Event Notification Report for June 16, 1999

TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (TDAFW) PUMP START AND INJECTION.

The Unit 2 TDAFW pump automatically started and injected into the steam generator secondary side. The pump started when power was lost to an instrument panel board in the safe shutdown facility. The panel board was aligned to an alternate power source for maintenance activities. The panel board was not realigned to its normal power supply before power was removed from the alternate source. The TDAFW pump was secured when the instrument panel was re-energized.

The Unit 1 TDAFW pump was tagged out and inoperable at the time of the event. The Unit 1 TDAFW pump would have automatically started if not tagged out.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

POSTULATED FIRE MAY PREVENT MULTIPLE STARTS OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI).

During a review of the Fire Safe Shutdown methodology, it was determined that potential damage from a postulated fire in Fire Area 6S (Unit 2), could result in fire induced damage to the HPCI vacuum breaker motor operated valves (MOV) motive and control power source. Closure of the vacuum breaker MOV, due to fire damage, would prevent multiple starts of HPCI as required for this Appendix R scenario. HPCI remains operable for all other required fire scenarios and plant transients.

The licensee is establishing compensatory measures.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT RECEIVED VIA FACSIMILE

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Texas Department of Health:

"10 CFR Part 20.2202(b)(1)(I) - Report of exposure (real or threatened) of greater than or equal to TEDE of 5 rem, eye/lens 75 rem, skin/extremities 250 reds.

"Incident report 7472: Technical Welding of Pasadena, TX notified the TDH-BRC of a 10.082 rem exposure to a radiographer during 4/99. The radiographer has been removed from radiation work pending an investigation."

There was no additional information available on the facsimile.

(Call the NRC Operations Center for a contact telephone number and address.)

HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.

On 06/16/99, operators identified packing leakage from a drain valve in the high head safety injection system (valve SI-105). When the leakage was added to the existing system leakage, the control room ventilation system exceeded its system design basis calculation assumption for external recirculation system leakage (0.68 gph). The control room ventilation system continues to remain operable per an existing operability determination (OD 98-16). Leakage was subsequently reduced, such that total system leakage was within design base limits.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1318 ON 06/18/99 FROM DECLEMENTE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

"On 06/16/99, while the plant was in operation, operators identified active packing leakage from a drain valve in the high head safety injection system (valve SI-105). When the leakage is added to the existing system leakage, the control room ventilation system exceeded its system design basis calculation assumption for external recirculation system leakage (0.68 gph). The control room ventilation system continues to remain operable per an existing operability determination (OD 98-16). Following discovery of the active packing leak, adjustments were made that reduced leakage. However, the subsequent calculated leak rate shows the leak rate still remained greater than 0.68 gph, specifically 0.683 gph.

"During another test procedure, PT-Q116, packing leakage from valve SI-MOV-851B, 32 safety injection pump discharge isolation valve was found on 06/18/99. Total leak rate of systems outside containment likely to contain radioactive material is 0.689 gph."

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified R1DO (Yerokun).

PHYSICAL SECURITY REPORT

Unescorted access granted inappropriately, immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Refer to HOO Log for additional details.

* * * RETRACTION 1215 6/17/99 FROM BARBARA HANSEN-HARRIS TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

After discussion with the Region IV security inspector, the licensee has determined that this event is loggable, and not reportable. The NRC resident inspector will be informed by the licensee. Notified R4DO (Pellet).

PHYSICAL SECURITY REPORT

Plant access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

Refer to HOO Log for additional details.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1312 ON 06/18/99 FROM BARNES TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

The licensee has determined that this event is not reportable, and this notification is being retracted. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations Officer notified R2DO (Julian).

ACTUATION OF A "Q" SAFETY SYSTEM.

At 1631 hours on 6/16/99, operations personnel responded to a high voltage outleakage smokehead alarm at the X-333 Low Assay Withdrawal (LAW) condenser accumulator area. Operators responded per alarm response procedures and checked for outleakage and observed smoke at Instrument Control Panel (ICP) Number 13. Operators immediately evacuated the area, called 911, and initiated a building recall.

The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) responded and monitored air quality for hydrogen fluoride, airborne radioactivity, and surveyed for surface contamination. All sample results were less than minimum detectable activity. Investigation determined that a Dalton fitting in ICP#13 was cross threaded and was considered a possible source of the outleakage.

This is reportable as a valid actuation of a "Q" safety system in accordance with Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.9 (24-Hour Report).

The NRC resident inspector has been notified.

*** RETRACTION AT 1201 7/13/99 FROM J. MCCLEERY TO W. POERTNER ***

Further management review has determined that the high voltage outleakage smokehead alarm is not a "Q" safety system as previously reported.

Notified R3DO (Gardner), NMSS (Hickey)

LOSS OF ROD POSITION INDICATION RESULTS IN A RUNBACK

"At 0210, Motor Control Center (MCC) 24 deenergized. This resulted in a loss of power to rod position indication. This in turn caused a dropped rod automatic runback to 95% power. Axial power tilt remained within the band. Loss of rod position indication placed the plant in a condition which was outside the limitations of Technical Specification 3.10.6. Rod position indication was subsequently recovered at 0225 when this load was reenergized. All automatic functions associated with the loss of MCC 24 and the runback occurred as expected."

The licensee is investigating whether or not the runback should have reduced power to 85% vs 95% as well as the initial cause for the loss of power to MCC 24.

The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.