Event Notification Report for May 19, 1999

24-HOUR REPORT INVOLVING VIOLATION OF OPERATING LICENSE BASED ON INOPERABLE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TRAIN.

"On May 13, 1999, it was discovered that Train 'D' Auxiliary Feedwater Regulating Valve FV-7526 would not open as required during surveillance testing. Investigations revealed that at 05:00 on May 10, 1999, Train 'D' Auxiliary Feedwater was removed from service to perform a static diagnostic test on AF-FV-7526. This test was completed and Train 'D' Auxiliary Feedwater was declared operable at 09:20 on May 11, 1999.

"The failure of AF-FV-7526 was found to be caused by a misadjusted bracket for the limit switch which could have been caused during the static diagnostic test that was performed on May 10. 1999. This problem was corrected and Train 'D' Auxiliary Feedwater was declared operable at 00:10 on May 14,1999. This rendered Train 'D' Auxiliary Feedwater inoperable for a period of 91 hours and 10 minutes. This exceeded the time allowed under Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 action b., which states that the inoperable component must be restored to [an]operable[condition] within 72 hours.

"This is a violation of Operating License NPF-076, Section 2G."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO SPIKING ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT (IRNI) "N-36" DUE TO AN APPARENT INSTRUMENTATION PROBLEM.

DURING STARTUP OF UNIT 2 FOLLOWING A REFUELING OUTAGE, THE IRNI "N-36" UNEXPECTEDLY SPIKED CAUSING A "HIGH FLUX" TRIP (FIRST OUT). IT APPEARS TO BE AN INSTRUMENTATION PROBLEM. THERE WAS NO I&C MAINTENANCE IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME. ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED. DECAY HEAT WHICH IS LOW IS BEING REJECTED TO THE MAIN CONDENSER VIA THE STEAM DUMPS. THE STARTUP FEEDWATER PUMP IS IN SERVICE SUPPLYING WATER TO THE STEAM GENERATORS. ALL SYSTEM FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED WITH ALL SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL. THE LICENSEE WILL MAINTAIN THE UNIT IN MODE 3 PENDING THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION. THERE WAS NO RADIOACTIVE RELEASE.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

BOTH COMMERCIAL AND FTS PHONES OUT OF SERVICE.

THE PHONE SYSTEM FAILED WHEN AN INADVERTENT UNDERGROUND CABLE WAS CUT DURING ROAD CONSTRUCTION ON A NEARBY ROAD, AMERITECH IS WORKING ON THE CABLE REPAIR AND IT SHOULD BE FIXED BY 1130 EDT.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

* * * UPDATE AT 1224 EDT ON 5/19/99 BY PHILLIP SHORT TO FANGIE JONES * * *

ALL PHONE LINES HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO SERVICE. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE AND THE R3DO (BRENT CLAYTON) WAS NOTIFIED BY THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATION OFFICER.

PHYSICAL SECURITY REPORT

Unescorted access granted inappropriately, immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTED AT 1153 EDT ON 6/3/99 BY DAVID ERBE TO FANGIE JONES * * *

The licensee retracted this event based on a determination that the event did not meet the criteria for a one hour report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R4DO (Linda Howell).

Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.

24-hour Condition of License report involving fire protection barriers.

"On May 19,1999 at 1030 hours. McGuire Nuclear Station determined that provisions of the McGuire fire protection program had not been maintained as required by conditions C.(4) (Unit I) and C.(7) (Unit 2) of the McGuire Facility Operating License.

"Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9-5 requires that all fire rated assemblies and sealing devices separating
1. Safety from non-safety related areas or,
2. Redundant analyzed post fire safe shutdown equipment or,
3. The Control Complex (Control Room, Cable Rooms, and Battery Rooms) from the remainder of the plant or,
4. Containment from Non-containment areas shall be operable.

"Contrary to this, numerous fire barrier penetrations designed to satisfy the above separation criteria for certain containment to non-containment penetrations have been determined to be inoperable. This discovery was made as part of routine surveillance testing. A particular penetration design has been identified to have been installed in non-conformance with the design. The design specifies the incorporation of a fire resistive block material surrounded by a metal frame as the physical penetration which is installed in the wall as a unit. Necessary cables then penetrate through the fire resistive block. Physical penetrations were installed in excess of those actually necessary for transporting cables to accommodate future modifications or other contingencies. Penetrations in these 'blank locations' incorporated a welded steel plate as opposed to the design described above. This configuration has not been qualified as a 3 hour fire rated assembly.

"Remedial actions required by Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9-5 have been implemented (fire watches). The ability of the facility to achieve safe shutdown conditions under a postulated design bases fire has not been compromised by the discovered condition. Therefore, McGuire did not operate outside the design basis of the plant.

"The resident Inspector has been notified. A follow-up written report will be issued within 14 days. Note that this event is not reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73."

* * * UPDATE AT 2101 ON 05/20/99 BY LARRY TUMBLESON AND JULIUS BRYANT TO JOLLIFFE * * *

The following is an update to this event:

". . . A particular penetration design was thought to have been installed in non-conformance with design requirements. Specifically, penetrations in 'blank' locations incorporated a welded steel plate as a barrier rather than a fire resistive block material surrounded by a metal frame. Station personnel concluded that this welded steel plate design did not satisfy the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9-5. Consequently, these penetrations were declared inoperable and the May 19, 1999 NRC Notification was made.

Subsequent to the May 19,1999 notification, further evaluation of the welded steel plate fire barrier penetration design determined that these penetrations do satisfy the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment
16.9-5. Consequently, these penetrations were operable and the May 19, 1999 NRC notification is retracted. As a result, the remedial actions specified in that notification have been discontinued and a follow up written report will not be issued. The Resident Inspector has been notified."

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO Ann Boland.

MISSING MUZZLE REFERENCE SENSOR CONTAINING 10 CURIE TRITIUM SOURCE.

ON 5/19/99 WHILE TRAINING AT FT. PICKETT, VA, A TANK UNIT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD NOTED THAT A MUZZLE REFERENCE SENSOR MOUNTED ON THE END OF THE TANK GUN BARREL WAS MISSING. THE DEVICE CONTAINS 10 CURIES TRITIUM GAS. A SEARCH IS UNDERWAY TO LOCATE THE MISSING SOURCE.

- 15 YEAR OLD MALE OPENED A FIRE EXIT SIGN AND PARTIALLY REMOVED TRITIUM AMPOULES -

ON 05/19/99, JIM ALBRIGHT, NC DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION (DRP), WAS NOTIFIED THAT A 15 YEAR OLD MALE HAD OPENED A FIRE EXIT SIGN WITH A RAZOR KNIFE AND AT LEAST PARTIALLY REMOVED SOME OF THE TRITIUM AMPOULES (INCIDENT #99-09). ON THE MORNING OF 05/19/99, A DRP SURVEY TEAM RESPONDED. ALL AMPOULES HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR; NONE WERE DAMAGED OR BROKEN. WIPES TAKEN INDICATE NO CONTAMINATION. THE SIGN AND THE AMPOULES ARE CURRENTLY IN THE POSSESSION OF THE WASHINGTON COUNTY, NC, SHERIFF DEPARTMENT.

ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE TO RETURN THE SOURCE AMPOULES TO THE MANUFACTURER.
NC DRP CONSIDERS THIS INCIDENT CLOSED.