Event Notification Report for April 22, 1999

THE PLANT HAD A REACTOR SCRAM ON LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL. (Refer to event numbers 35618 and 35629 for event-related information.)

THE PLANT HAD A REACTOR SCRAM FROM 100% POWER DUE TO A LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL. CAUSE OF THE LOW REACTOR WASTER LEVEL IS UNKNOWN AND BEING INVESTIGATED. ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED, NO ECCS INJECTION OCCURRED, AND NO SAFETY RELIEF VALVES LIFTED. PLANT DID HAVE GROUP 2 AND GROUP 3 ISOLATIONS. THE GROUP 3 ISOLATION HAS BEEN RESET, AND PRESENTLY THEY ARE IN PROGRESS OF RESETTING THE GROUP 2 ISOLATION. THE MAIN CONDENSER IS THE HEAT SINK.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED.

THE LICENSEE DECLARED HPCI INOPERABLE AND ENTERED AN LCO ACTION STATEMENT. (Refer to event numbers 35617 and 35629 for event-related information.)

THE HPCI SYSTEM WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE FROM 0145 TO 0236 DUE TO MOISTURE IN THE TURBINE STEAM INLET LINE. A HPCI TURBINE INLET HIGH DRAIN POT LEVEL ANNUNCIATION WAS RECEIVED AT 0145. RCIC WAS VERIFIED OPERABLE. THE STEAMLINE MANUAL DRAIN VALVE WAS OPENED AND THE DRAIN LINE ANNUNCIATOR CLEARED AT 0236. HPCI WAS DECLARED OPERABLE AND PLACED IN STANDBY.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.

DAMAGED VIAL CONTAINING 0.8 CURIES OF TRITIUM

During repair activities at Fort Drum, New York, in the arms room, an M224 range indicator was apparently damaged. The illuminator was checked working prior to the maintenance and noted not to be working later. The contained vial of tritium, 0.8 Ci, used in the illuminator is assumed to be broken. The device has been double bagged and the area secured until the results of surveys are obtained. Survey results were sent off site as lab facilities are not available on site. Investigation of the event is ongoing, and no further information is available at this time.

POSSIBLE OVERLOAD OF ESF TRANSFORMER IN AN ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE FOUND

While investigating a previous Licensee Event Report concerned with backfeed the following was discovered:
"During a scenario involving a Loss of Off-Site Power resulting from a loss of the BEST and Startup transformers, the Crystal River Unit 3 abnormal operating procedures could have caused an overload of the safety-related Engineered Safeguards 4160V to 480V transformer. Assuming a single failure of the 'B' side diesel generator, power could have been unavailable to both trains of 480V Engineered safeguards loads. This condition is considered reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(l)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) as a condition outside of the design basis of the plant. Loads have been identified which can be administratively maintained off during this scenario to avoid the overload condition, and therefore, the transformer is operable."

This condition is under investigation and further actions will be forthcoming.

The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

**** UPDATE ON 05/07/99 AT 2311 BY RAWLS TO GOULD **** EVENT RETRACTION

THE LICENSEE AND ABB POWER T&D CO, INC HAVE EVALUATED POSSIBLE OVERLOAD CONDITIONS OF THE "A" 4160/480V TRANSFORMER DURING A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER WITH THE LOSS OF THE "B" BATTERY SCENARIO. THE RESULTS OF THE EVALUATIONS SHOW THAT THE CLASS 1E TRANSFORMER AND COMPONENTS WILL PERFORM THEIR DESIGNED FUNCTION FOR LONGER THAN 30 DAYS WITHOUT FAILURE. THE TRANSFORMER WILL SURVIVE LONGER THAN ONE YEAR UNDER THE IDENTIFIED LOAD CONDITIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF ANSI/IEEE C57.96. IN ADDITION, THE NON-CLASS 1E CROSSTIES CIRCUITS TO THE RX AUX BUS 3A/3B ARE LICENSING BASIS REQUIREMENTS AND ARE NOT DESIGN BASIS REQUIREMENTS. THE LICENSEE IS THEREFORE RETRACTING THIS EVENT.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R2DO CHRIS CHRISTENSEN.

24-HOUR REPORT REQUIRED BY FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

"24-hour Report regarding Violation of Operating License NPF-76 for performing Core Alterations in Unit 1 while Containment Equipment Hatch was open.

"In accordance with Technical Specification 3.9.4, Containment Building Penetrations, the equipment hatch must be closed and held in place by at least four bolts during Core Alterations or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

"The South Texas Project Technical Specifications define Core Alterations as the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. The insertion of the incore detector thimbles into the core is considered a Core Alteration.

"It has been determined that during Unit 1 refueling outage 1RE08, between 2100 hours on April 22, 1999, and 0030 hours on April 23, 1999, the incore detector thimbles were inserted into the reactor core after the containment equipment hatch was opened. At this time all fuel assemblies had been reloaded into the reactor core and refueling cavity level had been reduced to permit setting the reactor vessel head.

"This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76 Condition 2.G for operation or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications."

The licensee discovered this occurrence as the result of a review of a Condition Report.
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.