Event Notification Report for April 18, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/17/1999 - 04/18/1999
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35602
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RUSS GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RUSS GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 04/18/1999
Notification Time: 21:08 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/1999
Event Time: 16:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/1999
Notification Time: 21:08 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/1999
Event Time: 16:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
CLOSURE OF THE HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DIESEL GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKER IN RESPONSE TO AN UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION WHEN THE NORMAL SUPPLY BREAKER TRIPPED OPEN
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1647 [CDT], on April 18, 1999, with the plant in Mode 5 (Refueling), the High Pressure Core Spray [(HPCS)] Diesel Generator [(DG)] output breaker closed in response to an undervoltage condition on its safety-related 4.16-kV bus."
"At the time of the event, the HPCS DG was already running, unloaded, as part of a planned test sequence. The undervoltage condition occurred when the normal supply breaker tripped open. The HPCS DG output breaker operated as designed, and the HPCS DG supplied its safety-related bus."
"The HPCS system was inoperable when this event occurred and is not required to be operable in the current plant mode."
"The cause of the trip of the normal supply breaker is not known. [The] plant staff is investigating this event, and the cause will be corrected prior to returning the HPCS system to service."
The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required in response to the undervoltage condition. The licensee also stated that core alterations (fuel shuffle) are in progress.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"At 1647 [CDT], on April 18, 1999, with the plant in Mode 5 (Refueling), the High Pressure Core Spray [(HPCS)] Diesel Generator [(DG)] output breaker closed in response to an undervoltage condition on its safety-related 4.16-kV bus."
"At the time of the event, the HPCS DG was already running, unloaded, as part of a planned test sequence. The undervoltage condition occurred when the normal supply breaker tripped open. The HPCS DG output breaker operated as designed, and the HPCS DG supplied its safety-related bus."
"The HPCS system was inoperable when this event occurred and is not required to be operable in the current plant mode."
"The cause of the trip of the normal supply breaker is not known. [The] plant staff is investigating this event, and the cause will be corrected prior to returning the HPCS system to service."
The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required in response to the undervoltage condition. The licensee also stated that core alterations (fuel shuffle) are in progress.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 35606
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: FRANK CAGE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: FRANK CAGE
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 04/19/1999
Notification Time: 16:54 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/1999
Notification Time: 16:54 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/1999
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
JOHN SURMEIER (NMSS)
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
JOHN SURMEIER (NMSS)
- NRC Bulletin 91-01, 24 hour report: Vacuum hose found wrapped around a HEPA vacuum cleaner -
A HEPA vacuum cleaner was discovered in a containment pan on top of the C-337 Surge Drum Room with the vacuum hose wrapped around it in violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NCSA GEN-04. The purpose of the requirement is to prevent fissile material which may be present inside the hose due to a clog from interacting with the material within the vacuum cleaner. No information is available to indicate the hose is clogged, therefore, it is assumed that it is not clogged. This information was requested, however, the personnel who last used the vacuum was not available.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Double contingency was not maintained because the hose was not adequately spaced from the vacuum. A control which was relied upon for double contingency was violated. If both controls were lost, the configuration would still be subcritical; however, the evaluation does not credit additional controls for double contingency.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
If both controls were lost, the configuration would still be subcritical. For a criticality to be possible, both controls would have to be lost and the vacuum hose would need to be greater than 12 feet in length and the entire hose full of fissile material. Additionally, the hose would have to be wrapped around the vacuum cleaner. The hose in use was less than 12 feet in total length.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
InteractIon.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
Estimated amount of uranium: Less than 80 pounds.
Enrichment: Less than 2.0 wt% U-235.
Form of licensed material: UO2F2.
Process limit: 600 pounds uranium.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE CONTINGENCY:
Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two controls on Interaction.
The first leg of double contingency is based on requiring a clogged vacuum hose to be disconnected from the vacuum and placed in a 5.5 gallon waste drum and handled as waste. Handling the clogged hose as waste will ensure the minimum spacing is observed and limit/control interaction between the hose and vacuum. There is no indication that the hose is clogged; therefore, this control is considered intact.
The second leg of double contingency is based on a control to prevent the hose from being wrapped around the vacuum. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent interaction between the vacuum and other fissile material which may be contained within the hose in the event there is a clog within the hose and the clog is not discovered or properly handled. This control was violated.
Since double contingency was based on two controls on interaction and one control was violated, double contingency was not maintained.
EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS:
The area should be posted with an NCS requirement sign in accordance with CP2-EG-NS1031 which states the following:
- This area contains improperly stored HEPA vacuum hoses.
- Do not move fissile/potentially fissile material into or within this zone without NCS consent.
- Maintain a minimum 2 feet edge-to-edge spacing from any other fissile/potentially fissile material.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Corrective actions will be provided via remediation guide #NCS-RG-99-009.
PGDP Problem Report #ATRC-99-2201; PGDP Event Report #PAD-1999-028; Incident Report #NCS-INC-99-021
This event is being reported as a 24 hour Event Notification as an NRC Bulletin 91-01 Report.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
A HEPA vacuum cleaner was discovered in a containment pan on top of the C-337 Surge Drum Room with the vacuum hose wrapped around it in violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NCSA GEN-04. The purpose of the requirement is to prevent fissile material which may be present inside the hose due to a clog from interacting with the material within the vacuum cleaner. No information is available to indicate the hose is clogged, therefore, it is assumed that it is not clogged. This information was requested, however, the personnel who last used the vacuum was not available.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Double contingency was not maintained because the hose was not adequately spaced from the vacuum. A control which was relied upon for double contingency was violated. If both controls were lost, the configuration would still be subcritical; however, the evaluation does not credit additional controls for double contingency.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
If both controls were lost, the configuration would still be subcritical. For a criticality to be possible, both controls would have to be lost and the vacuum hose would need to be greater than 12 feet in length and the entire hose full of fissile material. Additionally, the hose would have to be wrapped around the vacuum cleaner. The hose in use was less than 12 feet in total length.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
InteractIon.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
Estimated amount of uranium: Less than 80 pounds.
Enrichment: Less than 2.0 wt% U-235.
Form of licensed material: UO2F2.
Process limit: 600 pounds uranium.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE CONTINGENCY:
Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two controls on Interaction.
The first leg of double contingency is based on requiring a clogged vacuum hose to be disconnected from the vacuum and placed in a 5.5 gallon waste drum and handled as waste. Handling the clogged hose as waste will ensure the minimum spacing is observed and limit/control interaction between the hose and vacuum. There is no indication that the hose is clogged; therefore, this control is considered intact.
The second leg of double contingency is based on a control to prevent the hose from being wrapped around the vacuum. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent interaction between the vacuum and other fissile material which may be contained within the hose in the event there is a clog within the hose and the clog is not discovered or properly handled. This control was violated.
Since double contingency was based on two controls on interaction and one control was violated, double contingency was not maintained.
EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS:
The area should be posted with an NCS requirement sign in accordance with CP2-EG-NS1031 which states the following:
- This area contains improperly stored HEPA vacuum hoses.
- Do not move fissile/potentially fissile material into or within this zone without NCS consent.
- Maintain a minimum 2 feet edge-to-edge spacing from any other fissile/potentially fissile material.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Corrective actions will be provided via remediation guide #NCS-RG-99-009.
PGDP Problem Report #ATRC-99-2201; PGDP Event Report #PAD-1999-028; Incident Report #NCS-INC-99-021
This event is being reported as a 24 hour Event Notification as an NRC Bulletin 91-01 Report.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.