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Event Notification Report for May 04, 1999

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/03/1999 - 05/04/1999

EVENT NUMBERS
356723567335674356693567035679

Power Reactor
Event Number: 35672
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1     State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ERIC OLSON
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/04/1999
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/1999
Event Time: 16:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
JAMES LINVILLE (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 80 Power Operation 80 Power Operation
Event Text
HPCI AND RCIC DIFFERENCES FOUND BETWEEN DESIGN BASIS AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

"During license design-basis reconstitution efforts it was discovered that the specific values in the PNPS TS for HPCI and RCIC operability testing are not in accordance with the plant design. In accordance with the TS, the HPCI System is tested to ensure the HPCI pump can deliver at least 4,250 gpm for a system head corresponding to a reactor pressure of 1,000 to 150 psig. The RCIC test requirement is that RCIC shall deliver at least 400 gpm for a system head corresponding to a reactor pressure of 1,000 to 150 psig. The applicable Tech Spec Sections are 3.5.C for HPCI and 3.5.D for RCIC.

"The design requirement of HPCI and RCIC is to achieve 4,250 gpm and 400 gpm, respectively, for a reactor pressure corresponding to the Safety Relief Valve (SRV) setpoint. Currently, the SRV upper setpoint limit is 1,115 +/-11 psig. Therefore, the corresponding discharge pressure of the pumps shall be that required to achieve the required flow rate at the given reactor vessel pressure (1,126 psig) taking into account system head loss, elevation changes, lowering level in the CST or suction taken from the torus and instrument setpoint error. For both HPCI and RCIC, this pressure should be approximately 1,243 psig (slightly less for RCIC due to lower head loss from the lower flow criteria).

"Both the HPCI and RCIC systems are considered operable per Operability Evaluation #99-024 and #99-025. This is a verbal evaluation based on engineering judgement that there is sufficient horsepower available to achieve the design parameters of both systems and that, [during] past testing, the actual values have, in fact, been achieved. However, the systems have not been tested to the design values on a periodic (quarterly) test basis. During a normal surveillance test of HPCI on 03/13/98, the HPCI discharge pressure was 1,260 psig. During startup testing, the RCIC system was tested to 1,280 psig discharge pressure."

The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35673
Facility: COOK
Region: 3     State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DONALD KOSLOFF
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/04/1999
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/1999
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - DEG/UNANALYZED COND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
Event Text
SI THROTTLE VALVES CAVITATION DURING LOCA COULD LEAD TO FAILURE OF SI PUMPS.

"On March 27, 1999, engineering personnel investigating NRC Information Notice 97-76 concluded that a preliminary flow analysis indicated that six Unit 1 safety injection (SI) throttle valves could experience cavitation during a LOCA. As a result of that conclusion, SI throttle valve #1-SI-121S was radiographed to determine its position. On April 8, 1999, a review of the radiograph indicated that the valve was about 43 percent open. The
radiograph also showed indications of possible erosion of the valve that could have been caused by cavitation. Valve cavitation during a LOCA could cause the valves to allow excessive flow, leading to SI pump runout and subsequent failure of the SI pumps. Valve #1-SI-141L1 was also radiographed and determined to be 27 percent open.

"A fax from the valve vendor indicated that SI throttle valves that were less than 32 percent open may not be capable of allowing passage of sump debris of the expected maximum size, 0.25 inch diameter. Several of the
valves may be less than 32 percent open. This condition could restrict SI flow to the reactor coolant system during a LOCA.

"On May 4, 1999, during continuing evaluation of the above conditions, plant personnel determined that the conditions were reportable. Both conditions may also exist in Unit 2. Both Units are currently in Mode 5. Evaluation of these conditions, including determination of the need for physical modification, is ongoing, and the conditions will be resolved prior to startup of the units."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35674
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: KURT SISLER
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 05/04/1999
Notification Time: 23:52 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/1999
Event Time: 13:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
Event Text
VALID SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION OF AN OVERHEAD CRANE HOIST BRAKE RESULTING IN A FULL, 10-TON, UF6 CYLINDER BEING SUSPENDED ABOVE THE AUTOCLAVE ROLLERS IN THE X-343 BUILDING

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth:

"On May 04, 1999, at 1350 hours, during removal of a full, 10-ton, UF6 cylinder from autoclave #5, the hoist on the North overhead crane stopped due to an actuation of the hoist brake caused by a power failure. The hoist brake did perform its design function upon this loss of power. This power failure resulted in the cylinder being suspended approximately 1 foot above the autoclave rollers. Procedure XP2-TE-TE5030 steps were implemented, and after the power breaker was reset, the cylinder was lowered within the confines of the autoclave, and the North crane was declared inoperable."

"This event is being categorized and reported as a valid actuation of a 'Q' Safety System in accordance with Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.9 (24-hour report)."

"There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."

Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and the Department of Energy site representative. (Call the NRC operations officer for a site contact telephone number.)


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35669
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2     State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GRADY PICKLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/04/1999
Notification Time: 10:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/1999
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) - UNANALYZED COND OP
Person (Organization):
AL BELISLE (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
MECHANICAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR PORV OPERATION WERE DISCOVERED AND CORRECTED.

On March 14, 1999, McGuire Nuclear Station identified mechanical problems with one Unit 2 Steam Generator Power-Operated Relief Valve (PORV). A similar problem was identified with another Unit 2 Steam Generator PORV on March 20, 1999. On May 3, 1999, it was determined that, as a result of the observed mechanical problems, both of the affected Unit 2 Steam Generator PORVs were inoperable for a period of time greater than allowed by McGuire Technical Specification 3.7.4. This condition affected the ability of the PORVs to operate in manual. Manual operation of the PORVs is credited in mitigation of design basis accidents. Consequently, on May 4, 1999, at 0930 hours it was determined that this issue was reportable as a 1-hour Unanalyzed Condition event.

The mechanical problem discussed above is that a pin is used to connect the handwheel to the shaft that operates a Steam Generator PORV valve. It was found that the pin for operation of two of the Steam Generator PORV valves was inserted into the handwheel, but the pin was not inserted far enough to go into the shaft. Therefore, the handwheel would have turned, but the shaft going to the PORV would not have turned. The licensee has corrected this problem, and an investigation of Unit 1 did not find this type of problem.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 35670
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL RUDY
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/04/1999
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/1999
Event Time: 12:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
CHRIS CHRISTENSEN (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 8 Power Operation 8 Power Operation
Event Text
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER DECLARED INOPERABLE (Refer to event #35678 for additional information.)

All Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumps have been declared inoperable, including the #2A and #2B motor-driven and the #2 turbine-driven AFW Pumps.

"The suction piping to the [AFW] System from the Nuclear Service Water System was discovered to have excessive fouling that resulted in the AFW system being outside its design basis. Engineering analysis determined that under certain accident scenarios involving AFW system runout flow, there is inadequate suction pressure to assure AFW pump operability. The turbine-driven AFW pump has been isolated as an interim
compensatory measure. This action reduces the system runout flow which should increase the suction pressure to the two remaining motor-driven AFW pumps sufficiently to assure pump operability. Engineering analysis is in progress to verify the adequacy of this action. The affected piping will be cleaned which will ultimately correct the problem."

Unit 2 will remain at its present power level until the engineering analysis is complete and corrective actions are determined to be adequate.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35679
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3     State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 05/05/1999
Notification Time: 13:08 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/1999
Event Time: 12:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
DON COOL (NMSS)
FRANK CONGEL (IRO)
Event Text
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24-HOUR REPORT, LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROL

"On 05/04/99 at 1210 CDT, while performing a walkdown of C-333 for GEN-10 items, a 'square-to-round process pipe' was discovered which did not have an NCS tagging, posting, or NCSA controls applied. It is believed that this equipment has been exposed to process gas. If the square-to-round contains fissile material, it should have been controlled under GEN-010 or NCSA GEN-20/27. The controls provided in these NCSAs ensure compliance with the double contingency principle. An Nondestructive Analysis has been performed on this equipment with results indicating mass of uranium being much less than the safe mass. However, no NCS controls were applied, double contingency cannot be demonstrated for this equipment, and double contingency was lost.

"This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event in accordance with Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria A.4.a, and Bulletin 91-01, Supplement 1 report.

"PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-99-2568, PGDP Event Report No. PAD-1999-034, Event Worksheet 35679.

"The NRC Senior resident inspector has been notified of this event."

*** UPDATE ON 5/6/99 @ 1401 BY WALKER TO GOULD *** EVENT RETRACTION

AN ASSAY VERIFICATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND IT INDICATES THE MATERIAL ON THE PIPE TO BE NON-FISSILE(.711% wt U). THUS, THE PIPE IS NCS EXEMPT, AND A VIOLATION OF NCS CONTROLS DID NOT OCCUR MAKING A NOTIFICATION TO NRC NOT REQUIRED. THEREFORE, THEY ARE RETRACTING THIS EVENT.

THE RESIDENT HAS BEEN NOTIFIED.

THE REG 3 RDO(PHILLIPS) AND NMSS EO(GREEVES) WERE NOTIFIED.