Event Notification Report for June 15, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/14/1999 - 06/15/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
35828358243582535826
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35828
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 06/16/1999
Notification Time: 03:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/1999
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/1999
Notification Time: 03:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/1999
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (NMSS)
BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT
On 6/15/99, at 0930 the Plant Shift Superintendent's office was notified by operations personnel that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) was not being maintained In the X-705 decontamination building. While performing operator rounds, Operations personnel discovered that a general purpose small diameter container in a transport cart, was incorrectly spaced from a 1-inch line containing fissile solution.
The NCSA for this operation. NCSA-0705.004. has a requirement which states in part, "when moving uranium bearing containers, a minimum 2 feet edge-to--edge spacing shall be maintained between other uranium bearing materials and the container being moved."
The Nuclear Criticality Safety staff determined that this incident caused a loss of control such that only one double contingency control remained in place.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
On 6/15/99, at 0930 the Plant Shift Superintendent's office was notified by operations personnel that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) was not being maintained In the X-705 decontamination building. While performing operator rounds, Operations personnel discovered that a general purpose small diameter container in a transport cart, was incorrectly spaced from a 1-inch line containing fissile solution.
The NCSA for this operation. NCSA-0705.004. has a requirement which states in part, "when moving uranium bearing containers, a minimum 2 feet edge-to--edge spacing shall be maintained between other uranium bearing materials and the container being moved."
The Nuclear Criticality Safety staff determined that this incident caused a loss of control such that only one double contingency control remained in place.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35824
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY ROGENSKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY ROGENSKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/15/1999
Notification Time: 07:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/1999
Event Time: 03:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/1999
Notification Time: 07:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/1999
Event Time: 03:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JIMI YEROKUN (R1)
JIMI YEROKUN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
VALID RADIATION ALARM IN AUXILIARY BUILDING CAUSED BY MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY.
"WHILE DRAINING CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) HOLDUP TANK (HUT) 'A' WHICH WAS ISOLATED, THE LICENSEE NOTICED THE AUXILIARY BUILDING PARTICULATE AND GAS MONITORS INCREASING. OPERATORS CLOSED THE DRAIN VALVE AND THE RADIATION MONITORS CONTINUED TO INCREASE. THE GAS MONITOR TRIPPED AND GAVE AN AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION ISOLATION."
THE CVCS HUT IS NORMALLY MAINTAINED CLOSED WITH A NITROGEN OVERPRESSURE. RADIATION MONITORS R13 AND R14 INSTALLED ON THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION EXHAUST BOTH SHOWED INCREASING COUNTS. THE R14 MONITOR INCREASED TO 2755 CORRECTED COUNTS PER MIN (CCPM) EXCEEDING THE ALARM SETPOINT OF 2250 RESULTING IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION ISOLATION. THE R13 INCREASED TO 1283 CCPM WELL BELOW THE ALARM SETPOINT OF 3000. THE LICENSEE SUBSEQUENTLY RESTORED VENTILATION AND RESET THE ISOLATION SIGNAL. THERE WAS NO RADIATION RELEASE OFFSITE.
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
"WHILE DRAINING CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) HOLDUP TANK (HUT) 'A' WHICH WAS ISOLATED, THE LICENSEE NOTICED THE AUXILIARY BUILDING PARTICULATE AND GAS MONITORS INCREASING. OPERATORS CLOSED THE DRAIN VALVE AND THE RADIATION MONITORS CONTINUED TO INCREASE. THE GAS MONITOR TRIPPED AND GAVE AN AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION ISOLATION."
THE CVCS HUT IS NORMALLY MAINTAINED CLOSED WITH A NITROGEN OVERPRESSURE. RADIATION MONITORS R13 AND R14 INSTALLED ON THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION EXHAUST BOTH SHOWED INCREASING COUNTS. THE R14 MONITOR INCREASED TO 2755 CORRECTED COUNTS PER MIN (CCPM) EXCEEDING THE ALARM SETPOINT OF 2250 RESULTING IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION ISOLATION. THE R13 INCREASED TO 1283 CCPM WELL BELOW THE ALARM SETPOINT OF 3000. THE LICENSEE SUBSEQUENTLY RESTORED VENTILATION AND RESET THE ISOLATION SIGNAL. THERE WAS NO RADIATION RELEASE OFFSITE.
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35825
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MAGLAJANG
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MAGLAJANG
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 06/15/1999
Notification Time: 20:13 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/1999
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/1999
Notification Time: 20:13 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/1999
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
HIGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN ALARM NOT TESTED DURING CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
The following is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The function of the Source Range Channels is to provide detection and indication of source range neutron flux during shutdown, refueling and startup modes. The source range channels N31/N32 provide a 'High Flux at Shutdown' alarm in the control room and containment in case of unexpected reactivity excursions during shutdown and refueling operations. This alarm is credited in the Cook licensing basis for detection and mitigation of a boron dilution event as analyzed in UFSAR. This function is required to be available during modes 3, 4, 5 and 6.
"Technical Specifications defines a Channel Functional Test as an injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions. Contrary to this the 'High Flux at Shutdown' alarm is not tested or verified during the Source Range Channel Functional Test. The function of the Source Range Channels cannot be credited as operable under the Technical Specifications unless it has been tested in conjunction with these Tech Spec requirements.
"Technical Specification compensatory actions have begun which include verifying the Shutdown Margin requirements are met within one hour and at least once per 12 hours thereafter.
"It should be noted that there is a great degree of confidence in the physical functionality of this alarm based on drawing review and the fact that the alarm came in on a channel spike on 2/4/99. The inoperability is based entirely on missed surveillance requirements."
The licensee is revising procedures to test the high flux at shutdown alarm.
The licensee plans to contact the NRC resident inspector.
The following is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"The function of the Source Range Channels is to provide detection and indication of source range neutron flux during shutdown, refueling and startup modes. The source range channels N31/N32 provide a 'High Flux at Shutdown' alarm in the control room and containment in case of unexpected reactivity excursions during shutdown and refueling operations. This alarm is credited in the Cook licensing basis for detection and mitigation of a boron dilution event as analyzed in UFSAR. This function is required to be available during modes 3, 4, 5 and 6.
"Technical Specifications defines a Channel Functional Test as an injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions. Contrary to this the 'High Flux at Shutdown' alarm is not tested or verified during the Source Range Channel Functional Test. The function of the Source Range Channels cannot be credited as operable under the Technical Specifications unless it has been tested in conjunction with these Tech Spec requirements.
"Technical Specification compensatory actions have begun which include verifying the Shutdown Margin requirements are met within one hour and at least once per 12 hours thereafter.
"It should be noted that there is a great degree of confidence in the physical functionality of this alarm based on drawing review and the fact that the alarm came in on a channel spike on 2/4/99. The inoperability is based entirely on missed surveillance requirements."
The licensee is revising procedures to test the high flux at shutdown alarm.
The licensee plans to contact the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35826
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 06/15/1999
Notification Time: 23:51 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/1999
Event Time: 21:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/1999
Notification Time: 23:51 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/1999
Event Time: 21:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | M/R | Y | 41 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FROM 41% POWER.
Operators manually scrammed the reactor from 41% power because of lowering vacuum in the main condenser. Operators first noticed lowering vacuum at around 2000 and worked unsuccessfully to fix the problem until the reactor was eventually scrammed at 2124. The cause of the loss of vacuum was a faulty steam jet air ejector. The turbine was manually tripped after the scram. Reactor water level lowered to -20 inches during the transient and caused an automatic group II isolation.
Several complications arose during the plant response to this transient. The 4160 Volt electrical buses 2C and 2D did not switch to their alternate power supply as expected. This caused the loss of the recirculation pump oil pumps and the resultant loss of the recirculation pumps. These buses have been restored and recirculation pumps restarted. Restoring one of the recirculation pumps resulted in a transient on Unit 1 as described in the update below.
The outboard MSIVs were manually closed because of low condenser vacuum and loss of the condensate system. The inboard 2B MSIV did not auto close as expected when vacuum reached 10 inches. This valve could not be shut manually (remotely) either and still indicates open. A drywell entry is planned to ascertain the exact status of this valve.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) has been manually started and is being used in conjunction with Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) to maintain reactor pressure, temperature and water level. Suppression pool cooling is operating, although pool temperature has risen to 112° F. Tech specs require the plant to be placed in cold shutdown within 36 hours when pool temperature exceeds 110° F. Operators are currently preparing to place High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) online which is expected to reduce the heat load on the suppression pool and allow its temperature to lower. Efforts are also in progress to restore the secondary plant to aid in plant cooldown if necessary.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0041 ON 6/16/99 BY COLEMAN TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
Just prior to this event a hard ground was coming and going on the 600 Volt bus 1D. The licensee believes that the ground was caused by the cycling of the "B" recirculation pump discharge MOV on Unit 2. The 600 Volt bus 1D is the normal power supply to 2R24-SO18B which feeds the "B" recirculation pump discharge valve 2B31-FO31B.
The "B" RPS MG set tripped causing a half scram, a half group II isolation (the outboard valves closed), a half group V isolation (F004 closed & RWCU pump tripped), reactor building & refueling floor ventilation isolated (outboard dampers closed), all four Standby Gas Treatment fans auto started, the main control room ventilation went into pressurization mode, and the fission product monitors isolated (outboard valves).
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the Operations Officer informed the R2DO (Julian).
Operators manually scrammed the reactor from 41% power because of lowering vacuum in the main condenser. Operators first noticed lowering vacuum at around 2000 and worked unsuccessfully to fix the problem until the reactor was eventually scrammed at 2124. The cause of the loss of vacuum was a faulty steam jet air ejector. The turbine was manually tripped after the scram. Reactor water level lowered to -20 inches during the transient and caused an automatic group II isolation.
Several complications arose during the plant response to this transient. The 4160 Volt electrical buses 2C and 2D did not switch to their alternate power supply as expected. This caused the loss of the recirculation pump oil pumps and the resultant loss of the recirculation pumps. These buses have been restored and recirculation pumps restarted. Restoring one of the recirculation pumps resulted in a transient on Unit 1 as described in the update below.
The outboard MSIVs were manually closed because of low condenser vacuum and loss of the condensate system. The inboard 2B MSIV did not auto close as expected when vacuum reached 10 inches. This valve could not be shut manually (remotely) either and still indicates open. A drywell entry is planned to ascertain the exact status of this valve.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) has been manually started and is being used in conjunction with Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) to maintain reactor pressure, temperature and water level. Suppression pool cooling is operating, although pool temperature has risen to 112° F. Tech specs require the plant to be placed in cold shutdown within 36 hours when pool temperature exceeds 110° F. Operators are currently preparing to place High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) online which is expected to reduce the heat load on the suppression pool and allow its temperature to lower. Efforts are also in progress to restore the secondary plant to aid in plant cooldown if necessary.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0041 ON 6/16/99 BY COLEMAN TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
Just prior to this event a hard ground was coming and going on the 600 Volt bus 1D. The licensee believes that the ground was caused by the cycling of the "B" recirculation pump discharge MOV on Unit 2. The 600 Volt bus 1D is the normal power supply to 2R24-SO18B which feeds the "B" recirculation pump discharge valve 2B31-FO31B.
The "B" RPS MG set tripped causing a half scram, a half group II isolation (the outboard valves closed), a half group V isolation (F004 closed & RWCU pump tripped), reactor building & refueling floor ventilation isolated (outboard dampers closed), all four Standby Gas Treatment fans auto started, the main control room ventilation went into pressurization mode, and the fission product monitors isolated (outboard valves).
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the Operations Officer informed the R2DO (Julian).