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Event Notification Report for June 09, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/08/1999 - 06/09/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
3580935810

Power Reactor
Event Number: 35809
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE FERGUSON
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 06/09/1999
Notification Time: 00:26 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/1999
Event Time: 00:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 99 Power Operation
Event Text
TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN - BOTH CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL PUMPS INOPERABLE

The licensee commenced a Tech Spec required shutdown at 0020 on 6/9/99. The shutdown was terminated at 0029 when the 1A Chemical and Volume Control (CVC) charging pump was returned to an operable status. Reactor power had been reduced to 99%.

On 6/7/99 at 1500, the 1A CVC charging pump was declared inoperable because the "A" Service water pump was inoperable. At 2320 on 6/8/99, the 1B CVC charging pump was also declared inoperable because of abnormal flow. The licensee entered Tech Spec 3.0.3 at that time, and since the condition had not been repaired by 0020 on 6/9/99, a shutdown was commenced.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35810
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ZAREMBA
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 06/09/1999
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/1999
Event Time: 16:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/09/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
JOHN ZWOLINSKI (NRR)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
SCOTT BARBER/REG 1 (DRP)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 95 Power Operation
Event Text
LOSS OF CONTROL POWER TO THE ECCS RESTART PROGRAM FOR AN EMERGENCY BUS DURING PERFORMANCE OF MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES AND RESULTING TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN

At 1640 EDT on 06/09/99, the control room received an annunciator (Restart Program Control Power Loss) which indicated a loss of 125-VDC control power for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) restart program on the 10500 bus (one of two 4,160-V emergency buses). The licensee stated that this failure removed the ability to strip the 10500 bus of loads, isolate the bus, and then automatically reload the bus with power being supplied by the applicable emergency diesel generators (EDG). It, therefore, prevents automatic startup of certain ECCS equipment and prevents loading of the associated EDGs on low emergency bus voltage. (The licensee stated that everything is still functional. However, if there was a situation where the bus was stripped and where an automatic restart using power from the EDGs was required, the loss of control power to the restart program would prevent automatic restart of the applicable ECCS equipment.)

The unit has four EDGs; two for each 4,160-V emergency bus. The licensee stated that the EDGs associated with the 10500 bus were already inoperable at the time of the event. However, the 4,160-V 10600 emergency bus and its associated pair of EDGs remained operable.

As a result of the loss of control power for the ECCS restart program, the low pressure ECCS systems associated with the 10500 bus ('A' and 'B' residual heat removal and 'A' core spray) and the pair of EDGs associated with the 10500 bus were declared inoperable, and the licensee entered Technical Specification 3.5.a.6. The action statement for this technical specification requires the licensee to place the unit in a Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours. Accordingly, a unit shutdown from 100% reactor power was commenced at 1739 EDT. The shutdown is planned to occur at a rate of 50 MWe/hour.

The licensee stated that maintenance activities were ongoing at the time of the event. A breaker was being racked in for another maintenance effort on some auxiliary contacts when the 'Restart Program Control Power Loss' annunciator was received. Apparently, the fuses that control the logic for the restart program control power are located in close proximity to the breaker that was being racked in.

Troubleshooting activities are underway. The licensee is currently checking the switchgear fuses and supply breakers and is also initiating corrective maintenance.

Other than receipt of the annunciator in the control room, there were no automatic initiations (such as actual ECCS injections or engineered safety feature actuations) associated with this event. There was no emergency declaration. The licensee plans to provide additional information as it becomes available (when the situation mitigates or escalates).

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

******************** UPDATE AT 2228 ON 06/09/99 FROM PETER ABBOTT TO TROCINE ********************

Investigation revealed that a fuse holder had lost tension and was not making proper contact. The fuse holder was subsequently adjusted and reinstalled, and the 24-hour action statement was exited at 2219 EDT. The licensee was maintaining reactor power at 88% and is currently in the process of evaluating whether or not power ascension can be commenced.

The licensee stated that the ability to manually start the affected ECCS pumps was not lost because 4,160-V bus power was never lost. Therefore, the affected ECCS equipment could have been manually started either from the control room or locally.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Caruso), NRR EO (Zwolinski), and IRO (Congel).