Event Notification Report for May 25, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/24/1999 - 05/25/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
3576835763357643576535766
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35768
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RON CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RON CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/26/1999
Notification Time: 04:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/1999
Event Time: 21:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/1999
Notification Time: 04:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/1999
Event Time: 21:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TONY VEGEL (R3)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
TONY VEGEL (R3)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING THE LOSS OF ONE OF THE TWO DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CONTROLS
"On 5/25/99 at 2105 hours, while processing waste water solution through X-705 microfiltration filter press 'A', approximately 5 gallons of solution leaked from between the second and third filter plates, spilling onto the floor. At the time of this spill, Operations personnel were processing a 2072 liter 'batch' of waste water which contained 29.44 grams of U-235 at an enrichment of 1.4 wt % U-235. Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Personnel determined the leak to be a loss of a single control (physical integrity of the system) such that only one of the double contingency controls (geometry) remained in place.
"This event is reportable under NRC Bulletin 91-01, 24-hour criticality control.
"There was no radioactive / radiological exposure as a result of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
On May 25, 1999, approximately 5-gallons of concentrate leaked from filter press A in the microfiltration system. The leak occurred between the second and third filter press plates, most likely the result of a failed 0-ring. NCSA.0705_076 covers the use of inadvertent containers in X-705, given the concern of leaks/spills from the various solution bearing systems. NCSA.0705_076 considers the leak/spill of more than 4.8-liters from any system to be an unlikely event, given the design and physical integrity of the systems (i.e., the systems are designed and built to contain the solution). While this leak resulted in greater than 4.8-liters spilling from the system in question, the second contingency was not violated in that the solution did not accumulate in an unsafe geometry (it spilled to the floor and spread out into a safe slab geometry).
"Based on sampling and batching calculations performed on the concentrate storage tank (i.e., T.103A) the total mass of material to be fed to the filter press is known prior to introducing concentrate into the filler press. NCSA-0705_015 limits the mass of U-235 to be processed (i.e., in a single batch) to a maximum of 350 grams. Per the filter press batch sheet for batch 103A-511, the batch being fed when this leak occurred contained 29.44 grams U-235. This amount of material is well below the safe mass of material, even at 100 wt% enrichment (ref. GAT-225). The actual enrichment of the material being processed was 1.4% U-235, per the filter press batch sheet for batch 103A-511. Therefore, while one of the contingencies was lost, the safety significance for this occurrence was low given the prerequisite for limiting the mass in the batch to 350 grams U-235.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
A significant amount of uranium-bearing solution would have to leak from a system and accumulate in an unsafe geometry in order for a criticality to occur.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The parameters being controlled for this event were volume of a leak in a system in X-705. NCSA-0705_076 considers it unlikely that a leak of more than 4.8-liters would occur given the physical integrity of systems in X-705. In addition, the mass of U-235 in the batch being processed was limited to a maximum of 350 grams.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
Based on PR-PST-99-02948 and filter press batch sheet for batch 103A-511 the volume of solution which leaked was approximately 5-gallons. The maximum amount of U-235 in the concentrate was 29.44 grams and the maximum enrichment of material was 1.4 wt% U-235. It should be noted that the actual mass of U-235 which was in the leaked solution would be less than 29.44 grams, since the total amount of solution being processed was 2072 liters.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
NCSA-0705_075 considers it unlikely that more than 4.8-liters of solution would leak from a system given the physical integrity of the systems used in X-705. The leak in question resulted in approximately 5-gallons of solution leaking from the filter press. This amount of solution exceeded the considered limit for the unlikely event and resulted in the loss of double contingency for this leak.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:"
Operations informed the NRC resident inspector and will inform the DOE site representative.
"On 5/25/99 at 2105 hours, while processing waste water solution through X-705 microfiltration filter press 'A', approximately 5 gallons of solution leaked from between the second and third filter plates, spilling onto the floor. At the time of this spill, Operations personnel were processing a 2072 liter 'batch' of waste water which contained 29.44 grams of U-235 at an enrichment of 1.4 wt % U-235. Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Personnel determined the leak to be a loss of a single control (physical integrity of the system) such that only one of the double contingency controls (geometry) remained in place.
"This event is reportable under NRC Bulletin 91-01, 24-hour criticality control.
"There was no radioactive / radiological exposure as a result of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
On May 25, 1999, approximately 5-gallons of concentrate leaked from filter press A in the microfiltration system. The leak occurred between the second and third filter press plates, most likely the result of a failed 0-ring. NCSA.0705_076 covers the use of inadvertent containers in X-705, given the concern of leaks/spills from the various solution bearing systems. NCSA.0705_076 considers the leak/spill of more than 4.8-liters from any system to be an unlikely event, given the design and physical integrity of the systems (i.e., the systems are designed and built to contain the solution). While this leak resulted in greater than 4.8-liters spilling from the system in question, the second contingency was not violated in that the solution did not accumulate in an unsafe geometry (it spilled to the floor and spread out into a safe slab geometry).
"Based on sampling and batching calculations performed on the concentrate storage tank (i.e., T.103A) the total mass of material to be fed to the filter press is known prior to introducing concentrate into the filler press. NCSA-0705_015 limits the mass of U-235 to be processed (i.e., in a single batch) to a maximum of 350 grams. Per the filter press batch sheet for batch 103A-511, the batch being fed when this leak occurred contained 29.44 grams U-235. This amount of material is well below the safe mass of material, even at 100 wt% enrichment (ref. GAT-225). The actual enrichment of the material being processed was 1.4% U-235, per the filter press batch sheet for batch 103A-511. Therefore, while one of the contingencies was lost, the safety significance for this occurrence was low given the prerequisite for limiting the mass in the batch to 350 grams U-235.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
A significant amount of uranium-bearing solution would have to leak from a system and accumulate in an unsafe geometry in order for a criticality to occur.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The parameters being controlled for this event were volume of a leak in a system in X-705. NCSA-0705_076 considers it unlikely that a leak of more than 4.8-liters would occur given the physical integrity of systems in X-705. In addition, the mass of U-235 in the batch being processed was limited to a maximum of 350 grams.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
Based on PR-PST-99-02948 and filter press batch sheet for batch 103A-511 the volume of solution which leaked was approximately 5-gallons. The maximum amount of U-235 in the concentrate was 29.44 grams and the maximum enrichment of material was 1.4 wt% U-235. It should be noted that the actual mass of U-235 which was in the leaked solution would be less than 29.44 grams, since the total amount of solution being processed was 2072 liters.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
NCSA-0705_075 considers it unlikely that more than 4.8-liters of solution would leak from a system given the physical integrity of the systems used in X-705. The leak in question resulted in approximately 5-gallons of solution leaking from the filter press. This amount of solution exceeded the considered limit for the unlikely event and resulted in the loss of double contingency for this leak.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:"
Operations informed the NRC resident inspector and will inform the DOE site representative.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35763
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL BAIN
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL BAIN
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 05/25/1999
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/1999
Event Time: 15:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/1999
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/1999
Event Time: 15:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP BECAUSE OF A SECONDARY SIDE STEAM LEAK
The reactor was manually tripped from 100% power because of a steam leak in the 1A feedwater heater. All control rods fully inserted. Both motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were started and are maintaining water level in the steam generators. Decay heat is being removed by use of the steam generator atmospheric reliefs.
The MSIVs are shut. The plant is stable in hot standby.
The steam leak was discovered when oscillations in the feedwater heater water level resulted in a main control board annunicator. Personnel sent to investigate the feedwater heater reported a steam leak in the pipe leading up to the flange to which the relief valve is connected. Operators then manually tripped the reactor.
Access to the turbine building is restricted while the feedwater heater is steaming down. A 120 V instrument AC panel switched to an alternate power supply during the plant transient. This had no effect on the plant's response.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and will notify state and local officials.
The reactor was manually tripped from 100% power because of a steam leak in the 1A feedwater heater. All control rods fully inserted. Both motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were started and are maintaining water level in the steam generators. Decay heat is being removed by use of the steam generator atmospheric reliefs.
The MSIVs are shut. The plant is stable in hot standby.
The steam leak was discovered when oscillations in the feedwater heater water level resulted in a main control board annunicator. Personnel sent to investigate the feedwater heater reported a steam leak in the pipe leading up to the flange to which the relief valve is connected. Operators then manually tripped the reactor.
Access to the turbine building is restricted while the feedwater heater is steaming down. A 120 V instrument AC panel switched to an alternate power supply during the plant transient. This had no effect on the plant's response.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and will notify state and local officials.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35764
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 05/25/1999
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/1999
Event Time: 16:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/1999
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/1999
Event Time: 16:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PRESSURIZER SUPPORT BOLTS WOULD EXCEED ALLOWABLE STRESS DURING AN EARTHQUAKE
At 1621 hours on May 25, 1999, utilizing preliminary calculations (not yet design verified), GPU Nuclear determined that a condition outside the design basis of the plant exists at TMI-1 and that an immediate report to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(B)(i)(ii)(B) is required.
A review of the design of the bolts that insert into the Pressurizer Support Lugs found that in the event of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (the Maximum Hypothetical Earthquake (MHE)) the bolts would be exposed to loads in excess of allowable stress as analyzed in the TMI-1 FSAR
The bolts have been determined to be operable utilizing building and equipment damping factors (7% / 7%) in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61. However, the TMI-1 FSAR utilizes more conservative damping factors (2% building / 2.5% equipment). When bolt load calculations are performed utilizing the FSAR factors, the MHE shear stress exceeds the allowable stress by approximately 25% and the MHE seismic stress slightly exceeds the allowable stress by approximately 1.5%. However, when the calculations are performed using the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 damping factors of 7% building / 7% equipment, the MHE shear and MHE seismic stresses are well within the allowable stress.
GPU Nuclear intends to finalize the calculations and to resolve the non-conformance with the design basis as stated in the FSAR by either:
Restoring the bolts to within the plant design basis via, the plant modification process or,
Revising the plant design basis via a license amendment.
This condition has been documented in the GPU Nuclear Corrective Action Program (CAP T1999-0264).
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.
At 1621 hours on May 25, 1999, utilizing preliminary calculations (not yet design verified), GPU Nuclear determined that a condition outside the design basis of the plant exists at TMI-1 and that an immediate report to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(B)(i)(ii)(B) is required.
A review of the design of the bolts that insert into the Pressurizer Support Lugs found that in the event of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (the Maximum Hypothetical Earthquake (MHE)) the bolts would be exposed to loads in excess of allowable stress as analyzed in the TMI-1 FSAR
The bolts have been determined to be operable utilizing building and equipment damping factors (7% / 7%) in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61. However, the TMI-1 FSAR utilizes more conservative damping factors (2% building / 2.5% equipment). When bolt load calculations are performed utilizing the FSAR factors, the MHE shear stress exceeds the allowable stress by approximately 25% and the MHE seismic stress slightly exceeds the allowable stress by approximately 1.5%. However, when the calculations are performed using the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 damping factors of 7% building / 7% equipment, the MHE shear and MHE seismic stresses are well within the allowable stress.
GPU Nuclear intends to finalize the calculations and to resolve the non-conformance with the design basis as stated in the FSAR by either:
Restoring the bolts to within the plant design basis via, the plant modification process or,
Revising the plant design basis via a license amendment.
This condition has been documented in the GPU Nuclear Corrective Action Program (CAP T1999-0264).
The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35765
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RICK LANGE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RICK LANGE
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 05/25/1999
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/1999
Event Time: 16:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/1999
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/1999
Event Time: 16:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) INOPERABLE
"HPCS is inoperable but available. During an independent review of the In Service Inspection (ISI) program plan it was found that 52 welds in the HPCS system were improperly exempted from ISI requirements. These welds are located between the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) and the HPCS pump suction valve (MOV101). In addition, the weld inspections are required by ASME section XI. Preparations are being made to perform the required ISI weld exams."
The HPCS LCO is 14 days. All other ECCS equipment is operable.
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
"HPCS is inoperable but available. During an independent review of the In Service Inspection (ISI) program plan it was found that 52 welds in the HPCS system were improperly exempted from ISI requirements. These welds are located between the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) and the HPCS pump suction valve (MOV101). In addition, the weld inspections are required by ASME section XI. Preparations are being made to perform the required ISI weld exams."
The HPCS LCO is 14 days. All other ECCS equipment is operable.
The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35766
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARTIN MANTENFEL
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARTIN MANTENFEL
HQ OPS Officer: DOUG WEAVER
Notification Date: 05/25/1999
Notification Time: 21:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/1999
Event Time: 19:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/1999
Notification Time: 21:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/1999
Event Time: 19:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
RCIC STEAM EXHAUST CHECK VALVES FAIL LEAK TEST
TWO IN SERIES REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) STEAM EXHAUST CHECK VALVES FAILED THEIR LEAK TESTS. THE LEAKAGE WAS IN EXCESS OF 10.1 GALLONS PER MINUTE. NO PRESSURE COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE LINE DURING THE TEST. THE PLANT IS SHUTDOWN IN REFUELING MODE SO RCIC IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE. CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN BEFORE STARTUP.
THE LICENSEE HAS NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
TWO IN SERIES REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) STEAM EXHAUST CHECK VALVES FAILED THEIR LEAK TESTS. THE LEAKAGE WAS IN EXCESS OF 10.1 GALLONS PER MINUTE. NO PRESSURE COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE LINE DURING THE TEST. THE PLANT IS SHUTDOWN IN REFUELING MODE SO RCIC IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE. CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN BEFORE STARTUP.
THE LICENSEE HAS NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.