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Event Notification Report for May 09, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/08/1999 - 05/09/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
35695

Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35695
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/09/1999
Notification Time: 20:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/1999
Event Time: 16:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
Event Text
NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4-HOUR REPORT

AT 1645 ON 05/09/99, DURING A PRESSURE DECAY TEST OF THE #1 AUTOCLAVE IN THE X-342 BUILDING, A LIGHT DUSTING OF UO2F2 WAS OBSERVED INSIDE THE AUTOCLAVE, AND A HEAVIER ACCUMULATION OF UO2F2 WAS OBSERVED ON THE PRESSURE DECAY FILTER USED TO PREVENT URANIUM FROM ENTERING THE AUTOCLAVE DURING THIS TEST. THE AUTOCLAVE WAS PLACED IN A CONTAINMENT MODE ISOLATING IT FROM ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS. HEALTH PHYSICS TECHNICIANS PERFORMED CONTAMINATION AND AIRBORNE SAMPLING, AND ALL SAMPLES WERE LESS THAN DETECTABLE LIMITS. HAVING URANIUM INSIDE THE SHELL OF THE AUTOCLAVE IS A LOSS OF ONE CONTROL OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE CONTAINED IN NCSA_342A002. THE ACCUMULATION OF UO2F2 ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE PRESSURE DECAY FILTER IS NOT EXPECTED. ADDITIONAL EVALUATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED AT THIS TIME.

THERE IS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. THIS EVENT DOES NOT PRESENT ANY IMMINENT DANGER OF A CRITICALITY.

THE AUTOCLAVE HAS BEEN ISOLATED FROM ALL POTENTIAL MODERATOR SOURCES, SO CRITICALITY IS NOT POSSIBLE. MODERATION, ENRICHMENT, AND GEOMETRY PARAMETERS WERE MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT. THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF URANIUM INSIDE THE AUTOCLAVE SHELL AND OUTSIDE OF THE UF6 CYLINDER WAS A LOST PARAMETER. THE AUTOCLAVE WAS TAGGED TO PREVENT ANY OPERATION UNTIL RECOVERY PLANS ARE DEVELOPED.

THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL.

***UPDATE ON 05/13/99 AT 2248 EDT FROM J. CASTLE TAKEN BY MACKINNON***

REVISION TO THE NCS ANOMALOUS CONDITIONS INCIDENT REPORT (NSI-99-02603 REV. 1) IDENTIFIES THAT THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF U-235 THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED IN THE AUTOCLAVE WAS 755.2 GRAMS. THIS AMOUNT OF U-235 IS LESS THAN THE ALWAYS SAFE MASS OF 800 GRAMS FOR 5% ENRICHED MATERIAL AND IS WELL BELOW THE SUBCRITICAL LIMIT OF 1640 GRAMS AT 5% ENRICHMENT. THIS INCIDENT REPRESENTS A DEGRADATION IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY FOR THE MASS CONTROL PARAMETER BUT DID NOT RESULT IN A LOSS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY BASED ON THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF MATERIAL POTENTIALLY LOST.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: THE EVENT RESULTED IN A DUSTING OF URANIUM INSIDE THE AUTOCLAVE (A/C) SHELL AS WELL AS URANIUM ON THE PRESSURE DECAY FILTER. THE MAXIMUM CREDIBLE AMOUNT OF U-235 RELEASED INSIDE THE A/C WAS CALCULATED BY ENGINEERING TO BE 755.2 GRAMS OF U-235 BASED ON ASSUMING THE ENTIRE AVAILABLE UF6 PIPING VOLUME AND PRESSURE DECAY FILTER VOLUME WERE FILLED WITH URANIUM AT MAXIMUM DENSITY PRIOR TO THE EVENT. THIS IS LESS THAN THE SAFE MASS OF 800 GRAMS U-235 AT 5% ENRICHMENT AND MUCH LESS THAN THE SUBCRITICAL MASS LIMIT OF 1,640 GRAMS OF U-235. THEREFORE, A CRITICALITY COULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT THE ADDITION OF MORE MASS AND MODERATION TO THE AUTOCLAVE. BOTH ADDITIONS ARE UNLIKELY AS THE AUTOCLAVE IS SHUTDOWN AND ISOLATED, PENDING CLEANUP. THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE WAS, THEREFORE, STILL MET FOLLOWING THIS EVENT.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): A CRITICALITY WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF MORE THAN 300 lbs OF WATER IS ADDED TO THE AUTOCLAVE. THE AUTOCLAVE HAS BEEN ISOLATED FROM ALL POTENTIAL MODERATOR SOURCES. AT LEAST 885 GRAMS OF U-235 WOULD NEED TO BE ADDED TO THE AUTOCLAVE IN ADDITION TO AT LEAST 300 POUNDS OF WATER IN ORDER FOR A CRITICALITY TO BE POSSIBLE IN THE AUTOCLAVE GEOMETRY. THE AUTOCLAVE HAS BEEN ISOLATED FROM ALL POTENTIAL SOURCES OF MODERATION AND URANIUM. MODERATION AND ENRICHMENT CONTROL WERE MAINTAINED, AND ALSO, GEOMETRY OF THE PRESSURE DECAY FILTER WAS MAINTAINED.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: THE PRESENCE OF UO2F2 INSIDE THE AUTOCLAVE SHELL IN AN AMOUNT LESS THAN A SAFE MASS REPRESENTS A DEGRADATION IN ONE OF THE TWO CONTROLS FOR DOUBLE CONTINGENCY, BUT IT DOES NOT REPRESENT A COMPLETE LOSS OF THAT CONTROL. TWO UNLIKELY, INDEPENDENT AND CONCURRENT EVENTS WOULD STILL NEED TO OCCUR IN ORDER FOR A CRITICALITY TO BE POSSIBLE IN THE AUTOCLAVE.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: AT 1805 HOURS ON 05/09/99, THE AUTOCLAVE WAS DANGER TAGGED TO PREVENT ANY OPERATION UNTIL RECOVERY PLANS ARE DEVELOPED.

THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER. THE NMSS EO (JOE HOLONICH) AND R3DO (ROGER LANKSBURY) WERE NOTIFIED BY THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER.