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Event Notification Report for August 06, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/05/1999 - 08/06/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
3600236005360063599735998359993621836265360623602536121

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36002
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3     State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAD ELLISON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/06/1999
Notification Time: 15:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/1999
Event Time: 13:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
DISCOVERY OF A DOOR CONFIGURATION THAT DID NOT MEET THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR THE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN BASIS HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK (HELB)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"During performance of monthly equipment walkdowns, it was discovered that a door assumed to open as a vent path in the HELB analysis was jammed closed. The door is one of two doors in a double door assembly. The analysis assumes that both doors open in order for room pressurization to meet the acceptance criteria for the structural analysis of the design basis HELB. The door was returned to an operable configuration. The door was disabled for 20 minutes from the time of discovery."

The length of time the door was in this configuration prior to discovery is not currently known. The units are not in any limiting conditions for operation as a result of this issue.

The door involved is door #182. It is an Auxiliary Building door on the 735' level, and it goes to the Fuel Handling Area which is part of a special vent zone. It is also an HELB analysis door.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

*** RETRACTION 1617 EDT on 9/3/99 FROM ANDREWS TO POERTNER ***

Subsequent analysis and testing has demonstrated that the door would have opened as necessary and this event notification is therefore retracted.

The NRC resident inspector will be notified.

Notified R3DO (HILLS).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36005
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE VASELY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/06/1999
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation
Event Text
VOLUNTARY NOTIFICATION REGARDING POTENTIAL FOR CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM RECIRCULATION DUE TO SMOKE FROM FIRES ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HUDSON RIVER

Brush fires are currently burning along the west side of the Hudson River across from the Indian Point facility. The fires pose no threat to operation of the facility or personnel because they are on the opposite side of the river. Recent changes in wind direction have caused the smoke plum to reach the site. Control room personnel have begun to notice the odor but are not currently adversely affected. The control room ventilation system is currently in its normal configuration with outside air makeup. The licensee may decide to place the system in its incident mode (full internal recirculation) in the future to maintain the comfort level should the condition persist. This evolution will be performed using normal operating procedures, and as such, the licensee does not consider this to be an engineered safety feature actuation.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

*** UPDATE AT 0403 ON 8/9/99 DURING MORNING STATUS CALL BY POERTNER ***

The control room ventilation system was not placed in its incident mode.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 36006
Rep Org: IDAHO NAT ENGR & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB
Licensee: IDAHO NAL ENGR & ENVIRONMENTAL LAB
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS   State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB TOONE, ED BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 08/06/1999
Notification Time: 19:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TOM STETKA (R4)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
BILL BEECHER (PAO)
R. REAPE/D. SULLIVAN (FEMA)
Event Text
COURTESY NOTIFICATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) IDAHO ALERT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE IN THE DESERT ON DOE CONTROLLED PROPERTY

This event was classified as an Alert at 1600 MDT in accordance with DOE procedures. This is not a classification driven by the Three Mile Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSI) Emergency Plan. This is a courtesy notification.

A fire occurred that covers approximately 7 acres of DOE controlled property. The Idaho Nuclear Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) fire department and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) are fighting the fire. The fire is not threatening any site area. It is located in the middle of a desert. The fire fighters are currently in the "Mop Up Mode." There are no open flames, and the fire should be contained. However, it is still windy. The fire is believed to have been started due to a lightning strike during a wind storm and due to the ongoing dry weather.

DOE Idaho made notifications per procedures to activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Emergency Control Center (ECC) to backup the INEEL and BLM firemen who are doing the actual fire fighting. One offsite notification was made because BLM was assisting in fighting the fire.

NRC assistance was not requested.

(Call the NRC operations officer for a DOE contact telephone number.)

*** UPDATE AT 0305 EDT ON 08/07/99 FROM BROWN TO POERTNER ***

The DOE Alert was terminated at 0052 MDT on 08/07/99. The fire was contained. No facilities were threatened during the event.

The HOO notified the R4DO (Stetka), NMSS EO (Shankman), IRO (Miller), PAO (Gagner), FEMA (Sweetser), HHS-CDC (Wilson), EPA-NRC (Chancellor), and USDA (Graham).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35997
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID T. WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/06/1999
Notification Time: 10:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/1999
Event Time: 09:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
1-HOUR SAFEGUARDS REPORT

DISCOVERY OF POTENTIAL COMPROMISE OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. COMPENSATORY MEASURES NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. CONTACT THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS CENTER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.


Hospital
Event Number: 35998
Rep Org: SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL
Licensee: SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL
Region: 2
City: NORFOLK   State: VA
County: NORFOLK
License #: 45-00131-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID WEIMER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/06/1999
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/1999
Event Time: 08:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
Event Text
STUCK SOURCE IN HDR AFTERLOADER DURING TESTING

AT 0858 EDT ON 8/6/99, A HIGH DOSE REMOTE (HDR) AFTERLOADER SOURCE STUCK IN THE EXTENDED POSITION DURING PHANTOM VISUAL STEP INDICATOR TESTING. THE HDR IS A GAMMAMED 12i CONTAINING A 4.5-CURIE IRIDIUM-192 SOURCE LOCATED IN THE RADIATION ONCOLOGY 4-MeV VAULT. THREE HOSPITAL STAFF ENTERED THE VAULT FOR APPROXIMATELY 1-1/2 MINUTES EACH IN ORDER TO MANUALLY CRANK THE SOURCE BACK INTO THE STOWED POSITION. THE RSO ESTIMATES THAT THE BRIEF EXPOSURE TIME IN THE 200 MILLIREM/HR FIELD RESULTED IN APPROXIMATELY 5-10 MILLIREM DOSE TO EACH INDIVIDUAL. THE PERSONNEL FILM BADGES WILL BE PROCESSED TO CONFIRM THIS ESTIMATE. THE SERVICE COMPANY IN RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, HAS DISPATCHED A TECHNICIAN TO RETURN THE SOURCE TO THE STOWED POSITION. THIS PARTICULAR DEVICE WAS SCHEDULED FOR A SOURCE CHANGEOUT ON MONDAY WHICH WILL BE COMPLETED TODAY. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THEIR REGION 2 INSPECTOR PRIOR TO CONTACTING THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS CENTER.

NOTE: REFER TO RELATED EVENT #36025.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35999
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4     State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID PIERCE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 08/06/1999
Notification Time: 11:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/1999
Event Time: 07:50 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(v) - OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP
Person (Organization):
TOM STETKA (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
EMERGENCY SIREN COMPUTER INOPERABLE

The shift supervisor was notified at 0750 PDT that the early warning siren (EWS) computer, located in the San Louis Obispo County Sheriff's office, had failed at 0605 PDT. Licensee personnel transferred control of the emergency sirens to a computer located at the licensee's San Louis Obispo distribution center at 0745 PDT. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36218
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL ZACCONE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/23/1999
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/1999
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
VERN HODGE (FAX) (NRR)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT - ABB K-LINE BREAKER DEFECT

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 [in order] to identify a substantial safety hazard with an ABB K-line breaker."

"On August 6, 1999, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) determined that a substantial safety hazard could exist with ABB K-line breakers failing to trip. Improper routing/support of the shunt trip wires during refurbishment caused interference with the red trip-shaft paddle on the left side of the breaker. This condition was found on a breaker installed in [a] safety-related switchgear at VCSNS. This breaker condition was compared to several other ABB K-line breakers at the plant site. The other breakers were found to have the wires routed in a different direction, precluding interference with the red trip-shaft paddle."

"VCSNS utilizes these breakers in many applications, including the 480-VAC, safety-related, electrical buses. The shunt trip wiring problem is considered a defect in repair. This condition represents a potential for a
common mode failure for safety-related K-line breakers."

"The vendor has been notified of the shunt trip wiring problem and has agreed to modify the procedure for the refurbishment of these breakers. VCSNS Engineering has determined that vendor procedure changes
should prevent recurrence of this problem."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

********************* UPDATE AT 0934 ON 10/18/99 FROM PHIL ROSE TO LEIGH TROCINE ********************

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On [10/07/99], ABB Service and VCSNS personnel inspected the affected breaker along with a second K-line breaker that was determined to also be potentially affected at VCSNS. It was determined that the following information should be provided to all licensees regarding this issue:"

"The potentially affected breakers at ABB K-line breakers of the following type:
* all electrically-operated breakers model K-1600, K-1600S, K-2000, K-2000S, and K-225 through K-800[; and]
* any mechanically- or electrically-operated breakers with the above model numbers which have any
auxiliary switches or a shunt trip."

"The potential impact on the breakers has been assessed to be either of the following:
* For breakers having the shunt trip coil wiring on top of the tripper paddle, a trip free condition could result.
* For breakers which have the shunt trip coil wiring underneath the tripper paddle, the overload trip could be
prevented from operating. The circuit breaker is capable of a manual or electrical trip. This condition
impacts the overload trip function only."

"It was also determined that this problem was not limited to the breaker refurbishment/repair process by ABB Service. [The licensee stated that this condition could occur on new breakers.]"

"VCSNS has inspected 26 safety-related breakers. One breaker was found to be affected and another potentially affected. Corrective actions have been taken. VCSNS has also inspected three non-safety-related breakers with no further problems identified. The remaining breakers (four safety related and five non-safety related) have been added to the scope of the next refueling outage."

"[Both] VCSNS and ABB Service recommend inspection of all potentially affected breakers as soon as they can be made available. The recommended corrective action is to inspect and secure any wiring that could potentially interfere with the proper operation of the tripper paddle."

The licensee stated that a 30-day report regarding this issue is due to be issued this week. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Cook), R2DO (Julian), R3DO (Jorgensen), R4DO (Smith), and NRR (Hodge).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36265
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: W. BAUDHAUER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/06/1999
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
VERN HODGE (FAX)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
Event Text
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT - DAMAGED SAFETY GRADE ELECTRICAL CABLING FOUND IN SUPPLY

"On August 31, 1999, damage to a new power cable being installed in a non-safety-related application under Modification Approval Record MAR 98-04-06-01 (Instrument Air Compressor Upgrade) was identified. The insulation on one conductor of three conductor cable (BICC Brand Rex Company power cable #1108582, 1 Kv, 3/C, #2/0, Class B, 90C, XLPE Insulated, Black Jacket) was found to be damaged when the outer jacket was
removed for termination. This was the first issuance of the cable (4 Reels containing approximately 4,000 feet total in stock), which had been procured as safety grade and Environmentally Qualified (EQ) (PO #F830409D). A total of six samples of the pulled cable were inspected. Damage to the same conductor was found in all six samples. The cable appeared to have been damaged during fabrication rather than by cable pulling techniques.

"The vendor stated that the damage was created during the cabling process while combining the three conductors just prior to closing. The damaged conductor fell off the cabling unit pulley due to loss of tension, causing the insulation to be scraped

"Although never used in the plant, the subject cable could have been used in a safety-related application in a harsh environment such as the Reactor Building or Intermediate Building. In a harsh environment created under accident conditions, the damaged cable insulation could allow the cable conductor to "leak" through moisture to nearby grounds, thus tripping and rendering inoperable, equipment downstream of the fault. Normally, conductor insulation is the primary barrier to leaks in loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) tests when jacket material occasionally cracks. Also, if the cable was installed in a metal cabinet so that the cable outer jacket had been stripped near the defect to allow cable termination, the damaged cable insulation on the one conductor could potentially allow contact with the cabinet or a nearby ground during a seismic event and cause the circuit to malfunction. In either case, safety-related loads required to mitigate the consequences of an accident or to perform a safety-related function, could be impacted to the extent that a substantial safety hazard could be created.

"The above evaluation was completed on October 4, 1999. The FPC director/responsible officer was notified of the above determination on October 6, 1999. The vendor has been notified of FPC's intent to report this issue under 10CFR21.21."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 36062
Rep Org: T.A. HOUSTON & ASSOCIATES
Licensee: T.A. HOUSTON & ASSOCIATES
Region: 2
City: CULPEPER   State: VA
County:
License #: 45-025073-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: T.A. HOUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/24/1999
Notification Time: 11:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SPARKS (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
Event Text
TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE LOST DURING SHIPMENT

A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE MODEL 3411B SERIAL #15637 CONTAINING 8 MILLICURIES OF CESIUM-137 AND 40 MILLICURIES OF AMERICIUM WHICH WAS SHIPPED FROM T.A. HOUSTON & ASSOCIATES IN CULPEPER VA TO THE TROXLER COMPANY IN RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK, NC ON 8/6/99 HAS NOT REACHED ITS DESTINATION AS OF 8/13/99. FEDERAL EXPRESS, THE CARRIER, AND TROXLER BOTH HAVE BEEN CONTACTED. THE TRACKING NUMBER IS 813439593699. THE GAUGE WAS BEING SHIPPED TO TROXLER FOR CALIBRATION AND ROUTINE MAINTENANCE.


Hospital
Event Number: 36025
Rep Org: THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Licensee: SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL
Region: 2
City: NORFOLK   State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS BEATTY, RSO
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 08/12/1999
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(c)(3)(i) - DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
DALE POWERS (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
Event Text
PART 21 REPORT - DEFECT IN A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPHY UNIT

DOUGLAS BEATTY, RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER, THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED IN KANATA, ONTARIO, CANADA, REPORTED THAT ON 08/06/99, AN Ir-192 SOURCE CABLE ON A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPY UNIT, MODEL #12i, SERIAL #709, LOCATED AT SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL IN NORFOLK, VA, FAILED TO RETRACT TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION. THE SOURCE WAS MANUALLY RETURNED TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION BY A THERATRONICS SERVICE TECHNICIAN ON 08/06/99.

THE LICENSEE IS PERFORMING AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE DEFECT AND PLANS TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NRC.

NOTE: REFER TO RELATED EVENT #35998.

* * * UPDATE AT 1614 ON 08/13/99 BY JOLLIFFE * * *

On 08/12/99, MDS Nordion, Kanata, Ontario, Canada, the parent company of Theratronics International Limited, issued GammaMed User Bulletin #GMUB 99-01 as follows:

Subject: Notice of Incident - GammaMed High Dose Remote (HDR) Afterloader Units

Units Affected: GammaMed Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Units operating in the United States and Canada.

We have recently been notified of four incidents involving GammaMed HDR Afterloader Units in which the source cable became separated from the driving mechanism. In each of these incidents, the source remained in an exposed position, and required intervention to place the source into a shielded position.

We have investigated these incidents, and have concluded that the cause is attributable to a specific lot of cable used by the source manufacturer in the production of these sources. These sources have been installed only in the United States and Canada.

We strongly recommend that your institution suspend use of your GammaMed Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Unit until the source is replaced. We are presently working with the source manufacturer to expedite replacement of these sources. A representative of our service department will contact you shortly to schedule a date for replacement of the source in your GammaMed Unit.

We, at MDS Nordion, believe that safety of the patient and hospital personnel is of the utmost importance. We will strive to correct this situation as soon as possible.

For further information, please contact Dave Marquez, Manager, Installation and Service, MDS Nordion.

Note: Refer to Event #36027 for a related event.

*** UPDATE AT 1600 EDT on 9/3/99 BY POERTNER ***

Theratronics International Limited submitted a 30 day report of notification of defect to the NRC regarding the source cable wires used in GammaMed brachytherapy High Dose Rate Afterloader devices.

Notified NMSS (PIERSON)


Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36121
Rep Org: USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE
Licensee: USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE
Region: 2
City: ELGIN AF BASE   State: FL
County:
License #: 42-23539-01AF
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIE COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 09/03/1999
Notification Time: 10:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
CHARLES CAIN (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
Event Text
TWO SEALED SOURCES CONTAINING LESS THAN 4 MICROCURIES EACH OF AMERICIUM-241 MISSING

On 6 August 1999 at 1200 EST, Eglin AFB, FL notified Air Force Medical Operations Agency/Office of the Surgeon General (AFMOA/SGOR) of the suspected loss of a Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) target pod. The LANTIRN pod contains two sealed sources with less than 4 microcuries of Americium-241 each. This was reported under an incident report on the Loss of USAF Radioactive Material under Florida Permit # FL-30314-02/00AFP.

The Laser Transmitter (LTR) is a removable subassembly housed in a nose assembly; internally contains the permitted radioactive source (Americium); when installed, it is completely covered by an access panel. The next higher assembly is the Nose Equipment Support Assembly (NESA), which is the forward section of a LANTIRN targeting pod.

A NESA was shipped to a contractor owned depot for testing and upon arrival it was determined that the LTR was missing. It was not physically checked installed before it was shipped as the access panel was not removed. The LTR that was supposed to be in the NESA shipped was found installed in a different NESA. Further investigation determined that there was a different LTR actually unaccounted for.

The last known time that the missing LTR was accounted for was in the June 1999, semi-annual inventory. A search was conducted, including tracking down all NESAs that had been shipped to depot for repair. The LTR is unaccounted for and it has been flagged by depot in the supply system. If it turns up, it will be returned to the proper site.

Corrective actions have been implemented to prevent reoccurrence of a loss of control including an itemized checklist to ensure a LTR is not installed in a NESA prior to shipment, monthly inventories versus semi-annual, and all LTR transactions are recorded in the Americium inventory.

A copy of the report was sent to NRC Region 4 (Gains).