Event Notification Report for July 05, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/04/1999 - 07/05/1999
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35894
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GORDEN FIEDLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: GORDEN FIEDLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/05/1999
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/1999
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/1999
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/1999
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 22 | Power Operation | 22 | Power Operation |
UNIT ENTERED 24-HOUR LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATIONS (LCO) ACTION STATEMENT (A/S) DUE TO AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) TEMPERATURE LIMIT.
BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS WERE DETERMINED TO BE OUTSIDE THEIR DESIGN BASIS DUE TO AMBIENT OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING 88 DEGREES F. THE UNIT ENTERED A 24-HOUR LCO A/S 3.5.F.1 AND COMMENCED TEMPERATURE MONITORING PER 2.2.8 ATTACHMENT 6. ONE OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS WILL BE TAGGED OUT TO INSTALL A TEMPERATURE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL RAISE THE DESIGN AMBIENT TEMPERATURE LIMIT TO 95 DEGREES F. BOTH EDGs ARE STILL AVAILABLE, IF NEEDED.
THE NRC RESIDENT WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS WERE DETERMINED TO BE OUTSIDE THEIR DESIGN BASIS DUE TO AMBIENT OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING 88 DEGREES F. THE UNIT ENTERED A 24-HOUR LCO A/S 3.5.F.1 AND COMMENCED TEMPERATURE MONITORING PER 2.2.8 ATTACHMENT 6. ONE OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS WILL BE TAGGED OUT TO INSTALL A TEMPERATURE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL RAISE THE DESIGN AMBIENT TEMPERATURE LIMIT TO 95 DEGREES F. BOTH EDGs ARE STILL AVAILABLE, IF NEEDED.
THE NRC RESIDENT WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35895
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DONALD HART
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DONALD HART
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 07/05/1999
Notification Time: 13:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/1999
Event Time: 11:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/1999
Notification Time: 13:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/1999
Event Time: 11:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW SIGNAL.
A loss of coolant flow signal was received from the "A" RCP which actuated an automatic reactor trip. All control rods except 2 inserted into the core as designed as indicated by the rod bottom light indication. Control rods J13 (outer portion of the core) & F8 (inner portion of the core) initially did not fully insert however both slowly drifted into the core as indicated by rod bottom lights. This is believed to be an instrumentation problem and is being investigated. The shutdown margin for Unit 2 was determined to be satisfactory. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (both Turbine and Motor Driven Pumps) automatically initiated as designed on low low steam generator water level following the reactor trip. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature decreased to 542 degrees F following the trip. No primary or secondary safety or power operated relief valves (PORVs) actuated during the event. No indication of primary to secondary leakage exists. Therefore, no adverse radiological consequences resulted. All electrical buses transferred properly following the trip and all emergency diesel generators and emergency core cooling systems are operable and available. There were no radiation releases nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination involved. The cause of the loss of coolant flow signal is being investigated.
Unit 2 is at a Tave no load condition of 547 degrees dumping steam to the main condenser.
Unit 1 was not affected by and remains stable at 100% power.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed by the licensee.
A loss of coolant flow signal was received from the "A" RCP which actuated an automatic reactor trip. All control rods except 2 inserted into the core as designed as indicated by the rod bottom light indication. Control rods J13 (outer portion of the core) & F8 (inner portion of the core) initially did not fully insert however both slowly drifted into the core as indicated by rod bottom lights. This is believed to be an instrumentation problem and is being investigated. The shutdown margin for Unit 2 was determined to be satisfactory. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (both Turbine and Motor Driven Pumps) automatically initiated as designed on low low steam generator water level following the reactor trip. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature decreased to 542 degrees F following the trip. No primary or secondary safety or power operated relief valves (PORVs) actuated during the event. No indication of primary to secondary leakage exists. Therefore, no adverse radiological consequences resulted. All electrical buses transferred properly following the trip and all emergency diesel generators and emergency core cooling systems are operable and available. There were no radiation releases nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination involved. The cause of the loss of coolant flow signal is being investigated.
Unit 2 is at a Tave no load condition of 547 degrees dumping steam to the main condenser.
Unit 1 was not affected by and remains stable at 100% power.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed by the licensee.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35896
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: ERIC deMONCH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: ERIC deMONCH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 07/05/1999
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/1999
Event Time: 14:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/1999
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/1999
Event Time: 14:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH (NRR)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO STARTUP TRANSFORMERS FOR APPROXIMATELY 8 MINUTES
The units main generator output supplies power to two (2) 230KV "A" & "B" buses. The 230KV "A" & "B" buses, in addition to supplying power to the grid, each have a 230KV/34.5KV step-down transformer energizing the 34.5KV "A" & "B" buses, respectively. These 34.5KV buses feed Bank 5 and 6 Startup Transformers using offsite power when the main generator is offline. Both the "A" & "B" 34.5KV buses deenergized for approximately 8 minutes, possibly due to a thermal overload trip condition caused by high ambient temperatures >100 degrees F (the specific location of the 34.5KV loss is under investigation). This placed the unit in Tech Spec 3.7.A.(3) which states "that one 230KV line must be fully operational and switchgear for both Startup Transformers to the station are energized to carry power . . . ." or the unit must be shutdown. The unit exited the Technical Specification required Shutdown after approximately 8 minutes when both 34.5KV buses were reenergized. The associated 4.16KV safeguard buses remained energized throughout the transient since they normally receive power from the Auxiliary Transformer during power operations. Both emergency diesel generators are available, if needed.
At the present time the licensee said that they are carrying a large amount of VARS.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event notification by the licensee.
**** RETRACTION ON 07/07/99 AT 1502 ET BY J. FREEMAN TAKEN BY MACKINNON****
After further review the licensee determined that this notification was made prematurely. The licensee determined that they had not begun a Technical Specification required shutdown under section 3.7.A.3, therefore, this event is not reportable. Based on this information the licensee is retracting the above notification.
R1DO (J Trapp) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this retraction.
The units main generator output supplies power to two (2) 230KV "A" & "B" buses. The 230KV "A" & "B" buses, in addition to supplying power to the grid, each have a 230KV/34.5KV step-down transformer energizing the 34.5KV "A" & "B" buses, respectively. These 34.5KV buses feed Bank 5 and 6 Startup Transformers using offsite power when the main generator is offline. Both the "A" & "B" 34.5KV buses deenergized for approximately 8 minutes, possibly due to a thermal overload trip condition caused by high ambient temperatures >100 degrees F (the specific location of the 34.5KV loss is under investigation). This placed the unit in Tech Spec 3.7.A.(3) which states "that one 230KV line must be fully operational and switchgear for both Startup Transformers to the station are energized to carry power . . . ." or the unit must be shutdown. The unit exited the Technical Specification required Shutdown after approximately 8 minutes when both 34.5KV buses were reenergized. The associated 4.16KV safeguard buses remained energized throughout the transient since they normally receive power from the Auxiliary Transformer during power operations. Both emergency diesel generators are available, if needed.
At the present time the licensee said that they are carrying a large amount of VARS.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event notification by the licensee.
**** RETRACTION ON 07/07/99 AT 1502 ET BY J. FREEMAN TAKEN BY MACKINNON****
After further review the licensee determined that this notification was made prematurely. The licensee determined that they had not begun a Technical Specification required shutdown under section 3.7.A.3, therefore, this event is not reportable. Based on this information the licensee is retracting the above notification.
R1DO (J Trapp) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this retraction.