Skip to main content

Event Notification Report for June 19, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/18/1999 - 06/19/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
35846358473584836451

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35846
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1     State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RAY MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 06/19/1999
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 06/19/1999
Event Time: 10:01 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JIMI YEROKUN (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
Event Text
-AFW PUMP STARTED DUE TO LOW S/G LEVEL SIGNALS WHILE VENTING A S/G LEVEL TRANSMITTER-

WITH UNIT 3 IN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) IN A REFUELING OUTAGE AND THE #2A VITAL INSTRUMENT AC BUS INOPERABLE, PLANT TECHNICIANS WERE VENTING AN 'A' STEAM GENERATOR (S/G) LEVEL TRANSMITTER. THE 'A' AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMP STARTED DUE TO A LOW S/G LEVEL ACTUATION SIGNAL ALONG WITH A LOW S/G LEVEL SIGNAL DUE TO THE #2A VITAL INSTRUMENT AC BUS BEING INOPERABLE (2 OUT OF 4 LOGIC ACTUATION SIGNAL). PLANT OPERATORS STOPPED THE 'A' AFW PUMP AND RESET IT TO NORMAL WITHIN ONE MINUTE.

THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

* * * UPDATE AT 1412 ON 7/19/99, BY OLSON RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *

During the event investigation it was determined that the ESF actuation of the 'A' MDAFW Pump was not reportable because the signal was invalid and the system had been properly removed from service and controlled in accordance with the applicable operating procedures. Therefore, this condition did not represent a reportable actuation of an ESF pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). The condition is also not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), as an event or condition that is prohibited by the Technical Specifications (TS) because the Unit was in Mode 5, a condition in which the TS are not applicable to this ESF System. The Immediate Notification is therefore being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

The Operations center notified the R1DO (Noggle).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35847
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: PRESTON GILLESPIE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 06/19/1999
Notification Time: 11:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/19/1999
Event Time: 10:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 66 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN TURBINE TRIP

The unit experienced an automatic turbine trip/reactor trip due to an indicated high moisture separator level. Following the trip, all control rods inserted and all systems functioned as required. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3, with steam generator levels being maintained by the feedwater system and decay heat being removed via the main condenser.

The licensee is investigating the cause of the trip, but reported that numerous 125VDC ground alarms were received prior to the trip. The unit had been operating at reduced power because one of the reactor coolant pumps had been secured due to an oil leak. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35848
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4     State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BRINKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 06/19/1999
Notification Time: 22:25 [ET]
Event Date: 06/19/1999
Event Time: 21:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO VITAL AREA BOUNDARY. COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. CONTACT THE OPERATIONS CENTER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 36451
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: EDWIN PRICE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 11/18/1999
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/19/1999
Event Time: 02:18 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
EDWARD MCALPINE (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 68 Power Operation 68 Power Operation
Event Text
UNIT OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS DUE TO 10 CFR PART 50 APPENDIX R ISSUE

"An ongoing review of the circumstances pertaining to a decrease in a reactor coolant pump (RCP) oil level has concluded that leakage of the RCP oil collection system onto hot piping constituted a condition outside the design basis. At 2335 on 6/18/99 a control room alarm for low oil pot level on 2A1 RCP Motor was received. Investigation of trends showed that a slow downward trend on 2A1 RCPM lower oil pot level had increased to a rate of 0.5 inches decrease in four hours. Operations calculated that this rate would result in reaching the requirement to trip the 2A1 RCP within about three hours.

"Abnormal Procedure AP/2/A/1700/06 was entered and appropriate notifications were made.

"Power reduction to <70% was begun at 0020 on 5/19/99 in order to secure the 2A1 RCP prior to receiving the 2A1 ROP Low Oil level Statalarm. Unit power was stabilized at 58% at 0217 on 6/19/99. 2A1 RCP was stopped at 0218 on 6/19/99 with the lower oil pot level reading approximately -1.0 inches.

"The lower oil pot was removed and inspected. The cause of the leak was determined to be poor condition of the oil pot sealing surfaces. The aluminum pot had numerous dents and scrapes on the sealing surfaces. Permatex was filling the voids created by the dents and scrapes. Several likely leak paths were noted. Sudden loss of oil was caused by a large clump of the Permatex washing out on the bottom-sealing surface. Gaskets were still soft and pliable and no flaking or disintegration was noted. The Permatex was soft and smearable. The oil pot was replaced by a new steel oil pot.

"Another problem noted during the investigation of the leaking oil pot was that the drip pan under the oil pot, which is designed to collect leakage and route it to an oil collection tank in the reactor building basement, was leaking. It was determined approximately 10 gallons of oil had leaked out. The source of the leakage was a poor seal at the gasketed drip pan joint. This joint had been assembled with a thin gasket and very little joint sealant. Following reassembly of the oil pot, the drip pan was reassembled using high temperature RTV on the gasket to achieve a good seal. 2B2 drip pan was removed to investigate a possible oil pan leak and reassembled using the same method. The other Unit 2 drip pans (2A1, 2A2) were inspected and they appeared in good condition with no evidence of leakage.

"The design requirements for RCP Oil collection systems are given in 10 CFR 50 Appendix R (iii) (O). The RCP Oil collection system that leaked is considered PAST INOPERABLE. It was assumed that this occurred in the time period since its last inspection because the known cause is degradation of the sealing material over time.

"Fire protection uses a defense-in-depth solution to minimize the hazards and effects associated with fires. Even though the oil collection system leaked part of their collected contents they still performed part of their function. Because of the high flash point of the oil used, the oil collected location, and limited oxygen availability; the risk of a significant fire initiation in the reactor building was minimal. The only potential ignition source is thermally hot pipe. Hot pipe is covered with metallic reflective insulation. This jacket would limit oxygen available to fire and thus the potential severity of a fire. A fire at any reactor coolant pump would be limited to that RCP cavity by lack of continuity of combustible materials. Thus the potential for fire propagation was low.

"Appendix R scenarios take into account the potential for fire in the reactor building and designed the safe shutdown system features, modified plant equipment, and procedures in order to successfully mitigate any core consequences.

"This event is being reported because the RCP lube oil collection system did not meet the UFSAR and Design Basis Document requirements to contain and prevent oil from getting onto hot piping or equipment with a surface temperature above the flashpoint of the oil."

The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this condition by the licensee.