability requirements. This condition was discovered as a result of an engineering review of individual sprinkler heads that had previously been identified as exhibiting corrosion around the valve seat. The engineering review was conducted following the discovery that similar corrosion problems experienced at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant resulted in sprinkler heads being unable to actuate at normal pressure. An initial screening of PORTS sprinkler heads known to exhibit corrosion was conducted, and systems where the potential for two or more adjacent heads to be corroded were inspected. This identified 11 systems in the X-333 and 2 systems in the X-326 that did not meet the sprinkler system operability requirement that no two adjacent sprinkler heads be inoperable."
"The PSS declared the affected sprinkler systems inoperable, and TSR required actions were completed. Further inspections of sprinkler systems are planned. This report will be updated if additional sprinkler systems are determined to be inoperable."
"There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the onsite Department of Energy representative.
*** UPDATE ON 08/19/99 AT 2327 FROM HALCOMB TO POERTNER ***
During continuing walkdowns, HPFW system #398 was discovered with two or more (3) adjacent sprinkler heads with mineral deposits. This HPFW sprinkler was declared inoperable at 1038 hours and was repaired at 1407 hours.
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1415 EDT ON 08/28/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following information was provided as an update to this report:
"During continuing walk downs of the HPFW system, systems 194, 196, 197, 211, [and] 212 were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable to meet system operability. Systems were made inoperable at 1452 on 08/27/99. All sprinklers were repaired and system operability made at 0550 [on] 08/26/99."
Portsmouth personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone).
* * * UPDATE AT 2337 ON 08/30/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"During continuing walkdowns of the HPFW system, seven additional systems were found with two or more adjacent sprinkler heads unable to meet system operability. Six systems were in the X-333 and one in the X-330. These systems were made inoperable starting at 1100 [on] 08/30/99 and repairs are being performed at this time."
The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Piccone).
* * * UPDATE AT 2305 ON 08/31/1999 FROM McCLEERY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"Add seven HPFW systems from X-333 building."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Pierson).
* * * UPDATE 0047 ON 09/02/99 FROM JIM McCLEERY TO FANGIE JONES * * *
"Add fourteen HPFW systems from X-333 building."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Pierson).
*** UPDATE 1438 EDT ON 09/03/99 FROM WILLIAMSON TO POERTNER ***
"Add 5 HPFW systems from the X-333 and X-330 building."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Portsmouth personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Hickey).
******************** UPDATE AT 0439 ON 09/03/99 FROM JEFF CASTLE TO TROCINE ********************
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:
"[The] X-326, X-330, [and] X-333 HPFW sprinkler systems [were] all declared inoperable based on [the] number of corroded sprinkler heads being identified during ongoing building walkdowns."
It was stated that the actions of the Technical Safety Requirement are being met. These actions include smoke watch tours every 4 hours and controls on hot work in the area.
Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and Department of Energy site representative. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills and Madera) and NMSS EO (Pierson).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36011
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GREGORY BRYAN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GREGORY BRYAN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 08/10/1999
Notification Time: 14:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/1999
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/1999
Notification Time: 14:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/1999
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
COURTESY CALL REGARDING DISCOVERY OF FISH KILL IN CIRCULATING WATER INTAKE
The licensee notified the Texas State Parks and Wildlife Agency regarding the discovery of several thousand dead shad in the vicinity of the circulating water intake. The state informed the licensee that this discovery was not reportable, hence the licensee is providing this notification to the NRC as a courtesy. The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:
"Approximately two to three thousand shad were observed floating in the vicinity of the circulating water intake area. No sport fish were observed in this area. The likely cause of the die-off was stress to the shad due to dissolved oxygen depletion and high ambient temperatures. A survey of the main reservoir revealed few (less than ten) floating fish in the main water body. Consequently, this condition appears to be limited to the intake area only. A courtesy call to the Texas Parks and Wildlife was made at approximately 1100 on 08/07/99. The agency indicated that no formal reporting was required. A follow-up survey of the main reservoir on 08/08/99 confirmed that only shad in the intake area remained affected and no floating fish were observed in the main water body of the reservoir. A walk-down of the intake structure on 08/09/99 revealed several thousand floating shad collected in front of the Unit 1 trash racks extending out approximately 10 feet from the trash racks."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
The licensee notified the Texas State Parks and Wildlife Agency regarding the discovery of several thousand dead shad in the vicinity of the circulating water intake. The state informed the licensee that this discovery was not reportable, hence the licensee is providing this notification to the NRC as a courtesy. The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:
"Approximately two to three thousand shad were observed floating in the vicinity of the circulating water intake area. No sport fish were observed in this area. The likely cause of the die-off was stress to the shad due to dissolved oxygen depletion and high ambient temperatures. A survey of the main reservoir revealed few (less than ten) floating fish in the main water body. Consequently, this condition appears to be limited to the intake area only. A courtesy call to the Texas Parks and Wildlife was made at approximately 1100 on 08/07/99. The agency indicated that no formal reporting was required. A follow-up survey of the main reservoir on 08/08/99 confirmed that only shad in the intake area remained affected and no floating fish were observed in the main water body of the reservoir. A walk-down of the intake structure on 08/09/99 revealed several thousand floating shad collected in front of the Unit 1 trash racks extending out approximately 10 feet from the trash racks."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36012
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT POWERS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT POWERS
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 08/10/1999
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/1999
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/1999
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/1999
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO FUEL OIL LEAK
"Abnormal readings from the lube oil analysis of the division 2 diesel generator lead to further testing of its lube oil. Gas chromatography analysis of the division 2 diesel generator lube oil showed a 5.7% fuel oil dilution. Vendor recommendations were to not operate the diesel with greater than 5.0% fuel oil dilution. The division 2 diesel generator was tagged out for maintenance and declared inoperable on 8/9/99 at 1330 central time. During maintenance of the division 2 diesel generator it was discovered that the 12th cylinder of the 16 cylinder engine fuel injector return line fitting was weeping fuel oil.
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR5072(b)(1)(ii)(B) as a condition outside of the design basis of the plant because of the discovery that the division 2 diesel generator has been incapable of performing its design function (intended safety function) for an extended period of time during operation."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION 1803 10/8/1999 FROM ED TIEDEMANN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"This report is to retract the notification of 8/10/1999, based on further evaluation by onsite engineering and licensing personnel, and offsite resources. The engineering evaluation performed for this event determined that the diesel generator would have fulfilled the design basis requirements, even with the effects of fuel dilution in the lube oil. "
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified R3DO (Jacobson).
"Abnormal readings from the lube oil analysis of the division 2 diesel generator lead to further testing of its lube oil. Gas chromatography analysis of the division 2 diesel generator lube oil showed a 5.7% fuel oil dilution. Vendor recommendations were to not operate the diesel with greater than 5.0% fuel oil dilution. The division 2 diesel generator was tagged out for maintenance and declared inoperable on 8/9/99 at 1330 central time. During maintenance of the division 2 diesel generator it was discovered that the 12th cylinder of the 16 cylinder engine fuel injector return line fitting was weeping fuel oil.
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR5072(b)(1)(ii)(B) as a condition outside of the design basis of the plant because of the discovery that the division 2 diesel generator has been incapable of performing its design function (intended safety function) for an extended period of time during operation."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION 1803 10/8/1999 FROM ED TIEDEMANN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"This report is to retract the notification of 8/10/1999, based on further evaluation by onsite engineering and licensing personnel, and offsite resources. The engineering evaluation performed for this event determined that the diesel generator would have fulfilled the design basis requirements, even with the effects of fuel dilution in the lube oil. "
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified R3DO (Jacobson).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36013
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RAWLEIGH DILLARD
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RAWLEIGH DILLARD
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 08/10/1999
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/1999
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/1999
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/1999
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM PENETRATION OUTSIDE OF 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX R DESIGN BASIS
The licensee has identified a 12" x 12" through-wall penetration between the emergency switchgear room and the control room annex that was not filled in accordance with the licensee's fire barrier construction standards. The penetration was filled with mineral wool that did not meet the three hour fire rating requirements for the control room. The licensee has posted a continuous fire watch in this area as a compensatory measure. The NRC resident inspector will be informed by the licensee.
The licensee has identified a 12" x 12" through-wall penetration between the emergency switchgear room and the control room annex that was not filled in accordance with the licensee's fire barrier construction standards. The penetration was filled with mineral wool that did not meet the three hour fire rating requirements for the control room. The licensee has posted a continuous fire watch in this area as a compensatory measure. The NRC resident inspector will be informed by the licensee.