Event Notification Report for May 03, 1999

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIATION THERAPY SEEDS BURNED

"475 Pd-103 seeds arrived at the licensee's receiving department on Friday, 30 April 99. The package was taken to the radiation therapy section, and the technician says he advised the physicist that the package was in the hall outside the door. The physicist says that he doesn't remember being so advised. Later that day, a janitor stated that she picked up what she assumed was a empty box and placed it in the trash. The package was taken to the county waste facility and incinerated. The package was consumed in the 2,000°F heat, but since palladium does not vaporize until 2,800°F, it should have remained as ash. That small amount of ash diluted in huge bunches of ash was not detected by the waste stream monitor. A state survey of the waste energy facility did not detect any activity. The package was noted missing on 3 May 99, and this office [State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] was so advised. Further action is referred to Material Licensing."

The seeds constituted 666 mCi as of 1200 on 4 May 99.

(Call the NRC operations officer for a contact telephone number.)

ONE HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION LINE DETERMINED NOT TO HAVE FLOW DURING TESTING

"During performance of the 18 month high head charging valve throttle test, it was discovered that the #21 high head cold leg injection line did not pass flow until the other three lines for high head cold leg injection were closed. At that point, an audible indication was heard and flow was observed through the #21 cold leg. All cold leg injection flows were subsequently balanced. The cause of this is under investigation and will be resolved prior to Mode 4."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the local government agencies.

* * * UPDATE AT 1212 ON 6/1/99 BY SIMPSON TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *

On 5/3/99, Salem Unit 2 reported an event concerning a safety injection system cold leg injection line which appeared to not pass flow during the performance in an 18 month surveillance test for flow balancing. The discrepancy appeared to be due to a stuck check valve. At the time of the event it was not known how long the condition had existed thus a 50.72 call was made. The valve in question (21SJ17) was subsequently physically removed from the system and inspected. No failure mode was determined. No evidence was found that the valve had been inoperable for any length of time. These valves do not have a history of negative performance in this application. A review of' industry data did not identify any similar sticking problems, generally the failure reported concerned leakage. Therefore, the guidance of NUREG 1022 applies. This guidance states that the out of service time is calculated using the time of discovery unless there is firm evidence based on a review of relevant information (e.g. the equipment history and cause of failure) to believe the discrepancy existed previously. Based on the time of discovery being the event date, this event is not reportable because the requirements of the Technical Specifications were being met for the current mode of operations and the event is bounded by current design. Further review of the design bases is underway to confirm assumptions.

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The Operations Center informed R1DO (Conte).

SAFETY VALVE INOPERABLE ALARM

The inoperable alarm was received for the '3A Target Rock Safety Valve' which is an indication that the safety function of this valve is inoperable. It is probably a failed bellows, thus replacement of valve will be required. This is a degraded condition per the licensee's reportability manual.

The failure of the safety function puts the unit in a 12 hour to hot shutdown (Mode 3) and 24 hours to cold shutdown (Mode 4) per Technical Specification action statement 3.6.e.1. The plant will stay in Mode 4 until repairs are completed. Actual plant shutdown will commence after all preparations are completed.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

HEADQUARTERS OPERATION CENTER NOTE: NOED was granted to the licensee at 0317 EDT on 05/04/99 to remain at power.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO THREE OUT OF FOUR OVERTEMPERATURE DELTA TEMPERATURE AND OVERPOWER DELTA POWER CHANNELS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE

During calibrations of Protection Channels, it was determined that three out of four Overtemperature and Overpower Delta Channels were inoperable requiring entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 requiring Mode 3 (Hot Standby) within 6 hours (0530 EDT on 05/04/99).

The summer coming out of the Delta Temperature Channels is superimposing an AC ripple on top of the DC output, and depending on whether it is feeding out through an NUS bistable or Foxboro bistable, the Foxboro bistable apparently allows the AC ripple to continue through and cause the Delta Temperature Setpoints to be non-conservative. The licensee did not know when a surveillance test had last been performed on the channels.

All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable. The electrical grid is stable.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.

**** Update on 05/04/99 at 0442 EDT from Dan Berry taken by MacKinnon ****

The licensee exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 0437 EDT when three Channels were declared operable and the fourth channel was defeated (bistables were tripped). Reactor power level was reduced to 21% before Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. The licensee plans to increase reactor power level to between 30 to 35%, at which point, the licensee plans to stabilize reactor power level and repair a steam leak on MSR "2B."

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee. The R1DO (Jim Linville) was notified by the NRC Operations Officer.