Event Notification Report for June 30, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/29/1999 - 06/30/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
35880358813588235883
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35880
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DANA MORRELL
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DANA MORRELL
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 06/30/1999
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/1999
Event Time: 09:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/1999
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/1999
Event Time: 09:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24 HOUR REPORT - DEAD SEAL FOUND
The licensee notified the National Marine Fisheries and the NRC Resident Inspector that they discovered a dead seal in the plant intake structure during a routine inspection.
The licensee notified the National Marine Fisheries and the NRC Resident Inspector that they discovered a dead seal in the plant intake structure during a routine inspection.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35881
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 06/30/1999
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/1999
Event Time: 17:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/1999
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/1999
Event Time: 17:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
- Certain accident scenarios could cause pressurization of Low Pressure Injection and Rx Bldg Spray Systems -
During investigation of a valve leak observed during a test on Unit 1, it was discovered that there is a possibility that certain accident scenarios could cause pressurization of certain portions of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) and Reactor Building Spray (RBS) Systems above values previously evaluated.
Specifically, following a small break LOCA, the LPI System is still taking suction from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) when the system is aligned with the LPI Pump 'A' discharging to both injection headers through the crossover piping in preparation for realigning suction to the Reactor Building Emergency Sump. At this time, it is possible to pressurize the suction piping of the idle LPI Pump 'B' and RBS Pump 'B'. This can occur because the LPI Pump 'B' minimum flow recirculation line is connected downstream of the pump discharge check valve or as a result of leakage through the pump discharge check valve. A small amount of fluid would flow through the recirculation line until the pressure in the pump suction piping is equal to the pressure in the cross-connected LPI discharge headers. (Procedural details would prevent this problem from affecting Train 'A'.)
This pressure could be in excess of the capability of certain valve operators to reposition process valves. Among the affected valves is #LP-20, the RB Emergency Sump Train 'B' isolation valve.
When nearing depletion of the BWST inventory, the Emergency Operating Procedure calls for opening both RB Emergency Sump isolation valves (#LP-19 on Train 'A' and #LP-20 on Train 'B').
It was also recognized that #LP-19, in the redundant flow path, must be considered vulnerable to a random single failure.
Therefore, at 1722 on 06/30/99, Oconee Site Managers concluded that #LP-20 must be considered inoperable for use in this specific system configuration. This configuration is only used during certain small break LOCAs which require that the LPI and High Pressure Injection (HPI) Systems be placed in the "piggy-back" configuration where the LPI pumps supply flow to the HPI pump suctions. In addition, this failure scenario only applies to the limited spectrum of small breaks that do not result in initiation of Reactor Building Spray.
Because this inoperablity only affects the HPI-LPI "piggy-back" Train 'B' flow path, the operating units (Units 2 & 3) entered Tech Spec 3.5.2, Condition C, which has a 72 hour action statement. The main corrective action is implementation of a system alignment change which will create a vent path to the Reactor Building using the Reactor Building Spray Train 'B' piping. This will prevent the possibility of pressurizing the piping at #LP-20 and eliminate the potential for this problem. The procedure changes are in progress and the implementation is expected to occur on night shift tonight (06/30/99). In addition, operators on shift will receive awareness training on the new configuration as it is implemented. Corresponding changes to the Emergency Operating Procedure
will be implemented prior to exiting the Tech Spec 3.5.2.C action statement. Affected Periodic Test, Maintenance, and Instrument Procedures have been placed on administrative hold until they can be revised.
Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) in a Refueling Outage preparing to enter Mode 4. These alignment changes will be incorporated on Unit 1, as appropriate, during plant start-up.
The analysis of this issue is continuing, and the potential exists that further analysis or testing may allow retraction
of this notification. If not, further details will be provided in the LER that will be submitted to the NRC.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
***Retraction on 07/28/99 at 1651 by James V. Weast taken by MacKinnon***
After further investigation and analysis, Duke Energy determined that the Reactor Building (RB) Emergency Sump Train "B" isolation valve (LP-20) for all three units could have opened on demand, therefore being operable for the accident scenarios for which operability was suspect. Therefore, this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72. R2DO (Haag) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
During investigation of a valve leak observed during a test on Unit 1, it was discovered that there is a possibility that certain accident scenarios could cause pressurization of certain portions of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) and Reactor Building Spray (RBS) Systems above values previously evaluated.
Specifically, following a small break LOCA, the LPI System is still taking suction from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) when the system is aligned with the LPI Pump 'A' discharging to both injection headers through the crossover piping in preparation for realigning suction to the Reactor Building Emergency Sump. At this time, it is possible to pressurize the suction piping of the idle LPI Pump 'B' and RBS Pump 'B'. This can occur because the LPI Pump 'B' minimum flow recirculation line is connected downstream of the pump discharge check valve or as a result of leakage through the pump discharge check valve. A small amount of fluid would flow through the recirculation line until the pressure in the pump suction piping is equal to the pressure in the cross-connected LPI discharge headers. (Procedural details would prevent this problem from affecting Train 'A'.)
This pressure could be in excess of the capability of certain valve operators to reposition process valves. Among the affected valves is #LP-20, the RB Emergency Sump Train 'B' isolation valve.
When nearing depletion of the BWST inventory, the Emergency Operating Procedure calls for opening both RB Emergency Sump isolation valves (#LP-19 on Train 'A' and #LP-20 on Train 'B').
It was also recognized that #LP-19, in the redundant flow path, must be considered vulnerable to a random single failure.
Therefore, at 1722 on 06/30/99, Oconee Site Managers concluded that #LP-20 must be considered inoperable for use in this specific system configuration. This configuration is only used during certain small break LOCAs which require that the LPI and High Pressure Injection (HPI) Systems be placed in the "piggy-back" configuration where the LPI pumps supply flow to the HPI pump suctions. In addition, this failure scenario only applies to the limited spectrum of small breaks that do not result in initiation of Reactor Building Spray.
Because this inoperablity only affects the HPI-LPI "piggy-back" Train 'B' flow path, the operating units (Units 2 & 3) entered Tech Spec 3.5.2, Condition C, which has a 72 hour action statement. The main corrective action is implementation of a system alignment change which will create a vent path to the Reactor Building using the Reactor Building Spray Train 'B' piping. This will prevent the possibility of pressurizing the piping at #LP-20 and eliminate the potential for this problem. The procedure changes are in progress and the implementation is expected to occur on night shift tonight (06/30/99). In addition, operators on shift will receive awareness training on the new configuration as it is implemented. Corresponding changes to the Emergency Operating Procedure
will be implemented prior to exiting the Tech Spec 3.5.2.C action statement. Affected Periodic Test, Maintenance, and Instrument Procedures have been placed on administrative hold until they can be revised.
Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) in a Refueling Outage preparing to enter Mode 4. These alignment changes will be incorporated on Unit 1, as appropriate, during plant start-up.
The analysis of this issue is continuing, and the potential exists that further analysis or testing may allow retraction
of this notification. If not, further details will be provided in the LER that will be submitted to the NRC.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
***Retraction on 07/28/99 at 1651 by James V. Weast taken by MacKinnon***
After further investigation and analysis, Duke Energy determined that the Reactor Building (RB) Emergency Sump Train "B" isolation valve (LP-20) for all three units could have opened on demand, therefore being operable for the accident scenarios for which operability was suspect. Therefore, this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72. R2DO (Haag) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
Transportation Event
Event Number: 35882
Rep Org: SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP
Licensee: SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP
Region: 2
City: NASHVILLE State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT LANGFORD
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP
Region: 2
City: NASHVILLE State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT LANGFORD
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 06/30/1999
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/1999
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
DON COOL (NMSS)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
DON COOL (NMSS)
- OVERDUE SHIPMENT OF MEDICAL RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS (IODINE-131) -
AT 1630 ON 06/25/99, A PACKAGE OF MEDICAL RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS (0.9 MILLICURIES OF IODINE-131) WAS SHIPPED BY CAR/TRUCK VIA ASSOCIATED COURIERS FROM SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP, ST LOUIS, MO TO SYNCOR, NASHVILLE, TN. THE SHIPMENT WAS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN NASHVILLE AT 1200 ON 06/26/99. THE SHIPMENT IS OVERDUE. ASSOCIATED COURIERS IS ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THE PACKAGE. MR LANGFORD PLANS TO NOTIFY THE STATE OF TN.
AT 1630 ON 06/25/99, A PACKAGE OF MEDICAL RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS (0.9 MILLICURIES OF IODINE-131) WAS SHIPPED BY CAR/TRUCK VIA ASSOCIATED COURIERS FROM SYNCOR INTERNATIONAL CORP, ST LOUIS, MO TO SYNCOR, NASHVILLE, TN. THE SHIPMENT WAS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN NASHVILLE AT 1200 ON 06/26/99. THE SHIPMENT IS OVERDUE. ASSOCIATED COURIERS IS ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THE PACKAGE. MR LANGFORD PLANS TO NOTIFY THE STATE OF TN.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 35883
Rep Org: QUEST X TECHNOLOGIES, GUAM
Licensee: QUEST X TECHNOLOGIES, GUAM
Region: 0
City: GUAM State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CUMMINGS & HICKMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: QUEST X TECHNOLOGIES, GUAM
Region: 0
City: GUAM State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CUMMINGS & HICKMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 06/30/1999
Notification Time: 19:13 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 07/01/1999
Notification Time: 19:13 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 07/01/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
EPA (BY FAX)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
SUSAN SHANKMAN (NMSS)
EPA (BY FAX)
- PACKAGE OF IRIDIUM - 192 WITHOUT SHIPPING PAPERS LOCATED IN GUAM -
TOM BIRKAMEYER, CHIEF OF SAFETY, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, GUAM AIRPORT, RECEIVED A PACKAGE OF IRIDIUM - 192 ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO AND STORED IT IN THE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AREA AT THE AIRPORT IN GUAM. THE SHIPPING PAPERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE AND THE SHIPPER AND RECEIVER ARE UNKNOWN.
RECENTLY, PERSONNEL AT QUEST X TECHNOLOGIES (JAHA CUMMINGS & WALT HICKMAN) TOOK POSSESSION OF THE PACKAGE AND PLACED IT IN A LOCKED STORAGE SHED IN GUAM. THE PACKAGE IS A SMALL DRUM, TYPE 'A' PACKAGE WITH THE FOLLOWING PARTIALLY OBSCURED MARKINGS: RADIATION SYMBOL, RADIOACTIVE YELLOW 3, SOLID FORM, UN-2982 (NUMBER MAY BE INCORRECT), AND "ENGLAND". QUEST PERSONNEL MEASURED THE PACKAGE WITH A GM SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND OBTAINED MAXIMUM READINGS OF 0.2 MR/HR AT THE SURFACE OF THE PACKAGE.
QUEST PERSONNEL CALLED THE NRC TO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT TO DO WITH THE PACKAGE.
***** LINDA HOWELL REGION IV to WILLIAM POERTNER 0835 EDT 7/1/99 ******
Region IV will coordinate with EPA (San Francisco) to resolve issue.
TOM BIRKAMEYER, CHIEF OF SAFETY, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, GUAM AIRPORT, RECEIVED A PACKAGE OF IRIDIUM - 192 ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO AND STORED IT IN THE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AREA AT THE AIRPORT IN GUAM. THE SHIPPING PAPERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE AND THE SHIPPER AND RECEIVER ARE UNKNOWN.
RECENTLY, PERSONNEL AT QUEST X TECHNOLOGIES (JAHA CUMMINGS & WALT HICKMAN) TOOK POSSESSION OF THE PACKAGE AND PLACED IT IN A LOCKED STORAGE SHED IN GUAM. THE PACKAGE IS A SMALL DRUM, TYPE 'A' PACKAGE WITH THE FOLLOWING PARTIALLY OBSCURED MARKINGS: RADIATION SYMBOL, RADIOACTIVE YELLOW 3, SOLID FORM, UN-2982 (NUMBER MAY BE INCORRECT), AND "ENGLAND". QUEST PERSONNEL MEASURED THE PACKAGE WITH A GM SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND OBTAINED MAXIMUM READINGS OF 0.2 MR/HR AT THE SURFACE OF THE PACKAGE.
QUEST PERSONNEL CALLED THE NRC TO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT TO DO WITH THE PACKAGE.
***** LINDA HOWELL REGION IV to WILLIAM POERTNER 0835 EDT 7/1/99 ******
Region IV will coordinate with EPA (San Francisco) to resolve issue.