Event Notification Report for July 29, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/28/1999 - 07/29/1999
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35972
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: PAT RYAN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: PAT RYAN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/29/1999
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/1999
Event Time: 16:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/1999
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/1999
Event Time: 16:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
GEOFFREY WRIGHT (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM SPECIAL VENTILATION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At approximately 1640 CDT on 07/29/99, Plant Engineering discovered that a condition existed with door #158 (entry door to #122 Control Room Chiller Room) on 07/27/99 similar to a condition that existed on 06/25/99 that resulted in a LER. Further investigation concluded that the condition of door #158 on 07/27/99 was almost exactly the same as that on 06/25/99. Door #158 was identified as having a broken latch mechanism. The broken latch results in a breach of the Control Room Special Ventilation System, such that both trains are to be considered inoperable.
"Interviews with duty people present during the 07/27/99 breach confirmed that the door latch was repaired well within an hour from its discovery and returned to service."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
HOO note: See related event #EN 35860.
"At approximately 1640 CDT on 07/29/99, Plant Engineering discovered that a condition existed with door #158 (entry door to #122 Control Room Chiller Room) on 07/27/99 similar to a condition that existed on 06/25/99 that resulted in a LER. Further investigation concluded that the condition of door #158 on 07/27/99 was almost exactly the same as that on 06/25/99. Door #158 was identified as having a broken latch mechanism. The broken latch results in a breach of the Control Room Special Ventilation System, such that both trains are to be considered inoperable.
"Interviews with duty people present during the 07/27/99 breach confirmed that the door latch was repaired well within an hour from its discovery and returned to service."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
HOO note: See related event #EN 35860.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35973
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 07/30/1999
Notification Time: 00:02 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/1999
Event Time: 23:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/30/1999
Notification Time: 00:02 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/1999
Event Time: 23:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/30/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE
Check valve #2CSH*V16 on the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System pump suction from the suppression pool is not in the inservice testing program plan for reverse flow testing. A preliminary review indicates that this check valve should be reverse-flow tested. The HPCS System was declared inoperable and Unit 2 entered a 14 day LCO. Steps are being taken to retest the valve.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Check valve #2CSH*V16 on the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System pump suction from the suppression pool is not in the inservice testing program plan for reverse flow testing. A preliminary review indicates that this check valve should be reverse-flow tested. The HPCS System was declared inoperable and Unit 2 entered a 14 day LCO. Steps are being taken to retest the valve.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.