Event Notification Report for May 14, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/13/1999 - 05/14/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
357143571535716357173571835769
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35714
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY HASTINGS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY HASTINGS
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 05/14/1999
Notification Time: 09:13 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 07:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/1999
Notification Time: 09:13 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 07:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
JIM LYONS (NRR)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
JIM LYONS (NRR)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND MANUAL SAFETY INJECTION DUE TO A STEAM LEAK ON THE 4B FEEDWATER HEATER STEAM SIDE
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Unit 1 experienced a manual reactor trip [from 100% power] at 0713 CDT due to a steam leak on the 4B feedwater heater steam side. The control room operators also manually safety injected at 0716 [CDT] due to decreasing pressurizer level. The steam leak has been isolated. All equipment operated as designed during the event. No injuries have been reported. [The licensee is] currently performing the [safety injection] termination procedure. The unit is currently stable at 2,010 psig and 538°F. No release did occur or is occurring."
The licensee stated that the auxiliary feedwater pumps started. The emergency diesel generators also started but did not load. These actions were expected as a result of the manual safety injection. All rods fully inserted as a result of the manual reactor trip, and the main steam isolation valves were manually closed. In addition, the licensee stated that the manual safety injection was considered to be an engineered safety feature actuation and that there were no emergency core cooling system injections.
The reactor is currently stable in Hot Shutdown. The reactor coolant pumps, normal charging and letdown, and pressurizer heaters and sprays are being utilized for primary system transport, level, and pressure control. All containment parameters are normal. Auxiliary feedwater is supplying water to the steam generators, and secondary steam is being dumped to atmosphere because the main steam isolation valves were manually closed. There has been no history of steam generator tube leakage. Offsite power is available, and the emergency diesel generators are running unloaded at this time.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify Kewaunee County, and Manitowoc County, and the state.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Unit 1 experienced a manual reactor trip [from 100% power] at 0713 CDT due to a steam leak on the 4B feedwater heater steam side. The control room operators also manually safety injected at 0716 [CDT] due to decreasing pressurizer level. The steam leak has been isolated. All equipment operated as designed during the event. No injuries have been reported. [The licensee is] currently performing the [safety injection] termination procedure. The unit is currently stable at 2,010 psig and 538°F. No release did occur or is occurring."
The licensee stated that the auxiliary feedwater pumps started. The emergency diesel generators also started but did not load. These actions were expected as a result of the manual safety injection. All rods fully inserted as a result of the manual reactor trip, and the main steam isolation valves were manually closed. In addition, the licensee stated that the manual safety injection was considered to be an engineered safety feature actuation and that there were no emergency core cooling system injections.
The reactor is currently stable in Hot Shutdown. The reactor coolant pumps, normal charging and letdown, and pressurizer heaters and sprays are being utilized for primary system transport, level, and pressure control. All containment parameters are normal. Auxiliary feedwater is supplying water to the steam generators, and secondary steam is being dumped to atmosphere because the main steam isolation valves were manually closed. There has been no history of steam generator tube leakage. Offsite power is available, and the emergency diesel generators are running unloaded at this time.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify Kewaunee County, and Manitowoc County, and the state.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35715
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RONALD GIULIANI
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RONALD GIULIANI
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 05/14/1999
Notification Time: 10:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 07:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/1999
Notification Time: 10:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 07:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 4 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FROM 4% POWER DUE TO A LEVEL TRANSIENT ASSOCIATED WITH A FEED REGULATING VALVE MALFUNCTION
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"While in steady state conditions of 4% [reactor] power and 34" reactor level [at] 0723 [CDT], the [motor-driven reactor feed pump] feed regulating valve (1FW004) malfunctioned causing a level excursion to [approximately] 42". This level transient was controlled by [manually] isolating feedwater to the reactor vessel. Reactor level returned to [approximately] 30"[, and at approximately] 0738 [CDT], feedwater was reestablished to the vessel. As reactor feed was established, the transient was not able to be controlled and level increased. [At] 0752 [CDT], the motor-driven reactor feed pump tripped on a level 8 signal [when level reached 52"], and the reactor mode switch was then manually placed into the [shutdown] position. This caused a reactor scram. All rods fully inserted. All systems functioned as expected following the scram [with one exception described below]. The plant is in Mode 3 and is proceeding to Mode 4. Feedwater is being supplied to the vessel from the [condensate and condensate booster] system. Reactor pressure is [approximately] 430 psig and is steady. The plant will be cooled down to Mode 4 in a controlled manner using bypass valves and shutdown cooling."
"[Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)] was being tested at the time of the scram. [However,] RCIC did not trip on level 8. This will be investigated. It is possible that the level channels required for this trip did not reach the trip setpoint. RCIC was manually tripped after the scram to control cooldown rate."
The licensee stated that the reactor protection system trip on level 8 was bypassed because the unit was in Mode 2 with the mode switch in the startup position.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to issue a media/press release.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"While in steady state conditions of 4% [reactor] power and 34" reactor level [at] 0723 [CDT], the [motor-driven reactor feed pump] feed regulating valve (1FW004) malfunctioned causing a level excursion to [approximately] 42". This level transient was controlled by [manually] isolating feedwater to the reactor vessel. Reactor level returned to [approximately] 30"[, and at approximately] 0738 [CDT], feedwater was reestablished to the vessel. As reactor feed was established, the transient was not able to be controlled and level increased. [At] 0752 [CDT], the motor-driven reactor feed pump tripped on a level 8 signal [when level reached 52"], and the reactor mode switch was then manually placed into the [shutdown] position. This caused a reactor scram. All rods fully inserted. All systems functioned as expected following the scram [with one exception described below]. The plant is in Mode 3 and is proceeding to Mode 4. Feedwater is being supplied to the vessel from the [condensate and condensate booster] system. Reactor pressure is [approximately] 430 psig and is steady. The plant will be cooled down to Mode 4 in a controlled manner using bypass valves and shutdown cooling."
"[Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)] was being tested at the time of the scram. [However,] RCIC did not trip on level 8. This will be investigated. It is possible that the level channels required for this trip did not reach the trip setpoint. RCIC was manually tripped after the scram to control cooldown rate."
The licensee stated that the reactor protection system trip on level 8 was bypassed because the unit was in Mode 2 with the mode switch in the startup position.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to issue a media/press release.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35716
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRETT BOISMENER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRETT BOISMENER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/14/1999
Notification Time: 12:49 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/1999
Notification Time: 12:49 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
A CONTRACT SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL.
A CONTRACTOR FULFILLING A SUPERVISOR POSITION WAS STOPPED BY SECURITY PRIOR TO ENTERING THE PROTECTED AREA DUE TO THE ODOR OF ALCOHOL. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS ESCORTED TO FITNESS FOR DUTY WHERE A FOR-CAUSE TEST WAS CONDUCTED. THE TEST RESULTS WERE CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL. THE INDIVIDUAL'S UNESCORTED ACCESS WAS IMMEDIATELY REVOKED. THE INDIVIDUAL'S SUPERVISOR WILL BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM AN IMPACT OF QUALITY AND SAFETY REVIEW OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S WORK. (CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.)
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
A CONTRACTOR FULFILLING A SUPERVISOR POSITION WAS STOPPED BY SECURITY PRIOR TO ENTERING THE PROTECTED AREA DUE TO THE ODOR OF ALCOHOL. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS ESCORTED TO FITNESS FOR DUTY WHERE A FOR-CAUSE TEST WAS CONDUCTED. THE TEST RESULTS WERE CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL. THE INDIVIDUAL'S UNESCORTED ACCESS WAS IMMEDIATELY REVOKED. THE INDIVIDUAL'S SUPERVISOR WILL BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM AN IMPACT OF QUALITY AND SAFETY REVIEW OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S WORK. (CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.)
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35717
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: J. SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: J. SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/14/1999
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 12:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/1999
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 12:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
A FLOOD PATH WAS DISCOVERED BETWEEN THE UNIT 1 TURBINE BUILDING AND CONTROL BUILDING.
Two penetrations between the Three Mile Island Unit 1 Turbine Building (a non-flood protected structure) and the Control Building (a flood protected structure) have been found to allow the free flow of flood waters from the Turbine Building into the Control Building in the event of the maximum predicted flood at Three Mile Island. This is a non-conformance made to the NRC (originally made to the AEC) as documented in Section 2.6.5.i of the Three Mile Island Final Safety Analysis Report.
The flood protection procedure will be modified as soon as possible to require the installation of plugs in the identified flow path in the event of a pending flood. Additionally, a review of the event of the identified condition will be performed in an Licensee Event Report.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
Two penetrations between the Three Mile Island Unit 1 Turbine Building (a non-flood protected structure) and the Control Building (a flood protected structure) have been found to allow the free flow of flood waters from the Turbine Building into the Control Building in the event of the maximum predicted flood at Three Mile Island. This is a non-conformance made to the NRC (originally made to the AEC) as documented in Section 2.6.5.i of the Three Mile Island Final Safety Analysis Report.
The flood protection procedure will be modified as soon as possible to require the installation of plugs in the identified flow path in the event of a pending flood. Additionally, a review of the event of the identified condition will be performed in an Licensee Event Report.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 35718
Rep Org: CITY OF NEW YORK DEPT. HEALTH
Licensee: BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: NEW YORK CITY State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket: Y
NRC Notified By: RICHARD BORRI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: NEW YORK CITY State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket: Y
NRC Notified By: RICHARD BORRI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/14/1999
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/1999
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE EVENT REPORTED BY THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
JEMS SANITATION LOCATED IN LYNDHURST, NEW JERSEY, HAD RECEIVED A SHIPMENT OF MUNICIPAL WASTE WHICH SET OFF THEIR RADIATION DETECTORS. THE MUNICIPAL WASTE IS BEING SHIPPED BACK TO BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER LOCATED IN NEW YORK CITY. THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH WILL INVESTIGATE THIS EVENT. NO FURTHER INFORMATION COULD BE GIVEN BY THE CALLER.
************ HOO NOTE: This event was updated to correct the licensee name and notification names.
THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
JEMS SANITATION LOCATED IN LYNDHURST, NEW JERSEY, HAD RECEIVED A SHIPMENT OF MUNICIPAL WASTE WHICH SET OFF THEIR RADIATION DETECTORS. THE MUNICIPAL WASTE IS BEING SHIPPED BACK TO BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER LOCATED IN NEW YORK CITY. THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH WILL INVESTIGATE THIS EVENT. NO FURTHER INFORMATION COULD BE GIVEN BY THE CALLER.
************ HOO NOTE: This event was updated to correct the licensee name and notification names.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 35769
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF ENVIRO.
Licensee: CARROLL COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: State: MD
County: CARROLL
License #: MD-13-001-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEON RACHUBA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: CARROLL COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: State: MD
County: CARROLL
License #: MD-13-001-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEON RACHUBA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/26/1999
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/1999
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
"On May 26, 1999. I conducted an investigation of the Iodine-125 brachytherapy seeds which were reported as leaking in a letter dated May 14, 1999 from the licensee's radiation safety officer, Richard Haar, M.D. The letter was faxed to this office on May 18, 1999 along with an analysis report from Krueger-Gilbert Health Physics, Inc., dated May 14. 1999. Copies of the letter and the report are attached.
"The investigation was conducted with Ms. Gina Sebald, Assistant Administrative Director, Radiology and nuclear medicine technicians Messrs. Michael Robertson and Joseph Shaw. Mr. Robertson informed the inspector that following an Iodine-125 prostate seed implant on May 10, 1999, an unused pre-loaded cartridge of I-125 seeds obtained from Amersham was unloaded according to the licensee's protocol in the Nuclear Medicine Hot Lab. The cartridge contained ten seeds which were all removed and placed in a lead pig for storage. The cartridge was then surveyed with a sodium iodide detector to confirm that all of the seeds had been removed and the readings obtained were above background. Mr. Robertson then visually inspected the seeds and saw that one of the seeds was damaged. A wipe sample taken from the seeds also showed a count rate higher than expected. Spectral analysis showed a discernable photopeak in the range of 23 to 41 keV. The radiation safety officer. Dr. Richard Haar, was immediately notified and Krueger-Gilbert was asked to help quantify the licensee's data. Krueger-Gilbert's testing was done on May 14, 1999 and showed removable activity of 0.007 microcuries.
"The ten seeds in question were subsequently returned to Amersham on May 25, 1999. Three other seeds from a different cartridge of ten seeds used in the same implant were unused and were placed in a lead pig to be held for decay prior to disposal by the licensee. The lead pig is kept in the hot lab behind an L-block shield. A copy of the report covering the disposition of the seeds is attached.
"Mr. Robertson said he was told by Krueger-Gilbert that Bio-assays were not necessary due to the low activity involved.
"The weekly wipe survey of the hot lab conducted by the licensee on May 15, 1999 showed no contamination of the area.
"Independent measurements were taken by the inspector with an Eberline Pulse Ratemeter PRM--6, s/n 1239, calibrated on September 1, 1998, using an LEG probe. No contamination was found."
"The investigation was conducted with Ms. Gina Sebald, Assistant Administrative Director, Radiology and nuclear medicine technicians Messrs. Michael Robertson and Joseph Shaw. Mr. Robertson informed the inspector that following an Iodine-125 prostate seed implant on May 10, 1999, an unused pre-loaded cartridge of I-125 seeds obtained from Amersham was unloaded according to the licensee's protocol in the Nuclear Medicine Hot Lab. The cartridge contained ten seeds which were all removed and placed in a lead pig for storage. The cartridge was then surveyed with a sodium iodide detector to confirm that all of the seeds had been removed and the readings obtained were above background. Mr. Robertson then visually inspected the seeds and saw that one of the seeds was damaged. A wipe sample taken from the seeds also showed a count rate higher than expected. Spectral analysis showed a discernable photopeak in the range of 23 to 41 keV. The radiation safety officer. Dr. Richard Haar, was immediately notified and Krueger-Gilbert was asked to help quantify the licensee's data. Krueger-Gilbert's testing was done on May 14, 1999 and showed removable activity of 0.007 microcuries.
"The ten seeds in question were subsequently returned to Amersham on May 25, 1999. Three other seeds from a different cartridge of ten seeds used in the same implant were unused and were placed in a lead pig to be held for decay prior to disposal by the licensee. The lead pig is kept in the hot lab behind an L-block shield. A copy of the report covering the disposition of the seeds is attached.
"Mr. Robertson said he was told by Krueger-Gilbert that Bio-assays were not necessary due to the low activity involved.
"The weekly wipe survey of the hot lab conducted by the licensee on May 15, 1999 showed no contamination of the area.
"Independent measurements were taken by the inspector with an Eberline Pulse Ratemeter PRM--6, s/n 1239, calibrated on September 1, 1998, using an LEG probe. No contamination was found."