Event Notification Report for May 26, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/25/1999 - 05/26/1999
Hospital
Event Number: 35772
Rep Org: WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL
Licensee: WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: ROYAL OAK State: MI
County:
License #: 21-01333-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERYL SCHULTZ, RSO
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: ROYAL OAK State: MI
County:
License #: 21-01333-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERYL SCHULTZ, RSO
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 05/27/1999
Notification Time: 13:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/1999
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/1999
Notification Time: 13:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/1999
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
- HOSPITAL DOSIMETER MEASURED A DOSE READING OF GREATER THAN 1000 RADS -
AT 1430 ON 05/26/99, LYNN [LAST NAME UNKNOWN] EMPLOYED BY LANDAUER RADIATION BADGE DOSIMETRY COMPANY, GLENWOOD, IL, REPORTED TO CHERYL SCHULTZ, RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER (RSO), WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL, ROYAL OAK, MI, THAT ONE OF BEAUMONT HOSPITAL'S RADIATION DOSIMETERS MEASURED A DOSE READING OF GREATER THAN 1000 RADS. THE RADIATION DOSIMETER IS A LUXEL ALUMINUM OXIDE FILMLESS RADIATION DOSIMETER THAT HAS BEEN USED IN THE INDUSTRY SINCE THE FALL OF 1998. THIS TYPE OF DOSIMETER HAS BEEN USED AT BEAUMONT HOSPITAL SINCE JANUARY 1999. THE HOSPITAL MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIST WHO USED THIS DOSIMETER WORKS IN A BLOOD BANK AND LAST USED A BLOOD IRRADIATOR IN APRIL 1999. THE IRRADIATOR CONTAINS A SELF CONTAINED SEALED 10,000 CURIE CESIUM-137 RADIATION SOURCE.
THE HOSPITAL RSO STATED THAT THE IRRADIATOR IS FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND THAT THE TECHNOLOGIST DID NOT RECEIVE THIS HIGH DOSE. THE RSO FURTHER STATED THAT HOSPITAL PERSONNEL HAVE NEVER RECEIVED GREATER THAN 0.06 MR/HR MAXIMUM DOSE RATE WITH THE IRRADIATOR SOURCE EXPOSED. THE RSO BELIEVES THAT THE DOSE READING IS INCORRECT OR THAT THE DOSIMETER SOMEHOW BECAME IRRADIATED. THE DOSIMETRY COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT THE DOSIMETER READINGS WERE OBTAINED TWICE AND THE DOSIMETER IS NOT DAMAGED.
THE HOSPITAL RSO PLANS TO OBTAIN A BLOOD SAMPLE FROM THE TECHNOLOGIST AND HAVE IT ANALYZED ON 05/27/99.
* * * UPDATE 5/28/99 FROM BRIAN SMITH (NMSS) TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
The blood irradiator is a CIS-US Model IBL-473C with a source strength of approximately 2,000 Ci, contrary to the information provided in the initial report.
AT 1430 ON 05/26/99, LYNN [LAST NAME UNKNOWN] EMPLOYED BY LANDAUER RADIATION BADGE DOSIMETRY COMPANY, GLENWOOD, IL, REPORTED TO CHERYL SCHULTZ, RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER (RSO), WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL, ROYAL OAK, MI, THAT ONE OF BEAUMONT HOSPITAL'S RADIATION DOSIMETERS MEASURED A DOSE READING OF GREATER THAN 1000 RADS. THE RADIATION DOSIMETER IS A LUXEL ALUMINUM OXIDE FILMLESS RADIATION DOSIMETER THAT HAS BEEN USED IN THE INDUSTRY SINCE THE FALL OF 1998. THIS TYPE OF DOSIMETER HAS BEEN USED AT BEAUMONT HOSPITAL SINCE JANUARY 1999. THE HOSPITAL MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIST WHO USED THIS DOSIMETER WORKS IN A BLOOD BANK AND LAST USED A BLOOD IRRADIATOR IN APRIL 1999. THE IRRADIATOR CONTAINS A SELF CONTAINED SEALED 10,000 CURIE CESIUM-137 RADIATION SOURCE.
THE HOSPITAL RSO STATED THAT THE IRRADIATOR IS FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND THAT THE TECHNOLOGIST DID NOT RECEIVE THIS HIGH DOSE. THE RSO FURTHER STATED THAT HOSPITAL PERSONNEL HAVE NEVER RECEIVED GREATER THAN 0.06 MR/HR MAXIMUM DOSE RATE WITH THE IRRADIATOR SOURCE EXPOSED. THE RSO BELIEVES THAT THE DOSE READING IS INCORRECT OR THAT THE DOSIMETER SOMEHOW BECAME IRRADIATED. THE DOSIMETRY COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT THE DOSIMETER READINGS WERE OBTAINED TWICE AND THE DOSIMETER IS NOT DAMAGED.
THE HOSPITAL RSO PLANS TO OBTAIN A BLOOD SAMPLE FROM THE TECHNOLOGIST AND HAVE IT ANALYZED ON 05/27/99.
* * * UPDATE 5/28/99 FROM BRIAN SMITH (NMSS) TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
The blood irradiator is a CIS-US Model IBL-473C with a source strength of approximately 2,000 Ci, contrary to the information provided in the initial report.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 35774
Rep Org: GEORGIA DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Licensee: THERAGENICS, INC.
Region: 2
City: BUFORD State: GA
County:
License #: GA 881-2MD
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: THERAGENICS, INC.
Region: 2
City: BUFORD State: GA
County:
License #: GA 881-2MD
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/28/1999
Notification Time: 10:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/1999
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/1999
Notification Time: 10:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/1999
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
INFORMATION REPORT RECEIVED FROM AN AGREEMENT STATE INVOLVING AN UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION EVENT
"Description of Event : In accordance with Rule .03(14)(b)2. of the Rules and Regulations for Radioactive Material, Joseph Rodgers, Deputy RSO, ((770) 271-0233) notified the Department of an unplanned contamination event. While transporting a shielded 100 milliliter volumetric flask containing 24 Curies of purified liquid Pd 103 (cyclotron produced) the transport cart struck an object in the lab and the flask toppled out of the shield onto the floor. The Chemist immediately exited the area and notified health physics. Steps were immediately implemented to: minimize any exposure; prevent the spread of contamination; and initiate timely gross decontamination. Access to the room remains restricted and monitoring will continue with decontamination planned for the end of next week after the radiation levels are reduced by decay of the Palladium. Emergency processing of the film badges for the three involved employees was initiated with the following range of exposures reported for whole body: DDE 55 mrem to 277 mrem; LDE 61 mrem to 326 mrem; SDE 65 mrem to 355 mrem; and for extremities: SDE 170 mrem to 4040 mrem. Nasal swabs of the affected employees were negative. Results from a fixed air sampler, whose intake is directly above the area of the spill, indicated the 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix B values for inhalation were not exceeded. No radioactive materials were released outside the restricted area. Representatives of the Radiation Control Program visited the site on 5/27/99. The Licensee will submit a written report within 30 days, implement short term corrective actions and resume operation in this facility in early June, 1999."
"Description of Event : In accordance with Rule .03(14)(b)2. of the Rules and Regulations for Radioactive Material, Joseph Rodgers, Deputy RSO, ((770) 271-0233) notified the Department of an unplanned contamination event. While transporting a shielded 100 milliliter volumetric flask containing 24 Curies of purified liquid Pd 103 (cyclotron produced) the transport cart struck an object in the lab and the flask toppled out of the shield onto the floor. The Chemist immediately exited the area and notified health physics. Steps were immediately implemented to: minimize any exposure; prevent the spread of contamination; and initiate timely gross decontamination. Access to the room remains restricted and monitoring will continue with decontamination planned for the end of next week after the radiation levels are reduced by decay of the Palladium. Emergency processing of the film badges for the three involved employees was initiated with the following range of exposures reported for whole body: DDE 55 mrem to 277 mrem; LDE 61 mrem to 326 mrem; SDE 65 mrem to 355 mrem; and for extremities: SDE 170 mrem to 4040 mrem. Nasal swabs of the affected employees were negative. Results from a fixed air sampler, whose intake is directly above the area of the spill, indicated the 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix B values for inhalation were not exceeded. No radioactive materials were released outside the restricted area. Representatives of the Radiation Control Program visited the site on 5/27/99. The Licensee will submit a written report within 30 days, implement short term corrective actions and resume operation in this facility in early June, 1999."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35770
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRIAN WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRIAN WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 05/26/1999
Notification Time: 20:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/1999
Event Time: 16:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/1999
Notification Time: 20:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/1999
Event Time: 16:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FAILURE TO PERFORM REQUIRED IN SERVICE TESTING
While performing a review of the pressure testing program, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Engineering discovered that the High Pressure Core Spray System (CSH) suction line from the Condensate Storage Tanks (CST) check valve 2CSH*V59 has not been tested since November 1997. Testing of this valve was stopped when available licensing and design basis information incorrectly determined testing was not required under the second 10-Year IST Program Plan.
NMP2 Engineering initial review revealed that valve 2CSH*V59 is the redundant barrier to prevent uncontrolled suppression pool level loss in the event of the active failure of the CST motor operated Suction valve 2CSH*MOV 101 to close during a coincident Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and DBA Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
As the required testing on 2CSH*V59 has not been performed, 2CSH*MOV 101 has been de-energized shut as a compensatory action to isolate this line. High Pressure Core Spray has been declared inoperable and actions per Tech Spec 3.5.1 initiated. CSH remains available with suction lined up to the suppression pool.
This notification is being made as required per 10CFR50.72.b.2.(iii).(D) for unplanned inoperability of a single train ECCS system.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
While performing a review of the pressure testing program, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Engineering discovered that the High Pressure Core Spray System (CSH) suction line from the Condensate Storage Tanks (CST) check valve 2CSH*V59 has not been tested since November 1997. Testing of this valve was stopped when available licensing and design basis information incorrectly determined testing was not required under the second 10-Year IST Program Plan.
NMP2 Engineering initial review revealed that valve 2CSH*V59 is the redundant barrier to prevent uncontrolled suppression pool level loss in the event of the active failure of the CST motor operated Suction valve 2CSH*MOV 101 to close during a coincident Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and DBA Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
As the required testing on 2CSH*V59 has not been performed, 2CSH*MOV 101 has been de-energized shut as a compensatory action to isolate this line. High Pressure Core Spray has been declared inoperable and actions per Tech Spec 3.5.1 initiated. CSH remains available with suction lined up to the suppression pool.
This notification is being made as required per 10CFR50.72.b.2.(iii).(D) for unplanned inoperability of a single train ECCS system.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.