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Event Notification Report for June 07, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/06/1999 - 06/07/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
3580435805

Power Reactor
Event Number: 35804
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM WACH
HQ OPS Officer: WILLIAM POERTNER
Notification Date: 06/07/1999
Notification Time: 13:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/1999
Event Time: 12:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(vi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH BARR (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF DEAD CROCODILE IN COOLING CANAL

Plant management was notified by land utilization personnel that a deceased 4.5-foot long American crocodile was found yesterday (6/6/99) in the suction of one of the cooling canal skimmer pumps. An autopsy was performed, but the cause of death could not be determined. FPL is notifying state and local authorities and is planning a news release to the press. No further actions are planned.

The NRC resident inspector has been notified by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35805
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM DOUGHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 06/07/1999
Notification Time: 14:09 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/1999
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
THE DIVERSITY AND REDUNDANCY FOR AUTOMATICALLY ISOLATING A BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT IN THE RWCU SYSTEM WAS RENDERED INOPERABLE ON THREE PREVIOUS OCCASIONS.

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On 06/07/99, at 1100 hours, it was determined that on three occasions in the past, on 07/23/98, 09/17/98, and 09/28/98, while placing the Unit 2 Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System in service, bypassing of the RWCU - Leak Detection System (LDS) isolation function by procedure created a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and control the release of radioactive material.

"The RWCU-LDS is made up of two subsystems. The first subsystem is the RWCU high differential flow isolation signal which is a protective feature designed to limit the release of radioactive material from a pipe break outside of containment in the 'cold' portions of the RWCU system by detecting a difference between system inlet flow and outlet flow. The second RWCU-LDS subsystem is the RWCU area high temperature isolation signal. This second subsystem is a protective feature designed to limit the release of radioactive material from a pipe break outside of containment in the high energy portions of the RWCU system by detecting high ambient temperature in the RWCU system equipment room areas. Both of these isolation signals are also part of the Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System (PCRVICS).

"The RWCU high differential flow isolation signal was intentionally bypassed by procedure on the three occasions identified above to defeat a potential RWCU system isolation that could be caused by a pressure perturbation in the system while placing the system in service. Recent investigation subsequently revealed that the RWCU area high temperature isolation signal was also bypassed by the same installed jumpers.

"The installation of the jumpers in the isolation logic for both the inboard isolation trip system and the outboard isolation trip system for both RWCU-LDS subsystems created a condition such that the diversity and redundancy for automatically isolating a break outside containment in the RWCU system as described in the safety analysis was rendered inoperable. Therefore, this condition is reportable as a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and control the release of radioactive material. This notification is being made in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)."

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.