Event Notification Report for July 02, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/01/1999 - 07/02/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
35888358893589035891358923589335887
General Information or Other
Event Number: 35888
Rep Org: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES, INC
Licensee: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES, INC
Region: 4
City: CRAWFORD State: NE
County:
License #: SUA-1534
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES, INC
Region: 4
City: CRAWFORD State: NE
County:
License #: SUA-1534
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 07/02/1999
Notification Time: 12:49 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/02/1999
Notification Time: 12:49 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/02/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
DAN GILLEN (NMSS)
EPA (by fax)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
DAN GILLEN (NMSS)
EPA (by fax)
- CROW BUTTE URANIUM LEACH MINE PERIMETER MONITOR WELL PLACED IN EXCURSION STATUS -
WATER SAMPLES OF THE PERIMETER MONITOR WELL #CM6-6 AT THE CROW BUTTE IN-SITU URANIUM LEACH MINE, CRAWFORD, NE, EXCEEDED THE MULTIPLE UPPER CONTROL LIMITS ON FOUR OF THE FOLLOWING FIVE PARAMETERS MONITORED AND THE WELL WAS PLACED IN EXCURSION STATUS:
PARAMETER (UNITS) UPPER LIMIT (MULTIPLE) UPPER LIMIT (SINGLE) LATEST SAMPLE
----------------------------------- ----------------------------------- ------------------------------- ------------------------
CONDUCTIVITY (µMHOs) 2412 2894 2750
CARBONATES (PPM) 370 444 378
CHLORIDES (PPM) 251 301 268
SULFATES (PPM) 461 553 550
SODIUM (PPM) 486 583 457
OPERATORS HAVE REDUCED INJECTION AND INCREASED PRODUCTION IN THE AREA OF THE EXCURSION. THE MINE IS LOCATED 5 - 6 MILES FROM THE NEAREST TOWN OF CRAWFORD, NE. THERE WERE NO SPILLS OR RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FROM THE MINE.
THE LICENSEE'S ASSESSMENT OF THIS SITUATION IS THAT RISK IS MINIMAL AND THERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON PERSONS, ANIMALS, OR THE ENVIRONMENT. THE NRC URANIUM MINING EXPERT, DAN GILLEN, AGREES WITH THIS ASSESSMENT AND NO NRC RESPONSE IS REQUIRED.
WATER SAMPLES OF THE PERIMETER MONITOR WELL #CM6-6 AT THE CROW BUTTE IN-SITU URANIUM LEACH MINE, CRAWFORD, NE, EXCEEDED THE MULTIPLE UPPER CONTROL LIMITS ON FOUR OF THE FOLLOWING FIVE PARAMETERS MONITORED AND THE WELL WAS PLACED IN EXCURSION STATUS:
PARAMETER (UNITS) UPPER LIMIT (MULTIPLE) UPPER LIMIT (SINGLE) LATEST SAMPLE
----------------------------------- ----------------------------------- ------------------------------- ------------------------
CONDUCTIVITY (µMHOs) 2412 2894 2750
CARBONATES (PPM) 370 444 378
CHLORIDES (PPM) 251 301 268
SULFATES (PPM) 461 553 550
SODIUM (PPM) 486 583 457
OPERATORS HAVE REDUCED INJECTION AND INCREASED PRODUCTION IN THE AREA OF THE EXCURSION. THE MINE IS LOCATED 5 - 6 MILES FROM THE NEAREST TOWN OF CRAWFORD, NE. THERE WERE NO SPILLS OR RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FROM THE MINE.
THE LICENSEE'S ASSESSMENT OF THIS SITUATION IS THAT RISK IS MINIMAL AND THERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON PERSONS, ANIMALS, OR THE ENVIRONMENT. THE NRC URANIUM MINING EXPERT, DAN GILLEN, AGREES WITH THIS ASSESSMENT AND NO NRC RESPONSE IS REQUIRED.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35889
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: HANK STRAHLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: HANK STRAHLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 07/02/1999
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/1999
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 13:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 15 | Power Operation | 15 | Power Operation |
- RCIC SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE -
While performing Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System injection testing, the licensee declared the RCIC System inoperable due to problems with the system injection testable check valves. Valve #2ICS*AOV157 did not indicate open with full flow to the reactor vessel and valve #2ICS*AOV156 continued to indicate open following injection. The licensee declared these containment isolation valves inoperable and is taking actions to isolate the containment penetration. The RCIC System injected properly with the exception of the above noted problem. Otherwise, the RCIC System operated properly. Tech Spec 3.7.4 requires the licensee to restore the RCIC System to operable status within 14 days. The High Pressure Core Spray System is operable. The licensee will be troubleshooting these valves.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1028 ON 07/29/99 BY PITTS TO WEAVER * * *
At 1330 on 07/2/99, a report associated with the RCIC System inoperability was made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D). The RCIC System was declared inoperable due to problems with the injection testable check valves which are primary containment isolation valves. Valve #2ICS*AOV156 continued to indicate open following injection and valve #2ICS*AOV157 did not indicate open with full flow to the reactor vessel. These valves were declared inoperable and actions were taken to isolate the containment penetration. The RCIC System injected properly when tested and injection capabilities were only effected by virtue of the necessity to comply with isolation requirements. RCIC System testable check valves #2ICS*AOV156 and 157 failing to properly close or indicate position are independent of the ability of the RCIC System to operate and perform its function.
Thus, the RCIC System would have operated under all design conditions and was incapacitated only as a result of satisfying primary containment isolation functions. Therefore, the licensee desires to retract this event.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Kinneman.
While performing Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System injection testing, the licensee declared the RCIC System inoperable due to problems with the system injection testable check valves. Valve #2ICS*AOV157 did not indicate open with full flow to the reactor vessel and valve #2ICS*AOV156 continued to indicate open following injection. The licensee declared these containment isolation valves inoperable and is taking actions to isolate the containment penetration. The RCIC System injected properly with the exception of the above noted problem. Otherwise, the RCIC System operated properly. Tech Spec 3.7.4 requires the licensee to restore the RCIC System to operable status within 14 days. The High Pressure Core Spray System is operable. The licensee will be troubleshooting these valves.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1028 ON 07/29/99 BY PITTS TO WEAVER * * *
At 1330 on 07/2/99, a report associated with the RCIC System inoperability was made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D). The RCIC System was declared inoperable due to problems with the injection testable check valves which are primary containment isolation valves. Valve #2ICS*AOV156 continued to indicate open following injection and valve #2ICS*AOV157 did not indicate open with full flow to the reactor vessel. These valves were declared inoperable and actions were taken to isolate the containment penetration. The RCIC System injected properly when tested and injection capabilities were only effected by virtue of the necessity to comply with isolation requirements. RCIC System testable check valves #2ICS*AOV156 and 157 failing to properly close or indicate position are independent of the ability of the RCIC System to operate and perform its function.
Thus, the RCIC System would have operated under all design conditions and was incapacitated only as a result of satisfying primary containment isolation functions. Therefore, the licensee desires to retract this event.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO Kinneman.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35890
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE EMPY
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE EMPY
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 07/02/1999
Notification Time: 16:58 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 16:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/30/1999
Notification Time: 16:58 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 16:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/30/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
- PRIMARY CONTAINMENT COULD BE OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS -
During validation of the Vermont Yankee (VY) Containment Pressurization System Design Basis Document, the licensee determined that a design analysis which envelopes the design operating conditions of the torus and drywell does not exist. Specifically, no design analysis exists which verifies the ability of the torus-to-drywell and torus-to-reactor building vacuum breakers to limit depressurization of the containment to less than the design basis value of - 2 psig (22A1265, Rev. 1).
The specific event in question involves the effects of an inadvertent drywell spray actuation occurring during conditions when the torus water is at a minimum temperature 50°F (VYAPF 0150.03).
Present design evaluations (VYC-236, Rev 0, "Torus-Reactor Building Vacuum Breaker Conditions" and VYC-315, Rev 0, "Primary Containment Vacuum") calculated the resulting torus and containment pressure caused by inadvertent spray actuation, but used a spray water temperature of 83.7°F. These analyses concluded that vacuum breaker operation was not necessary to ensure that the containment remained within its external design pressure. These analyses evaluated this event at normal operating conditions (100°F torus water temperature, 33°F service water temperature, and 165°F drywell temperature). No evaluation has been performed for temperatures below these values.
The General Electric design basis for the VY vacuum breaker sizing is based on an evaluation for Monticello. This evaluation assumed a minimum spray water temperature of 50°F and assumed that all vacuum breakers operated within one second. The VY vacuum breaker design differs from this design assumption in that operation of the torus-to-reactor building vacuum breakers requires the opening of air operated valves (AOVs) #SB-16-19-11A & B as part of the vacuum breaker operation. These AOVs require more than 5 seconds to operate (VYOPF 4115.01, 03/23/99). As a result, it cannot be assured that the vacuum breaker system will function adequately to prevent the containment from exceeding its design basis external design pressure for low spray water temperature conditions.
A plant operability evaluation, based on the information included in VYC-315, Rev 0, has concluded that a minimum drywell spray water temperature of 70°F would be required to approach the design basis containment external pressure limit of - 2.0 psig without effective vacuum breaker operation. In order to achieve this low spray water temperature, a combination of low torus water temperature and/or low service water temperature would be required to exist. Current operating conditions indicate that the torus water temperature is being maintained at ~80°F and has been maintained at this temperature during the months of May and June, 1999. The current service water temperature of 79°F ensures that, in the event of an inadvertent drywell spray event, spray water temperature will not be lower than 70°F.
This 79°F service water temperature corresponds to the maximum 20 year average for river water temperature. Based on this temperature, river water temperature would not be anticipated to decrease below 70°F until mid-to-late September, 1999.
Based on the current high service water temperature, in combination with existing torus water temperature, this condition does not effect the operability of the primary containment or the operability of the primary containment vacuum breakers. There is no operability concern providing the torus water temperature remains above 70°F and river water temperature remains above 33°F.
The license plans to immediately issue standing orders to plant operators regarding this situation and to perform necessary design analyses prior to September, 1999.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0956 ON 07/30/99 BY SORTWELL TO WEAVER * * *
The licensee is retracting this event report based on the following explanation:
GE Design Specification #22A2753 sizes the torus-to-reactor building vacuum breakers to cope with an inadvertent containment spray initiation. This specification is not part of VY's current licensing basis. Rather, this specification provides guidance to be applied when determining the size of the subject vacuum breakers. The postulated scenario (the inadvertent spray initiation) requires multiple operator errors. The VY plant design basis requires that the licensee postulate any SINGLE failure, including single operator errors. Scenarios that assume multiple operator errors are beyond the design basis of the VY plant.
At the time of the original ENS notification, VY had in place, analyses supporting containment spray operations. Those analyses demonstrated that the actuation of containment sprays, consistent with VY plant procedures, would have effects consistent with the design basis of the plant. Additionally, at the time of discovery, VY had in place, calculations that bounded the inadvertent spray scenario under the plant conditions present.
More recently, an analysis was performed to quantify the possible effect of an inadvertent initiation of containment spray under the off-normal conditions identified in the GE design specification, including the assumed multiple operator errors. The analysis assumes initial plant conditions that are conservative.
Using this approach, it was determined that an inadvertent initiation of containment sprays could, if unmitigated, achieve the drywell design pressure differential of 2 psid (drywell external pressure greater than internal pressure) approximately 20 seconds after initiation.
The subject vacuum breakers would be fully open approximately 13 seconds into the postulated event. Either one of the two sets of vacuum breakers has adequate capacity to limit the pressure transient to less than 2 psid.
Therefore, this event is being retracted.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Kinneman).
During validation of the Vermont Yankee (VY) Containment Pressurization System Design Basis Document, the licensee determined that a design analysis which envelopes the design operating conditions of the torus and drywell does not exist. Specifically, no design analysis exists which verifies the ability of the torus-to-drywell and torus-to-reactor building vacuum breakers to limit depressurization of the containment to less than the design basis value of - 2 psig (22A1265, Rev. 1).
The specific event in question involves the effects of an inadvertent drywell spray actuation occurring during conditions when the torus water is at a minimum temperature 50°F (VYAPF 0150.03).
Present design evaluations (VYC-236, Rev 0, "Torus-Reactor Building Vacuum Breaker Conditions" and VYC-315, Rev 0, "Primary Containment Vacuum") calculated the resulting torus and containment pressure caused by inadvertent spray actuation, but used a spray water temperature of 83.7°F. These analyses concluded that vacuum breaker operation was not necessary to ensure that the containment remained within its external design pressure. These analyses evaluated this event at normal operating conditions (100°F torus water temperature, 33°F service water temperature, and 165°F drywell temperature). No evaluation has been performed for temperatures below these values.
The General Electric design basis for the VY vacuum breaker sizing is based on an evaluation for Monticello. This evaluation assumed a minimum spray water temperature of 50°F and assumed that all vacuum breakers operated within one second. The VY vacuum breaker design differs from this design assumption in that operation of the torus-to-reactor building vacuum breakers requires the opening of air operated valves (AOVs) #SB-16-19-11A & B as part of the vacuum breaker operation. These AOVs require more than 5 seconds to operate (VYOPF 4115.01, 03/23/99). As a result, it cannot be assured that the vacuum breaker system will function adequately to prevent the containment from exceeding its design basis external design pressure for low spray water temperature conditions.
A plant operability evaluation, based on the information included in VYC-315, Rev 0, has concluded that a minimum drywell spray water temperature of 70°F would be required to approach the design basis containment external pressure limit of - 2.0 psig without effective vacuum breaker operation. In order to achieve this low spray water temperature, a combination of low torus water temperature and/or low service water temperature would be required to exist. Current operating conditions indicate that the torus water temperature is being maintained at ~80°F and has been maintained at this temperature during the months of May and June, 1999. The current service water temperature of 79°F ensures that, in the event of an inadvertent drywell spray event, spray water temperature will not be lower than 70°F.
This 79°F service water temperature corresponds to the maximum 20 year average for river water temperature. Based on this temperature, river water temperature would not be anticipated to decrease below 70°F until mid-to-late September, 1999.
Based on the current high service water temperature, in combination with existing torus water temperature, this condition does not effect the operability of the primary containment or the operability of the primary containment vacuum breakers. There is no operability concern providing the torus water temperature remains above 70°F and river water temperature remains above 33°F.
The license plans to immediately issue standing orders to plant operators regarding this situation and to perform necessary design analyses prior to September, 1999.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0956 ON 07/30/99 BY SORTWELL TO WEAVER * * *
The licensee is retracting this event report based on the following explanation:
GE Design Specification #22A2753 sizes the torus-to-reactor building vacuum breakers to cope with an inadvertent containment spray initiation. This specification is not part of VY's current licensing basis. Rather, this specification provides guidance to be applied when determining the size of the subject vacuum breakers. The postulated scenario (the inadvertent spray initiation) requires multiple operator errors. The VY plant design basis requires that the licensee postulate any SINGLE failure, including single operator errors. Scenarios that assume multiple operator errors are beyond the design basis of the VY plant.
At the time of the original ENS notification, VY had in place, analyses supporting containment spray operations. Those analyses demonstrated that the actuation of containment sprays, consistent with VY plant procedures, would have effects consistent with the design basis of the plant. Additionally, at the time of discovery, VY had in place, calculations that bounded the inadvertent spray scenario under the plant conditions present.
More recently, an analysis was performed to quantify the possible effect of an inadvertent initiation of containment spray under the off-normal conditions identified in the GE design specification, including the assumed multiple operator errors. The analysis assumes initial plant conditions that are conservative.
Using this approach, it was determined that an inadvertent initiation of containment sprays could, if unmitigated, achieve the drywell design pressure differential of 2 psid (drywell external pressure greater than internal pressure) approximately 20 seconds after initiation.
The subject vacuum breakers would be fully open approximately 13 seconds into the postulated event. Either one of the two sets of vacuum breakers has adequate capacity to limit the pressure transient to less than 2 psid.
Therefore, this event is being retracted.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Kinneman).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35891
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 07/02/1999
Notification Time: 22:13 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 21:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/1999
Notification Time: 22:13 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 21:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
- Emergency safeguards system transformer radiator bottom oil drain valves found closed -
At 1500 on 07/01/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 was in Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) and Unit 2 was at 100% power, when the licensee identified that the radiator bottom drain valves were closed on two of the four emergency safeguards system (ESS) transformers. Each transformer provides the preferred offsite power to one load group and alternate offsite power to another. The two affected transformers provided backup to each other. The drain valves allow oil circulation though the transformer finned coolers. The drain valves were opened and the ESS transformers are currently operable.
Per the Susquehanna Tech Spec 3.8.1 Basis, the AC electrical power distribution system is designed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 17, which requires the AC electrical power system to provide independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to ESF systems. The class 1E AC distribution system is divided into redundant load groups, so the loss of any one group does not prevent minimum safety functions from being performed. Each load group has connections to two preferred offsite power supplies and a single emergency diesel generator (EDG) in order to meet this requirement.
Licensee evaluation of the effects of the drain valves being closed is in progress. Initial evaluation has determined that in this configuration, these transformers would have been able to perform their design function for an indeterminate period of time. Pending further evaluation, this report is being provided based on conservative interpretation of the existing guidance in that due to the absence of design analysis for this scenario, it could represent a condition that is potentially outside of design basis, therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B).
The licensee currently believes that this condition was not safety significant because Susquehanna is designed for a DBA LOCA/LOOP with a single failure which they believe is more limiting. At no time were any ESS buses deenergized due to this condition and the condition was promptly corrected and does not currently exist. The EDGs would have been available to power the subject buses had the transformers failed.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
***Retraction on 07/28/99 at 1145 ET from Mike Peal taken by MacKinnon***
Upon completion of an engineering evaluation, the Emergency Safeguards System transformers would have performed as designed for the duration of any postulated accident condition. Based on this evaluation the condition described in the above event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72 or 50.73. R1DO (John MacKinnon).
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified the event retraction.
At 1500 on 07/01/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 was in Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) and Unit 2 was at 100% power, when the licensee identified that the radiator bottom drain valves were closed on two of the four emergency safeguards system (ESS) transformers. Each transformer provides the preferred offsite power to one load group and alternate offsite power to another. The two affected transformers provided backup to each other. The drain valves allow oil circulation though the transformer finned coolers. The drain valves were opened and the ESS transformers are currently operable.
Per the Susquehanna Tech Spec 3.8.1 Basis, the AC electrical power distribution system is designed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 17, which requires the AC electrical power system to provide independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to ESF systems. The class 1E AC distribution system is divided into redundant load groups, so the loss of any one group does not prevent minimum safety functions from being performed. Each load group has connections to two preferred offsite power supplies and a single emergency diesel generator (EDG) in order to meet this requirement.
Licensee evaluation of the effects of the drain valves being closed is in progress. Initial evaluation has determined that in this configuration, these transformers would have been able to perform their design function for an indeterminate period of time. Pending further evaluation, this report is being provided based on conservative interpretation of the existing guidance in that due to the absence of design analysis for this scenario, it could represent a condition that is potentially outside of design basis, therefore reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B).
The licensee currently believes that this condition was not safety significant because Susquehanna is designed for a DBA LOCA/LOOP with a single failure which they believe is more limiting. At no time were any ESS buses deenergized due to this condition and the condition was promptly corrected and does not currently exist. The EDGs would have been available to power the subject buses had the transformers failed.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
***Retraction on 07/28/99 at 1145 ET from Mike Peal taken by MacKinnon***
Upon completion of an engineering evaluation, the Emergency Safeguards System transformers would have performed as designed for the duration of any postulated accident condition. Based on this evaluation the condition described in the above event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72 or 50.73. R1DO (John MacKinnon).
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified the event retraction.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35892
Facility: TROJAN
Region: 4 State: OR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KARL OBERLOH
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 4 State: OR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KARL OBERLOH
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 07/02/1999
Notification Time: 22:55 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 18:43 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/02/1999
Notification Time: 22:55 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 18:43 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/02/1999
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a)(1)(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH (NRR)
BUTCH STINEDURF (FEMA)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH (NRR)
BUTCH STINEDURF (FEMA)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
- 5.0 EARTHQUAKE FELT ONSITE AT TROJAN; NO DAMAGE TO PLANT COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS -
AT 1843 PDT ON 07/02/99, AN EARTHQUAKE, MEASURING 5.0 ON THE RICHTER SCALE, OCCURRED AT THE GREY HARBOR AREA OF WASHINGTON STATE, APPROXIMATELY 50 - 60 MILES SOUTHWEST OF SEATTLE, WA.
TROJAN, WHICH IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 70 - 80 MILES FROM THE EPICENTER, REPORTED THAT THE EARTHQUAKE WAS FELT ONSITE AND THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO PLANT COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS.
TROJAN IS DECOMMISSIONED BUT STILL HAS SPENT FUEL IN THEIR SPENT FUEL POOL.
AT 1905 PDT, THE LICENSEE DECLARED AND TERMINATED AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO THE EARTHQUAKE BEING FELT ONSITE AND NOTIFIED STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS.
AT 1843 PDT ON 07/02/99, AN EARTHQUAKE, MEASURING 5.0 ON THE RICHTER SCALE, OCCURRED AT THE GREY HARBOR AREA OF WASHINGTON STATE, APPROXIMATELY 50 - 60 MILES SOUTHWEST OF SEATTLE, WA.
TROJAN, WHICH IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 70 - 80 MILES FROM THE EPICENTER, REPORTED THAT THE EARTHQUAKE WAS FELT ONSITE AND THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO PLANT COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS.
TROJAN IS DECOMMISSIONED BUT STILL HAS SPENT FUEL IN THEIR SPENT FUEL POOL.
AT 1905 PDT, THE LICENSEE DECLARED AND TERMINATED AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO THE EARTHQUAKE BEING FELT ONSITE AND NOTIFIED STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 35893
Rep Org: FL BUREAU OF RAD CONTROL
Licensee: ATC ASSOCIATES, MIAMI, FL
Region: 2
City: HOMESTEAD State: FL
County:
License #: FL 2962-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN WILLIAMS, FL BRC
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: ATC ASSOCIATES, MIAMI, FL
Region: 2
City: HOMESTEAD State: FL
County:
License #: FL 2962-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN WILLIAMS, FL BRC
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 07/03/1999
Notification Time: 18:05 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 22:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/1999
Notification Time: 18:05 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 22:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
- TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN FROM A COMPANY TRUCK IN HOMESTEAD, FL -
A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE WAS STOLEN FROM A TRUCK OWNED BY ATC ASSOCIATES,
MIAMI, FL, BETWEEN 2230 ON 07/02/99 AND 0730 ON 07/03/99. THE TRUCK WAS AT THE HOME OF AN
EMPLOYEE IN HOMESTEAD, FL. THE UNDAMAGED GAUGE, MODEL #3411B, SERIAL #15140, CONTAINS
SEALED SOURCES OF 6.1 MILLICURIES OF Cs-137 AND 39.3 MILLICURIES OF Am-241-Be. AN ATC
REPRESENTATIVE NOTIFIED THE HOMESTEAD POLICE AND THE FL BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL (BRC). THE HOMESTEAD POLICE ARE PREPARING A PRESS RELEASE WARNING OF THE DANGER INVOLVED IN HANDLING THE GAUGE AND OFFERING A REWARD FOR THE RETURN OF THE GAUGE.
*** UPDATE ON 7/6/99 @ 0931 BY ADAMS TO GOULD ***
THE GAUGE WAS FOUND IN HOMESTEAD ON 7/6/99 @ 0500 AND IT HAS BEEN RETURNED TO THE OWNER. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE DEVICE.
NOTIFIED REG 2 RDO(FREDRICKSON) AND NMSS EO(STURZ)
A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE WAS STOLEN FROM A TRUCK OWNED BY ATC ASSOCIATES,
MIAMI, FL, BETWEEN 2230 ON 07/02/99 AND 0730 ON 07/03/99. THE TRUCK WAS AT THE HOME OF AN
EMPLOYEE IN HOMESTEAD, FL. THE UNDAMAGED GAUGE, MODEL #3411B, SERIAL #15140, CONTAINS
SEALED SOURCES OF 6.1 MILLICURIES OF Cs-137 AND 39.3 MILLICURIES OF Am-241-Be. AN ATC
REPRESENTATIVE NOTIFIED THE HOMESTEAD POLICE AND THE FL BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL (BRC). THE HOMESTEAD POLICE ARE PREPARING A PRESS RELEASE WARNING OF THE DANGER INVOLVED IN HANDLING THE GAUGE AND OFFERING A REWARD FOR THE RETURN OF THE GAUGE.
*** UPDATE ON 7/6/99 @ 0931 BY ADAMS TO GOULD ***
THE GAUGE WAS FOUND IN HOMESTEAD ON 7/6/99 @ 0500 AND IT HAS BEEN RETURNED TO THE OWNER. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE DEVICE.
NOTIFIED REG 2 RDO(FREDRICKSON) AND NMSS EO(STURZ)
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35887
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MAY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MAY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/02/1999
Notification Time: 00:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 00:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/1999
Notification Time: 00:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/02/1999
Event Time: 00:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/1999
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
76.120(a)(4) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
10 CFR Section:
76.120(a)(4) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 76.120(c)(2)(ii) - EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
HILAND/CANIANO (R3)
LIZ TEN EYCK (NMSS)
JAMES CREED (R3)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
HILAND/CANIANO (R3)
LIZ TEN EYCK (NMSS)
ALERT DECLARED DUE TO CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE.
THE CERTIFICATEE DISCOVERED THAT THE CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (CAAS) FAILED ITS SURVEILLANCE TEST DUE TO THE CALIBRATION SETPOINT BEING INCORRECT. THE CORRECT SETPOINT SHOULD BE 5 MR/HR, BUT THE AS-FOUND SETPOINT WAS 8.57 MR/HR. DUE TO THIS CONDITION, THE CERTIFICATEE CANNOT MEET THEIR OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CAAS, SO ALL OF THE CAAS IS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE (BUT FUNCTIONAL) WHICH PUTS THE PLANT AT THE ALERT LEVEL PER THEIR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL PROCEDURES. ALL OF THE AUTOCLAVE AREAS ARE SHUTDOWN AND PLANT PERSONNEL THAT ARE STAFFING THE FACILITIES ARE USING ALARMING DOSIMETERS. THE CASCADES ARE STILL OPERATING AT THIS TIME. THERE ARE 76 CAAS CLUSTERS AFFECTED BY THIS CONDITION. THE CERTIFICATEE BELIEVES THAT THESE INSTRUMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN CALIBRATED CORRECTLY SINCE ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. THE CERTIFICATEE HAS NOT YET DETERMINED WHEN THE CALIBRATION OF THE CAAS CLUSTERS WILL BE COMPLETED.
THE CERTIFICATEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR, DOE SITE REPRESENTATIVE, DOE OAK RIDGE, OHIO EMA, PIKE COUNTY LEPC AND PIKE COUNTY EMA.
* * * UPDATE ON 07/02/99 @ 0251 BY MCCRAE TO GOULD * * *
THE CERTIFICATEE IS RESTRICTING ACCESS TO ALL AREAS AFFECTED BY THE INOPERABLE CAAS MONITORS. RECOVERY EFFORTS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED TO RECALIBRATE THE MONITORS. NONESSENTIAL PERSONNEL ON DAY SHIFT WILL BE SENT HOME UPON ARRIVAL AT THE SITE.
THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (JAMES CREED) AND NMSS EO (SUSAN SHANKMAN).
* * * UPDATE ON 07/02/99 @ 0432 BY CASTLE TO GOULD * * *
THE CERTIFICATEE WILL BE MAKING A PRESS RELEASE AND NOTIFIED DOE. THIS ACTION REQUIRES A 4 HOUR NOTIFICATION TO NRC.
WITH THE CAAS CLUSTERS INOPERABLE AND NOT AVAILABLE TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED, THIS IS A 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.
THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (JAMES CREED), NMSS EO (SUSAN SHANKMAN) AND HQ PAO (JOE GILLILAND).
* * * UPDATE ON 07/03/99 @ 0013 BY FAUST TO GOULD * * *
THE CERTIFICATEE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED TWO CAAS CALIBRATIONS, TERMINATED THE ALERT AT 0010 ON 07/03/99, AND NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR, SITE DOE REPRESENTATIVE, AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS.
THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (JAMES CREED), NMSS EO (SUSAN SHANKMAN), IRO(JOE GIITTER), FEMA (STINEDURF), DOE (BY FAX), USDA (BY FAX), HHS (BY FAX), & EPA/NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER (BY FAX).
THE CERTIFICATEE DISCOVERED THAT THE CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (CAAS) FAILED ITS SURVEILLANCE TEST DUE TO THE CALIBRATION SETPOINT BEING INCORRECT. THE CORRECT SETPOINT SHOULD BE 5 MR/HR, BUT THE AS-FOUND SETPOINT WAS 8.57 MR/HR. DUE TO THIS CONDITION, THE CERTIFICATEE CANNOT MEET THEIR OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CAAS, SO ALL OF THE CAAS IS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE (BUT FUNCTIONAL) WHICH PUTS THE PLANT AT THE ALERT LEVEL PER THEIR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL PROCEDURES. ALL OF THE AUTOCLAVE AREAS ARE SHUTDOWN AND PLANT PERSONNEL THAT ARE STAFFING THE FACILITIES ARE USING ALARMING DOSIMETERS. THE CASCADES ARE STILL OPERATING AT THIS TIME. THERE ARE 76 CAAS CLUSTERS AFFECTED BY THIS CONDITION. THE CERTIFICATEE BELIEVES THAT THESE INSTRUMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN CALIBRATED CORRECTLY SINCE ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. THE CERTIFICATEE HAS NOT YET DETERMINED WHEN THE CALIBRATION OF THE CAAS CLUSTERS WILL BE COMPLETED.
THE CERTIFICATEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR, DOE SITE REPRESENTATIVE, DOE OAK RIDGE, OHIO EMA, PIKE COUNTY LEPC AND PIKE COUNTY EMA.
* * * UPDATE ON 07/02/99 @ 0251 BY MCCRAE TO GOULD * * *
THE CERTIFICATEE IS RESTRICTING ACCESS TO ALL AREAS AFFECTED BY THE INOPERABLE CAAS MONITORS. RECOVERY EFFORTS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED TO RECALIBRATE THE MONITORS. NONESSENTIAL PERSONNEL ON DAY SHIFT WILL BE SENT HOME UPON ARRIVAL AT THE SITE.
THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (JAMES CREED) AND NMSS EO (SUSAN SHANKMAN).
* * * UPDATE ON 07/02/99 @ 0432 BY CASTLE TO GOULD * * *
THE CERTIFICATEE WILL BE MAKING A PRESS RELEASE AND NOTIFIED DOE. THIS ACTION REQUIRES A 4 HOUR NOTIFICATION TO NRC.
WITH THE CAAS CLUSTERS INOPERABLE AND NOT AVAILABLE TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED, THIS IS A 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.
THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (JAMES CREED), NMSS EO (SUSAN SHANKMAN) AND HQ PAO (JOE GILLILAND).
* * * UPDATE ON 07/03/99 @ 0013 BY FAUST TO GOULD * * *
THE CERTIFICATEE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED TWO CAAS CALIBRATIONS, TERMINATED THE ALERT AT 0010 ON 07/03/99, AND NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR, SITE DOE REPRESENTATIVE, AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS.
THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (JAMES CREED), NMSS EO (SUSAN SHANKMAN), IRO(JOE GIITTER), FEMA (STINEDURF), DOE (BY FAX), USDA (BY FAX), HHS (BY FAX), & EPA/NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER (BY FAX).