Event Notification Report for June 14, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/13/1999 - 06/14/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
35823358433591735819358203582135822
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35823
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/15/1999
Notification Time: 04:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 17:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/1999
Notification Time: 04:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 17:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING NCSA VIOLATION
"On 6/14/99 at 1756, the Plant Shift Superintendent's office was notified by operations personnel that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) was not being maintained in the X-333 process building. Operations personnel discovered that a converter classified as UH (uncomplicated handling) being stored on the cell floor had a cover missing from an opening. The NCSA for this operation, PLANT062.A00, has a requirement which states in part, 'Openings/penetrations shall be covered to minimize the potential for moderator collection and moist air exposure.'
"The Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) staff determined that this incident caused a loss of control such that only one double contingency control remained in place."
Operations personnel will inform the DOE Site Representative and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0402 BY SPAETH, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
On 6/15/99, at 1123 while continuing an NCS walkdown, an additional NCSA non-compliance was discovered. A Recycle Cooler stored on the cell floor had a cover missing from an opening. The Recycle Cooler is classified as UH. Compliance was restored within four hours.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The HOO notified the RDO (Madera); NMSS EO (Piccone).
"On 6/14/99 at 1756, the Plant Shift Superintendent's office was notified by operations personnel that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) was not being maintained in the X-333 process building. Operations personnel discovered that a converter classified as UH (uncomplicated handling) being stored on the cell floor had a cover missing from an opening. The NCSA for this operation, PLANT062.A00, has a requirement which states in part, 'Openings/penetrations shall be covered to minimize the potential for moderator collection and moist air exposure.'
"The Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) staff determined that this incident caused a loss of control such that only one double contingency control remained in place."
Operations personnel will inform the DOE Site Representative and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0402 BY SPAETH, TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *
On 6/15/99, at 1123 while continuing an NCS walkdown, an additional NCSA non-compliance was discovered. A Recycle Cooler stored on the cell floor had a cover missing from an opening. The Recycle Cooler is classified as UH. Compliance was restored within four hours.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The HOO notified the RDO (Madera); NMSS EO (Piccone).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 35843
Rep Org: NC DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: BARNHILL CONSTRUCTION
Region: 2
City: ROBERSON State: NC
County: MARTIN
License #: NC-092-0958-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MR. JEFFRIES
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Licensee: BARNHILL CONSTRUCTION
Region: 2
City: ROBERSON State: NC
County: MARTIN
License #: NC-092-0958-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MR. JEFFRIES
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 06/18/1999
Notification Time: 08:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/18/1999
Notification Time: 08:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE WAS DAMAGED BY A MOTORIST AT A CONSTRUCTION WORKSITE ALONG HIGHWAY 64 IN MARTIN COUNTY, NC. THE GAUGE WAS SEVERELY DAMAGED AS WAS THE SOURCE TUBE, BUT NO CONTAMINATION WAS SPREAD BY THIS INCIDENT. THE GAUGE HAS BEEN RETURNED TO TROXLER. THE GAUGE IS A MODEL 4640B CONTAINING A 8 mCi Cs-137 SOURCE.
A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE WAS DAMAGED BY A MOTORIST AT A CONSTRUCTION WORKSITE ALONG HIGHWAY 64 IN MARTIN COUNTY, NC. THE GAUGE WAS SEVERELY DAMAGED AS WAS THE SOURCE TUBE, BUT NO CONTAMINATION WAS SPREAD BY THIS INCIDENT. THE GAUGE HAS BEEN RETURNED TO TROXLER. THE GAUGE IS A MODEL 4640B CONTAINING A 8 mCi Cs-137 SOURCE.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 35917
Rep Org: HOWARD UNIVERSITY
Licensee: HOWARD UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 0800386-19
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GREGORY TALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Licensee: HOWARD UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 0800386-19
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GREGORY TALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 07/13/1999
Notification Time: 14:56 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/13/1999
Notification Time: 14:56 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/13/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
DON COOL (NMSS)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
DON COOL (NMSS)
MISSING SHIPMENT OF IODINE-125
The licensee reported that a shipment from Amersham Inc. on June 7, 1999 containing 2 millicuries (mCi) of I-125 in liquid form was missing. The package arrived at Howard University and can not be located at this time. The licensee identified that the shipment was lost on June 14, 1999.
The licensee reported that a shipment from Amersham Inc. on June 7, 1999 containing 2 millicuries (mCi) of I-125 in liquid form was missing. The package arrived at Howard University and can not be located at this time. The licensee identified that the shipment was lost on June 14, 1999.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35819
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL EMPEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL EMPEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/14/1999
Notification Time: 09:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 08:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/1999
Notification Time: 09:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 08:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
JIMI YEROKUN (R1)
JIMI YEROKUN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED AN NSS CABLE ROUTED THROUGH BOTH A SAFETY DIVISION I & II CABLE TRAY
"DURING PREPARATION OF EDCR [ENGINEERING DESIGN CHANGE REQUEST] 99-402, DESIGN ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED A CABLE SEPARATION CONCERN CREATED BY EDCR 95-407. EDCR 95-407 INSTALLED 'EGS' QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTIONS FOR A NUMBER OF MOVs , THE CONNECTORS ARE INSTALLED IN JUNCTION BOXES IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE VALVES, FOR MOV 2-53A, WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH SEPARATION DIVISION SII, THE NEW BOX IS LABELED 'B-1279SII.' CABLE 1729G, A NNS CABLE WHICH SUPPORTS JET PUMP TOTAL FLOW LOGIC, PREVIOUSLY WAS ROUTED DIRECTLY TO V2-53. EDCR 95-407 REROUTED C1729G THROUGH B-1279SII AND THE ASSOCIATED EGS CONNECTOR. CABLE 1729G IS ROUTED THOUGH AN 'SI' CONTAINMENT PENETRATION AND THE CIRCUIT CONTINUES VIA OTHER CABLE THROUGH "SI" TRAYS TO THE CONTROL ROOM.
"C1729G IS THEREFORE ROUTED IN AN 'SII' RACEWAY AND AN 'SI' RACEWAY WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF VYS-027.
"Operability Assessment
"Electrical separation between redundant systems is maintained in order to provide confidence that a single failure in one division does not impact the safety function of the opposite division. For this installation, credible failure of cable C1729G cannot impact the safety function of two divisions or failure within one safety division cannot propagate to the other division through C1729G.
"Cable C1729G supplies valve position logic signals to Recirculation Pump relays located in CRP 9-38. The relays are used to generate computer inputs and alarms. The relay circuit is fused at 3 amps.
"Credible failures consisting of short circuits or open circuits can originate either in the SI raceway system, the SII raceway system or on cable C1729G which is installed between Box B-1279SII (near V2-53A) and Box B440SI (penetration X105A termination box). A failure within the division SI raceway system may impact SI equipment but the failure would not propagate from the SI raceway to the SII equipment through cable C1729G without blowing the 3 amp fuse which protects the cable. In order for a failure to propagate from the SI system to the SII system a damaging signal or voltage must be impressed on C1729G within the SI system. That signal must then be carried and transferred to the SII system within box B-1279SII.
"Cable C1729G consists of a 4/C #14 Rockbestos FWIII control cable insulated at 600 V. It [is] routed to box B440SI, the inboard penetration termination box in a dedicated steel conduit. In the outboard box it connects to other cables which are routed in '300' series trays. These trays are dedicated to control circuits (120 V ac and 125 V dc or lower voltage). It is not credible that a failure within the 300 series SI trays would impress a signal or voltage on Cable C1729G which would cause damage to SII circuits within box B-1279SII or other equipment within the SII system. Possible voltages within the 300 series trays are 120 V ac or 125 V dc. The cable, rated at 600 V, will not break down when exposed to the maximum credible voltage. In addition the cable is protected by a 3 amp fuse which should interrupt the circuit before any short circuit current could affect adjacent cable.
"Similar to the above, failure within the SII system would not affect the equipment in the SI system and failure of cable C1729G within the drywell will not affect both the SI and SII system.
"Conclusion
"The SI and SII electrical distribution systems are operable even though C1729G is routed in B-1279SII and B440SI."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION 1344 7/12/1999 FROM JIM BROOKS TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"The VY FSAR Section 8.6.4 titled, 'Cable Installation and Separation Criteria,' states that it provides a 'summary of the VYNPS Cable Separation Criteria and cable installation criteria for redundant safety systems. . .' Conditions in conflict with the general requirements documented in section 8.6.4 or the detailed requirements contained within VY Specification 27, 'Separation Criteria for RPS, ESF and Auxiliary Support Systems-Related Electrical Equipment and Wiring' must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine their acceptability in light of the related design bases.
"As identified in the original ENS notification, the 'as-found' cabling configuration was assessed by the VY engineering organization. The VY engineering staff initial conclusion was confirmed. There was no credible ESF single failure vulnerability present due to the cited non-conformance. VY Regulatory Compliance further concluded that such a non-conformance does not constitute operation outside of the design basis of the VY plant."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Trapp).
"DURING PREPARATION OF EDCR [ENGINEERING DESIGN CHANGE REQUEST] 99-402, DESIGN ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED A CABLE SEPARATION CONCERN CREATED BY EDCR 95-407. EDCR 95-407 INSTALLED 'EGS' QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTIONS FOR A NUMBER OF MOVs , THE CONNECTORS ARE INSTALLED IN JUNCTION BOXES IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE VALVES, FOR MOV 2-53A, WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH SEPARATION DIVISION SII, THE NEW BOX IS LABELED 'B-1279SII.' CABLE 1729G, A NNS CABLE WHICH SUPPORTS JET PUMP TOTAL FLOW LOGIC, PREVIOUSLY WAS ROUTED DIRECTLY TO V2-53. EDCR 95-407 REROUTED C1729G THROUGH B-1279SII AND THE ASSOCIATED EGS CONNECTOR. CABLE 1729G IS ROUTED THOUGH AN 'SI' CONTAINMENT PENETRATION AND THE CIRCUIT CONTINUES VIA OTHER CABLE THROUGH "SI" TRAYS TO THE CONTROL ROOM.
"C1729G IS THEREFORE ROUTED IN AN 'SII' RACEWAY AND AN 'SI' RACEWAY WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF VYS-027.
"Operability Assessment
"Electrical separation between redundant systems is maintained in order to provide confidence that a single failure in one division does not impact the safety function of the opposite division. For this installation, credible failure of cable C1729G cannot impact the safety function of two divisions or failure within one safety division cannot propagate to the other division through C1729G.
"Cable C1729G supplies valve position logic signals to Recirculation Pump relays located in CRP 9-38. The relays are used to generate computer inputs and alarms. The relay circuit is fused at 3 amps.
"Credible failures consisting of short circuits or open circuits can originate either in the SI raceway system, the SII raceway system or on cable C1729G which is installed between Box B-1279SII (near V2-53A) and Box B440SI (penetration X105A termination box). A failure within the division SI raceway system may impact SI equipment but the failure would not propagate from the SI raceway to the SII equipment through cable C1729G without blowing the 3 amp fuse which protects the cable. In order for a failure to propagate from the SI system to the SII system a damaging signal or voltage must be impressed on C1729G within the SI system. That signal must then be carried and transferred to the SII system within box B-1279SII.
"Cable C1729G consists of a 4/C #14 Rockbestos FWIII control cable insulated at 600 V. It [is] routed to box B440SI, the inboard penetration termination box in a dedicated steel conduit. In the outboard box it connects to other cables which are routed in '300' series trays. These trays are dedicated to control circuits (120 V ac and 125 V dc or lower voltage). It is not credible that a failure within the 300 series SI trays would impress a signal or voltage on Cable C1729G which would cause damage to SII circuits within box B-1279SII or other equipment within the SII system. Possible voltages within the 300 series trays are 120 V ac or 125 V dc. The cable, rated at 600 V, will not break down when exposed to the maximum credible voltage. In addition the cable is protected by a 3 amp fuse which should interrupt the circuit before any short circuit current could affect adjacent cable.
"Similar to the above, failure within the SII system would not affect the equipment in the SI system and failure of cable C1729G within the drywell will not affect both the SI and SII system.
"Conclusion
"The SI and SII electrical distribution systems are operable even though C1729G is routed in B-1279SII and B440SI."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION 1344 7/12/1999 FROM JIM BROOKS TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
"The VY FSAR Section 8.6.4 titled, 'Cable Installation and Separation Criteria,' states that it provides a 'summary of the VYNPS Cable Separation Criteria and cable installation criteria for redundant safety systems. . .' Conditions in conflict with the general requirements documented in section 8.6.4 or the detailed requirements contained within VY Specification 27, 'Separation Criteria for RPS, ESF and Auxiliary Support Systems-Related Electrical Equipment and Wiring' must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine their acceptability in light of the related design bases.
"As identified in the original ENS notification, the 'as-found' cabling configuration was assessed by the VY engineering organization. The VY engineering staff initial conclusion was confirmed. There was no credible ESF single failure vulnerability present due to the cited non-conformance. VY Regulatory Compliance further concluded that such a non-conformance does not constitute operation outside of the design basis of the VY plant."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Trapp).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35820
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: ROY PRADOS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: ROY PRADOS
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 06/14/1999
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 13:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/1999
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 13:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
JOHN PELLET (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF THE '1A' 7KV ELECTRICAL BUS
"While operating at 100% power, the plant experienced an automatic reactor trip at 1307 [CDT] due to the loss of the '1A' 7Kv electrical bus. In addition to other loads, this bus supplies power to two of the four Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP). The loss of the two RCPs resulted in an uncomplicated trip of the reactor and turbine. The resulting secondary system transient initiated both channel of the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System, however no actual feeding of the steam generators occurred, nor was any necessary. The plant is currently stable in Hot Standby, Mode 3, at normal operating temperature and pressure. There is no safety significance to this event. In the near term, the plant will remain in Hot Standby and attempt to determine the cause of the loss of the '1A' 7Kv bus."
During the transient the safeties and reliefs did not open. Normal feedwater was maintained for feeding the steam generators and excess energy is being dumped to the main condensers.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"While operating at 100% power, the plant experienced an automatic reactor trip at 1307 [CDT] due to the loss of the '1A' 7Kv electrical bus. In addition to other loads, this bus supplies power to two of the four Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP). The loss of the two RCPs resulted in an uncomplicated trip of the reactor and turbine. The resulting secondary system transient initiated both channel of the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System, however no actual feeding of the steam generators occurred, nor was any necessary. The plant is currently stable in Hot Standby, Mode 3, at normal operating temperature and pressure. There is no safety significance to this event. In the near term, the plant will remain in Hot Standby and attempt to determine the cause of the loss of the '1A' 7Kv bus."
During the transient the safeties and reliefs did not open. Normal feedwater was maintained for feeding the steam generators and excess energy is being dumped to the main condensers.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35821
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK SHAFFER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK SHAFFER
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 06/14/1999
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 07:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/1999
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 07:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JIMI YEROKUN (R1)
JIMI YEROKUN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24 HOUR LICENSE REQUIREMENT
"In Amendment 114 to the Hope Creek license, PSE&G was authorized to perform single cell charging of connected cell in OPERABLE Class 1E batteries as described in the license amendment application and supplemental correspondence and as evaluated in the NRC SER. The submittals and SEP specified the following as one of the equipment provisions with respect to use of the battery chargers.
"At least two Class 1E properly rated fuses in series will be used on both the positive and negative leads between the battery charger and the cell(s) to protect the battery if a fault should develop in the charger.
"Contrary to this requirement, on June 6, a charger was connected to an operable 125VDC Class 1E battery (1C-D-411) without fuse protection. The charger was subsequently disconnected following charging of a given cell and reconnected (again without fuse protection) to charge a second cell. The charger remained connected to the battery until the error was identified 0755 on June 14 at which time the charger was disconnected. No other Class 1E batteries were inoperable during the time that the charger was connected to the 1C-D-411 battery.
"Amendment 114 included a license condition that required that single cell charging be performed in accordance with the provisions contained in the PSE&G letters and NRC SER. As a result, this is a license condition violation and is therefore reportable as a 24-hour report under Section 2.F of the Hope Creek operating license.
"At the time of discovery of this condition, Hope Creek was in Operating Condition 1 at 100% power with the 'B' Station Service Water loop removed from service for a scheduled outage. This is a 72 hour action statement that commenced at 0000 on 6/14/99. This event had no impact on the Service Water loop outage or the associated LCO."
The licensee is conducting a root cause investigation.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"In Amendment 114 to the Hope Creek license, PSE&G was authorized to perform single cell charging of connected cell in OPERABLE Class 1E batteries as described in the license amendment application and supplemental correspondence and as evaluated in the NRC SER. The submittals and SEP specified the following as one of the equipment provisions with respect to use of the battery chargers.
"At least two Class 1E properly rated fuses in series will be used on both the positive and negative leads between the battery charger and the cell(s) to protect the battery if a fault should develop in the charger.
"Contrary to this requirement, on June 6, a charger was connected to an operable 125VDC Class 1E battery (1C-D-411) without fuse protection. The charger was subsequently disconnected following charging of a given cell and reconnected (again without fuse protection) to charge a second cell. The charger remained connected to the battery until the error was identified 0755 on June 14 at which time the charger was disconnected. No other Class 1E batteries were inoperable during the time that the charger was connected to the 1C-D-411 battery.
"Amendment 114 included a license condition that required that single cell charging be performed in accordance with the provisions contained in the PSE&G letters and NRC SER. As a result, this is a license condition violation and is therefore reportable as a 24-hour report under Section 2.F of the Hope Creek operating license.
"At the time of discovery of this condition, Hope Creek was in Operating Condition 1 at 100% power with the 'B' Station Service Water loop removed from service for a scheduled outage. This is a 72 hour action statement that commenced at 0000 on 6/14/99. This event had no impact on the Service Water loop outage or the associated LCO."
The licensee is conducting a root cause investigation.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35822
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY HARRINGTON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY HARRINGTON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 06/14/1999
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/1999
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 06/14/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) - UNANALYZED COND OP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) - UNANALYZED COND OP
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF SOME ESF EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE AT THE SAME TIME
"KNPP [Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant] recognized on 6/11/99 that the 'B' diesel generator governor control speed sensor was misadjusted on 6/2/99. The actual impact of the misadjusted switch is unknown. Nevertheless, KNPP is reporting this as though the condition resulted in the diesel generator being inoperable. The basis for reporting this event is that during the time between 6/2 and 6/11 while the control was misadjusted, the opposite train Shield Building Vent system was removed from service for maintenance on 6/3, and the opposite train Internal Containment Spray system was removed from service for maintenance on 6/10. Having both trains of ESF equipment out of service is reportable as being in an unanalyzed condition.
"Currently all ESF equipment is operable. Corrective action program efforts need to determine why the operability/reportability assessment was not performed on 6/11. KNPP will also continue to pursue what the actual operability impact is from the misadjusted control."
The licensee is also investigating the cause of the misadjustment that occurred on 6/2/99.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT ON 6/22/99 AT 1139 BY HARRINGTON, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The licensee has requested retraction of this event report based on testing conducted subsequent to the report. On 6/17/99, the licensee tested the diesel generator using the speed setting from the as found condition. Based on the results of this test the licensee has concluded that the diesel generator was operable and therefore that no reportable event occurred. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The Operations center notified the R3DO (Jordan).
"KNPP [Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant] recognized on 6/11/99 that the 'B' diesel generator governor control speed sensor was misadjusted on 6/2/99. The actual impact of the misadjusted switch is unknown. Nevertheless, KNPP is reporting this as though the condition resulted in the diesel generator being inoperable. The basis for reporting this event is that during the time between 6/2 and 6/11 while the control was misadjusted, the opposite train Shield Building Vent system was removed from service for maintenance on 6/3, and the opposite train Internal Containment Spray system was removed from service for maintenance on 6/10. Having both trains of ESF equipment out of service is reportable as being in an unanalyzed condition.
"Currently all ESF equipment is operable. Corrective action program efforts need to determine why the operability/reportability assessment was not performed on 6/11. KNPP will also continue to pursue what the actual operability impact is from the misadjusted control."
The licensee is also investigating the cause of the misadjustment that occurred on 6/2/99.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT ON 6/22/99 AT 1139 BY HARRINGTON, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The licensee has requested retraction of this event report based on testing conducted subsequent to the report. On 6/17/99, the licensee tested the diesel generator using the speed setting from the as found condition. Based on the results of this test the licensee has concluded that the diesel generator was operable and therefore that no reportable event occurred. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The Operations center notified the R3DO (Jordan).