Event Notification Report for July 13, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/12/1999 - 07/13/1999
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35920
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: THOMAS WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: THOMAS WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/14/1999
Notification Time: 18:16 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/1999
Event Time: 21:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/1999
Notification Time: 18:16 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/1999
Event Time: 21:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
RONALD GARDNER (R3)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT
"At 2123 CDT on 7/13/99, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that a product cylinder had been washed In the C-400 Cylinder Wash facility without independent verification of cylinder heel weight, This is in violation of NCSA.400.002. Product cylinders are required to be weighed prior to washing as an independent verification of the Indicated heel weight. A weight ticket is used to calculate the cylinder heel weight and this ticket was not attached to the cylinder wash data sheet. The weight ticket has subsequently been found and the heel weight shown to be acceptable. Although the cylinder heel weight was within the maximum allowable weight, double contingency was not maintained since the independent verification of the heel weight was not performed at the time the cylinder was washed."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.
"At 2123 CDT on 7/13/99, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that a product cylinder had been washed In the C-400 Cylinder Wash facility without independent verification of cylinder heel weight, This is in violation of NCSA.400.002. Product cylinders are required to be weighed prior to washing as an independent verification of the Indicated heel weight. A weight ticket is used to calculate the cylinder heel weight and this ticket was not attached to the cylinder wash data sheet. The weight ticket has subsequently been found and the heel weight shown to be acceptable. Although the cylinder heel weight was within the maximum allowable weight, double contingency was not maintained since the independent verification of the heel weight was not performed at the time the cylinder was washed."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35918
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS GUMBERT
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS GUMBERT
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/14/1999
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/1999
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/1999
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LICENSEE 24-HOUR REPORT DUE TO 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R ISSUE
"During on-going review of Salem Fire Protection Program and the post fire safe shutdown analysis it was determined that cables associated with the limit switches for both of the service water header valves (SW22) are routed through the same fire protection area, in close proximity (mechanical penetration area). This is not in conformance with the approved fire protection program. In the event of fire in this area, hot shorts, although highly unlikely, are required to be postulated per NRC guidance, in both of these cables simultaneously. These shorts would result in the closure of both of the header valves with the attendant loss of service water to safety related equipment. Long term loss of service water would result in loss of some equipment necessary to maintain safe shutdown, if left uncorrected.
"The area in question has been subject to compensatory actions due to the on-going fire wrap issues which had been previously identified. Based on this, if a fire were to occur it would be detected and extinguished before the postulated failure would occur. In the unlikely event that detection did not occur simple non-heroic, straight forward operator action could easily correct the resulting deficiency such that safe shutdown would be maintained.
"This is not an equipment operability concern because adequate compensatory actions are in place and were in place prior to discovery. the likelihood of the event is extremely low. No further immediate actions are necessary. Current plans are to perform a design change which will eliminate the concern.
"This report is being made to the NRC in accordance with Section 2.1 of the Salem Unit 2 Operating License as a condition found in violation of the: requirements contained in Operating License Section 2.C.1O Fire Protection. There is no significant impact on the public health and safety."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event notification by the licensee.
"During on-going review of Salem Fire Protection Program and the post fire safe shutdown analysis it was determined that cables associated with the limit switches for both of the service water header valves (SW22) are routed through the same fire protection area, in close proximity (mechanical penetration area). This is not in conformance with the approved fire protection program. In the event of fire in this area, hot shorts, although highly unlikely, are required to be postulated per NRC guidance, in both of these cables simultaneously. These shorts would result in the closure of both of the header valves with the attendant loss of service water to safety related equipment. Long term loss of service water would result in loss of some equipment necessary to maintain safe shutdown, if left uncorrected.
"The area in question has been subject to compensatory actions due to the on-going fire wrap issues which had been previously identified. Based on this, if a fire were to occur it would be detected and extinguished before the postulated failure would occur. In the unlikely event that detection did not occur simple non-heroic, straight forward operator action could easily correct the resulting deficiency such that safe shutdown would be maintained.
"This is not an equipment operability concern because adequate compensatory actions are in place and were in place prior to discovery. the likelihood of the event is extremely low. No further immediate actions are necessary. Current plans are to perform a design change which will eliminate the concern.
"This report is being made to the NRC in accordance with Section 2.1 of the Salem Unit 2 Operating License as a condition found in violation of the: requirements contained in Operating License Section 2.C.1O Fire Protection. There is no significant impact on the public health and safety."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event notification by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35916
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID ODONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID ODONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 07/13/1999
Notification Time: 13:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/1999
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/13/1999
Notification Time: 13:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/1999
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/13/1999
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
CHRIS GRIMES (NRR)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
KEN SWEETZER (FEMA)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
CHRIS GRIMES (NRR)
CHARLES MILLER (IRO)
KEN SWEETZER (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO FIRE IN AUXILIARY BUILDING
The licensee declared an Unusual Event due to a fire in the waste evaporator feed tank room lasting longer than 10 minutes. While removing abandoned equipment from the room, welders inadvertently set fire to a temporary ventilation filter. No safety equipment was damaged, and no personnel injuries occurred as a result of the fire.
The fire was declared to be extinguished at 1340 EDT. The licensee is currently performing radiological surveys of the auxiliary building. A press release may be made regarding this event. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.
* * * UPDATE 1417 FROM ODONNELL TAKEN BY POERTNER * * *
The Unusual Event was terminated at 1415. Notified R1DO (White), NRR (Grimes), FEMA (Sweetzer).
The licensee declared an Unusual Event due to a fire in the waste evaporator feed tank room lasting longer than 10 minutes. While removing abandoned equipment from the room, welders inadvertently set fire to a temporary ventilation filter. No safety equipment was damaged, and no personnel injuries occurred as a result of the fire.
The fire was declared to be extinguished at 1340 EDT. The licensee is currently performing radiological surveys of the auxiliary building. A press release may be made regarding this event. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.
* * * UPDATE 1417 FROM ODONNELL TAKEN BY POERTNER * * *
The Unusual Event was terminated at 1415. Notified R1DO (White), NRR (Grimes), FEMA (Sweetzer).