Event Notification Report for August 02, 1999

THE LICENSEE DETERMINED A CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE CVC SYSTEM FROM FULFILLING ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION.

At 1643 CDT on 8/2/99 with charging pumps 'A' and 'B' operating, the control room received the "CHARGING HEADER FLOW LO" annunciator. The operator observed that charging header flow indicated 0.0 gpm. The control room personnel selectively secured charging pump 'A' and observed that the charging header flow returned to the expected flow (44.0 gpm) for a single operating charging pump. At 1650 charging pump 'A' was restarted to investigate if the condition was repeatable. Operations personnel were observing the charging pumps locally during this period. The condition was identified as repeatable, however, operations personnel could not conclusive identify locally any abnormalities. Charging pump 'A' was declared inoperable and was secured in the "OFF" condition to preclude any unplanned starts due to automatic actuations (pressurizer level deviation or SIAS) and Technical Specification 3.1.2.4 was entered at 1654 (CDT). The on-coming shift isolated and danger tagged charging pump 'A'. After review of the information by licensing personnel on August 3, 1999, it was determined that this failure may have prevented the CVC System from fulfilling its intended safety function.
The plant was in a 72 hr LCO action statement to have both charging pumps operable while in modes 1,2,3, & 4. The plant entered mode 5 within the 72 hr action statement. The cause of the problem is being investigated.

The resident inspector will be notified.

***RETRACTION on 08/10/99 at 1107 ET by Arthur Wemett taken by MacKinnon***

A team was appointed to investigate the event that was observed on August 2, 1999. Plant data and discussions with individuals were performed to identify pertinent facts and potential failure modes. Additional troubleshooting was performed August 6, 1999 to confirm which components were operating correctly or possibly failed. The result of the troubleshooting concluded that a failure of the charging flow transmitter was occurring at low pressures (indicator was sporadic). The flow was verified by other plant parameters (i.e., temperatures, pressures, and levels) and by the use of a temporary installed ultrasonic flow meter. The transmitter was removed from service and replaced. The transmitter was tested by maintenance and the failure could be repeated.

The failure of the charging flow transmitter gave the indication that charging flow was lost but at no time during the plant evolution was actual flow lost. Based on this information we are retracting the four hour notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) that was made on August 3, 1999.

HOO notified R4DO (Powers).

DISCOVERY THAT PREVENTS A 3 HOUR FIRE BARRIER FROM MEETING ITS DESIGN

"On 7/26/99 a 3-5/8 inch gap approximately 7 feet long was identified to exist between the Auxiliary Building (Fire Area #17) and the #2 Mechanical Equipment Room (Fire Area #31). A deviation report was submitted on the above date for this condition. On 8/2/99 following additional evaluation by the plant staff, it was determined that this gap would have prevented this fire barrier from meeting its 3-hour fire rating. This condition is considered to have existed since original design and construction of the plant. This condition constitutes a condition outside the Appendix R design basis of the plant. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B). A continuous fire watch has been established on one side of the affected fire barrier as a compensatory measure in accordance with the station Appendix R Program."

The discovery occurred during a quarterly inspection in an area that was difficult to access normally. The corrective actions have been determined and will be completed before the fire watch is removed.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

BOMB THREAT AT LANDFILL

THE LICENSEE REPORTED AN UNCLASSIFIED EMERGENCY, AS A COURTESY NOTIFICATION, THAT THERE WAS A POTENTIAL BOMB THREAT, WHICH HAS NOT YET REACHED THE CREDIBLE STATE, AT A LANDFILL NORTH OF THE PLANT. THIS THREAT IS BASED ON UNIDENTIFIED AND SUSPICIOUS ITEMS BEING FOUND AT THE LANDFILL. THE LOCAL POLICE BOMB SQUAD IS RESPONDING. NO PROTECTIVE ACTION IS RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME, SIRENS HAVE NOT BEEN ACTIVATED, NO EAS MESSAGE WAS REQUIRED AND NO RELEASES HAVE OCCURRED.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED ALONG WITH THE COUNTY AND STATE DISASTER AND EMERGENCY SERVICES, AND DOE.

*** UPDATE ON 8/2/99 @ 1526 BY JONES TO GOULD ***

THE POLICE BOMB SQUAD WILL EVALUATE THE SUSPICIOUS ITEMS AT THE SITE.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

*** UPDATE ON 8/2/99 @ 1617 BY JONES TO GOULD ***

THE POLICE BOMB SQUAD DETERMINED THE CONTAINERS AT THE LAND FILL CONTAINED ANTIFREEZE, THE EMERGENCY WAS TERMINATED AT 1458 CDT.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. THE NMSS EO(MOORE) AND THE REG 3 RDO(RING) AND DANIS(IAT) WERE NOTIFIED.

LOST SECURITY KEY. COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN. SEE LOG FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

*** RETRACTION AT 12:42 ON 8/3/99 FROM DORAZIO TO POERTNER ***

The licensee determined that this event was not reportable. See HOO LOG for additional information.

The NRC resident inspector has been notified.

HOO notified R3DO (Mark Ring)

PLATFORM GRATING CLAMPS(FASTENERS) APPEAR NOT TO BE SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED.

THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT THE PLATFORM GRATING CLAMPS DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN QUALIFIED FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF A SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 COMPONENT WHEN LOADED. WITH THE GRATINGS UNLOADED, HOWEVER, THIS CONDITION DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS TO PERFORM THERE INTENDED FUNCTIONS DURING A DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE. ENGINEERING IS CONTINUING TO EVALUATE THIS CONDITION.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED

* * * RETRACTED AT 2221 EDT ON 8/25/99 BY TIM CLOUSER TO FANGIE JONES * * *

"After further review of the condition (event # 35984) reported on August 2,1999, TXU did not identify any deviation from the design basis requirements of the plant as defined in 10CFR50.2. Although the basic premise of the conservative reporting of this issue was that a "test failed", it was later noted that the newly tested configuration was not the as built configuration. Specifically, the new test configuration used an EPI clamp versus
the friction clamps actually installed in the field. In addition, plant drawings and procedures already prohibited live loads in the areas that were deemed susceptible to the conditions identified in the initial corrective action document. Therefore, the platforms still maintained their ability to perform their specified safety functions, are not a condition outside of the design basis, and not reportable under 10CFR50.72/73. Accordingly, this report is hereby retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the R4DO (Phil Harrell) was informed by the HOO.

* * * UPDATE 2138 8/30/1999 FROM NEMEYER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

"This is a clarification to the retraction reported on August 25,1999, associated with Event # 35984 reported on August 2,1999.

"After further review of the condition TXU did not identify any deviation from the design basis requirements of the plant as defined in 10CFR50.2. Although the basic premise of the conservative reporting of this issue was that a 'test failed', it was later noted that the newly tested configuration was not the as built configuration. Based on a review of the test and its implications, engineering judgement [consistent with guidance provided in NUREG 1022 Rev. 1 and GL-91-18 Rev.1] has concluded that there is a reasonable expectation that the platforms would have continued to fulfill their safety function, and does not represent a condition outside of design basis of the plant pursuant to 10CFR50.72/73. However, TXU has strengthened its control associated with live loads in the plant as a conservative measure.

"Because the information gathered during this review and evaluation of the platforms may be of a generic interest to the industry, TXU will report this issue via a voluntarily LER."

Notified R4DO (Cain).

SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO VITAL AREA BOUNDARY. COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. CONTACT THE OPERATIONS CENTER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

POSSIBLE DAMAGED THICKNESS GAUGE

The licensee reported a strip break on the #6 continuous galvanizing line struck a NDS Model #200 (Serial #2061T) thickness gauge and knocked it from its mount. The gauge contains a sealed source of 2 curies of Americium-241. The area was isolated and a survey and wipe test indicated normal readings as indicated by recent surveys. The licensee notified its contractor, Val Met, who will actually go the plant to move the gauge and verify any actual damage to the gauge. Val Met is the company that replaced NDS.

No injuries, personnel exposures, or contamination occurred in this incident.