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Event Notification Report for May 05, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/04/1999 - 05/05/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
3568535683356783568035681356763567535759

Power Reactor
Event Number: 35685
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4     State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 05/06/1999
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
BILL JONES (R4)
VERN HOGE (FAX) (NRR)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT A MANUFACTURING DEFECT IS PRESENT ON SOME OF THE POTTER AND BRUMFIELD (P&B) RELAYS THEY HAVE AT THE SITE.

SIXTEEN P&B RELAYS, MODEL KUP93-14A32-120, WERE SUPPLIED IN LOT #913501 BY THE VENDOR AS COMMERCIAL GRADE ITEMS AND WERE DEDICATED FOR NUCLEAR SERVICE AT SAN ONOFRE. THE LICENSEE'S LAB ANALYSIS OF FOUR OF THESE RELAYS DETERMINED THE CONTACT PADS WERE INSUFFICIENTLY WELDED TO THEIR CONTACT ARMS AND COULD BECOME DETACHED. BASED ON THEIR REVIEW OF RELAY FAILURE HISTORY, THE LICENSEE CONCLUDED THE INSUFFICIENT CONTACT PAD WELDING IS LIMITED TO LOT #913501.

THESE RELAYS HAVE BEEN REPLACED WITH NEW P&B RELAYS WHICH HAVE THE CONTACT PADS RIVETED TO THEIR CONTACT ARM, THUS PRECLUDING ANY CONTACT DETACHMENT.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35683
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: JEFF CASTLE
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 05/06/1999
Notification Time: 09:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/1999
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2)(iii) - REDUNDANT EQUIP INOP
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
FRED COMBS (NMSS)
Event Text
DISCOVERY OF TWO INOPERABLE ADJACENT SMOKEHEADS (24-hour report - Safety Equipment Failure)

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:

"On 05/05/99 at 1430 hours, it was discovered that two adjacent smokeheads (S13 and S14) in [the] X-330 building 31-3-1 cell housing were not operable. The second smokehead in 31-3-1 (S13) was not declared inoperable at the time of failure resulting in a violation of TSR 2.2.3.3 and a failure to enter the [limiting condition for operation (LCO)] required by TSR 2.2.3.3, action A.1. The LCO was not entered as required on 05/02/99 at 1132 hours. The second smokehead (S13) was declared inoperable on 05/03/99 at 0828 hours at which time a smoke watch was stationed, and TSR compliance was established. Smokehead S14 was repaired and declared operable on 05/03/99 at 1330 hours at which time the LCO was exited (50% coverage was restored)."

"There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."

Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and the Department of Energy site representative.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35678
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRIS ORR
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/05/1999
Notification Time: 12:01 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/1999
Event Time: 04:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
CHRIS CHRISTENSEN (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER MAINTENANCE

The plant is being shutdown to Hot Shutdown (Mode 4) to perform maintenance on the assured source piping for the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The piping is biologically fouled and was reported in event notification #35670. The maintenance required will be pipe cleaning which will necessitate the shutdown of each train. Only one train will be done at a time, leaving only one train available for operation which is only allowed per the technical specifications in Mode 4 or below. The plant will remain in Mode 4 until the systems are restored to full operation. Unit 1 is defueled at this time, so there is no impact on its present operation.

At 1130 EDT, the licensee determined that a 1-hour report had not been made earlier (within 1-hour of the determination of the required shutdown) and made this notification at 1201 EDT.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35680
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG GOMEZ
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/05/1999
Notification Time: 19:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/1999
Event Time: 15:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES LINVILLE (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 97 Power Operation 94 Power Operation
Event Text
TURBINE POWER RUNBACK SIGNAL FROM REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM

The unit received a runback signal from Overpower Delta T channels 3 and 4 for 1.2 sec, during which time turbine reference power decreased from 90.7% to 90.3%. Actual turbine load was manually reduced to lower reactor power to 94% for increased margin to the runback. I&C personnel are investigating why the signal actuated as there is no readily apparent reason.

This report is required per the unit's procedures.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the Public Service Commission for the State of New York.

* * * UPDATE 1049EDT ON 5/27/99 FROM KEVIN McLAUGHLIN TO S.SANDIN * * *

THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS REPORT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

"Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) is retracting this event notification. A turbine runback signal was listed in the unit's procedures as an RPS signal. Upon further review, a turbine runback is not an RPS signal, and was erroneously listed as such in the unit's procedures. The procedure has been revised to delete a turbine runback as an RPS signal. Therefore, the licensee has concluded that the event is not reportable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction by the licensee."

NOTIFIED R1DO(CONTE).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35681
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CALVIN WARD
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/05/1999
Notification Time: 20:16 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/1999
Event Time: 17:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHRIS CHRISTENSEN (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE DETERMINED TO BLOCK BOTH SIAS ACTUATION CHANNELS

"During performance of a monthly surveillance of the Safety Injection Actuation System (SIAS) circuitry at St. Lucie Unit 2, a licensed Senior Operator questioned the acceptability of procedure steps which blocked both actuation channel of SIAS.

"The licensed Senior Operator ordered the surveillance testing secured pending a plant technical review and verification of his conclusion that both SIAS actuation channels were blocked simultaneously by the surveillance procedure. Technical review of the procedure confirmed that both SIAS actuation channels were simultaneously blocked for brief periods (less than 1 minute) during the surveillance as currently written.

"This surveillance has been performed in a similar manner for a long period of time on both St. Lucie Units 1 and 2. The surveillance procedure will be revised such that only one SIAS channel will be blocked at any one time.

"The SIAS actuation circuitry is currently operable on both St. Lucie Units 1 and 2. "

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35676
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2     State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWIN URQUHART
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 05/05/1999
Notification Time: 09:21 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/1999
Event Time: 07:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - RPS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRIS CHRISTENSEN (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 98 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
A GENERATOR TRIP FOR UNKNOWN REASONS RESULTED IN A TURBINE TRIP AND SUBSEQUENT AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM.

At 0748, the main generator tripped for unknown reasons. The generator trip caused a main turbine trip on power load unbalance, and the turbine trip caused an automatic reactor scram from 98% power because the reactor was at a power level of greater than 30%. All control rods fully inserted, and all systems functioned as required. Nine of eleven safety relief valves opened due to the expected high pressure when the main turbine tripped, and all of these valves properly reseated. The recirculation pumps also tripped as expected based on opening of the EOC/RPT (end of cycle/recirculation pump trip) breakers because the unit was at a power level of greater than 30%. The main steam isolation valves remained open. There were no emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or engineered safety feature actuations, and none were required. Narrow range level decreased to +8 inches, and the first ECCS injection setpoint is -35 inches narrow range. Normal level is +37 inches narrow range.

The unit is currently stable in Hot Shutdown. Condensate is supplying water to the reactor vessel, and steam is being bypassed to the condenser. The recirculation pumps have been restarted. Containment parameters are normal. Offsite power is available, and the emergency diesel generators are operable if needed.

The cause of the main generator trip is currently under investigation.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35675
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG SOSSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 05/05/1999
Notification Time: 04:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/1999
Event Time: 02:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES LINVILLE (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
ISOLATION OF THE 'B' LOOP DRYWELL CHILLED WATER INBOARD SUPPLY AND RETURN VALVES DURING PERFORMANCE OF A SPECIAL PROCEDURE TO DEENERGIZE A SAFEGUARDS BUS

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"On 05/05/99 at 0200 hours, it was discovered that an [engineered safety feature (ESF)] actuation occurred on the Unit 2 Drywell Chilled Water (DWCW) system. This isolation occurred at approximately 2300 on 05/02/99 during performance of a special procedure to deenergize the D22 safeguards bus."

"With Unit 2 in OPCON 5, the 'B' loop DWCW inboard supply and return valves HV-087-222 and HV-087-223 isolated when the power supply to an interposing relay was deenergized per a special procedure on 05/02/99. This special procedure did not properly address the valve closure. During this special procedure, power was later removed from both valves. This removed control room indication of their position, and their closure was not immediately detected. Later, station personnel observed increasing drywell temperatures. The follow-up investigation revealed the isolation valves were closed by local verification."

"Additional investigation found several containment atmosphere sample valves and primary containment instrument gas [primary containment isolation valves] that also closed during the loss of power. These conditions were also expected but not properly documented in the special procedure."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

***RETRACTION ON 05/14/99 AT 1643 EDT FROM DAVID NEFF TAKEN BY MACKINNON***

A review of the closure of two primary containment isolation valves has concluded that the event did not involve a valid ESF actuation signal and that the equipment affected did not involve the minimum actuation logic for the isolation control system. Therefore, an ESF actuation did not occur.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this retraction by the licensee. The R1DO (John Caruso) was notified by the NRC operations officer.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 35759
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: MARYLAND LABORATORY ADMINISTRATION
Region: 1
City: BALTIMORE   State: MD
County:
License #: MD 07-040-04
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALAN JACOBSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/24/1999
Notification Time: 09:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
PETER ESELGROTH (R1)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
Event Text
MISSING RADIOACTIVE LIQUID REAGENT CONTAINING 80 MICROCURIES OF IODINE-125

Sometime between May 3rd and May 5th, 80 µCi of Iodine-125 was discovered missing from the walk in freezer in the Neonatal Hypothyroidism Lab in the Maryland Lab Administration Building. The I-125 was in 10 bottles of 8 µCi each and in the form of a liquid used as a tracer reagent. It is unknown whether the I-125 was stolen or disposed of and it is still being investigated at this time. The Department of General Services Police were notified and are part of the investigation.

This constitutes minimal threat to the general public.